FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 4, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK A. TURNER,
Plaintiff/Counter-Claim-
Defendant–Appellee/Cross-
Appellant,
v. Nos. 07-6031 & 08-6097
(D.C. No. 5:04-CV-00793-W)
A. PASSMORE & SONS INC., (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant/Counter-Claimant–
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
and
JIM A. PASSMORE, individually and
his official capacity as agent of
defendant,
Defendant/Counter-Claimant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, BALDOCK, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Defendant A. Passmore & Sons, Inc. (“APSI”) appeals from a jury verdict
awarding damages in the amount of $200,000 to its former employee, plaintiff
Patrick A. Turner. 1 Mr. Turner cross-appeals, asking us to reverse the district
court’s decision denying his post-judgment motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and
prejudgment interest. Exercising jurisdiction over these appeals under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I. APSI’s Appeal (No. 07-6031)
A. Relevant Background
APSI, a trucking company in Altus, Oklahoma, hired Mr. Turner to be its
general manger under an employment agreement dated August 28, 2003
(“Agreement”). Mr. Turner began work in September 2003 but left shortly after
in February 2004. In June 2004, he filed this lawsuit against APSI in federal
district court, asserting a myriad of claims arising out of the parties’ brief
employment relationship. 2 The only claim relevant to this appeal, however, is
Count I, in which initially he charged APSI with breach of contract for
terminating him in violation of the Agreement. In support of this claim,
1
Mr. Turner’s claims against APSI’s founder, Jim A. Passmore, were
resolved prior to trial and are not before us in this appeal.
2
Federal jurisdiction was premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1332, as
Mr. Turner included some federal claims, not relevant here, and also alleged
complete diversity of citizenship.
-2-
Mr. Turner alleged that APSI failed to timely pay him his Fourth Quarter 2003
bonus as required under the Agreement, and that this failure constituted a material
breach of the Agreement and a termination of his employment. In June 2005,
APSI successfully moved to dismiss the breach of contract claim on the basis that
the Agreement did not alter the parties’ at-will employment relationship under
Oklahoma law.
Mr. Turner filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in January 2006.
The allegations in the FAC were substantially similar to those in the original
complaint, but Mr. Turner changed the name of Count I from “Breach of
Contract” to “Unjust Enrichment.” As in the original complaint, he alleged that
APSI “refused to pay [him] money for work he had already completed pursuant to
[the] terms of the Contract.” Aplt. App. at 54. APSI promptly filed a motion for
summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim. APSI
argued that Mr. Turner’s renamed Count I was simply an underhanded attempt to
reallege his breach of contract claim based on wrongful termination, which the
court had already rejected. By order dated March 1, 2006, the district court
rejected APSI’s argument and denied its request to dismiss Count I, the unjust
enrichment claim. It held Mr. Turner had properly alleged that he had provided
services to APSI, for which APSI had refused to compensate him.
On June 30, 2006, APSI filed a second motion for summary judgment,
seeking dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, and also seeking to invalidate
-3-
the Agreement’s liquidated damages provision (“Section Five”) as an
unenforceable penalty under Oklahoma law. The district court denied this motion
on August 16, 2006. With respect to the unjust enrichment claim, it held that
“Turner’s use of the phrase ‘Unjust Enrichment’ as the caption for Count I [did]
not constrain the Court’s treatment of [the claim] or its examination of the
allegations supporting the same.” Id. at 216 n.8. The court went on to note that it
would construe Mr. Turner’s claims so as to do substantial justice and stressed
that “[t]he defendants . . .[had] had sufficient notice of this imprecisely-named
cause of action and the allegations giving rise to it.” Id. Those allegations, the
court held, included Mr. Turner’s claim that APSI had failed to timely pay him
his Fourth Quarter bonus for the year 2003. It clarified that despite the parties’
at-will employment relationship, Mr. Turner could “nevertheless recover those
amounts, if any, that had accrued prior to the date of his departure,” including
“his Fourth Quarter 2003 bonus, if [he] [could] establish his entitlement to the
same.” Id. at 217 (citation omitted). The court reserved judgment as to APSI’s
challenge to Section Five pending a more thorough examination of the facts at
trial.
