FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 5, 2009
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 08-2070
HILARIO CORNEJO-SANDOVAL,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. 1:06-cr-00265-WJ-1)
Brian Pori, Inocenté, P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant.
Laura Fashing, Assistant United States Attorney (Gregory J. Fouratt, United States
Attorney, with her on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before McCONNELL, HOLLOWAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Hilario Cornejo-Sandoval appeals his conviction, alleging
violations of his procedural and substantive due process rights. Specifically,
Defendant contends the district court erred by (1) failing to order a second
competency hearing during trial based on Defendant’s unusual behavior, and
(2) allowing him to be tried and convicted while incompetent. Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I.
.
In late 2005, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement opened an
investigation based on information provided by Barbaro Veloz, a/k/a “El Pequeño”
(“The Little One”), a confidential informant. Veloz reported that Defendant, a/k/a
“El Sapo” (“The Toad”), had the ability to procure kilogram quantities of cocaine.
Eventually, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) authorities in New Mexico
took the lead role in the investigation because the transaction was to take place there.
After numerous delays, on January 24, 2006, Veloz and Defendant traveled
separately to Albuquerque, New Mexico, in order to consummate a drug deal. The
next day, Defendant, along with two companions met with Veloz, who was
accompanied by an undercover DEA agent, at a local Albuquerque fast-food
restaurant to discuss the particulars of the drug transaction. Veloz and the agent
agreed to pay $20,000 per kilogram for eleven-and-a-half kilograms of cocaine.
A day later all parties met in the parking lot of the same restaurant to
consummate the deal. Defendant arrived in a van with the same two companions,
one of whom approached Veloz and the DEA officer with a kilogram of cocaine,
informing them that it was a sample, and that ten-and-a-half more kilograms were
waiting for them in Taos, New Mexico. A dispute about payment ensued. Defendant
and his two companions re-entered the van and sped off as police arrived. The police
gave chase, catching all three men shortly thereafter. They found Defendant in a
2
nearby residential neighborhood hiding beneath a discarded Christmas tree.
Authorities recovered 1,009 grams of cocaine in the vicinity of the restaurant parking
lot.
On February 7, 2006, a federal grand jury returned a two count indictment
against Defendant and his two companions. Count 1 charged Defendant with
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 846. Count 2 charged Defendant with
possessing 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court assigned Mr. Brian Pori as counsel for
Defendant. At Mr. Pori’s request, the district court referred Defendant to Eric
Westfried, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist board-certified in forensics and
neuropsychology, for a competency evaluation.
Dr. Westfried filed a detailed report with the district court on October 18,
2006. After a 5.75 hour interview in which he performed a battery of tests, Dr.
Westfried concluded that Defendant was “not presently insane or otherwise so
mentally incompetent as to be unable to understand the proceedings against him or
properly assist in his own defense.” Dr. Westfried’s report noted that Defendant was
“resistant and possibly uncooperative,” and that he was “angry with his attorney and
does not feel he is receiving adequate representation.” The report explained,
however, that Defendant’s feelings were likely due to a “frequent expectation of
people from Mexico . . . that payment of high fees to an attorney resolves any legal
3
issues in even serious cases.” Dr. Westfried opined that this expectation would
interfere with the attorney-client relationship, but it was not “a delusional belief
based on psychosis.” Despite Defendant’s marginal literacy, he “actively
participated in tests of cognitive functioning, obtaining average to high average level
scores. . . . Overall, he met no criteria for a major mental disorder or a cognitive
disorder, but did present himself as a somewhat angry and defensive man.”
Having received Dr. Westfried’s report, the district court scheduled a
preliminary hearing concerning Defendant’s competency. The court requested notice
from defense counsel whether an evidentiary hearing or additional evaluations were
necessary. Before the preliminary hearing, however, Mr. Pori moved for substitution
of counsel, citing a complete breakdown in communication. During an in camera
session, Mr. Pori explained that the Defendant would not cooperate with him in
identifying witnesses for his defense and continually rejected his advice. Instead of
substituting new counsel, however, the district court decided to appoint Ms. Ann
Steinmetz, who formerly served as a chief federal public defender and a New Mexico
state district judge, to review the evidence with Defendant and discuss his options.
