FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 27, 2009
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
AMY THOMSON, individually and as
Guardian Ad Litem for Sadie Ann
Marie Thomson and Andrew Wade
Thomson, and ESTATE OF CHAD
THOMSON, by and through its
personal representative, Amy
Thomson,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
No. 06-4304
v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Utah, and
ALAN MORRICAL, an individual,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Utah
(D.C. No. 2:05-CV-352-TS)
Ryan B. Hancey (Joseph C. Rust with him on the brief), Kesler & Rust, Salt Lake
City, Utah, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Nicholas M. D’Alesandro Jr. (Donald H. Hansen with him on the brief), Salt Lake
County District Attorney’s Office, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendants-
Appellees.
Before TYMKOVICH, GORSUCH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
HOLMES, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs-Appellants Amy Thomson, individually and as guardian ad litem
for her two children, and the estate of Chad Thomson, through Ms. Thomson as
its personal representative, challenge the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for Defendants-Appellees Salt Lake County and Deputy Alan Morrical.
First, Plaintiffs argue that it was error to grant summary judgment to Deputy
Morrical on the basis of qualified immunity because the use of deadly
force—allegedly involving the release of a police dog and the shooting of Mr.
Thomson—violated a clearly established constitutional right. Second, Plaintiffs
assert that the district court erred in finding the County not liable for failure to
train officers on the subject of dealing with suicidal suspects. Finally, Plaintiffs
argue that Defendants should not have been granted summary judgment on
Plaintiffs’ state-law claims.
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we conclude that the
district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Defendants. After
determining that the release of a police dog does not constitute deadly force in
this case, we conclude that Plaintiffs have not met their burden of demonstrating a
constitutional violation regarding the fatal shooting of Mr. Thomson. It therefore
was appropriate to grant summary judgment to Deputy Morrical on the basis of
qualified immunity. Because Plaintiffs have not proven a constitutional violation,
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their failure to train claim against the County also must fail. As to Plaintiffs’
state-law claims, the district court properly dismissed these claims because the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 et seq., grants
immunity to Defendants. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on April 19, 2004, while out for an evening of
drinking, Chad Thomson, called his wife, Amy Thomson. She was at a friend’s
apartment. During the course of this telephone call, Mr. Thomson became angry
and threatened to act violently. He told Ms. Thomson to meet him at their
residence. Ms. Thomson telephoned her mother, who was at that residence, and
told her about this conversation. Ms. Thomson’s mother then called 911. When
Ms. Thomson arrived at the residence with her friend, she went to check on the
firearms that the couple kept in their basement. She unexpectedly saw Mr.
Thomson there; he pointed a gun at her. Ms. Thomson fled upstairs, and her
friend made another call to 911, during which her friend told the 911 dispatcher
about the gun-pointing incident and also told the dispatcher that Mr. Thomson had
been talking about suicide. Mr. Thomson left the home sometime thereafter.
Salt Lake County Sheriff’s deputies John Shire, Walter Jarvis, and Alan
Morrical arrived at the Thomsons’ home in response to the second 911 call. They
learned that Mr. Thomson had threatened Ms. Thomson with a weapon, was likely
armed and potentially suicidal, and had left his truck parked on a nearby street.
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Believing Mr. Thomson to be nearby, the officers—aided by Chaos, Deputy
Morrical’s police dog—searched the Thomson residence and yard, but they did
not find Mr. Thomson. They did, however, confirm that a firearm was missing
from the Thomson residence.
The officers then began a yard-by-yard search. While the officers were
searching the darkened neighborhood, Ms. Thomson’s friend, who had previously
spoken to Mr. Thomson, was able to reach Mr. Thomson on her cellular telephone
from her car parked outside the Thomson residence. She handed the telephone to
Lieutenant Michael Wardle of the Salt Lake County Sheriff’s Office, who
identified himself and began to speak to Mr. Thomson. After Lieutenant Wardle
told Mr. Thomson that he did not want to see anyone get hurt, Mr. Thomson told
Lieutenant Wardle that if he did not want his officers to get hurt, he should have
them leave the area. Lieutenant Wardle could hear a dog barking in the
background of the call, so he radioed the officers to tell them that they must be
close to Mr. Thomson’s location, told them that Mr. Thomson wanted them to
back off, and warned them to be careful.
