FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 31, 2009
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
PUBLISH Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
DEBRA HATTEN-GONZALES,
individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. Nos. 08-2009 & 08-2146
PAMELA S. HYDE, Secretary of the
New Mexico Human Services
Department,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. Nos. 88-CV-00385-JEC-ACT and 88-CV-00786-JEC-ACT)
Paul R. Ritzma, General Counsel (Jerry A. Walz, Walz and Associates, Cedar
Crest, New Mexico, with him on the briefs), New Mexico Human Services
Department, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Defendant–Appellant.
Daniel Yohalem (Jane B. Yohalem, and Gail J. Evans, N.M. Center on Law and
Poverty, Albuquerque, New Mexico, with him on the briefs), Santa Fe, New
Mexico, for Plaintiffs–Appellees.
Before LUCERO, HOLLOWAY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
Entangled in the present litigation for more than twenty years, the New
Mexico Human Services Department (“HSD”) seeks review of two interlocutory
orders of the district court. HSD and a plaintiff class headed by Debra Hatten-
Gonzales have been operating under a Modified Settlement Agreement (“MSA”)
approved by the district court in 1998. Although it restrained the parties from
violating the MSA, the district court has not entered a final judgment, and the
case remains on its active docket.
In 2005, the parties’ then-dormant dispute once again erupted. HSD sought
to end plaintiffs’ periodic review of its files, ongoing for a dozen years, and have
the case dismissed. Plaintiffs sought enforcement of the MSA, alleging that HSD
had breached several of its provisions. From this bevy of motions, HSD asks us
to review two orders. The first denied its motion to dismiss. The second, entered
while the first was already on appeal, granted plaintiffs’ motion to enforce
compliance with the MSA. We address both appeals in this opinion.
Although the parties contend that we possess jurisdiction to review both
orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we disagree. As to the first, HSD’s
motion to dismiss did not seek to dissolve an injunction, and thus, the court’s
order was not one refusing to dissolve an injunction. The second order merely
interpreted an existing injunction, thus it does not fall within the strictures of
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§ 1292(a)(1). Accordingly, we dismiss HSD’s appeals for want of jurisdiction.
I
A
In 1988, Hatten-Gonzales filed suit against the Secretary of HSD. Her
complaint alleged that HSD violated various federal laws in determining
applicants’ eligibility for food stamps, Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(“AFDC”), and Medicaid. She sought to represent a class of all New Mexico
residents who have applied, are applying, or will apply for food stamps, AFDC, or
Medicaid benefits, and requested an injunction prohibiting HSD from engaging in
the complained-of practices.
Following class certification, the parties reached a settlement agreement,
and on August 29, 1990, the district court approved it. In its order, the court
“restrained [the parties] from violating the terms, conditions and undertakings of
the Settlement Agreement.” It also “retain[ed] jurisdiction over this matter to
enforce the terms, conditions and undertakings of the Settlement Agreement.”
Under the agreement, HSD was required to take various steps to revise its
benefits application system. Several provisions govern plaintiffs’ role in
monitoring compliance with the settlement agreement:
To the extent that any term of this Agreement is prospective in
nature, HSD agrees to continue to meet and to confer with counsel
for the applicants regarding the progress made towards
implementation of this Agreement’s terms until each such term is
finally implemented. The parties agree to make good faith efforts to
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resolve any differences that may arise in the course of rendering this
Agreement operational. . . .
....
. . . Once the terms of this Agreement have become fully operational
and permanently incorporated into HSD’s administration of the
AFDC, Food Stamp and Medicaid programs, the [plaintiffs] will seek
dismissal of these actions, with prejudice regarding only such issues
actually resolved in this Agreement, from the Court. Dismissal will
be requested in strict accordance with the timetables set forth in
Section IV ([Plaintiffs’] Review of Implementation Procedures) of
this Agreement.
Section IV, in turn, states:
The parties agree that [plaintiffs] are entitled to review the
implementation of this Agreement to determine if its terms,
conditions and undertakings are implemented in a timely and correct
fashion. . . .
1. The review of implementation procedures will commence six
months after this agreement is approved by the Court and will be
completed by the end of the second annual quarter following full
implementation of the terms, conditions and undertakings of this
Agreement, subject to the timetable regarding Section II of this
Agreement set forth in the following paragraph. Within 30 days of
completion of the review of implementation procedures, the
applicants will request from the Court dismissal with prejudice of all
such issues actually resolved by this Agreement.