The hope was that Defendant would warm up to working with Mr. Pori once he had
received a second opinion. In order to ensure Defendant’s interests concerning the
competency evaluation were adequately represented, the district court deferred
consideration of Dr. Westfried’s evaluation to a later date.
After meeting with Defendant, Ms. Steinmetz reported to the district court that
4
Defendant appeared to understand the nature of the charges against him, was aware
of the need to cooperate with his attorney, and was willing to go forward to a jury
trial with his present lawyer, Mr. Pori. On April 17, 2007, however, Mr. Pori again
requested substitution of counsel and a hearing, asserting that Defendant had asked
for his replacement four days earlier and was “unwilling to assist his attorney in any
way in the preparation for trial.” Appellant’s Appendix (App.) Vol. I, at 116. In a
hearing two days later, the district court inquired whether appointing a native
Spanish-speaking attorney would assist with some of the communication difficulties.
(Mr. Pori spoke fluent Spanish but was not a “native” speaker.) Although Mr. Pori
continued to express doubts about Defendant’s competency, he was agreeable to the
idea of additional assistance. The district court appointed Mr. Mario Esparza to
assist. Although normally Defendant would not be entitled to more than one court-
appointed attorney, the district court authorized both Mr. Pori’s and Mr. Esparza’s
appointment because of the “unique” nature of the case.
On August 1, 2007, just six days before the trial commenced, the district court
held a competency hearing. At that time, Defendant’s two attorneys agreed with Dr.
Westfried’s report, and described the issue as a communication problem, not a
competency problem. 1 Accordingly, the court entered a finding that Defendant was
1
Specifically, in response to the district court’s question whether “counsel
disagreed with the [Westfried] report,” Mr. Pori informed the court as follows:
(continued...)
5
competent to stand trial. App. Vol. III, at 74. At the competency hearing, it was
brought to the court’s attention that Defendant had unrealistic expectations regarding
the role the confidential informant, Veloz, would play at trial. Defendant wanted
Veloz tried as a co-defendant and to sit at the table with him. The district court
explained to Defendant that Veloz was a witness, not a defendant, and despite
Defendant’s preference, Veloz would not sit beside him. The district court also
admonished Defendant that he had appointed two “expert defense lawyers” to assist
him and that Defendant should listen to their advice. Id. at 87-88.
Defendant’s trial began on August 7, 2007 with jury selection. Before the jury
convened for opening statements, Defendant’s attorneys explained to the district
(...continued)
We don’t take issue with Dr. Westfried’s report. We do think that,
certainly, [Defendant] is able to understand the nature of the charges
which are pending against him. Our concern primarily was whether or
not he was able to cooperate with his counsel and be able to make
meaningful decisions in his defense; . . . particularly concerning his
right to testify or his right to remain silent.
I think that, at the end of the day, what we had was more of a
personality conflict between [Defendant] and myself. To the extent that
I contributed to that conflict, I apologize first to [Defendant] and then
to the Court. He certainly does seem to have a rational and factual
understanding of the charges and has a present mental ability to consult
with his attorney and sufficient intellectual functioning to allow him to
assist in the defense of these charges.
App. Vol. III, at 72. Additionally, Mr. Esparza informed the court that Defendant
had been assisting him with his defense and that Mr. Esparza’s “observation of
[Defendant] is that he is very coherent and understands totally the judicial
process . . . . So my belief, Your Honor, is that he is competent to stand trial.” App.
Vol. III, at 73.
6
court that Defendant desired to be excused from the trial until the defense called
Veloz to testify. Id. at 240. In order to confirm that Defendant had knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to be present during the proceedings,
see Fed. R. Crim P. 43(c)(1), the district court conducted an in camera colloquy with
Defendant and his attorneys. The district court informed Defendant that because he
was raising an entrapment defense it was important that he be present to prevent the
jury from drawing a negative inference from his absence. Id. at 246. The district
court also explained that, if Defendant chose to testify, it would be helpful for him
to hear the testimony of the witnesses. Id. at 247. After this explanation, Defendant
stated he still did not want to be present during the trial unless the “rat” Veloz was
present first. Id. at 247.
