FILE D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
U N IT E D STA T E S C O U R T O F A PPE A L S June 2, 2009
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FO R T H E TE N T H C IR C U IT Clerk of Court
JOSE LUIS PEREZ-HERNANDEZ,
a/k/a Jose L. Perez-Hernandez,
a/k/a Jose Luis Perez,
a/k/a Jose Hernandez,
Petitioner,
No. 08-9567
v. ( Petition for Review )
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., *
United States Attorney General,
Respondent.
O R D E R A N D JU D G M E N T * *
Before O ’B R IE N , Circuit Judge, BR O R BY , Senior Circuit Judge, and
G O R SU C H , Circuit Judge.
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Eric H. Holder, Jr. is substituted for
M ichael B. M ukasey as the respondent in this appeal.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Jose Luis Perez-Hernandez petitions for review of a final order of the
Bureau of Immigration Appeals authorizing his removal from the United States
because he was convicted of an aggravated felony. M r. Perez-Hernandez
contends that his Utah plea to a charge concerning possession with intent to
distribute methamphetamine doesn’t actually qualify as an aggravated felony. W e
disagree and thus have no jurisdiction to review his removal order. Alternatively,
M r. Perez-Hernandez seeks review of the BIA’s affirmance of an immigration
judge’s denial of his motion to continue his removal proceedings. But here, too,
we do not have jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision.
M r. Perez-Hernandez, a citizen of M exico, became a permanent resident
alien of the United States in 1990. Subsequently, he was arrested for possession
of a controlled substance and then for an outstanding warrant relating to a hit and
run incident. But this case began in earnest when M r. Perez-Hernandez was
arrested in 2007 for another offense, this time after police apparently found a bag
containing drugs and a digital scale at his workplace. M r. Perez-Hernandez was
charged with possession with the intent to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance (methamphetamine), a second degree felony. In due course, he was
allowed to enter a guilty plea to attempted possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine, a third degree felony. The court held his plea in abeyance for
a year, pending his completion of a drug treatment program.
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W hen the Department of Homeland Security got wind of all this it charged
M r. Perez-Hernandez with removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). That
statute authorizes the removal of any alien, including a resident alien, “convicted”
of an “aggravated felony.” DHS pointed to M r. Perez-Hernandez’s 2007 guilty
plea as evidence that he qualified for removal under the statute. Before the
immigration judge, M r. Perez-Hernandez disputed that his Utah plea constituted
either a “conviction,” or one for an “aggravated felony” within the meaning of the
law. He also sought a continuance of his removal proceedings until after his
wife’s application for naturalization was completed, explaining that he hoped his
wife would soon be sworn in as a United States citizen and that he could
thereafter seek an adjustment of status.
The immigration judge declined to stay the proceedings, found that
M r. Perez-Hernandez had indeed been convicted of an aggravated felony, and
ordered him removed from the United States. The Board of Immigration Appeals
affirmed, and M r. Perez-Hernandez now asks us to undo that decision.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), however, we lack jurisdiction to review
the merits of a BIA order of removal against an alien on the basis that he or she
has been convicted of an aggravated felony. In such cases, our jurisdiction
extends only so far as to determine our jurisdiction; that is, “[we] have
jurisdiction . . . to determine whether [or not] the jurisdictional bar applies.”
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Ballesteros v. Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 1156 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks
omitted). W e “may therefore decide whether the petitioner is (i) an alien
(ii) deportable (iii) by reason of a criminal offense listed in the statute.” Id.
(quotation marks omitted). If one of the elements is missing, the bar to our
jurisdiction doesn’t apply. But if each element is present, the jurisdictional bar
pertains and we must dismiss the matter.
This case falls into the latter category. M r. Perez-Hernandez does not
dispute that he is an alien but submits, as he did before the BIA, that
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) does not apply to him because he wasn’t convicted of an
aggravated offense within the statute’s meaning. In support of this submission,
he offers three arguments. None is persuasive.
First, M r. Perez-Hernandez contends that he was never actually “convicted”
of anything because he simply entered a plea which was held in abeyance for a
year. But this position is foreclosed by our precedent: a panel of this court has
already held that a guilty plea held in abeyance entered in Utah state court
satisfies the 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) definition of a “conviction,” United States
v. Zamudio, 314 F.3d 517, 521-22 (10th Cir. 2002), and we are not free to revisit
the decision of another panel.
Second, M r. Perez-Hernandez contends that, even if a conviction, his plea
wasn’t for an “aggravated felony.” Congress has defined the term “aggravated
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felony” to include “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance . . . including a
drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18).” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(B). In turn, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) defines drug trafficking crimes
to include “any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.