Having received this information from Lieutenant Wardle, Deputy Morrical
released Chaos into the third yard they searched in an attempt to locate Mr.
Thomson. Chaos did not return when Deputy Morrical called for him, but the
officers could hear noises coming from the yard. The officers, however, could
not initially determine the source of the noise, possibly because it was raining
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heavily that night. The officers later determined that the source of the noise was
Mr. Thomson.
As the three officers approached, they could hear Mr. Thomson yelling for
them to call off the dog and threatening to shoot, although it was unclear if Mr.
Thomson was threatening them or Chaos. The officers advanced and fanned out
into the yard; Deputies Shire and Morrical could see Mr. Thomson holding a rifle
and standing behind an object in the yard, but Deputy Jarvis could not see Mr.
Thomson from where he was positioned. The officers ordered Mr. Thomson to
put the gun down and come out with his hands up, stating they would then call off
the dog. When Mr. Thomson did not follow the officers’ instructions, they
repeated their warning.
The exact sequence of events that transpired next is unclear. Deputy
Morrical has stated that he saw Mr. Thomson place the barrel of his gun into his
own mouth briefly, then take it out and move the barrel quickly toward Deputy
Morrical. Deputy Shire, however, did not see Mr. Thomson put the barrel into his
mouth but did see the gun first being pointed at Chaos—who was biting Mr.
Thomson—and then the barrel being raised in Deputy Shire’s direction. Deputy
Shire thus prepared to fire his own weapon by depressing the trigger of his gun
slightly. It is undisputed that Mr. Thomson was moving the gun very quickly and
although the officers repeatedly ordered Mr. Thomson to drop his weapon, he
refused to do so. The facts taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs indicate
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that at one point, Mr. Thomson had the gun in his mouth, and that immediately
before he was shot, the gun was pointed upwards, near and toward Mr. Thomson’s
head.
It is undisputed, however, that at some point shortly before Mr. Thomson
was killed, he was aiming the gun in the direction of the officers. Both Deputies
Morrical and Shire perceived Mr. Thomson’s conduct as physically threatening to
them and prepared to shoot him based upon that conduct. Before Deputy Shire
fully pulled his partially depressed trigger, Deputy Morrical fired one shot into
Mr. Thomson’s head, killing him. Events were unfolding extremely quickly; the
entire sequence of events from when the officers entered the backyard and could
see Mr. Thomson until the time that he was shot took place in perhaps as little as
ten seconds.
Both Deputies Shire and Jarvis initially believed that Mr. Thomson had
killed himself and reported as much to Lieutenant Wardle via radio. Deputy
Morrical requested and received permission from Lieutenant Wardle to secure his
dog, Chaos, in the police car; it was not until after Deputy Morrical had done so
that he informed Lieutenant Wardle that he had fired one shot at Mr. Thomson.
Plaintiffs brought suit against Deputy Morrical and Salt Lake County,
asserting an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as several
state-law claims against both Defendants. Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that Deputy Morrical was entitled to qualified immunity on the
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§ 1983 claim, that the County could not be liable as there was no underlying
constitutional violation, that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act barred certain
state-law claims, and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the
remaining state-law claims. The district court found that Defendants were
entitled either to immunity from, or judgment as a matter of law on, the state-law
claims. The court also determined that Plaintiffs had not met their burden of
demonstrating excessive force on their constitutional claims; thus, the district
court granted summary judgment to Defendants.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs assert three arguments on appeal. First, Plaintiffs claim that
Defendants violated Mr. Thomson’s clearly established constitutional rights by
using excessive force. Next, Plaintiffs argue that Salt Lake County failed to
adequately train its officers regarding their treatment of people believed to be
suicidal. Finally, Plaintiffs assert that certain of their state-law claims should
survive summary judgment, namely, their claims for assault, battery, and
wrongful death. 1
A. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
employing the same legal standard applicable in the district court. Martinez v.