Displaying considerable patience, the district court attempted to help
Defendant understand criminal procedure by analogizing to the rules of soccer—a
sport Defendant told the district court he played in the past. The court explained that
“one of the rules of the game here in this trial is that the government goes first,” and
since the government was not calling Veloz in its case-in-chief, Defendant would
have to wait until his lawyers presented Defendant’s case. Id. at 248-49. In
response, Defendant launched into a lengthy diatribe about the injustice of his
situation. 2
2
Defendant stated:
(continued...)
7
2
(...continued)
Well, what I’m saying is I don’t know if that man who I saw 18
months ago, if he’s a rat, that was – that man is a rat that which I’ve
been saying for the last 18 months. He’s the one who – who trapped me
into working with him and got me here. And if that man is the one that
I’m asking for, then I don’t agree with the Court’s moving ahead,
because I’m going to be found guilty, and that’s an injustice. And in
order – I – in order for the Court to continue that man needs to be here
and for him and me to – to give testimony. If they’re going to hear me
they’re going to hear him also. . . . That man tricked me. He promised
me. He told me. He swore to me on his family that he was going to
give me money, and he tricked me, because I don’t sell drugs, neither
in Orlando, which is where I’m from. I’m not familiar with this town.
And I told him that I couldn’t work with him but he insisted, and
so he – he brought me here in order to meet those guys who are paying
for this case now. And if he brought me here and if the Judge is giving
me to understand that he’s a rat that the government is paying, then
that’s not true because he was – I was going to be doing the same
money – the same job for money, and he’s not going to give me money.
The Judge isn’t going to pay me. And true legal roots, as I see it, that
man needs to be here present so he can be put into prison with me
together at the same time. And if not, besides that, I have witnesses in
Orlando of ladies that he is pulling a scam on.
And so in order for me to plead guilty that man needs to be here
with me for us to go to jail together, because there were four people in
this case, and two of them are paying for it already, and two of them are
out here, so he needs to be out here to be a witness. And if that man is
not brought to me the way the gentlemen are saying that he’s going to
be brought, as I see it, if the Judge is not letting me speak, then that’s
abuse. He has all the power, and he is abusing me with it. And so if I
am not allowed to speak in the court what is allowed a defense, and so
if I am not being allowed to speak, then I’m not being denied my
defense.
And so if this is going to be determined now that we’re in the
home stretch, that man needs to be here to be fair in order for justice to
be done with me, because if not, there will be no justice here. This
house, outside of it, says this is the house of justice, not that it is the
house of injustice. And I’m a man who has a clean record, and I think
(continued...)
8
The district court inquired whether Defendant wanted to remain present during
the Government’s presentation of the witnesses that afternoon. Defendant responded
that he wanted “the rat” there “first,” “next to” him. Id. at 255. The district court
denied his request. Despite his earlier protests, Defendant remained in the courtroom
the rest of the day.
The following morning, the issue of Defendant’s presence in the courtroom
loomed. In the opening minutes of the day’s session, outside the presence of
Defendant and the jury, Mr. Pori suggested the district court was “dealing with
someone who is either crazy or crazy like a fox.” Id. at 329. Mr. Pori explained that
2
(...continued)
the Judge knows that, and what they’re giving me here is a man who is
a criminal, and that’s illegal. That’s not allowed in any country in the
world.
And if here, I’m going to be found guilty by the jury and the
prosecutor, who is the leader of saying that I sell – I sold – that I – that
I sold the car, which is all they have, that’s the only evidence they have,
I’ve seen that’s the only evidence they have. And if they’re going to try
me on these charges – and these gentlemen here won’t let me know,
I’ve asked them, and they won’t let me know.
And so the way I see it, the only way to try these charges – and
that’s why I’m asking for this man, for him to testify, because I was the
hook and the line and the bait that brought these – these men here, and
I did my job well, but because I don’t have documents, I’m here in jail
and he’s out on the street and that’s illegal. And that man, as I said, as
I said a moment ago, the Judge or I don’t know who, offered me the
same job but it wasn’t – but I didn’t get any money for – for it. And
they’re telling me that that’s paid for, and that’s not true. That’s
illegal. I know how the process of being a rat works. I know how that
process works.
