FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
July 31, 2009
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
__________________________
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA ,
Plaintiff - Appellee ,
v. No. 09-4013
( D. Utah )
M IGU EL AV ALO S-VA SQUEZ , (D.Ct. Nos. 2:07-CV-00948-TC and
2:04-CR-00708-JTG-DN -ALL )
Defendant - Appellant .
____________________________
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before H ARTZ , EBEL , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has agreed to
honor A ppellant’s waiver of oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir.
R. 34.1(G). Therefore, this case stands submitted on the briefs.
M iguel Avalos-Vasquez, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 seeks a
certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal from the district court’s denial of his
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Citation
to orders and judgments is not prohibited. Fed. R. App. 32.1. But it is discouraged,
except when related to law of the case, issue preclusion or claim preclusion. Any citation
to an order and judgment must be accompanied by an appropriate parenthetical notation --
(unpublished). 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
1
We construe pro se pleadings liberally. Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 318
F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).
motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
I. BACKGROUND
Avalos-Vasquez was sentenced to 120 months (the statutory minimum)
after pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of actual
m etham phetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii). On
direct appeal, his attorney filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
739 (1967), and moved to withdraw claiming there were no nonfrivolous issues to
be raised on appeal. W e agreed, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and
dismissed the appeal. See United States v. Avalos-Vasquez, 250 Fed. Appx. 235,
237-38 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished).
Avalos-Vasquez filed a M otion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by
a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming his guilty plea
was involuntary due to his mental illness and/or incompetency and his appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence in support of a sentencing
downward departure. The district court denied relief, concluding the evidence
demonstrated Avalos-Vasquez’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and he
had received a downward departure to the lowest sentence allowed by law, the
statutory minimum. Avalos-Vasquez filed a notice of appeal. W e dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal w as untimely. See United States
v. Avalos-Vasquez, No. 09-4000 (10th Cir. Feb. 3, 2009).
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Eight months after the district court denied his § 2255 motion, Avalos-
Vasquez filed a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court denied the motion concluding it
lacked jurisdiction over the motion because Avalos-V asquez’s case was closed.
Avalos-Vasquez filed a timely notice of appeal. The district court did not act on
the notice of appeal; this silence is deemed a denial of a COA. See Fed. R. App.
P. 22(b) (“If an applicant files a notice of appeal, the district judge who rendered
the judgment must either issue a [COA] or state why a certificate should not
issue.”); 10th Cir. R. 22.1(C) (“The district court must consider the propriety of
issuing a [CO A] in the first instance. Failure of the district court to issue a
[COA] within thirty days of filing the notice of appeal shall be deemed a
denial.”). Avalos-V asquez seeks a COA from this Court.
II. D ISC USSIO N
The district court denied Avalos-Vasquez’s Rule 60(b) motion without
determining whether it represented a second or successive § 2255 motion. “Our
first task, therefore, is to consider each of the issues raised in the motion in order
to determine whether it represents a second or successive petition, a ‘true’ Rule
60(b) motion, or a mixed motion,” i.e., “a motion containing both true Rule 60(b)
allegations and second or successive habeas claims.” Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d
1213, 1217, 1224 (10th Cir. 2006).
In his Rule 60(b) motion, Avalos-Vasquez argued (1) he did not receive the
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government’s response to his § 2255 motion and as a result he was denied the
opportunity to file a traverse (reply) brief in violation of his due process rights
and (2) his counsel’s ineffectiveness caused him to receive an additional 60
months imprisonment and denied him his right to a direct appeal of his illegal
sentence. The first argument is a true Rule 60(b) allegation because it
“challenges a defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding.” Id. at
1216; see also United States v. Luke-Sanchez, No. 08-4200, 2009 W L 1303150, at
*1 (10th Cir. M ay 11, 2009) (unpublished) (stating Rule 60(b) motion based on
government’s failure to serve its response on petitioner and petitioner’s inability
to file a reply brief is a true motion); United States v. Cleaver, No. 08-1330, 2009
W L 903408, at * 1 (10th Cir. Apr. 6, 2009) (unpublished) (same). 2 The latter
argument, however, constitutes a second or successive habeas claim because “it in
substance or effect asserts or reasserts a federal basis for relief from the
petitioner’s underlying conviction.” Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1215-16. Therefore, w e
are confronted with a “mixed motion” and address each claim separately.