The reference to “Section II” concerns a December 31, 1990 deadline for
HSD to complete certain reforms to its application processing practices. The
“following paragraph” reference is to Section IV.2, which permitted plaintiffs’
counsel to review a set of 40 case files in March of 1991 to determine whether
HSD was complying with the agreed-upon reforms. “If HSD is fully complying
with those terms, conditions and undertakings,” the agreement states, “plaintiffs
will, within 30 days, request from the Court dismissal with prejudice.” If HSD
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was not complying, plaintiffs’ counsel could review 40 additional case files in
June 1991. “Full compliance” and “full implementation” are defined in the
agreement synonymously as “HSD has completed, enacted and is operating
pursuant to all the terms, conditions and undertaking of [the] Agreement.”
At the parties’ request, the settlement agreement was twice modified. In
1992, the court entered an order: (1) extending deadlines contained in Section II;
(2) imposing a schedule for developing a computerized tracking system; and (3)
rescheduling the case-file review discussed in Section IV.2 for January 1993. It
appears that two file reviews occurred in 1993, but the record does not indicate
whether plaintiffs deemed HSD in full compliance at that time. In any event,
plaintiffs did not move to dismiss as contemplated by Section IV.1.
In 1998, after the AFDC program was replaced with Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families (“TANF”), the parties submitted the MSA for court approval.
The above-quoted monitoring provisions remained unchanged, with the exception
of a deleted reference to AFDC. On August 27, 1998, the court entered an “Order
Modifying Settlement Agreement.” As with the initial settlement agreement, the
court “restrained [the parties] from violating the terms, conditions and
undertakings of the Modified Settlement Agreement,” and it retained jurisdiction
to enforce it.
The next day, the court entered judgment dismissing the case without
prejudice but “retain[ing] complete jurisdiction to vacate this judgment and to
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reopen the action upon cause shown that the terms of the settlement agreement
have been breached and further litigation is necessary.” Shortly thereafter,
however, the court set aside that judgment and restored the case to its active
docket after plaintiffs’ counsel expressed unease with dismissal.
B
Between 1990 and 2005, plaintiffs’ counsel conducted various monitoring
activities and periodically moved for attorneys’ fees related to their monitoring
efforts. Many of these requests were unopposed. In 1997, plaintiffs filed a
motion seeking to enforce certain provisions of the settlement agreement and the
order accepting it. Granting the motion in part, the court stated that “Defendant is
hereby enjoined from imposing completion of a job search as an eligibility
requirement for applicants seeking assistance under any AFDC, TANF or
equivalent public assistance program.”
In 2005, the parties’ dispute flared up yet again. Plaintiffs filed a “Second
Report on Department of Human Services’ Compliance with Hatten-Gonzales” in
the district court based on their review of 180 files from four HSD county offices.
Plaintiffs’ report found “violations of the Hatten-Gonzales requirements in every
county reviewed and in virtually every aspect of the application process.”
Following completion of the report, plaintiffs filed a “Motion to Enforce
Compliance with Court’s Order,” complaining that HSD refused to meet and
confer in good faith regarding implementation of the MSA’s terms. They sought
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an order: (1) directing HSD to prepare a report addressing each MSA violation
alleged in plaintiffs’ report including steps that had been and would be taken to
remedy these violations; (2) requiring HSD to meet with plaintiffs’ counsel
monthly from July to December 2006; and (3) permitting plaintiffs to conduct a
“thorough review” of HSD’s practices. .
HSD responded by asking the district court to declare it in full compliance
with the MSA. On July 13, 2006, the district court entered a memorandum
opinion and order granting plaintiffs’ motion to enforce compliance. It found that
HSD had breached its duty to confer with plaintiffs in good faith and held that
plaintiffs’ “requests for meetings between July and December and further
cooperation thereafter will hereby be enforced.”
Following the court-ordered meetings (and another flurry of motions), HSD
filed a “Motion to Dismiss and Memeorandum [sic] in Support.” In that motion,
HSD contended that “recent case law has raised a jurisdictional question
concerning the Plaintiffs’ apparent lack of authority to continue monitoring
[HSD’s] compliance beyond the deadlines set forth in the [MSA] that [the district
court] has retained jurisdiction to enforce.” Specifically, HSD argued that it
previously acquiesced in plaintiffs’ monitoring and attorneys’ fee demands based
on a misreading of Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1492 (10th Cir. 1989), which
was dispelled by a subsequent opinion, Johnson v. City of Tulsa, 489 F.3d 1089
(10th Cir. 2007). Citing “Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and/or (6),” HSD argued that it
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was “entitled to dismissal of [the] action because, by its own terms and
conditions, the MSA precludes any further action or activities on the part of the
Plaintiffs.”