App. Vol., III, at 240-53.
9
Defendant insisted on only appearing in court if the cooperating informant was
seated next to him at counsel table, facing criminal charges. Defendant also insisted
on testifying “at the same time” as the informant, similar to the television program
Judge Judy. Id. at 329. Mr. Pori then raised the concern that Defendant was not just
“crazy like a fox,” i.e., malingering, but instead was affirmatively demonstrating his
incompetence. The district court stated that, in its view, there was no evidence in
the record to cast doubt on the initial determination of competency and that
Defendant’s prior issues with Mr. Pori “were not at all justified,” but that the court
had appointed Mr. Esparza in an effort to “appease” Defendant. The district court
stated that it would not stoop to the level of letting Defendant control the
proceedings. 3 The court relented, however, to defense counsel’s request to call
Veloz earlier, during the Government’s case-in-chief, in an effort to appease
Defendant’s desire to see him testify. At this point the court took a brief recess to
have Defendant transferred to the courtroom.
Upon reconvening, the district court explained to Defendant that he was
3
The district court’s exact words explaining that Defendant would not be
allowed to disrupt the proceedings were, “you don’t let the patients run the asylum.”
Id. at 331. In context, the court clearly did not intend to imply that Defendant was
demonstrating he should be in a mental asylum. Rather, the district court obviously
meant that Defendant could not have his every request catered to. Specifically, the
district court would not order the confidential informant to sit at counsel table with
Defendant because of the “real potential for . . . witness intimidation.” Id. at 331.
Perhaps, “you don’t let a fox guard the henhouse” would have been a better aphorism
to describe the situation.
10
granting his attorneys’ request to call the confidential informant, Veloz, out of order.
The district court emphasized, however, that Veloz would not sit beside Defendant
because the court viewed that “as a form of witness intimidation,” and that
Defendant would not be allowed to disrupt the proceedings. Id. at 339. “Why not?”
Defendant curtly replied. Id. The district court, again, patiently explained that there
were rules governing the presentation of evidence and that, although it understood
Defendant was upset that Veloz was not being charged with a crime, the court had
no control over the matter. Defendant launched into another tirade about the
necessity of Veloz testifying at the same time as Defendant.
At this point Mr. Pori renewed his concern about Defendant’s competency,
explaining that Defendant had exhibited this sort of behavior for “18 long months.”
Id. at 343. The district court noted counsel’s concern, but observed that “the
professional opinion of the evaluator,” Dr. Westfried, did not concur and “on that
basis” the district court wanted to proceed with the trial. Id. at 343. The district
court inquired whether Defendant would like to stay in the courtroom. Defendant
answered that, “if what I’m asking for is not going to be done, then I can’t.” Id. at
344. The district court again remonstrated with Defendant, explaining that his
lawyers thought it would be a good idea for him to stay in the courtroom, but that he
had the choice to leave. The district court then made a finding that Defendant was
voluntarily choosing to remove himself by “insisting on conditions” that would
“disrupt the decorum necessary for this proceeding to continue” and that “his
11
actions,” based on the court’s observations, were “an effort to intimidate the witness’
testimony and keep the witness from testifying.” Id. at 351. After this finding, the
court granted Mr. Pori’s request for a standing objection as to Defendant’s
competency. Id. at 352-53. The trial proceeded in Defendant’s absence for the
remainder of the day.
On the morning of the third day of trial, August 9, 2007, defense counsel noted
that, during Defendant’s tirade of the previous day, he had stomped his feet on the
floor like a child. Defense counsel requested that the district court again speak
directly to Defendant to assess his competency. The court complied, and an
exchange similar to the court’s conversations with Defendant on previous days
occurred, i.e., Defendant expressed anger and frustration and noted his refusal to
cooperate with the proceedings. At this point Mr. Pori suggested he was “probably
wrong” to acquiesce to Dr. Westfried’s evaluation and suggested circumstances had
“changed to the point where it may be appropriate to suspend these proceedings
because of the behavior that he’s demonstrated even today . . . making the same wild
request with the same st[o]mping of the feet, although it didn’t seem as loud today,
but that at that point, we do have some evidence before the Court.” Id. at 541. The
district court disagreed, however, stating that it would prefer to send Defendant to
an evaluation before sentencing if the jury returned a guilty verdict.