A. Rule 60(b) Allegation
A COA is required to appeal from the denial of a true Rule 60(b) motion.
See United States v. Pullen, 285 Fed. Appx. 535, 536 (10th Cir. 2008)
(unpublished) (§ 2255 proceeding), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1018 (2009); Spitznas,
2
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent. 10th Cir. R. App. P. 32.1(A).
We mention Luke-Sanchez and Cleaver as we would opinions from another circuit,
persuasive because of their reasoned analyses.
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464 F.3d at 1218 (§ 2254 proceeding). W e will issue a CO A only if the petitioner
“has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a petitioner must demonstrate “that
reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotations omitted). “W hen the district
court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the
prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner
shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.” Id.
The district court denied the Rule 60(b) motion for lack of jurisdiction
because Avalos-Vasquez’s case was closed. This was error because a district
court retains jurisdiction in civil cases to consider and deny a Rule 60(b) motion
even after an appeal has been taken. See Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. United
States SEC, 748 F.2d 1415, 1420 (10th Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, Avalos-Vasquez
is not entitled to a C OA .
“Relief under Rule 60(b) is extraordinary and may only be granted in
exceptional circumstances.” Davis v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 507 F.3d 1246, 1248
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(10th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). This case is no exception. The district
court denied Avalos-Vasquez’s § 2255 motion on the merits because his claims
failed as a matter of law . W e fail to see, and Avalos-V asquez does not suggest,
how he could have corrected these shortcomings with a traverse brief.
B. Second or Successive Claim
Avalos-Vasquez may only file a second or successive § 2255 motion if he
first obtains authorization from this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
United States v. Harper, 545 F.3d 1230, 1232 (10th Cir. 2008). He did not obtain
such authorization. Had the district court properly construed Avalos-Vasquez’s
Rule 60(b) motion as alleging an unauthorized second or successive habeas claim,
it would have had two options: (1) transfer the claim to this Court to decide
whether to permit a second or successive § 2255 proceeding if the transfer would
be in the “interests of justice” or (2) dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction
because a district court has no authority to entertain a second or successive
§ 2255 motion unauthorized by this court. Id. The district court did neither
because it erroneously concluded it did not have jurisdiction over Avalos-
Vasquez’s motion as the case was closed. In any event, had the court transferred
the claim to this Court for a determination of whether to permit a successive §
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2255 motion, we would have denied such permission because the claim does not
satisfy the requirements of § 2255(h). 3
Had the district court dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction because it
has no authority to entertain a second or successive § 2255 claim absent our
authorization, we would have denied a COA as no reasonable jurists could debate
the court’s decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 1233 (“[W ]e hold
that the district court’s dismissal of an unauthorized § 2255 motion is a final
order in a proceeding under section 2255 such that § 2253 requires petitioner to
obtain a COA before he or she may appeal.”) (quotations omitted). Avalos-
Vasquez’s claim that counsel’s ineffectiveness caused him to receive an
additional 60 months imprisonment and denied him his right to a direct appeal is
“a challenge to the legality of [his] detention . . . [which] must be brought
pursuant to § 2255 unless it appears that the remedy by this motion is inadequate
or ineffective.” Id. (quotations omitted). Avalos-V asquez did not demonstrate
the § 2255 remedy would be inadequate or ineffective and therefore he was
3
Section 2255(h) provides:
A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of
the appropriate court of appeals to contain--
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence
as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.
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required to pursue his claim under § 2255. “[O]nce this is established, it then
follows as a matter of course— as [Avalos-V asquez’s] motion was indisputably
successive and unauthorized by this court— that the district court [would have]
had no jurisdiction to proceed.” Id. at 1234.
This matter is DISM ISSED. Avalos-Vasquez’s motion to proceed in form a
pauperis on appeal is GR ANTED.
Entered by the C ourt:
Terrence L. O ’Brien
United States Circuit Judge
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