FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 25, 2009
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
PUBLISH Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
NORTH AMERICAN SPECIALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-
Appellee,
v. Nos. 07-7115 & 08-7000
BRITT PAULK INSURANCE
AGENCY, INCORPORATED, a
foreign corporation,
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-
Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 6:06-CV-00215-JHP)
Eric Mareshie (James K. Secrest, II, and Edward J. Main, with him on the briefs),
Secrest, Hill & Butler, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff–Appellant–Cross-Appellee.
Joseph R. Farris (Paula J. Quillin, Thayla P. Bohn, and Jeremy K. Ward, with him
on the briefs), Feldman Franden Woodard & Farris, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for
Defendant–Appellee–Cross-Appellant.
Before LUCERO, O’BRIEN, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
North American Specialty Insurance Co. (“North American”) sued its
general agent, Britt Paulk Insurance Agency, Inc. (“Britt Paulk”), and its limited
agent, Argenia, Inc. (“Argenia”), 1 alleging that the latter two companies
wrongfully caused North American to settle a bad faith lawsuit brought against it
by two insureds. North American claimed that Britt Paulk and Argenia were
liable for negligence and that Britt Paulk was liable for breach of contract and
contractual indemnification. A jury returned verdicts in favor of North American
and against Britt Paulk on all three claims.
After trial, consistent with the jury’s verdict, the district court entered
judgment in favor of North American on two claims: negligence and breach of
contract. But the district court entered judgment in favor of Britt Paulk and
against North American on the contractual indemnification claim, finding that it
was duplicative of the breach of contract claim. Both North American and Britt
Paulk appeal.
North American argues that none of its claims is duplicative of any other,
and it therefore is entitled to the awarded damages on all three. Britt Paulk
responds that there was insufficient evidence of causation to support any of the
jury’s findings, that exclusion of expert testimony and improper closing
arguments require a new trial, and that in any event all three claims were
1
Argenia is not a party to this appeal.
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duplicative and thus North American should be allowed to recover on one at most.
In all respects, we conclude that North American is correct. Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand. 2
I
Jerry and Nikki McDonald (“the McDonalds”) had a farm. On this farm
they had some chickens. They cooped these chickens in poultry houses, which
were insured by North American. Two of the poultry houses were damaged as a
result of blast mining in the area. North American’s insurance policy was
underwritten by Britt Paulk, who in turn employed Argenia as its sub-agent to
deal directly with the McDonalds. In November 2003, Argenia’s representative,
Michael Alexander, was contacted about the damage to the McDonalds’ property.
Upon learning of the property damage, Alexander contacted Curtis
Barham, Britt Paulk’s manager for the poultry property program. In response,
Barham indicated to Alexander that blasting was not covered under the North
American policy. Alexander then relayed that message to Jerry McDonald. North
American was unaware of these conversations.
2
Britt Paulk also appeals the award of attorneys’ fees to North American.
However, because the district court has yet to determine the amount of the
attorneys’ fees award, we lack jurisdiction over that portion of the appeal. Am.
Soda, LLP v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Group, 428 F.3d 921, 924 (10th Cir. 2005)
(“An award of attorneys’ fees is not final and appealable within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1291 until it is reduced to a sum certain.”).
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North American first learned of the McDonalds’ losses in January 2004.
After North American sent an independent adjuster, Bill Haneline, to inspect the
poultry houses, Haneline reported that the McDonalds were not making a claim
but providing notice that the damaged buildings would no longer be used for
raising chickens. Approximately one month later, North American closed the
McDonalds’ claim file.
Unbeknownst to North American, Jerry McDonald continued to request that
Argenia pay his claim. Yet, North American did not hear mention of the
McDonalds again until early 2005 when they sued North American for breach of
contract and bad faith denial of their claim.
After the McDonalds filed suit, North American determined that blasting
was a covered peril, contrary to what Britt Paulk and Argenia told the
McDonalds. North American then paid the McDonalds’ policy limit of $205,000
for the property damage. As for the bad faith component of the lawsuit, North
American and the McDonalds reached a mediated settlement of $1.2 million,
down from the McDonalds’ $2.3 million demand.
In May 2006, North American sued Britt Paulk and Argenia for breach of
contract, negligence, and indemnification. North American alleged that it was
forced to pay damages to the McDonalds on their bad faith claim because Britt
Paulk communicated to the McDonalds that the property damage was not covered
and failed to notify North American of the McDonalds’ attempts to obtain
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payment on their claim. Under the terms of the parties’ contract, Britt Paulk was
barred from investigating, defending, or denying any claim against North
American. Britt Paulk was also contractually required to “give [North American]
prompt written notice of any claim, demand, action, suit, or proceeding raised,
brought, threatened, made, or commenced.”