The following day, August 10, 2007, the jury did indeed return a verdict of
guilty on both counts. After Defendant refused to participate in a pre-sentence
12
interview with the U.S. Probation Office, his attorneys filed another motion
requesting a competency determination. App. Vol. I, at 612.
At a hearing on the motion, the district court quoted at length from Dr.
Westfried’s evaluation and stated the “difficulty in this case is . . . this is part of
[Defendant’s] modus operandi in terms of the patterns are consistent from early on
when we had a number of hearings.” App. Vol. III, at 849. The court noted that
there was “certainly some irrational conduct displayed by” Defendant. Id. at 849.
The court decided, however, that it would allow Defendant to be sent to an
evaluation to determine “that he is mentally competent to be sentenced.” Id. at 850.
The court noted that, if the “evaluator agrees with Dr. Westfried, then I’m fully
satisfied that [Defendant], at all material times, was competent and, therefore, is
competent to be sentenced.” Id. at 851. The district court entered an order to that
effect on November 8, 2007.
The competency evaluation took place over the course of a month at the
Federal Correctional Institution in Fort Worth, TX. Dr. Lisa Bellah, a forensic
psychologist, evaluated Defendant. Dr. Bellah concluded Defendant was “competent
throughout his legal proceedings and is competent to proceed to sentencing.” App.
Vol. I, at 642. Dr. Bellah acknowledged that Defendant “may have anger
management problems stemming from a possible mental health diagnosis.” Id. But
“upon further review of his history and behavior over a one month time frame, there
is insufficient evidence to suggest a formal mental health diagnosis is present.” Id.
13
Dr. Bellah concluded that Defendant’s “suspiciousness and distrust does not appear
to be delusional in nature, but rather, a characterological aspect of his overall
personality structure.” Id. The report noted that Defendant had the “capacity to
comport his behavior in an adequate manner, but chooses to behav[e] in a negative
manner in order to control his environment.” Id. Indeed, Dr. Bellah predicted that
Defendant would “likely continue to be a difficult client, but his behavior does not
appear to stem from the direct effects of a mental disease or defect.” Id.
At sentencing, Defendant’s attorneys stated that his suspiciousness and distrust
made Defendant incapable of assisting in his defense, and thus incompetent
throughout the proceedings. Defendant’s attorneys did not, however, request further
evaluation prior to sentencing. The district court concluded Defendant was
competent, based on the two competency evaluations by licensed professionals and
the court’s own observations of Defendant. App. Vol. III, at 859. The district court
also observed that Defendant’s personality made him a difficult client, and that he
had chosen not to work with his attorneys. The district court sentenced Defendant
to 78 months in prison, the higher end of the Guidelines sentence. Defendant
appeals.
II.
The Supreme Court established the Constitutional standard governing
competence in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam). “Dusky
14
defines the competency standard as including both (1) ‘whether’ the defendant has
‘a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him’ and (2)
whether the defendant ‘has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding.’” Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S.Ct. 2379,
2383 (2008).
“[C]ompetency claims can raise issues of both substantive and procedural due
process.” Walker v. Att’y Gen., 167 F.3d 1339, 1343 (10th Cir. 1999). Defendant
raises both procedural and substantive claims here. He contends (1) the district court
violated his right to procedural due process by “repeatedly fail[ing] to conduct an
adequate inquiry into [Defendant’s] competence during the jury trial,” and (2) the
district court violated his substantive right to be free from criminal prosecution while
incompetent. Because “an individual raising a procedural competency claim is held
to a lower burden of proof than one raising a substantive competency claim,” we
consider the procedural claim first. McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 952 (10th
Cir. 2001) (en banc).
A.