The district court denied HSD’s motion. It recited the standards for
dismissal under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), finding “that the Johnson case does
not prevent Plaintiffs from monitoring compliance and consequently, there is no
jurisdictional question.” HSD then appealed that order. The appeal was assigned
case number 08-2009 in this court.
C
While HSD’s appeal was pending before this court, the parties’ motions
practice continued apace in the district court. On May 9, 2008, plaintiffs moved
the district court to rule on its previously-filed “Second Motion to Enforce
Compliance with Court Order,” in which plaintiffs sought to enjoin HSD from
requiring an applicant for benefits to provide the social security numbers and
immigration statuses of non-applicants living in the applicant’s household.
Plaintiffs argued that notwithstanding the pending interlocutory appeal, the
district court was free to supervise the parties’ compliance with the MSA pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c). HSD countered that the district court lacked jurisdiction,
arguing that Rule 62(c) was inapposite because
[t]he Order on appeal is not a grant, dissolution or denial of an
injunction, as is required under [sic] as an exception to an automatic
stay during the appeal. The Order on appeal is effectively, the
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Court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to enforce the terms of the
settlement with respect to dismissal by the Plaintiffs.
The district court accepted plaintiffs’ interpretation of Rule 62(c) and
granted plaintiffs’ “Second Motion to Enforce Compliance with Court Order.”
Based on a provision of the MSA which states that “[a]pplicants will not be
required to complete questionnaires seeking information which is unnecessary to
determine eligibility and benefits amounts,” the court ordered that HSD “must
modify its applications for public benefits so that no application requires the
social security number and citizenship status of every member of the household.”
Following entry of that order, HSD filed a second notice of appeal, which was
assigned case number 08-2146 in this court.
II
Before proceeding to the merits of HSD’s appeals, we must consider our
jurisdiction. See Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271, 1276 (10th Cir.
2001) (“A federal court has an independent obligation to examine its own
jurisdiction.”). As a general matter, we review only final decisions of the district
courts. See Rekstad v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 1259, 1261 (10th Cir.
2001); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United
States . . . .”).
There are, of course, several exceptions to the finality rule. We have
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jurisdiction to review “interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United
States granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or
refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions.” § 1292(a)(1). However, “[s]ection
1292(a) was intended to carve out only a limited exception to the final-judgment
rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the long-established policy against piecemeal
appeals.” Pimentel & Sons Guitar Makers, Inc. v. Pimentel, 477 F.3d 1151, 1153
(10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, courts “have construed the
statute narrowly to ensure that appeal as of right under § 1292(a)(1) will be
available only in circumstances where an appeal will further the statutory purpose
of permitting litigants to effectually challenge interlocutory orders of serious,
perhaps irreparable, consequence.” Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84
(1981) (quotations and alteration omitted).
A
In case number 08-2009, HSD asks us to review the district court’s
December 17, 2007 order denying its “Motion to Dismiss and Memeorandum [sic]
in Support.” HSD cites only § 1291 in support of this court’s jurisdiction, but the
order at issue plainly did not constitute a “final decision[].” § 1291. A final
decision is “one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the
court to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233
(1945); see Gray v. Baker, 399 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 2005). The appealed
order denied HSD’s request that the case be dismissed. “A denial of a motion to
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dismiss ordinarily may not be appealed because it is not a final decision.”
Eastwood v. Dep’t of Corrs., 846 F.2d 627, 629 (10th Cir. 1988). 1 Further, as
evident from the district court’s post-notice of appeal actions, the order at issue
did not end this enduring litigation.
Curiously, plaintiffs provide an alternate basis for jurisdiction, suggesting
that the district court’s order “refus[ed] to dissolve or modify [an] injunction[].”
§ 1292(a)(1). We cannot agree with that characterization. To “refuse” to dissolve
or modify an injunction, a court must first be asked to do so; the district court was
not.