1
Plaintiffs do not appeal the grant of summary judgment on their
state-law emotional distress claims.
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Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2009 WL
2189679 (Oct. 5, 2009). Moreover, “[i]n exercising de novo review we afford no
deference to the district court’s interpretation of state law.” Devery Implement
Co. v. J.I. Case Co., 944 F.2d 724, 727 (10th Cir. 1991). A motion for summary
judgment should be granted “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Our review of summary judgment orders in the qualified immunity context
differs from that applicable to review of other summary judgment decisions.
Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1088. “When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at
summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the
defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was
clearly established.” Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, __ U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 808,
815-16 (2009)); see Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); see also Whittier
v. Kobayashi, 581 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009). 2 “Qualified immunity is
2
In Pearson, the Supreme Court reduced the reach of Saucier’s
holding that these two steps must be taken in this particular sequence. The
Pearson Court held that courts have discretion to determine “which of the two
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818 (citing
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). As explained infra in Part II(B), Defendants did not
violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Thus, we need not address whether any
such rights were clearly established. See Green v. Post, 574 F.3d 1294, 1299
(continued...)
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applicable unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established
constitutional right.” Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 816 (citing Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). In determining whether the plaintiff has met its
burden of establishing a constitutional violation that was clearly established, we
will construe the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the
nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 380 (2007); see Riggins v.
Goodman, 572 F.3d 1101, 1107 (10th Cir. 2009) (“The plaintiff must demonstrate
on the facts alleged both that the defendant violated his constitutional or statutory
rights, and that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
unlawful activity.”) (emphasis added)); Riggins, 572 F.3d at 1107 (noting that
generally “we accept the facts as the plaintiff alleges them”). However, because
at summary judgment we are beyond the pleading phase of the litigation, a
plaintiff’s version of the facts must find support in the record: more specifically,
“[a]s with any motion for summary judgment, ‘[w]hen opposing parties tell two
different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the
facts[.]” York v. City of Las Cruces, 523 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 2008)
(...continued)
(10th Cir. 2009); Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1088; cf. Swanson v. Town of Mountain
View, 577 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009) (exercising discretion to first
determine that the asserted right was not clearly established, thus avoiding what
previously was the “first” half of the two-step qualified immunity analysis);
Christensen v. Park City Mun. Corp., 554 F.3d 1271, 1277-78 (10th Cir. 2009)
(same).
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(quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 380) (second and third alteration in original); see also
Estate of Larsen ex rel. Sturdivan v. Murr, 511 F.3d 1255, 1258 (10th Cir. 2008).
B. Excessive Force
Defendants argue that Deputy Morrical is entitled to qualified immunity on
Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim. An officer using force in the course of a seizure
of a citizen is entitled to qualified immunity unless the level of force violated
clearly established Fourth Amendment law. See Estate of Larsen, 511 F.3d at
1259; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (“[A]ll claims that
law enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course
of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard . . . .”).
“This inquiry turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in
light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.”
Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 822 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Estate of
Larsen, 511 F.3d at 1259 (“To establish a constitutional violation, the plaintiff
must demonstrate the force used was objectively unreasonable.”). The precise
question asked in an excessive force case is “whether the officers’ actions are
‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them,
without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at
397.
Reasonableness is evaluated under a totality of the circumstances approach,
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which requires that we consider and balance the following factors: “the severity
of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety
of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting
to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. “We assess objective reasonableness based
on whether the totality of the circumstances justified the use of force, and pay
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Estate of
Larsen, 511 F.3d at 1260 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Johnson v.
Scott, 576 F.3d 658, 660 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The question whether the use of force .
