Wade Pediatrics v. Department of Health & Human Services

                                                                  FILED
                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                                              Tenth Circuit

                                                              June 2, 2009
                                 PUBLISH                 Elisabeth A. Shumaker
                                                             Clerk of Court
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                             TENTH CIRCUIT


WADE PEDIATRICS,

      Petitioner,

v.
                                                    No. 08-9529
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
SERVICES,

      Respondent.


         Petition for Review from the Departmental Appeals Board
              of the Department of Health and Human Services
                        App. Div. Docket No. A-08-06
                              Decision No. 2153


Sarah J. Glick, Scoggins & Cross, PLLC, Oklahoma City, OK (Linda G. Scoggins
with her on the briefs), for Petitioner.

G. Dirk Rozendale, Assistant Regional Counsel, Department of Health and
Human Services, Dallas, Texas (Thomas R. Barker, Acting General Counsel, and
Katherine W. Brown, Acting Chief Counsel, with him on the brief), for
Respondent.


Before LUCERO, O’BRIEN, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.


GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.
      From time to time, labs federally certified to analyze human specimens

must take proficiency tests to ensure their reliability and accuracy. On two such

tests, Wade Pediatrics checked its answers with those of another lab before

submitting its results to the government. The problem is that the government’s

proficiency testing program seeks to assess the competency of each lab’s

independent work. Sharing answers defeats the purpose of the exercise. Even

more pointedly, sharing answers violates the clear and unambiguous terms of a

federal statute. In response to Wade’s statutory violation, the government

suspended its certificate for one year. We deny Wade’s petition for review of that

decision.

                                          I

      Labs like Wade must meet certain federal standards in order to be certified

to conduct diagnostic tests on human specimens (blood, tissue, and the like), and

to receive Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement for their services. These

standards are embodied in the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of

1988 (“CLIA” or “the Act”) and its implementing regulations. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 263(a); 42 C.F.R. Part 493. Among other things, certified labs must participate

in periodic quality control proficiency tests.

      Wade’s troubles began in 2005 when it flunked portions of two proficiency

tests. In response, a field investigator for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid

Services (“CMS”) advised Wade “that it would be beneficial” for the lab “to

                                         -2-
receive training and comparison testing of the[ir] equipment from another”

certified lab, such as the nearby Muskogee Regional Medical Center. Wade

followed up on this recommendation, arranging to receive training and technical

support from Muskogee.

      In February 2006, Wade took another proficiency test. This time, instead

of testing the proficiency testing samples in Wade’s own lab, a technician first

took the samples to Muskogee and tested them on Muskogee’s equipment. Only

then did the technician return the samples to Wade’s lab and run tests on them

there. The purpose of all this was apparently to double-check Wade’s results to

ensure their accuracy before submitting anything to the government.

      As yet unaware of Wade’s conduct in connection with the February 2006

proficiency test, in March 2006 the government notified Wade that it was

temporarily restricting the scope of its certificate based on its 2005 problems. In

due course, Wade submitted a remedial plan to CMS promising to correct its

errors and adding that, toward this end, it was already engaging in training and

consultation with Muskogee’s staff. Wade added that it would “continue internal

proficiency testing with assistance and support/guidance” from Muskogee. When

CMS sent Wade yet another set of proficiency testing samples in May 2006,

Wade again checked its test results against results achieved in Muskogee’s lab

before submitting its answers to the government.




                                         -3-
      Eventually, CMS got wind that Wade had twice tested its proficiency

testing samples at another lab before submitting its results. CMS responded by

revoking Wade’s certificate for one year, citing as authority for its actions 42

U.S.C. § 263a(i)(4), which provides that “[a]ny laboratory that the Secretary

determines intentionally refers its proficiency testing samples to another

laboratory for analysis shall have its certificate revoked for at least one year. . . .”

Wade unsuccessfully challenged the revocation of its certificate before an ALJ,

and then before the Departmental Appeals Board (“DAB”) of the Department of

Health and Human Services.

      Failing to obtain relief in the administrative context, Wade petitions to us.

See 42 U.S.C. § 263a(k)(1). Wade asserts that its actions did not violate the

CLIA, and, alternatively, that CMS should be estopped from revoking its

certificate because it induced Wade into sharing its proficiency test results with

Muskogee. We address each argument in turn.