In its motion to dismiss, HSD did not request dissolution or modification of
an injunction. Instead, it challenged plaintiffs’ authority to monitor compliance
with the MSA and collect additional attorneys’ fees for their monitoring
activities. Although the motion is not altogether clear, HSD appears to argue that
the absence of specific monitoring provisions in the MSA divests the district
court of jurisdiction. HSD cited Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) and sought “an Order
dismissing this action.” HSD did not seek to alter or eliminate any of the terms
of the MSA, nor did it cite Rule 60(b)(5) or the standards for obtaining relief
from an order. See Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2593-95 (2009).
In ruling on the motion, the district court unsurprisingly recited the legal
1
HSD does not attempt to invoke the collateral order doctrine, see
Eastwood, 846 F.2d at 629, nor do we see any basis for it to do so.
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standards applicable to motions under 12(b)(1) and (6). Neither the motion nor
the order denying it use the terms “injunction,” “dissolve,” or “modify.”
Further, and perhaps most importantly, HSD disclaimed the reading of its
own motion that plaintiffs now urge. After HSD filed its first appeal, the district
court considered its jurisdiction to enforce the MSA while the appeal was
pending. HSD argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the order
being appealed did not fall within the ambit of Rule 62(c). Rather, HSD urged,
the “[o]rder on appeal is effectively, the Court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to
enforce the terms of the settlement with respect to dismissal by the Plaintiffs.”
(Emphasis added).
We see no reason to reject HSD’s interpretation of its own motion.
Although this court does not insist on magic words, we expect parties—especially
those represented by counsel—to be explicit when they seek to dissolve or modify
an injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(C) (motions must “state the relief
sought”). HSD’s motion to dismiss, along with the court’s order denying that
motion, do not explicitly put the modification or dissolution of an injunction at
issue. Given HSD’s post-appeal explanation of its motion to dismiss, we will not
strain to recharacterize it. Cf. Lermer Germany GmbH v. Lermer Corp., 94 F.3d
1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[T]here is no reason to grant a right to appellate
review of a district court order denying relief that was not sought.”).
In so holding, we do not foreclose the possibility that a motion may seek to
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dissolve or modify an injunction in effect without seeking relief in those precise
terms. For example, in Keyes v. School District Number 1, 895 F.2d 659 (10th
Cir. 1990), we exercised jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal after the district
court denied defendant school district’s motion seeking a declaration of “unitary”
status. Id. at 661, 663. We rejected plaintiffs’ contention that the order merely
declined to enter declaratory relief, reasoning that a declaration of unitary status
would effectively dissolve the injunction. See id. at 663. This was so because
the declaration sought “does not contemplate later judicial reappraisal” of a
school district’s compliance with a desegregation plan. Id. at 666. 2
In our present case, granting the motion would not have led to dissolution
of the MSA. Had HSD’s motion been granted, the district court would have
dismissed the case from its active docket and refused further attorneys’ fee
requests from plaintiffs, but the MSA would have remained in effect. The MSA
specifically provides that the court will retain “continuing jurisdiction . . . to
resolve disputes and enforce the terms of” the MSA even after dismissal with
prejudice. Cf. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381
(1994) (district courts possess ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a settlement
2
The school district also explicitly sought an order “dissolving the
injunction as it related to student assignments” in the same motion, clearly
conferring jurisdiction. Id. at 662. Keyes nonetheless illustrates that a motion
ostensibly seeking declaratory relief could in effect be more aptly characterized
as an order refusing to dissolve an injunction.
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agreement post-dismissal if the court expressly retains jurisdiction or incorporates
the agreement in its order of dismissal); Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105,
1110 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Kokkonen, 511 U.S. 375) (same). 3
Because HSD did not request dissolution or modification of an injunction,
the district court’s December 17, 2007 order cannot be characterized as one
“refusing to dissolve or modify [an] injunction[].” § 1292(a)(1). Accordingly,
we conclude that neither § 1292(a)(1) nor § 1291 confers jurisdiction upon this
court over case number 08-2009.
B
As to HSD’s second appeal, case number 08-2146, we reach the same
conclusion. HSD asks us to review the district court’s June 4, 2008 order
requiring HSD to “modify its applications for public benefits so that no
application requires the social security number and citizenship status of every
member of the household.” HSD relies solely on § 1292(a) as a jurisdictional
font, contending that order modified a prior injunction. Plaintiffs counter that we
lack jurisdiction because the order on appeal merely enforced a prior injunction.
3
To the extent our holding raises a concern that HSD will be forever
unable to challenge the district court’s retention of jurisdiction, we note that HSD
can file a proper motion to dissolve the court’s order mandating compliance with
the MSA. Whether granted or denied, a ruling on that motion would be subject to
appellate review. See § 1292(a)(1).