On September 14, 2006, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Turner
on Count I and awarded him $200,000 in damages. Pressing the same arguments
as before, APSI moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the
-4-
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court denied its motion and entered
judgment on the jury verdict in favor of Mr. Turner. This appeal followed.
B. Discussion
We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law
under Rule 50, making all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party,
in this case Mr. Turner. Smith v. United States, 555 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir.
2009). “Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if the evidence points but
one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may support the
opposing party’s position.” Loughridge v. Chiles Power Supply Co., 431 F.3d
1268, 1280 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
APSI challenges the district court’s decision to allow Mr. Turner’s unjust
enrichment claim to go to the jury as well as its enforcement of Section Five.
Employing a shotgun approach with respect to its first argument, APSI contends
that Count I of the FAC should have been thrown out for a variety of reasons. It
argues, for example, that Mr. Turner had an adequate remedy at law; that he
should not have been allowed to pursue two theories based on the same set of
facts; and that Count I was actually a breach of contract claim masquerading as
unjust enrichment. None of these arguments are persuasive. The record plainly
reveals that regardless of how he titled the cause of action, Mr. Turner alleged
and proved at trial that APSI committed a material breach of their Agreement by
-5-
failing to pay him his Fourth Quarter bonus for the year 2003. 3 The breach of
contract claim in Mr. Turner’s original complaint sought redress for this breach,
but also for APSI’s alleged wrongful termination of his employment. The district
court dismissed the latter aspect of the breach of contract claim under the
employment-at-will doctrine. Perhaps unwisely, Mr. Turner elected to reallege
his bonus claim under a theory of unjust enrichment. However, as we have
previously observed, the federal rules are “intended to promote the objective of
deciding cases on their merits rather than in terms of the relative pleading skills
of counsel.” Green Country Food Mkt., Inc. v. Bottling Group, LLC, 371 F.3d
1275, 1280 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). And with this
purpose in mind, the district court sent the so-called unjust enrichment claim to
the jury, noting that APSI had been on notice from the inception of the case of its
alleged misconduct and the contractual basis underlying Mr. Turner’s claim for
relief. For the same reason, we reject any notion that APSI was somehow
prejudiced by the amendment of Mr. Turner’s complaint or the jury’s
consideration of the unjust enrichment claim.
3
We know this because the jury returned a verdict in Mr. Turner’s favor on
the unjust enrichment claim. Pursuant to Jury Instruction No. 12, it could not
have done so unless Mr. Turner “prove[d] by the greater weight of the evidence
the following essential elements: (1) that he was entitled to the incentive
compensation or bonus under the terms of the parties’ employment agreement;
and (2) that [APSI] wrongfully failed to pay [him] the amount to which he was
entitled.” Aplt. Supp. App. at 25.
-6-
We also agree with Mr. Turner that the district court’s judgment was
mandated by Rule 54(c), which provides that a final judgment other than a default
judgment “should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party
has not demanded that relief in its pleadings.” Again, this rule stresses the
“federal rules’ simplification of procedure and rejection of formalism.” Reynolds
v. Slaughter, 541 F.2d 254, 256 (10th Cir. 1976) (rejecting defendants’ assertion
that plaintiff elected irrevocably to sue only for breach of contract and affirming
trial court’s grant of restitution as consistent with proof under Rule 54(c)).
We also reject APSI’s challenge to the district court’s ruling concerning
Section Five of the Agreement, the liquidated damages clause. Section Five
required APSI, upon breaching the Agreement, to pay Mr. Turner “his monthly
base compensation, and all previously used benefits, incentives . . . and
perquisites for a period of 12 months as though he were employed.” Aplt. App. at
31. The district court determined as a matter of Oklahoma law that this provision
did not constitute an unenforceable penalty:
Turner, who had the burden of establishing [the enforceability of
Section 5], had proven by the greater weight of the evidence that the
damages caused by a breach of the Agreement would be difficult to
estimate accurately, that the parties intended to provide for damages
rather than for a penalty and that the amounts set forth in Section 5
were a reasonable pre-breach estimate of Turner’s probable loss.