801 et seq.).” The offense to which M r. Hernandez-Perez pled guilty, Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iii), is just such a crime. Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), the
CSA proscribes the knowing or intentional possession with the intent to distribute
any controlled substance. And this crime is punishable as a felony because
Congress has established a maximum penalty for it of greater than one year in
prison. See id. § 841(b)(1)(B) (setting maximum penalty of five years in prison);
18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (defining felonies as offenses punishable by more than a year
in prison).
M r. Hernandez-Perez replies that he possessed a relatively small quantity of
drugs and emphasizes that he was treated by Utah more as a drug abuser than a
drug pusher because the State agreed to rehabilitative drug monitoring rather than
jail time. His crime, he says, is thus less like a felony trafficking offense and
more like a mere possession offense the CSA would treat as a misdemeanor. The
problem is that he was convicted not of mere possession but of a trafficking
offense, involving an effort to distribute drugs, that is punishable under the
federal CSA as a felony and is thus treated as an aggravated felony for purposes
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of the immigration laws. See Rendon v. M ukasey, 520 F.3d 967, 976 (9th Cir.
2008) (“possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell contains a
trafficking element and is an aggravated felony”).
Third, M r. Perez-Hernandez argues that his conviction is not an aggravated
felony for purposes of federal immigration law because the Utah statute under
which he was convicted encompasses both felony and misdemeanor offenses.
Because the BIA had to look to “conviction records” to determine whether he was
convicted of a felony or misdemeanor for purposes of Utah law, he asserts, the
government failed to meet its burden of showing that he was convicted of a crime
punishable as a felony under the CSA using a “categorical approach.” Under the
so-called categorical approach we look to statutory definitions rather than “the
particular facts underlying those convictions” to decide if an offense qualifies as
an aggravated felony. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990); see
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005). Though this approach first arose in
a very different context to answer a very different question, we have adopted it
for the purpose of classifying crimes under the immigration laws. Batrez Gradiz
v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 1206, 1211 (10th Cir. 2007).
M r. Perez-Hernandez’s argument on this score fails for two reasons. In the
first place, M r. Perez-Hernandez fails to recognize that the categorical approach
doesn’t categorically prohibit us from examining the charging document or
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documents reflecting his plea. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16; Taylor, 495 U.S. at
602; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) (listing documents or records constituting
proof of criminal conviction). The amended information charged
M r. Perez-Hernandez with knowing and intentional possession of a controlled or
counterfeit substance, namely methamphetamine, with the intent to distribute, a
second degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iii). His record of
conviction shows that he pled guilty to this same charge, but as a third degree
felony. These two documents thus show that he was not convicted of a
misdemeanor. Second, whether M r. Perez-Hernandez was convicted of a felony
or misdemeanor under Utah law is ultimately beside the point. The relevant
statutory inquiry is whether the state offense of conviction “proscribes conduct
punishable as a felony” under the CSA. Lopez v. Gonzales, 546 U.S. 47, 60
(2006). M r. Perez-Hernandez does not and cannot seriously dispute that Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iii) proscribes conduct that is punishable as a felony
under the CSA.
At the very least, M r. Perez-Hernandez submits we should review the
decision of the BIA affirming the immigration judge’s denial of his request for a
continuance of the proceedings while he sought an adjustment of status. But
having determined that M r. Perez-Hernandez committed an aggravated felony
pursuant to the terms of § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), we lack jurisdiction to review the
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agency’s final order of removal, including its interlocutory order denying his
request for a continuance. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). Our review is also barred
by § 1252(a)(2)(B), which generally prohibits review of discretionary decisions by
the Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland Security.
M r. Perez-Hernandez replies that, even in light of these statutory
injunctions, we might have jurisdiction at least “so far as those determinations
present constitutional claims or questions of law involving statutory
construction.” Kechkar v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 1080, 1083 (10th Cir. 2007).
M r. Perez-Hernandez then submits that the BIA has previously permitted
continuances in similar circumstances and its failure to do so here violates due
process. But whatever else is wrong with his argument, the effort to invoke a
constitutional “due process” interest surely is. M r. Perez-Hernandez has
identified no source of law entitling him to a continuance, such that due process
might be offended by its denial here. Instead, at most he has shown that the
immigration judge and BIA have broad statutory discretion to grant or deny
continuances in these cases. That they could have offered a continuance but
chose not to do so in M r. Perez-Hernandez’s case is something we have no
jurisdiction to review: “An alien does not present a colorable constitutional claim
capable of avoiding the jurisdictional bar by arguing that the evidence was
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incorrectly weighed, insufficiently considered, or supports a different outcome.”
Id. at 1084.
The petition for review is dismissed.
Entered for the Court
Neil M . Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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