. . is proper under the Fourth Amendment depends on the objective
reasonableness of the officer’s actions, judged on the basis of the conditions the
officer faced.”); Cordova v. Aragon, 569 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 2009)
(describing the reasonableness test as requiring a court to “slosh our way through
the fact-bound morass of reasonableness” by “conducting [a] balancing act”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). We recognize that officers may have “to
make split-second judgments in uncertain and dangerous circumstances.” Phillips
v. James, 422 F.3d 1075, 1080 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Cordova, 569 F.3d at 1188. Additionally, “[t]he
‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective
of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
If a particular use of force is considered deadly force, then an officer’s use
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of that force is reasonable only “if a reasonable officer in Defendants’ position
would have had probable cause to believe that there was a threat of serious
physical harm to themselves or to others.” Estate of Larsen, 511 F.3d at 1260
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11
(1985) (“Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not
constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.”). Deadly
force is such force that “create[s] a substantial risk of causing death or serious
bodily harm.” 3 Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410, 415 n.2 (10th
3
The origin of the quoted language is the Model Penal Code (“MPC”).
See Model Penal Code § 3.11(2) (1985) (defining “deadly force”). The MPC’s
definition of “deadly force” includes an alternative subjective element, focusing
on whether an individual used the force “with the purpose of causing . . . a
substantial risk of . . . death or serious bodily injury.” Id. (emphasis added).
Although we have recited the full MPC definition of deadly force in the § 1983
context, we do not appear to have relied on the subjective component of the
definition. See Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410, 415 n.2 (10th Cir.
2004); Ryder v. City of Topeka, 814 F.2d 1412, 1417 n.11 (10th Cir. 1987)
(noting simply that defendant police officer’s actions in shooting plaintiff “clearly
constitute the ‘use of deadly force’ in the constitutional sense”). The en banc
Ninth Circuit has suggested that such reliance would be inappropriate. See Smith
v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 706 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Smith has
“attribute[d] the inclusion of an alternative subjective component in the Model
Penal Code definition to the fact that the Model Penal Code is primarily designed
to govern criminal liability,” instead of the civil liability at issue under § 1983.
Id. Further, it contends that our sister circuits have embraced the MPC’s
definition of “deadly force,” in the § 1983 context, but deviated—albeit more or
less tacitly—to the extent of eschewing reliance on that definition’s subjective
element. Id. (“[T]he definition of deadly force used in the other circuits in § 1983
cases, while frequently labeled the Model Penal Code definition, is designed for
use in implementing the Fourth Amendment and necessarily differs in one minor
(continued...)
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Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Ryder v. City of Topeka, 814
F.2d 1412, 1417 n.11 (10th Cir. 1987). In assessing the degree of threat the
(...continued)
respect from the Model Penal Code’s definition. For Fourth Amendment purposes,
the objective part of the test must be employed. In short, courts do not use the
subjective alternative when they apply the ‘deadly force’ test in § 1983 cases.”
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)); see also Floyd R. Finch, Jr., Comment,
Deadly Force to Arrest: Triggering Constitutional Review, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 361, 363 (1976) (citing the MPC’s definition of “deadly force” in excessive
force context but describing the concept in objective terms, as “such force as
under normal circumstances poses a high risk of death or serious injury to its
human target”); cf. Robinette v. Barnes, 854 F.2d 909, 912 (6th Cir. 1988)
(describing the MPC’s objective deadly force inquiry as the “[m]ore important[]”
one). Although we focus in the text of this opinion on the objective component of
the MPC’s “deadly force” definition, we need not definitively opine on whether
the subjective component has a role to play in the qualified immunity context.