Prior to trial, North American moved to exclude testimony of Britt Paulk’s
expert Diane L. Luther, who would have testified that North American
mishandled the McDonalds’ claim by deviating from accepted insurance industry
standards of care. Granting the motion to exclude, the district court reasoned that
Luther’s opinion would not be helpful because the jury was perfectly capable of
deciding the case without her testimony. On the same day, the district court
granted Britt Paulk’s motion to exclude testimony by North American’s expert,
Michael Atkinson, for similar reasons.
During the presentation of North American’s case, Jerry McDonald testified
that he paid his premiums to Argenia and therefore understood Argenia to be his
insurance company. Alexander, Argenia’s representative, testified that he
notified Britt Paulk that the McDonalds continued to seek payment. For his part,
Barham, Britt Paulk’s manager for the poultry property program, testified that he
did not recall receiving any such notice. Notably, Barham did not notify North
American about the ongoing discussions or the McDonalds’ expressed desire for
payment.
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After North American concluded its case, Britt Paulk moved for judgment
as a matter of law, which the district court took under advisement. Following
testimony from Britt Paulk’s sole witness, the case proceeded to closing
arguments. During its rebuttal argument, counsel for North American argued that
Britt Paulk and Argenia had failed to produce certain phone records from the
months after North American was notified that the McDonalds did not seek
payment on their claim. North American’s counsel told the jury, “[T]his case
could have been so much simpler if [Britt Paulk or Argenia] would have stepped
up and showed you that phone record.” He reiterated that Britt Paulk and Argenia
“should have felt compelled to bring [the jury] their own client’s [phone]
records,” calling them “the one [thing] they didn’t want to show you.” Britt
Paulk moved for a mistrial. This was denied on the basis stated by the district
court that Britt Paulk had not been prejudiced.
After being instructed against awarding duplicative recoveries, 3 the jury, by
special interrogatories, found that Britt Paulk breached its contract with North
American, directly causing North American to settle with the McDonalds, and
3
Specifically, the jury was instructed:
You must not award damages more than once for the same injury.
For example, if plaintiff prevails on two claims and establishes a
dollar amount for its injuries, you must not award it any additional
damages on each claim. The plaintiff is only entitled to be made
whole once, and may not recover more than it has lost.
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awarded $500,000 on that claim. On the negligence claim, the jury awarded
$250,000 in damages. It found Britt Paulk and Argenia each responsible for 40%
of North American’s negligence damages. North American was itself 20%
responsible. The jury further found Britt Paulk liable to North American for
contractual indemnification in the amount of $250,000.
Judgment was entered in favor of North American on the negligence claim
and the breach of contract claim, including awarding attorneys’ fees. Without
making factual findings regarding duplicative recovery or providing any
explanation, however, the court entered judgment in favor of Britt Paulk and
against North American on the contractual indemnification claim.
North American moved for reconsideration, arguing that the jury awards
were not duplicative. While North American’s motion was pending, Britt Paulk
moved for a new trial and renewed its earlier motion for judgment as a matter of
law. Britt Paulk also moved the court to reconsider its judgment in favor of North
American on both negligence and breach of contract, contending that these
awards amounted to double recovery and that North American was not entitled to
attorneys’ fees. The district court denied all motions, leaving intact the
previously-entered judgment and award of an undetermined amount of attorneys’
fees. North American and Britt Paulk both appeal.
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II
We first consider Britt Paulk’s contention that the district court should have
granted its motion for judgment as a matter of law. We review denial of a motion
for judgment as a matter of law de novo, taking the evidence and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to North American, the
non-movant. Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1214-15 (10th Cir.
2008). “Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if the evidence points but
one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may support the
nonmoving party’s position.” Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Ground Improvement
Techniques, Inc., 532 F.3d 1063, 1081 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). Britt
Paulk contests only whether there was evidence that it caused North American to
have to settle the McDonalds’ bad faith claim.