                                            II

      Wade argues first that it did not “refer” its proficiency testing samples “for

analysis” to Muskogee in violation of § 263a(i)(4) of the CLIA. In Wade’s view,

the Act prohibits a lab only from passing off another lab’s results as its own

work; it does not prohibit a lab from double-checking its own results with another

lab. And, Wade stresses, it corresponded with Muskogee not out of any design to




                                           -4-
cheat the proficiency testing program but simply as part of a training program,

undertaken in good faith, to confirm the accuracy of its own work.

      Even accepting Wade’s description of its actions, they still violated the

plain and unambiguous terms of the statute. To “refer” means “to commit,

submit, hand over (a question, cause, or matter) to some special or ultimate

authority for consideration, decision, execution. . . .” Oxford English Dictionary,

Vol. XIII at 463 (2d. ed. 1989). “Analysis,” in turn, means “[t]he resolution or

breaking up of anything complex into its various simple elements . . .; the exact

determination of the elements or components of anything complex (with or

without their physical separation).” Id. Vol. I at 433. Without doubt, Wade

committed, submitted, or handed over for consideration its proficiency testing

samples to Muskogee for analysis – that is, for Muskogee’s resolution or breaking

up of those samples into their various simple elements. Of course, as it contends,

Wade did not simply pass off Muskogee’s results as its own. But nothing in the

text of § 263a(i)(4) suggests that a test-taker must pass off another lab’s results

before a violation has occurred. Under the statute’s plain terms, any intentional

“referral” of a proficiency testing sample “for analysis” in another lab is

forbidden. And that indubitably occurred here.

      Wade is like the student who protests that he did not cheat on his exam

because he did not hand in someone else’s work but merely checked his answers

against those of another student. But peering over the shoulder of another student

                                          -5-
in the middle of an exam to check one’s answers is as much cheating as handing

in someone else’s work. While consultation between labs may be permissible in

other circumstances, before or after a proficiency test, asking an outsider for help

during a test corrupts the process and defeats its purpose. Indeed, this type of

double-checking is exactly what Congress sought to prevent in the CLIA. It is

not just passing off another’s work as one’s own that concerned Congress:

“Run[ning] repeated tests on the sample, us[ing] more highly qualified personnel

than are routinely used for testing, or send[ing] the sample out to another

laboratory” are all among the many practices that “obviously undermine the

purpose of proficiency testing.” H.R. Rep. No. 100-899, at 16, 24 (1988), as

reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3828.

      Even if it did “refer” its test samples “for analysis” to Muskogee, Wade

replies that it did not do so “intentionally,” as the statute requires before CMS

may impose a one-year suspension. Although Wade agrees with CMS that the

statutory term “intentional” connotes “knowing and willful,” Aplt. Br. at 10,

Wade stresses that it had no wish to violate the law, and in fact was seeking to do

just the opposite – to improve its testing standards by reaching out to another lab

for guidance.

      This line of argument will not work either. Even assuming Wade’s ultimate

or end intent was to improve its work product, as a means of effecting that intent

Wade surely referred its proficiency test results “knowingly and willfully” to

                                         -6-
Muskogee. Wade does not suggest, for example, that its technician negligently

left the lab’s proficiency testing samples at Muskogee and Muskogee went ahead,

without Wade’s knowledge, to analyze them. Instead, it is undisputed that

Wade’s technician took the lab’s proficiency testing samples to Muskogee with

the express purpose of testing them there – that is, with the express purpose of

referring them for analysis. There was no mistake, accident, negligence or

recklessness about it. And under the statute’s plain language, such a “knowing

and willful” action is sufficient to trigger liability, even if it was undertaken only

in service of some further and ultimate intent. Simply put, Wade is responsible

for its intended means, whatever its intended ends might have been.

      CMS makes much the same point when it maintains that Wade’s “motive”

in asking Muskogee to analyze its test samples is “irrelevant.” Appellee Br. at

17. While Wade might well have acted with the benign motive of seeking to

improve its testing standards, CMS argues, that is neither here nor there; the

statute asks only whether a lab has acted intentionally. CMS’s argument recalls

the oft-repeated maxim every law student hears that the law cares about intent,

not motive. But like many maxims, this one obscures difficult analytical

questions – in this case, the longstanding question what qualifies as a motive

rather than an intention. See, e.g., Wayne LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law

§ 5.3(a) (2008) (“[W]hat is meant by the word ‘motive’ and how it differs from

‘intention,’ [is] a matter which has caused the theorists considerable difficulty for

                                          -7-
years.”); Walter Cook, Act, Intention and Motive in the Criminal Law, 26 Yale L.