Even if the subjective component was not categorically inapposite, on the facts of
this case we would reach the same ultimate disposition concerning the deadly
force questions. As detailed infra, Plaintiffs argue that deadly force was
unconstitutionally used when Deputy Morrical (1) released his police dog Chaos,
and (2) fatally shot Mr. Thomson. As to the latter, the precise contours of the
deadly force definition are not at issue because there is no dispute that Deputy
Morrical’s shooting of Mr. Thomson was an act of deadly force. Rather, the
question presented is whether that use of force was excessive (i.e.,
unconstitutional); we conclude infra that it was not excessive. As to the former,
the definitional boundaries of “deadly force” are implicated by the release of
Chaos because Plaintiffs argue that such a release constituted an act of deadly
force. However, even if we employed the subjective component, we would
conclude that Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of establishing that Chaos’s
release was an act of deadly force. For the reasons noted infra, we determine that
it was not an act of deadly force under the objective component. And,
specifically as to the subjective component, Plaintiffs have offered no evidence
that Deputy Morrical released Chaos with the purpose of causing a substantial
risk of death or serious bodily injury; accordingly, the release cannot be found to
be an act of deadly force under the subjective component. Therefore, application
of the subjective component of the MPC’s “deadly force” definition would not
alter the outcome as to the deadly force questions in this particular case.
According, we may leave for another day the determination of whether that
component is categorically inapposite in the qualified immunity context.
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suspect poses to the officers, we consider factors that include, but are not limited
to: “(1) whether the officers ordered the suspect to drop his weapon, and the
suspect’s compliance with police commands; (2) whether any hostile motions
were made with the weapon towards the officers; (3) the distance separating the
officers and the suspect; and (4) the manifest intentions of the suspect.” Estate of
Larsen, 511 F.3d at 1260.
Another important aspect of this inquiry is “whether the officers were in
danger at the precise moment that they used force.” Phillips, 422 F.3d at 1083
(internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, a reasonable but mistaken belief
that the suspect is likely to fight back justifies using more force than is actually
needed. Estate of Larsen, 511 F.3d at 1260. Finally, we are aware that deadly
force “encompasses a range of applications of force, some more likely to cause
death than others” and we take that into account in evaluating reasonableness.
Cordova, 569 F.3d at 1189.
Plaintiffs limit their claim to the argument that deadly force was
unconstitutionally used in two instances: (1) when Deputy Morrical released
Chaos, and (2) when he fatally shot Mr. Thomson. They also argue that even if
there was a need for deadly force, it was recklessly created by the actions of the
officers, and Defendants cannot now take advantage of the circumstances that
they created.
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1. Release of Police Dog
Plaintiffs assert that the release of Chaos, Deputy Morrical’s police dog,
constituted deadly force because Chaos is trained to bite and hold suspects, which
conceivably can cause serious bodily harm and even death, and that it is possible
that Chaos was not trained properly. We disagree that the use of a police dog on
the facts of this particular case constitutes deadly force, but we leave open the
question of whether the use of a police dog could constitute deadly force in other
circumstances.
Initially, we decline to deem a police dog’s ability to bite and hold to be
sufficient to make Chaos’s release, alone, an act of deadly force. To hold
otherwise could result in nearly every release of a police dog being considered
deadly force. See, e.g., Jarrett v. Town of Yarmouth, 331 F.3d 140, 143 (1st Cir.
2003) (noting that undisputed evidence presented at trial indicated that the vast
majority of jurisdictions train police dogs in the bite and hold method); Watkins v.
City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Police dogs were trained
and tested to bite solidly, bite hard, and hold on.”); Kerr v. City of W. Palm
Beach, 875 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Dogs in the canine unit were
trained to ‘bite and hold’ a suspect. This method of training is employed by many
other police departments throughout the country. The distinctive aspect of this
training method is its aggressive nature: unless the handler countermands his
order, the dog will seek to seize a suspect even if that individual complies with
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the officer’s orders. Thus, injury to the apprehended suspect is often
inevitable.”); cf. Johnson, 576 F.3d at 661 (“[W]e do not mean to minimize the
unpleasantness of having a German Shepherd clamp onto one’s arm or leg. This
does not mean, however, that the practice of deploying trained dogs to bite and
hold suspects is unconstitutional per se; the situation might warrant the use of a
dog that has been trained and that is under the control of the officer . . . .”).
Adopting a rule like that advanced by Plaintiffs—one that could essentially
preclude the use of police dogs—would not be wise and we discern nothing that
would compel us to do so.