Id. at 289 (citation omitted). It therefore concluded that if Mr. Turner could
prove a material breach by APSI, he would be entitled to the damages set forth in
-7-
Section Five, and it later found no basis to overturn the jury’s verdict. APSI has
failed to persuade us that the district court’s legal rulings on this issue were
incorrect under Oklahoma law or that the evidence before the jury pointed but one
way and was susceptible to no reasonable inferences in support of Mr. Turner’s
position. Loughridge, 431 F.3d at 1280. We therefore conclude that the district
court correctly denied APSI’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on this
issue.
II. Turner’s Cross-Appeal (No. 08-6097)
A. Timeliness
In his own post-judgment motion, Mr. Turner requested an award of
attorneys’ fees, costs, and prejudgment interest under the Agreement. The district
court denied the motion, concluding that the jury had considered these amounts in
calculating his damages award. Mr. Turner’s cross-appeal seeks a review of this
decision. First, however, we must examine our authority to consider the
cross-appeal since Mr. Turner seemingly failed to file his notice of cross-appeal
within the time limits set forth in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure. See Miller ex rel. S.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch.,
565 F.3d 1232, 1250 (10th Cir. 2009) (reaffirming “our independent duty to
examine our own jurisdiction”) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court entered its order denying the post-judgment motions on
January 16, 2007. APSI filed a timely notice of appeal on February 9. Under
-8-
Rule 4(a)(3), Mr. Turner had fourteen days from that date, until February 23, to
file a notice of cross-appeal as of right. Under Rule 4(a)(5), he had an additional
thirty days, until March 25, to request an extension of that time period upon a
showing of excusable neglect or good cause. But Mr. Turner, a reservist in the
United States Army, was recalled to active duty and sent to Iraq in January 2007.
And it is undisputed that he did not file his notice of cross-appeal, or seek an
extension of the time period in which to do so, until April 23, 2008, about three
months after his return. This was over a year past the deadlines set forth in Rule
4. He argues, however, that his notice of cross-appeal should be considered
timely under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (“SCRA” or “Act”), 50 U.S.C.
app. §§ 501-96, and a stay order that we issued under the Act.
i. Jurisdiction
This court has long considered the time limit prescribed in Rule 4(a)(3) for
asserting a cross-appeal to be mandatory and jurisdictional. E.g., Savage v.
Cache Valley Dairy Ass’n, 737 F.2d 887, 889 (10th Cir. 1984); cf. Woodruff v.
Covington, 389 F.3d 1117, 1120 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that “[t]he time limits of
Rule 4 are prerequisites to our jurisdiction” in considering whether notice of
cross-appeal was timely under Rule 4(a)(3) (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted)). In a string of recent cases, however, the Supreme Court has
admonished against the casual labeling of all inflexible deadlines as
“jurisdictional.” See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004) (holding that
-9-
Bankruptcy Rule 4004 is not jurisdictional but an “inflexible claim-processing
rule” that is forfeited if not timely raised); Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12,
16 (2005) (per curiam) (holding the same with respect to Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 33 and 45). “Clarity would be facilitated,” the Court urged in
Kontrick, if litigants and courts alike would refrain from labeling all
claim-processing rules as “jurisdictional,” explaining that the term is appropriate
to describe only “prescriptions delineating the classes of cases . . . and the
persons . . . falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority.” 540 U.S. at 455;
see also id. at 454 (holding that “the filing deadlines prescribed in Bankruptcy
Rules 4004 and 9006(b)(3) are claim-processing rules that do not delineate what
cases bankruptcy courts are competent to adjudicate”).
In Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007), the Court
expanded on the distinction between court-promulgated rules and limits enacted
by Congress, stressing the jurisdictional significance of the latter. The Court held
the district court had acted beyond its jurisdiction in that case by extending the
petitioner’s time period for filing an appeal by seventeen days when Congress had
authorized district courts to extend the filing period by only fourteen days. The
Court explained,
Like the initial 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal, the limit
on how long a district court may reopen that period is set forth in
a statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c). Because Congress specifically
limited the amount of time by which district courts can extend the
notice-of-appeal period in § 2107(c), that limitation is more than
-10-
a simple “claim-processing rule.” As we have long held, when an
appeal has not been prosecuted in the manner directed, within the
time limited by the acts of Congress, it must be dismissed for want
of jurisdiction.
Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2366 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court
noted, and as this court had already held in Alva v. Teen Help, 469 F.3d 946, 948
(10th Cir. 2006), the thirty-day limit for filing a notice of appeal under Rule
4(a)(1) derives from statute and is therefore not merely an inflexible
claim-processing rule, but a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction.
By contrast, no federal statute prescribes the time period for filing a notice
of cross-appeal. Therefore, the fourteen-day period set forth in Rule 4(a)(3)
would appear to be a claim-processing rule, which does not delineate a class of
cases that this court is competent to adjudicate. See Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 452,
454 (explaining that “[o]nly Congress may determine a lower federal court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction” and concluding that filing deadlines prescribed in
certain court-promulgated bankruptcy rules “do not delineate what cases
bankruptcy courts are competent to adjudicate”); see also United States v.
Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 744 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that Rule 4(b)(1) is a
claim-processing rule and not jurisdictional). We therefore conclude that
Mr. Turner’s failure to file a timely notice of cross-appeal does not create a
jurisdictional impediment to this court’s consideration.
-11-
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court requires judicial compliance with
claim-processing rules when they are properly invoked by an adverse party.
See Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 17 (holding that “district courts must observe the clear
limits of the Rules of Criminal Procedure when they are properly invoked”);
Mitchell, 518 F.3d at 744 (holding that “the time bar in Rule 4(b) must be
enforced by this court when properly invoked by the government”). The Second
Circuit has applied this mandate to dismiss a cross-appeal filed just one day late,
holding that the adverse party’s challenge to the cross-appeal on timeliness
grounds compelled a strict application of Rule 4(a)(3) under Eberhart. In re
Johns-Manville Corp., 476 F.3d 118, 120-24 (2d Cir. 2007). In this case, APSI
invoked the time bar of Rule 4(a)(3) on April 28, 2008, when it filed an objection
in the district court to Mr. Turner’s motion for an extension of time to file his
notice of cross-appeal. Accordingly, unless the notice of cross-appeal can be
considered timely by virtue of the SCRA and this court’s stay, dismissal of the
cross-appeal would appear to be mandatory. Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 18. We
therefore turn to Mr. Turner’s arguments under the Act.
ii. The SCRA
Two sections of the Act are arguably applicable, § 522 and § 526.
Section 522 provides that a court may, on its own motion, and must at the
servicemember’s request, stay any proceeding in which a servicemember is a
party, under certain conditions. Section 526 is a tolling provision that appears to
-12-
be triggered automatically when a servicemember is called to active duty. We
address both provisions, beginning with the latter (i.e., § 526).
a. Section 526
Section 526 provides in relevant part:
(a) Tolling of statutes of limitation during military service
The period of a servicemember’s military service may not be
included in computing any period limited by law, regulation, or order
for the bringing of any action or proceeding in a court, or in any
board, bureau, commission, department, or other agency of a State
(or political subdivision of a State) or the United States by or against
the servicemember or the servicemember’s heirs, executors,
administrators, or assigns.
50 U.S.C. app. § 526(a). It is debatable whether this section even applies under
the circumstances of this case, since Mr. Turner is not seeking to toll a statute of
limitation but a deadline in a pending action that was timely filed. But assuming
it does apply, § 526 cannot save Mr. Turner’s notice of cross-appeal from being
late. It is undisputed that he was discharged from active duty no later than
January 29, 2008, when he so advised this court. Accordingly, Mr. Turner’s
“period of military service” and its attendant tolling ended on that date, and the
fourteen-day-time-period to file a notice of cross-appeal began to run. The
fourteen days expired on February 12, 2008, and the additional thirty days
allowed for an extension under Rule 4(a)(5) expired on March 13, 2008.
Mr. Turner did not move for an extension of time until April 23, 2008. His
argument under § 526 is therefore unavailing.