“A procedural competency claim is based upon a trial court’s alleged failure
to hold a competency hearing, or an adequate competency hearing.” Id. In Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1966), the Supreme Court recognized a procedural
right to a competency hearing in state prosecutions, based on the due process clause
15
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. 14, § 1 (prohibiting state
deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”). Neither party
to this appeal has suggested that, in a federal criminal prosecution, the Fifth
Amendment’s due process clause would not provide the same protection. See id.
amend. 5.
Pate recognized that the Illinois state court could have satisfied due process
merely by “carrying out the terms of the State’s own statute which required ‘a sanity
hearing where the evidence raised a bona fide doubt’ as to the defendant’s
competence to stand trial.” United States v. Knohl, 379 F.2d 427, 435 (2d Cir.
1967). In federal court, however, a statutory procedure exists to protect the
procedural due process rights of criminal defendants. In pertinent part, 18 U.S.C.
§ 4241(a) provides:
[T]he defendant or the attorney for the Government may file a motion
for a hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant. The
court shall grant the motion, or shall order such a hearing on its own
motion, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may
presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him
mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the
nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist
properly in his defense.
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Swanson, 572 F.2d 523, 526 (5th Cir.
1978) (holding that the § 4241’s precursor “enforces the due process requirement”
identified in Pate); Knohl, 379 F.2d at 435 (noting § 4241’s precursor “was not
enacted in contravention of due process but in aid of it”). As relevant here, § 4241
16
applies “after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense and prior to the
sentencing of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). Thus, Defendant’s procedural
claim falls squarely within the parameters of the statute.
Defendant has not argued that satisfying § 4241’s procedural requirements
would fall short of meeting his procedural due process rights. There is good reason
to believe that Congress envisioned § 4241 as embodying at least as much procedural
protection as the standard described in Pate. The Senate Judiciary Report to the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 cited to Pate in noting that “all the
procedures included in [§ 4241] are for the benefit of the defendant.” S. Rept. No.
98-473, at 235 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3417. Additionally, the
“bona fide doubt” standard discussed in Pate is very similar to the language in
§ 4241. Pate expresses the standard in the negative, requiring a competency hearing
if “the evidence raises a ‘bona fide doubt’ as to a defendant’s competence,” 383 U.S.
at 385 (emphasis added), while § 4241 expresses the standard in the positive,
requiring a competency hearing “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the
defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him
mentally incompetent.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (emphasis added); see also Chavez v.
United States, 656 F.2d 512, 516 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981) (discussing different
formulations of the bona fide doubt standard and concluding that “all describe the
same constitutional standard”).
Finally, in evaluating § 4241’s precursor, the Second Circuit observed that
17
Pate “did not create any new federal right or a new procedure for applying for a
hearing in the federal courts on the issue of mental competency to stand trial” that
was not already protected by the federal statute. Knohl, 379 F.2d at 435. We agree
with this analysis for purposes of this case. Seeing no need to distinguish between
the procedural protections identified in Pate and § 4241, we, therefore, apply § 4241
to determine whether the district court erred in failing to hold a second competency
hearing during trial.
B.
Defendant, citing cases from two of our sister circuits, suggests that our
standard of review is “comprehensive” or “plenary” for a procedural competency
inquiry. See United States v. Ross, 510 F.3d 702, 712 (7th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 256 (3d Cir. 2003). We disagree. Ross merely held that,
where a district court “did not order a psychiatric examination or make a judicial
determination regarding the defendant’s competence,” appellate review is
“comprehensive.” Ross, 510 F.3d at 712. Similarly, in Jones the district court “did
not hold a formal hearing” concerning the defendant’s competency. Jones, 336 F.3d
at 257. That was not the case here. The district court in this case ordered an initial
psychiatric examination, provided counsel with an opportunity to supplement the
record prior to trial, and entered a finding of competency at a hearing just a few days
before trial. Our precedent is clear that “whether to order a second competency
exam is a matter wholly within the sound discretion of the trial court.” United States
18
v. Prince, 938 F.2d 1092, 1095 (10th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Ramirez,
304 F.3d 1033, 1035 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Whether to order a competency examination
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”). 4
Given that “a defendant's behavior and demeanor at trial are relevant as to the
ultimate decision of competency,” we stress that the observations and conclusions
of the district court observing that behavior and demeanor are crucial to any proper
evaluation of a cold appellate record. Prince, 938 F.2d at 1095; see also United
States v. Pompey, 264 F.3d 1176, 1179 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding the district court
“may rely on a number of factors, including . . . the court’s observations of the
defendant’s comportment”). Indeed, implicitly recognizing the importance of the
district court’s vantage point in a competency inquiry, several of our sister circuits
also apply an abuse of discretion standard. 5
4
We have identified at least one exception to applying the abuse of discretion
standard, i.e., “when a criminal defendant’s competency was determined under an
unconstitutional burden of proof.” McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 955 (10th
Cir. 2001) (en banc). In such cases “the prior competency determination merits no
presumption of correctness” and we will evaluate whether “a reasonable judge should
have had a bona fide doubt as to his competence at the time of trial.” Id. at 955.