J. 624 (1917); Walter Hitchler, Motive as an Essential Element of Crime, 35 Dick.

L. Rev. 105 (1931). But whether Wade’s state of mind is characterized as a

motive, as the government would have it, or as a further intent, as Wade would

have it, makes no difference to the outcome of this case. However characterized,

the fact that Wade acted with the earnest desire to improve its testing standards

does not negate the fact that the company did intentionally refer its proficiency

testing samples to another lab for analysis.

                                         III

      Perhaps seeing the writing on the wall, Wade supplements its statutory

argument with another approach. Even if it violated the statute, Wade submits, it

did so only at the direction and with the approval of CMS. Wade points to the

2005 statement by the CMS field investigator urging Wade to seek out

opportunities for “training and comparison testing of the[ir] equipment” with

other certified labs. Wade also points to the remedial plan it submitted to CMS

where it made mention of its correspondence with Muskogee. Because CMS

urged or at least tacitly approved its cooperation with other labs, Wade maintains,

the government should be estopped from complaining that it did just that. The

DAB of course disagreed with this line of argument, and we cannot say that its

factual findings lack substantial evidence or that its legal rulings were erroneous.




                                         -8-
      To the contrary, winning an equitable estoppel argument against the

government is a tough business. Courts generally invoke estoppel against the

government “only when it does not frustrate the purpose of the statutes expressing

the will of Congress or unduly undermine the enforcement of the public laws.”

FDIC v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 1489 (10th Cir. 1994). In addition to requiring the

traditional elements of estoppel, we require the party claiming estoppel to show

“affirmative misconduct on the part of the government”; mere “erroneous advice”

will not do. Id. at 1489-90 (noting that traditional elements of estoppel are (1)

the party to be estopped must have known the facts; (2) that party must have

intended that its conduct would be acted on or must have acted such that the party

asserting estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the asserting party

must have been ignorant of the true facts; and (4) the asserting party must have

relied on the other party’s conduct to his injury); see also INS v. Miranda, 459

U.S. 14, 17–19 (1982); Board of County Comm’rs of County of Adams v. Isaac,

18 F.3d 1492, 1499 (10th Cir. 1994). Courts are parsimonious about estoppel

claims against the government for good reason: “When the government is unable

to enforce the law because the conduct of its agents has given rise to an estoppel,

the interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedience to the rule of law is

undermined.” Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S.

51, 60 (1984). The public should not have to suffer, the reasoning goes, because

of a bureaucratic bungle. See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414,

                                          -9-
422 (1990) (noting that the Supreme Court had, to date, “reversed every finding

of estoppel that [it had] reviewed”).

      Wade does not come even close to meeting its burden under this standard.

Wade stresses that a CMS representative suggested the lab work with another

certified lab to train its employees and confirm the reliability of its equipment.

But there’s no hint in the record that CMS erroneously advised Wade that it could

or should share proficiency testing samples with another lab prior to handing in

its own proficiency test results (let alone that CMS engaged in any affirmative act

of misconduct). Teachers often allow students to work collaboratively to prepare

for an exam or to discuss answers after an exam, but that is no license for

students to share thoughts and answers during the exam. Under the statute, Wade

might have been free to work with another lab to train its personnel and to fix its

equipment, but it’s a very different thing to compare results during the testing

process.

      Wade replies by pointing to its remedial plan. There, Wade told CMS that

it intended to “continue internal proficiency testing with assistance and

support/guidance” from Muskogee. Even if one could read this statement as

clearly notifying CMS of Wade’s intent to break the law – a debatable enough

proposition – CMS said nothing in response. CMS did not condone or applaud

Wade’s plan. Silence, of course, does not rise to the level of giving erroneous

advice – which is still insufficient to warrant estoppel against the government –

                                         -10-
let alone to the level of “affirmative misconduct” required to warrant estoppel

against the government.

                                                   The petition for review is denied.




                                        -11-