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1
Before considering whether the June 4, 2008 order modified or merely
enforced a prior injunction, we must necessarily consider whether the August 27,
1998 order adopting the MSA constituted an injunction for purposes of our
appellate jurisdiction. If the 1998 order was not an injunction, the order under
appeal cannot be said to have enforced “an existing injunction,” Pimentel, 477
F.3d at 1154. In that event, the district court’s June 4, 2008 order would be a
fresh injunction subject to appellate review. See § 1292(a)(1).
The August 27, 1998 order states that the parties “are restrained from
violating the terms, conditions and undertakings of the Modified Settlement
Agreement.” The district court attached the MSA to its order, and “incorporated
[it] herein by this reference as though fully set forth at this point.” Both the
appealed order and the MSA contain mandatory language prohibiting the parties
from engaging in certain activities and would appear to subject a non-compliant
party to contempt. See Consumers Gas & Oil, Inc. v. Farmland Indus. Inc., 84
F.3d 367, 370 (10th Cir. 1996). But, as HSD argues in contesting the district
court’s authority to act during the pendency of its first appeal, the order
approving the MSA may not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
Rule 65 requires that “[e]very order granting an injunction and every
restraining order must . . . describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to
the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required.” Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 65(d)(1), (d)(1)(C) (emphasis added). It “expressly proscribes the
issuance of an injunction which describes the enjoined conduct by referring to
another document.” Consumers Gas & Oil, Inc., 84 F.3d at 371 (quotation
omitted). This circuit strictly applies Rule 65(d). Id.
This strict approach mandates that the parties “be able to interpret the
injunction from the four corners of the order.” Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v.
Manges, 900 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted); see also H. K.
Porter Co. v. Nat’l Friction Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 24, 27 (7th Cir. 1978) (when
district court “merely incorporated by reference [a] Settlement Agreement,” it
ignored Rule 65(d)’s “mandatory requirement”). Plaintiffs argue that Rule 65(d)
is satisfied because the district court physically attached the MSA to its order,
thus it is not an “other document” within the meaning of the rule.
We need not decide whether the 1998 order violated Rule 65(d) because,
even if it did, it is nevertheless an injunction for purposes of § 1292(a)(1). Our
holding is guided by a dyad of Supreme Court opinions, Gunn v. University
Committee to End the War in Vietnam, 399 U.S. 383 (1970), and Schmidt v.
Lessard, 414 U.S. 473 (1974) (per curiam).
In Gunn, a group of protesters sought to enjoin enforcement of a Texas
disturbing-the-peace statute. 399 U.S. at 384-85. A three-judge district court
panel entered an order providing:
We reach the conclusion that [the statute] is impermissibly and
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unconstitutionally broad. The Plaintiffs herein are entitled to their
declaratory judgment to that effect, and to injunctive relief against
the enforcement of [the statute] as now worded, insofar as it may
affect rights guaranteed under the First Amendment. However, it is
the Order of this Court that the mandate shall be stayed and this
Court shall retain jurisdiction of the cause pending the next session,
special or general, of the Texas legislature, at which time the State of
Texas may, if it so desires, enact such disturbing-the-peace statute as
will meet constitutional requirements.
Id. at 386. Defendants appealed directly to the Supreme Court under § 1253,
which permitted direct appeals from three-judge panel orders “granting or
denying . . . an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action.” Gunn,
399 U.S. 386. Noting that the order did not comply with Rule 65(d), the Court
found it “[im]possible to know with any certainty what the [district] court has
decided.” Id. at 388. Accordingly, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction
because “there was no order of any kind either granting or denying an injunction.”
Id. at 387. However, in a footnote, the Court stated:
This is not to suggest that lack of specificity in an injunctive order
would alone deprive the Court of jurisdiction under § 1253. But the
absence of any semblance of effort by the District Court to comply
with Rule 65(d) makes clear that the court did not think that its per
curiam opinion itself constituted an order granting an injunction.
Id. at 389 n.4 (emphasis added).