5
See, e.g., United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 622 (7th Cir. 2007) (“A
district court’s decision whether to hold a competency hearing is discretionary and
reviewed deferentially”); United States v. Nickels, 324 F.3d 1250, 1251 (11th Cir.
2003) (per curiam) (“We review the denial of a § 4241 motion for an abuse of
discretion”); United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 396 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Whether
reasonable cause exists [to doubt defendant’s competency] is a question left to the
discretion of the district court.”); United States v. George, 85 F.3d 1433, 1437 (9th
Cir. 1996) (holding § 4241’s “language . . . indicates that we should review a district
(continued...)
19
Other non-comprehensive factors relevant to the need for a competency
hearing include “evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial,
and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial.” Drope v. Missouri, 420
U.S. 162, 180 (1975). “[A]n attorney’s representation about his client’s
competency” is another factor that may be considered. Jones, 336 F.3d at 256
(internal quotation omitted). But we emphasize that there are “no fixed or immutable
signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to
proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations
and subtle nuances are implicated.” Drope, 420 U.S. at 180.
C.
Having reviewed the record in light of the above factors, we cannot say the
district court abused its discretion. We believe that a reasonable judge, situated in
the same position as the district court here, would find insufficient cause to believe
Defendant’s competence was compromised. Defendant’s behavior during trial was
consistent with Dr. Westfried’s psychological evaluation and his attorneys’ pre-trial
experience, i.e., Defendant was a difficult client, highly suspicious of his lawyers,
but ultimately, as Dr. Westfried concluded, “there were no signs of his having
5
(...continued)
court’s decision to deny an examination for abuse of discretion”); United States v.
Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1150 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Determination of whether there is
‘reasonable cause’ to believe a defendant may be incompetent rests in the discretion
of the district court.”).
20
compromised competence related capacities.” Defendant’s attorneys had concurred,
as soon as six days prior to trial, that Defendant was competent.
Indeed, the district court went out of its way prior to trial to ensure that
Defendant received adequate counsel from as many as three attorneys, all of whom
the district court viewed as highly experienced and capable of vigorously
representing Defendant’s interests. Although one of Defendant’s attorneys, Mr. Pori,
expressed concern about Defendant’s competency during the months preceding trial,
it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court, in the heat of trial, to weigh
the psychological evaluation more heavily given Mr. Pori’s and Mr. Esparza’s
assurances that Defendant was competent the week before trial, and Ms. Steinmetz’s
concurring report a few months prior. In fact, we believe the district court was
eminently reasonable in doing so. See United States v. Mackovich, 209 F.3d 1227,
1233 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he concerns of counsel alone are insufficient to establish
doubt of a defendant's competency.”).
To be sure, certain extreme behavioral manifestations may, along with other
factors, raise reasonable cause to doubt a defendant’s competency. For example, in
United States v. Williams, 113 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 1997), we held that the
defendant’s “irrational behavior,” “outbursts,” and “hysteria” during trial gave rise
to a “bona fide doubt” about her competence, and that the district court violated
procedural due process by not holding an evidentiary hearing under the
circumstances. Id. at 1160. But this case bears important differences from Williams.