North American contends that three acts or omissions by Britt Paulk caused
settlement of the bad faith claim: (1) Britt Paulk allowed the creation of a
coverage opinion regarding the McDonald’s property, (2) it allowed that opinion
to be communicated to the McDonalds, and (3) it failed to notify North American
of the McDonalds’ continued efforts to make a claim. Barham, Britt Paulk’s
representative, testified that he told Argenia that he did not think the loss from
blasting would be covered under the North American insurance policy and that he
thought the coverage opinion would be relayed to Jerry McDonald. For his part,
McDonald testified that Alexander informed him that the damage resulting from
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blasting was likely not covered. McDonald testified further that he understood
the opinion communicated by Argenia (generated by Britt Paulk) to be
authoritative because Argenia was the company to whom he sent his payments.
Moreover, ample evidence was presented that Britt Paulk did not notify North
American of the McDonalds’ continued efforts to make a claim.
Britt Paulk responds that it was required only to notify North American of
“new” claims, and because it was unaware that North American had closed its file
in February 2004, Britt Paulk assumed the claim was still pending. We are told,
therefore, that failure to provide notice did not breach a duty Britt Paulk owed to
North American. 4 We disagree. The terms of Britt Paulk’s agreement with North
American provide that Britt Paulk must “give [North American] prompt written
notice of any claim, demand, action, suit, or proceeding raised, brought,
threatened, made, or commenced against [North American].” (Emphasis added).
Based on that language, Britt Paulk was required to notify North American of any
demand made by the McDonalds, not just “new” ones. North American presented
a bounty of evidence to support the jury’s finding Britt Paulk’s acts and omissions
caused North American to settle the McDonalds’ lawsuit.
4
Notwithstanding the label attached by Britt Paulk in its briefing, this
argument does not focus on whether Britt Paulk’s omission caused North
American’s damage.
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III
Britt Paulk also contends that the district court erred by excluding Luther’s
expert testimony. We review a district court’s decision to exclude expert
testimony for abuse of discretion. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137, 152 (1999); Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1223 (10th Cir. 2003).
“[W]e will not disturb the district court’s ruling unless it is arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or manifestly unreasonable or when we are convinced that the district
court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible
choice in the circumstances.” Dodge, 328 F.3d at 1223 (quotation omitted).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993),
establishes a two-part test for admission of expert testimony under Federal Rule
of Evidence 702. First, evidence must be reliable, and second, it must be helpful
to the jury. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590-91; see also Fed. R. Evid. 702. Relying on
what we have called “the touchstone of admissibility” under Daubert, Thompson
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 34 F.3d 932, 941 (10th Cir. 1994) (quotation
omitted), the district court invoked the second prong of this test to exclude
Luther, concluding that the jury was perfectly capable of resolving the issues in
this case without expert testimony. Notably, it also applied this conclusion
evenhandedly to North American’s proposed expert witness, Atkinson.
Britt Paulk contends that the jury should have been permitted to hear
testimony regarding standard insurance industry practice. Such evidence, it
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claims, would help Britt Paulk establish that North American mishandled the
McDonalds’ claim, causing it to settle the bad faith lawsuit. Britt Paulk relies on
Ford v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., 72 F.3d 836 (10th Cir. 1996), for the
proposition that insurance experts may testify regarding industry standards. In
Ford, the district court permitted expert testimony on the issue of bad faith,
overruling an objection that the expert’s testimony was either legally or factually
erroneous. Id. at 841. Britt Paulk’s reliance is misplaced. First, the issue in Ford
is not analogous to the present case. Second, that the district court in Ford did
not abuse its discretion by allowing expert testimony by an insurance industry
expert does not lend measurable support to the contrary position that the district
court in this case abused its discretion by refusing to permit similar testimony.
See Shook v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of County of El Paso, 543 F.3d 597, 603
(10th Cir. 2008).
Thompson is closer to our present case. In Thompson, we affirmed a
district court ruling excluding testimony of an insurance industry expert in a case
alleging bad faith denial and investigation of insurance claims because the “expert
testimony [wa]s offered on an issue that a jury is capable of assessing for itself.”
34 F.3d at 941. As here, the excluded expert would have compared the insurance
company’s actions to the industry standard. Id. For the same reasons, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Luther’s
testimony because it would not assist the trier of fact. As the district court
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recognized, the jury was fully capable of deciding this case without expert
testimony from either party.
IV
Britt Paulk asserts that the district court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial
based on statements North American’s counsel made during the rebuttal portion
of closing argument. Counsel for North American argued that Argenia’s phone
records would have been useful to the issues at trial and that neither Britt Paulk
nor Argenia produced them, thereby intimating that Britt Paulk and Argenia had
something to hide. 5 It is suggested that a mistrial was required both because the
statements were made during rebuttal, thereby depriving Britt Paulk of an
opportunity to respond, and because they referenced evidence not before the jury.