-13-
b. Section 522
Section 522 provides in relevant part:
(b) Stay of proceedings
(1) Authority for stay
At any stage before final judgment in a civil action or
proceeding in which a servicemember described in subsection
(a) is a party, the court may on its own motion and shall, upon
application by the servicemember, stay the action for a period
of not less than 90 days . . . .
50 U.S.C. app. § 522(b). Mr. Turner successfully petitioned this court for a stay
of APSI’s appeal on March 15, 2007. This was after his fourteen-day period to
file a notice of cross-appeal as of right had expired, but only twenty days into the
additional thirty days allotted under Rule 4(a)(5) for seeking an extension of time.
Our stay was in effect until April 21, 2008. Accordingly, if we do not count the
period of the stay in calculating Mr. Turner’s cross-appeal deadline, he still had
ten days from April 21, 2008, or until May 1, 2008, to file a motion under Rule
4(a)(5). Since he filed such a motion on April 23, 2008, it would be considered
timely. This of course depends on construing the stay order as having suspended
Mr. Turner’s filing deadlines under Rule 4(a)(5). We can do so for the reasons
discussed above. That is, because the filing deadline applicable to a notice of
cross-appeal, unlike a notice of appeal, is not jurisdictional, but is set forth in a
claim-processing rule, we have discretion to set it aside. In this case, justice is
best served by construing this court’s stay order as having suspended all deadlines
-14-
applicable to the appeal, including the cross-appeal deadline. 4 Thus, Mr. Turner’s
clock recommenced on April 21, 2008, when the stay was lifted, and his notice of
cross-appeal filed two days later was timely.
Of course, our determination that the notice of cross-appeal was timely
leaves APSI without a proper challenge under Rule 4, and renders the Court’s
admonition in Eberhart, that claim-processing rules be strictly enforced when
properly invoked, inapplicable to the facts of this case. We therefore proceed to
the merits of Mr. Turner’s cross-appeal.
B. Merits
Mr. Turner claims he is entitled to his attorneys’ fees, costs, and
prejudgment interest under the Agreement, and accuses the district court of
impermissibly basing its denial of these damages on a speculative finding that the
jury included them in its damages award. 5 We review the district court’s
resolution of this issue for an abuse of discretion. Specialty Beverages, L.L.C. v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 537 F.3d 1165, 1183 (10th Cir. 2008). But “we review de
4
This result is most in harmony with the Act’s purpose of “provid[ing] for
the temporary suspension of judicial and administrative proceedings and
transactions that may adversely affect the civil rights of servicemembers during
their military service.” 50 U.S.C. app. § 502(2).
5
Quite apart from the Agreement, Mr. Turner also claims he is entitled to his
attorneys’ fees under Oklahoma law, see 12 Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 936, but since he
failed to make this argument to the district court, we decline to consider it on
appeal. See Rosewood Servs., Inc., v. Sunflower Diversified Servs., Inc., 413 F.3d
1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding argument not asserted before district court
is waived on appeal).
-15-
novo any statutory interpretation or other legal analysis underlying the district
court’s decision and review for clear error any supporting findings of fact.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Section Sixteen of the Agreement provided that APSI would be held liable
for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Mr. Turner in order to enforce the
Agreement. Aplt. App. at 33. In Section Six, APSI agreed to pay interest on any
amount that it owed Mr. Turner at a rate of 1.5% per month. Id. at 31. The
district court denied Mr. Turner’s request for these amounts, however, because it
concluded that “such items were presented to, and arguably considered by, the
jury” in calculating Mr. Turner’s $200,000 damages award. Id. at 290. We
conclude that this finding of fact is clearly erroneous and must be vacated to the
extent that it relates to Mr. Turner’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs. On the
other hand, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in denying
Mr. Turner’s request for interest.
The jury found, in a simple verdict form, that APSI was liable on
Mr. Turner’s claim for unjust enrichment and awarded damages on this claim in
the amount of $200,000. The jury did not answer special interrogatories or
otherwise indicate how it arrived at this amount. Accordingly, we must presume
it calculated the award based on the Agreement—particularly, Section Five.