It is no secret that many tools in law enforcement can potentially inflict
serious bodily harm or even death. See Robinette, 854 F.2d at 912 (noting that an
officer’s nightstick and vehicle both “possess the potential for being deadly
force”). Some of these tools, however, also have great potential to resolve
situations without resort to comparatively more lethal force. The Sixth Circuit
has opined that police dogs often can help prevent officers from having to resort
to deadly force: “[t]he use of dogs can make it more likely that the officers can
apprehend suspects without the risks attendant to the use of firearms in the
darkness, thus, frequently enhancing the safety of the officers, bystanders and the
suspect.” Id.; cf. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir. 1994)
(acknowledging the truth in the argument that the release of a police dog in lieu
of firing a gun at a suspect might have led to a better result for the suspect).
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“[T]he mere recognition that a law enforcement tool is dangerous does not suffice
as proof that the tool is an instrument of deadly force.” Robinette, 854 F.2d at
913. We see no need to deprive police officers of the benefit of these useful tools
(i.e., police dogs) solely because they carry the potential to cause serious harm.
Cf. id. at 914 (“[W]e are not persuaded . . . that the remote possibility that the use
of a police dog to apprehend a felon might, under extraordinary circumstances,
cause death, outweighs the dogs’ proven benefits for effective law
enforcement.”).
In examining the release of a police dog in this case, we find that the
circumstances under which Chaos was released do not make this release an
exercise of deadly force. Plaintiffs only endeavor to bolster their general deadly
force argument that the use of a police dog has the potential to cause serious harm
with speculation that Chaos may not have been properly trained, pointing to the
testimony of Defendants’ expert. Our review of the record, however, indicates
that this expert never opined that Chaos was not properly trained. Rather,
Defendants’ expert, in response to questioning by Plaintiffs at his deposition,
stated that at one point during the night’s events Deputy Morrical called out to
Chaos and Chaos did not immediately respond. Plaintiffs then asked the expert if
he knew why Chaos had not been immediately responsive, and the expert
answered, “I don’t know why. I mean there are certainly a number of reasons.”
Aplt. App. at 206. When asked if he believed this was due to a lack of training,
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the expert responded, “Not necessarily.” Aplt. App. at 206.
This evidence does not demonstrate that Chaos was improperly trained. Cf.
Robinette, 854 F.2d at 912-13, 912 n.3 (suggesting that improper training could
transform the use of a police dog into deadly force but rejecting speculation by an
expert to prove that the dog at issue was improperly trained). Further, even
assuming arguendo some degree of improper training, “[i]f the improper training
[of the police dog] was the result of simple negligence, no section 1983 action
will lie. Although a section 1983 action might lie if [the dog’s] training had been
intentionally altered, the record is devoid of any evidence which would support
such a finding in this case.” Id. at 912 n.3 (emphasis added) (first alteration in
original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs offer no other
reason why we should consider Chaos’s release to constitute deadly force.
Accordingly, we conclude that Chaos’s release did not rise to the level of deadly
force. 4
4
Although we leave open the possibility that under certain
circumstances (not present here) the use of a police dog could constitute deadly
force, we are unaware of any circuit that has found that the use of a properly
trained police dog constitutes deadly force. Marquez v. City of Albuquerque, 399
F.3d 1216, 1220 n.1 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that every circuit to consider the
issue has found that the use of a police dog is not deadly force); see also Smith,
394 F.3d at 707 (declining to rule out the possibility that use of a police dog
could constitute deadly force but noting that none of that circuit’s prior cases
have so held, albeit under a more restrictive definition of “deadly force” than the
one the court articulated as controlling); Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 365 F.3d
590, 597-98, 598 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he use of a properly trained police dog
in the course of apprehending a suspect does not constitute deadly force.”),
(continued...)
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The release of Chaos likewise did not constitute unconstitutional excessive
force. Mr. Thomson threatened his wife and fled their home; officers knew he
was armed and in a residential neighborhood in the middle of the night. Thus,
considering the totality of the circumstances, the officers were justified and acted
reasonably in releasing Chaos in order to locate Mr. Thomson. See Marquez, 399
F.3d at 1221 (holding that a jury could rationally conclude that the officer acted
reasonably when he ordered his dog to apprehend a suspect—believed to be
potentially armed, a danger to the public, and willing to evade arrest—subsequent
to a set of circumstances that were “tense and rapidly evolving”); Mendoza v.
Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1362-63 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding use of a police dog to find
and secure a suspect thought to be armed and hiding on private property
objectively reasonable, although it would have constituted excessive force if the
suspect had been handcuffed, had fully surrendered, and had been completely
(...continued)
vacated in part and abrogated on other grounds by Szabla v. City of Brooklyn
Park, 486 F.3d 385 (8th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Jarrett, 331 F.3d at 148-51
(concluding that the “release of a dog trained to bite and hold” was nondeadly
force that did not violate a constitutional right); Robinette, 854 F.2d at 912
(finding that the use of a properly trained police dog to seize a felony suspect was
not deadly force although the suspect in that case died as a result of being
apprehended by the dog); cf. Vathekan v. Prince George’s County, 154 F.3d 173,
178-80 (4th Cir. 1998) (analyzing the use of police dog under excessive force
analysis with no discussion of deadly force); Fikes v. Cleghorn, 47 F.3d 1011,
1014-15 (9th Cir. 1995) (approving district court’s instructions to jury on
excessive force and refusal to instruct on deadly force when no evidence was
presented that use of a trained police dog presented a risk of death or serious
bodily injury to suspect).
-19-
under control). Accordingly, Chaos’s release was not a constitutional violation,
as it did not constitute excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment
under the circumstances taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.
2. The Fatal Shot
Plaintiffs’ next argument centers around what they characterize as genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the officers were in danger when deadly
force—in the form of the shooting of Mr. Thomson—was employed. In support
of their argument, Plaintiffs point to alleged discrepancies between the officers’
testimony. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that Deputy Morrical’s testimony differs
from that of the other officers. Deputy Morrical testified that when Mr. Thomson
first came into his view, the barrel of Mr. Thomson’s gun was pointed in an
upwards direction, toward Mr. Thomson’s head. According to Deputy Morrical,
Mr. Thomson then placed the barrel of the gun into his mouth, removed the gun
from his mouth, and brought the barrel down directly toward Deputy Morrical.
Deputy Shire saw Mr. Thomson first point the gun at Chaos and then move the
gun in an “upward” motion such that the barrel of the gun was pointed “towards
[Mr. Thomson’s] head.” Aplt. App. at 165. Deputy Shire testified that at the
time Deputy Morrical fired a single, fatal shot into Mr. Thomson’s head, the
barrel of Mr. Thomson’s gun was still “pointing upward towards his head.” Aplt.
App. at 165. Even if there was some dispute regarding whether Mr. Thomson was
moving the gun upward or downward, however, both Deputies Morrical and Shire
-20-
agree that the gun was pointed at them shortly before Mr. Thomson was shot.
Deputies Shire and Morrical were the only witnesses to the shooting because
Deputy Jarvis could not see Mr. Thomson until after he heard the shot fired.
For qualified immunity purposes, the presumed factual dispute arising from
the officers’ testimony is irrelevant. In determining whether a plaintiff’s
constitutional rights were violated we ordinarily, as here, adopt plaintiff’s version
of the facts, insofar as it is supported by the record. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
The time frame during which all of this happened was very short; from the time
when Mr. Thomson came into view of the police until the time he was shot,
possibly as few as ten seconds had elapsed. During that time, Mr. Thomson was
repeatedly told to put down his weapon, but he did not comply with the
commands of the officers and instead moved the gun up and down quickly. Mr.
Thomson also was yelling that he would pull the trigger and that he would shoot.
Both Deputies Morrical and Shire felt threatened by this behavior and prepared to
shoot Mr. Thomson. Even taking the facts in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs, as we must, the gun still was pointed toward the officers almost
immediately prior to Deputy Morrical shooting Mr. Thomson—although it was
pointed upward towards Mr. Thomson’s head when the shot was fired.