Just four years later, that dicta was applied. In Schmidt, the Court
reviewed another three-judge panel opinion, this one followed by a judgment
decreeing, “It is Ordered and Adjudged that judgment be and hereby is entered in
accordance with the Opinion heretofore entered.” 414 U.S. at 474. The three-
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judge panel’s opinion provided that plaintiffs “are entitled to declaratory and
injunctive relief against further enforcement of the present [statutory] scheme
against them.” Id. Because the judgment contravened Rule 65(d), the appellee
argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction, citing Gunn. Id. at 474-75. The Court
rejected appellee’s contention, distinguishing Gunn as follows:
While the record in Gunn was devoid of any order granting
injunctive relief, there was in the present case a judgment entered “in
accordance with the Opinion.” Since the opinion of the District
Court by its own terms authorizes the granting of injunctive relief to
the appellee, we believe that the judgment here is sufficient to invoke
our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
Schmidt, 414 U.S. at 475.
Accordingly, the court held that “although the order below [wa]s sufficient
to invoke our appellate jurisdiction, it plainly does not satisfy the important
requirements of Rule 65 (d).” Id. at 477. In other words, an injunction that fails
to meet Rule 65(d)’s requirements is nevertheless an “injunction” for purposes of
determining appellate jurisdiction.
We conclude that the order approving the MSA, like the order in Schmidt,
serves as an injunction for jurisdictional purposes, even if it fails to comply with
Rule 65(d). At worst, the MSA-approving order suffers from a technical defect. 4
4
By characterizing the potential defect as “technical,” we do not mean to
gainsay the importance of Rule 65(d). “The judicial contempt power is a potent
weapon. When it is founded upon a decree too vague to be understood, it can be
a deadly one.” Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Phila. Marine Trade Ass’n, 389
(continued...)
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Although it may have fallen short of the specificity requirement of Rule 65(d) by
referentially incorporating the MSA, 5 the order is not so vague as to make it
“[im]possible to know with any certainty what the [district] court has decided.”
Gunn, 399 U.S. at 388. To the contrary, the district court plainly intended to
provide plaintiffs injunctive relief and entered an order attempting to do so. As
the district court explained regarding the August 1998 order, “[i]t appears beyond
any reasonable dispute that both the nature of the lawsuit and the terms of the
Decree contemplate continued, injunctive relief.”
2
Having concluded that the August 1998 order was an injunction within the
meaning of § 1292(a)(1), we must next consider whether the June 4, 2008 order
modified that earlier injunction, or merely enforced or clarified the earlier
injunction. Unlike modification orders, “[a]ppellate courts do not have
jurisdiction to review a district court order that merely interprets or clarifies,
without modifying, an existing injunction.” Pimentel, 477 F.3d at 1154.
“Whether an order interprets or modifies an injunction is determined by its actual,
practical effect.” Id. at 1154 (citation omitted). “An order is a clarification if it
4
(...continued)
U.S. 64, 76 (1967).
5
Given our conclusion that we lack jurisdiction over HSD’s appeals, we
express no opinion as to whether the order approving the MSA complies with
Rule 65(d).
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does not change the parties’ original legal relationship, but merely restates that
relationship in new terms.” Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824,
827 (10th Cir. 1993) (quotation and alteration omitted). “A modification, by
contrast, alters the legal relationship between the parties, or substantially changes
the terms and force of the injunction.” Mikel v. Gourley, 951 F.2d 166, 169 (8th
Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted); see also Roberts, 998 F.2d at 827 (citing Mikel,
951 F.2d at 169). “To change the legal relationship of the parties, the order must
change the command of the earlier injunction, relax its prohibitions, or release
any respondent from its grip.” Pimentel, 477 F.3d at 1154 (quotation omitted).
We conclude that the order at issue enforced and clarified, but did not
modify, the district court’s August 1998 injunction. The underlying motion
expressly sought “to Enforce Compliance with Court Order.” While labeling is
not dispositive, Pimentel, 477 F.3d at 1154, the content of the motion squares
with its label. Plaintiffs’ motion argued that HSD violated two specific terms of
the MSA by requiring applicants to provide social security numbers and
immigration statuses of individuals residing with them. The district court
examined the terms of the MSA and agreed with plaintiffs. It accordingly ordered
HSD to cease its violation by altering the application forms.