Regarding Section Five, the district court specifically instructed:
-16-
If you find that Turner has proven by the greater weight of the
evidence that the failure to pay the bonus was a material breach of
the parties’ agreement, then you must decide the amount of
compensation as outlined in Section 5 to which Turner is entitled.
Aplt. Supp. App. at 29 (Jury Instruction 13A); see Questar Pipeline Co. v.
Grynberg, 201 F.3d 1277, 1287 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that absent a reason to
conclude otherwise, “[j]uries are presumed to follow the court’s instructions”).
Section Five of the Agreement set forth how Mr. Turner would be
compensated in the event of a material breach by APSI, providing, in relevant
part, that APSI would pay Mr. Turner his monthly base compensation, plus
certain benefits, incentives, and perquisites, for a period of twelve months. In a
pre-trial report filed in February 2005, Mr. Turner claimed that these damages
equaled approximately $170,000. Aplt. App. at 37. At that point in time, he
claimed an additional $30,000 in interest, for a total of $200,000, not including
attorney’s fees. This is the amount the jury ultimately awarded.
As for the interest, notably the entire Agreement was admitted into
evidence, including the interest provision. And the jury heard extensive
testimony concerning the timing of APSI’s alleged breach, which would have
been the accrual date for any interest liability. During his closing, Mr. Turner’s
counsel urged the jury to consider the Agreement’s interest provision in arriving
at an award. In light of this, we conclude that the district court’s finding that
the jury’s award included an interest component was, at least arguably, correct.
-17-
More to the point, in our view the district court did not clearly err in making
this finding.
On the other hand, there appears to be no sound basis for the court’s
identical assumption concerning attorneys’ fees. Significantly, in contrast to
prejudgment interest, the jury was not presented with any evidence of what
Mr. Turner’s attorneys’ fees were in this case. Thus, if it had included an
attorneys’ fees award, the amount of that award would have been based on sheer
speculation and could not have stood in any event. See, e.g., Scott v. Anchor
Motor Freight , Inc., 496 F.2d 276, 282 (6th Cir. 1974) (reversing as speculative
portion of award representing attorneys’ fees because of a complete lack of
evidence as to proper amount).
The district court’s assumption that the jury considered attorneys’ fees
in its calculation appears to be based on a few instances where attorneys’ fees
were mentioned during the course of the trial. At one point during Mr. Turner’s
cross-examination, APSI’s lawyer asked him whether he had proposed the
contractual provision relating to legal fees. Aplee. Supp. App. at 161. At another
point, Mr. Turner testified that the attorneys’ fees provision was the subject of
intense negotiation between him and Jim Passmore. Aplt. Supp. App. at 9. And
during his closing, Mr. Turner’s counsel argued that damages, including legal fees
-18-
and costs, added up to $303,257. 6 Id. at 11. These stray comments did not
constitute evidence from which the jury could calculate the amount expended by
Mr. Turner to prosecute this lawsuit, and there is nothing to indicate that the jury
was charged with making this calculation. The district court therefore abused its
discretion in denying Mr. Turner’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs based on
an unfounded assumption. Cf. Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 874-75
(2d Cir. 1998) (holding that district court abused its discretion in presuming jury
award included prejudgment interest because prejudgment interest was never
mentioned). On the other hand, as we noted above, the jurors did have before
them the necessary information to calculate prejudgment interest under the
Agreement, and we cannot say that the district court’s finding that they included
prejudgment interest in their award was clearly erroneous. We therefore leave
undisturbed the portion of its order denying Mr. Turner’s request for prejudgment
interest but reverse its denial of attorneys’ fees and costs, and we remand for the
calculation and award of these amounts.
6
He also stated that it was “within the jury’s power to leave that subject to
later presentation to the court.” Id.
-19-
III. Conclusion
In appeal No. 07-6031, we AFFIRM the district court’s order denying
APSI’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. In appeal No. 08-6097, we
AFFIRM the district court’s denial of prejudgment interest, but we REVERSE
its denial of attorneys’ fees and costs and REMAND for further proceedings
consistent with this Order and Judgment.
Entered for the Court
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
-20-