FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 7, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
ABRAHAM ADKINS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 08-3250
STEPHEN N. SIX, Attorney General (D.C. No. 07-CV-3211-JTM)
for the State of Kansas, (D. Kan.)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before BRISCOE, MURPHY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
Abraham Adkins, a former Kansas state prisoner proceeding pro se,
requests a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s denial
of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. 1 We deny a COA and dismiss this
matter.
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
1
The fact that Adkins is no longer in custody does not moot his petition
because he was in custody at the time of filing. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S.
1, 7 (1998) (holding the custody requirement in the habeas statute only requires
that the petitioner be in custody at the time the petition was filed).
I
On June 6, 2001, Kansas City, Kansas police stopped a car in which Adkins
was a passenger. Although the driver consented to a search of the car, Adkins
refused to get out of the car. After police removed Adkins from the car, an
officer discovered some bags on the car seat where Adkins was sitting. The bags
contained substances that tests would later identify as marijuana and cocaine.
Adkins was charged with possession of marijuana and cocaine in violation
of Kansas law. A jury convicted Adkins on both charges. The state court
sentenced Adkins to 52 months’ incarceration on the cocaine charge and 12
months’ incarceration for the marijuana charge. The sentences ran concurrently.
Adkins appealed his state conviction, challenging the instructions the court
gave to the jury and the sufficiency of the evidence. On June 6, 2003, the Kansas
Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction on both counts, noting that the
possession instruction given to the jury was, and remained, an accurate statement
of Kansas law. On September 23, 2003, the Kansas Supreme Court denied
Adkins’ petition for review.
On March 19, 2004, Adkins filed an application for state post-conviction
relief. Adkins advanced three arguments: (1) counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to object to the possession instruction; (2) counsel provided
ineffective assistance because Adkins was intoxicated and unable to make sound
judgments regarding his defense; and (3) the trial court erred by failing to give a
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proper possession instruction. The state district court denied Adkins’ petition on
April 22, 2005. Adkins abandoned his intoxication claim, but appealed the state
district court’s denial of the remainder of his claims. On November 3, 2006, the
Kansas Court of Appeals held that Adkins could not establish ineffective
assistance of counsel because Adkins’ counsel did not perform below a
reasonably objective standard, again noting that the possession instruction given
to the jury was, and remained, an accurate statement of Kansas law. The Kansas
Court of Appeals also rejected Adkins’ ineffective assistance claims because
Adkins could not show prejudice. The Kansas Supreme Court denied his petition
for review on February 13, 2007.
On August 16, 2007, Adkins filed a pro se petition for federal habeas relief
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Adkins’ petition identified three grounds for relief:
(1) the trial court clearly erred by failing to instruct the jury properly on
“possession,” “constructive possession,” and “nonexclusive possession”—R. Vol.
I, Doc. 1 at 6; (2) the Kansas Court of Appeals erred by finding that Adkins could
not show prejudice; and (3) his counsel was ineffective for not requesting a
proper possession instruction.
On August 27, 2008, the district court denied Adkins’ petition. On
September 8, 2008, Adkins filed a notice of appeal. Adkins was paroled the next
day, September 9, 2008. On October 31, 2008, Adkins filed a motion for issuance
of a COA.
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II
Issuance of a COA is jurisdictional. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
336 (2003). In other words, a state prisoner may appeal from the denial of federal
habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only if the district court or this court first
issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A COA may be issued “only if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make that showing, a prisoner must demonstrate “that
reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III
Adkins seeks a COA with respect to four issues related to the challenged
jury instructions. First, Adkins argues that his counsel was ineffective by failing
to inform Adkins of the right to object to the possession instruction. Second,
Adkins asserts that counsel’s failure to object to the possession instruction
indicates ineffective assistance of counsel and structural error. Third, Adkins
argues that the trial court erred by giving the possession instruction. Fourth,
Adkins argues that the trial court also erred by failing to properly define
possession in the jury instructions.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that Adkins’ arguments fail to
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satisfy the standards for issuance of a COA. Claims of erroneous jury
instructions can result in the setting aside of a state conviction on habeas review
only if “the errors had the effect of rendering the trial so fundamentally unfair as
to cause a denial of a fair trial in the constitutional sense, or is otherwise
constitutionally objectionable as, for example, by transgressing the
constitutionally rooted presumption of innocence.” Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d
839, 854 (10th Cir. 1979) (internal citations omitted). Here, the challenged jury
instruction stated, “As used in these instructions ‘possession’ means: Having
control over a place or thing with knowledge of and the intent to have such
control.” R. Vol. V at 81. The Kansas Court of Appeals found that this jury
instruction accurately stated applicable law. No reasonable jurist could disagree.
This conclusion also resolves the ineffective assistance of counsel
arguments. As the district court properly noted, for Adkins to be entitled to
habeas relief, he must show that the state courts’ determinations regarding
counsel’s effectiveness were contrary to or unreasonably applied Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In this context, the Kansas Court of Appeals
applied the Kansas Supreme Court’s adoption of the Strickland two-pronged
standard in Chamberlain v. State, 694 P.2d 468, 475 (Kan. 1985). Under this
framework, Adkins must show that “counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness” and that there is “a reasonable probability
[that] the decision challenged would have been different had he received effective
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assistance.” Chamberlain, 694 P.2d at 473–74 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690,
695). The Kansas Court of Appeals determined that because the jury instruction
was proper, Adkins could not show that his counsel’s performance was below a
reasonably objective standard or that counsel’s performance prejudiced his
defense. No reasonable jurist could conclude that Adkins was denied his right to
effective assistance of counsel.
IV
The application for COA is denied and the matter is dismissed.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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