Yet, entry of this order did not “alter[] the legal relationship between the
parties or substantially change[] the terms and force of the injunction.” Mikel,
951 F.2d at 169 (quotation omitted). HSD was already precluded from requiring
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applicants “to complete questionnaires seeking information which is unnecessary
to determine eligibility and benefits amounts” by virtue of the August 27, 1998
order. The district court merely clarified that the existing prohibition applied to
the specific facts presented, and thus “merely restate[d] [the parties’] relationship
in new terms.” Roberts, 998 F.2d at 827 (quotation omitted). This did not
constitute a substantial change in the terms and force of the injunction. See
Mikel, 951 F.2d at 169. 6
6
We so hold despite the possibility that the 2008 order subjects HSD to
contempt for the first time. An injunction that fails to comply with Rule 65(d)
may not be enforced by way of contempt sanctions. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mast
Constr. Co., 84 F.3d 372, 376 (10th Cir. 1996) (because order “failed to meet the
requirements of Rule 65(d) . . . [it] was invalid and cannot provide the basis for a
compensatory civil contempt action”). If the order approving the MSA did not
meet Rule 65(d)’s requirements, a violation of its terms could not lead to
contempt. See id. The June 4, 2008 order, however, does not appear to suffer the
potential infirmities of the court’s prior injunction; it does not attempt to
incorporate any other document by reference. Accordingly, it is possible that the
2008 order is enforceable through the contempt power even if the 1988 order was
not.
At first blush, this contingency suggests that the new order might have
changed the “force of the injunction.” Pimentel, 477 F.3d at 1154 (quotation
omitted). But to constitute a modification rather than a clarification, our
precedent requires that an order “substantially change[] the terms and force of the
injunction.” Id. (quotation omitted, emphasis added). HSD has not shown that
any of the terms of the 1988 injunction were substantially changed, thus failing to
satisfy this conjunctive test.
We recognize this may appear to produce a strange result: a subsequent
injunction could be enforceable by contempt without “modifying” a prior
injunction that did not carry the contempt power. Yet we face a dichotomous
choice: modification or clarification/enforcement. An injunction can be invalid
under Rule 65(d) precisely because its incorporation of another document renders
it insufficiently clear. See Schmidt, 414 U.S. at 476 (Rule 65(d) “was designed to
(continued...)
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HSD argues that the district court erred in applying the terms of the August
27, 1998 order, but that issue is not subject to plenary review in this court.
“Although gross or blatant misinterpretations of the earlier injunction can
substantially alter the legal relationship of the parties,” our review for such
misinterpretation is highly circumscribed. Pimentel, 477 F.3d at 1154. “To
plunge into the details [of a past injunction and the order on appeal] would
collapse the jurisdictional inquiry into a decision on the merits, thwarting the
6
(...continued)
prevent uncertainty and confusion on the part of those faced with injunctive
orders”). Correcting such a defect in a subsequent order thus clarifies but does
not modify. A hypothetical may illustrate this point. Consider an injunction that
requires the parties to comply with a referenced—but unattached—settlement
agreement. Such an injunction would clearly violate Rule 65(d). If the district
court later recognized its mistake and entered a new injunction that included the
text of the settlement agreement, one would be hard-pressed to describe the new
order as a modification rather than a clarification even though the first order did
not carry contempt power and the second did.
This result comports with the goals of the clarification exception. Section
1292(a) is “not intended to allow litigants to circumvent by the filing of repetitive
motions the time limitation for taking appeals.” Buckhanon v. Percy, 708 F.2d
1209, 1212 (7th Cir. 1983). If an injunction is insufficiently specific or otherwise
non-compliant with Rule 65(d), an aggrieved party should appeal within the time
frames set out in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4. Permitting such a party
to appeal after a district court cures its initial error would be a bizarre result.
Indeed, it would encourage “sandbagging.” If, on the other hand, a party has a
substantive dispute with continued enforcement of an injunction, that party can
move to dissolve the injunction under Rule 60(b). Whether granted or denied by
the district court, a ruling on such a motion would be subject to appeal. See §
1292(a)(1) (granting courts of appeals jurisdiction to review orders dissolving and
refusing to dissolve injunctions).
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purpose of § 1292(a)(1).” S. Ute Indian Tribe v. Leavitt, 564 F.3d 1198, 1209
(10th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, we will treat an order
interpreting a prior injunction as a modification only if it constitutes “a gross or
blatant misinterpretation of the original injunction.” Id. (quotation omitted). We
discern no such error here.
We conclude that the order approving the MSA was an injunction, and that
the court’s June 4, 2008 order merely interpreted and clarified, without
modifying, that existing injunction. See Pimentel, 477 F.3d at 1154.
Accordingly, we lack appellate jurisdiction to review the latter order.
III
Because we lack jurisdiction, we DISMISS both interlocutory appeals.
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