We review denial of a mistrial for abuse of discretion. Towerridge, Inc. v.
T.A.O., Inc., 111 F.3d 758, 769 (10th Cir. 1997). We conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial because it does not
“clearly appear[] that the challenged remarks influenced the verdict.” See
Lambert v. Midwest City Mem’l Hosp. Auth., 671 F.2d 372, 375 (10th Cir. 1982).
As the district court explained, a great deal of testimony described phone
calls between Argenia and Britt Paulk. It was uncontroverted that Britt Paulk did
5
Britt Paulk also contends that the rebuttal argument contained improper
attacks on the credibility or ethics of its lawyers. We decline to address this
argument as it was not raised below. See Sewell v. Great N. Ins. Co., 535 F.3d
1166, 1170 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008).
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not notify North American of developments regarding the McDonalds’ desire for
payment. Moreover, absence of phone records does not bear on whether Britt
Paulk rendered a coverage opinion regarding the McDonalds property, whether
that opinion was relayed to the McDonalds, and whether the McDonalds relied on
it. We have already concluded that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s
liability findings. See Part II, supra. It may well have been improper to imply
that Britt Paulk was hiding evidence, but on this record it does not “clearly
appear” that Britt Paulk was prejudiced. See Lambert, 671 F.2d at 375; cf.
Whittenburg v. Werner Enters. Inc., 561 F.3d 1122, 1131-33 (10th Cir. 2009)
(ordering new trial when counsel made repeated improper remarks during closing
argument, the district court took insufficient curative action, and the size of the
damage award indicated prejudice).
V
Lastly, we consider North American’s contention that the district court
erred in entering judgment for Britt Paulk on the contractual indemnification
claim and Britt Paulk’s related contention that the district court erred in entering
judgment for North American on the negligence claim. “Whether an award is
duplicative is a question of fact, which we review for clear error.” Morrison
Knudsen Corp., 532 F.3d at 1077. An error is clear “only if the court’s finding is
without factual support in the record or if, after reviewing all the evidence, we are
left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Aquila,
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Inc. v. C.W. Mining, 545 F.3d 1258, 1263 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).
When a jury is instructed not to award duplicative damages and it returns a
total damage figure within the range of evidence, we are generally unwilling to
disturb or second guess the jury’s verdict. Questar Pipeline Co. v. Grynberg, 201
F.3d 1277, 1287 (10th Cir. 2000); see also Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist., 343 F.3d
1296, 1306 (10th Cir. 2003) (reiterating the standard presumption that juries
follow their instructions). In the present case, the jury was instructed not to
“award damages more than once for the same injury.” Moreover, the total amount
of damages the jury awarded to North American ($950,000, including the damage
award against Argenia) was lower than the $1.2 million North American paid the
McDonalds. Without making any factual findings to support its conclusion, the
district court determined that the contractual indemnification claim was
duplicative of the breach of contract claim. But this conclusion is belied by the
district court’s own words. In denying a motion for reconsideration, the district
court stated, “The contractual indemnification claim, aside from the ‘cost of
defense’ provision, is duplicative of the breach of contract claim.” (Emphasis
added). Because the jury was instructed to avoid double recovery and the total
damage award was within the range of evidence, the jury’s verdict should not be
upset based on speculation. See Midwest Underground Storage, Inc. v. Porter,
717 F.2d 493, 501 (10th Cir. 1983). In the absence of a factual finding, the
decision that the contractual indemnification claim was duplicative was clearly
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erroneous. 6
Regarding Britt Paulk’s contention that the breach of contract award is
duplicative of the negligence award, our review is again for clear error. See
Morrison Knudsen Corp., 532 F.3d at 1077. On this issue, however, the district
court did not set aside the jury’s verdict. Thus, the district court’s conclusion that
the negligence and breach of contract recoveries were not duplicative squares
with Questar Pipeline Co. and our presumption that juries follow their
instructions. Accordingly, that conclusion was not clearly erroneous.
VI
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED
in all respects save its entry of judgment in favor of Britt Paulk on the contractual
indemnification claim. As to that claim, the judgment of the district court is
REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED with directions to enter judgment in
favor of North American and reinstate the jury’s award.
6
Even had the district court’s conclusion not been clearly erroneous, it
would have been error nonetheless to enter judgment in favor of Britt Paulk to
prevent a double recovery by North American. Rather, in a case of double
recovery, a district court “should reduce the judgment by the amount of the
duplication” but not enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Morrison Knudsen
Corp., 532 F.3d at 1079.
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