21
First, the district court in Williams never ordered a pre-trial psychological
evaluation, and thus we undertook a “comprehensive” review. See id. at 1160
(“[W]ith no competency determination before us, our review
is . . . comprehensive.”). Here, we apply a more deferential standard to the district
court’s decision to forego a second competency hearing after a prior psychological
evaluation and finding of competency.
Second, in Williams, the defendant was taking a psychotropic drug and gave
a “cryptic[]” response to the district court’s inquiry whether “it interfered with her
ability to communicate with her attorney.” Id. at 1160. During trial, the defendant
informed the court that she had not taken her medication, but the district court “made
no further inquiry,” even when the defendant’s testimony spiraled into incoherency.
Id. at 1158. Here, Defendant was neither prescribed, nor failed to take, such mind-
altering medication.
Finally, even reviewing a cold appellate record, Defendant’s behavior here
bears little resemblance to that of the defendant in Williams. In Williams, the
defendant wept uncontrollably during trial, prompting us to editorialize that “[t]o say
[the defendant] was out of control during the second day of the proceeding
euphemizes the record.” Id. Here, Defendant’s tirades reflect anger and frustration,
but they are not incoherent. Defendant’s behavior was quite consistent with Dr.
Westfried’s evaluation, and the district court acted reasonably in taking the
psychological evaluation into consideration when evaluating Defendant’s conduct.
22
See United States v. Jones, 23 F.3d 1307, 1309 (8th Cir. 1994) (“The psychiatric
report submitted to the court indicated that [the defendant] was competent to stand
trial. Under those circumstances, the trial court had the discretion to hold or to forgo
an additional hearing on [the defendant’s] competency.”).
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order a
second competency evaluation or hearing, despite Defendant’s behavior at trial.
Under this record, the district court reasonably concluded that (1) Defendant had the
capacity and ability to understand the charges against him and to assist in his
defense, and (2) the Defendant’s behavior was merely an attempt to disrupt the
proceedings. See Drope, 420 U.S. 171 (defining competency in terms of “capacity”);
Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402 (defining competency in terms of “present ability”).
Accordingly, we reject Defendant’s procedural competency challenge. 6
D.
Defendant also raises a substantive due process challenge to the district court’s
competency finding. “[A] substantive competency claim is founded on the allegation
6
Defendant relies on other cases as well, but they do not bear any
resemblance to the facts presented here. See, e.g., Drope, 420 U.S. at 165-68
(psychiatric report indicated mental disease, defendant’s wife testified her husband
subjected her to bizarre physical and sexual assault and that he was sick, and
defendant shot himself during the trial); Pate, 383 U.S. at 378-80 (four witnesses
testified defendant was insane and described history of disturbed behavior, medical
records confirmed defendant had been committed and that he suffered from
hallucinations and possibly schizophrenia, and defendant had periods of irrational
and violent behavior).
23
that an individual was tried and convicted while, in fact, incompetent.” McGregor,
248 F.3d at 952. But Defendant’s failure to succeed on his procedural competency
claim also forecloses Defendant’s substantive challenge. See United States v.
Herrera, 481 F.3d 1266, 1272 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Since we conclude no bona fide
doubt exists that [the defendant] was not incompetent at trial, he likewise fails to
make a substantive due process claim.”). Where a petitioner cannot show a bona fide
doubt as to his competency, “he cannot meet the more stringent substantive due
process competency standard.” Walker v. Gibson, 228 F.3d 1217, 1230 (10th Cir.
2000), abrogated on other grounds by Neill v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir.
2001). Were we to reach the merits of Defendant’s substantive competency claim,
we would conclude, for the reasons already discussed, that the district court’s finding
was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Boigegrain, 155 F.3d 1181, 1189
(10th Cir. 1998) (holding that a district court may “rely on a number of factors,
including medical opinion and the court’s observation of the defendant’s
comportment” in “making a determination of competency”); see also Mackovich, 209
F.3d at 1232 (holding that the district court’s “reliance” on “the only medical expert
who assessed [the defendant’s] competence” was “not clear error”).
AFFIRMED.
24