Plaintiffs argue that Deputy Morrical acted unreasonably in shooting Mr.
Thomson because Mr. Thomson’s gun was aimed at his own head immediately
before Deputy Morrical fired the fatal shot. We rejected a similar argument in
-21-
Phillips, where the plaintiffs also focused their argument on the threat to the
officers at the exact moment that the shot was fired. See Phillips, 422 F.3d at
1083. Although we recognized that the precise moment of the shot is a critical
factor, we rejected the argument that the officer “was not in danger of serious
bodily injury immediately prior to the time when he shot Mr. Phillips,” stating
that the “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” events leading up to that moment
were “extremely relevant” in the totality of the circumstances approach. Id. at
1083-84. It is the totality of the circumstances that is the touchstone of the
reasonableness inquiry. Id. at 1080, 1083-84. “Strict reliance” on the “precise
moment” factor is inappropriate when the totality must be considered. Id. at
1083.
Here, the totality of the circumstances indicates that it was reasonable for
the officers to believe that Mr. Thomson was an immediate threat to them or to
others in the neighborhood. Mr. Thomson was in possession of a firearm, was
known to have threatened his wife with a firearm, and had not put his weapon
down as instructed by the officers. The central episode—that involved only a
matter of seconds during which the undisputed evidence indicates that Mr.
Thomson was moving his gun up and down quickly, including aiming it directly
at the officers at one point—is exactly the type of “tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving situation that we do not like to second-guess using the 20/20 hindsight
found in the comfort of a judge’s chambers.” Id. at 1084.
-22-
Additionally, the reasonableness of Deputy Morrical’s action is also
supported by the factors identified in Estate of Larsen: “(1) whether the officers
ordered the suspect to drop his weapon, and the suspect’s compliance with police
commands; (2) whether any hostile motions were made with the weapon towards
the officers; (3) the distance separating the officers and the suspect; and (4) the
manifest intentions of the suspect.” Estate of Larsen, 511 F.3d at 1260. All of
these factors endorse the use of deadly force in the situation before us. The
officers had instructed Mr. Thomson to drop his weapon, but he did not comply
with the command. Mr. Thomson made hostile motions; he aimed his weapon at
the officers after having previously stated that he was going to pull the trigger.
Further, the officers were unclear about who or what he was going to shoot.
Although Plaintiffs suggest that Mr. Thomson was suicidal because the gun was
pointing up near his head when he was shot, Mr. Thomson had pointed that same
gun at the officers a few seconds prior. Moreover, Mr. Thomson additionally had
threatened his wife, indicating that his intentions were not limited to suicide.
These factors indicate that “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, the totality of circumstances justified the use of force” in this case. 5 Id.
5
Plaintiffs also maintain that Deputy Morrical’s failure to immediately
correct the reports that Mr. Thomson committed suicide supports the view that
Deputy Morrical did not actually believe he was in danger. Our inquiry, however,
is limited to the totality of the circumstances at the time of the shooting,
regardless of what Deputy Morrical might have thought after the shooting took
place. See Phillips, 422 F.3d at 1080 (noting that a use of force that might later
(continued...)
-23-
It would have been virtually impossible for Deputy Morrical to ascertain
whether Mr. Thomson’s gun simply was moving upward or if it was coming down
to be aimed at him again. Deputy Morrical was forced to make a split-second
decision. Even if Deputy Morrical was mistaken in believing that Mr. Thomson
was threatening the officers (though this belief was shared by Deputy Shire), it
was not objectively unreasonable for him to have formed that belief. 6 See id.
Furthermore, a reasonable but mistaken belief that a suspect is going to fight back
with force would justify the use of deadly force on these facts. Id. (“[E]ven if an
officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect was likely to fight back
(...continued)
appear to be unnecessary “may nonetheless be reasonable under the circumstances
presented to the officer at the time” (emphasis added)). Furthermore, the inquiry
is “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). This inquiry does not examine what a particular
officer believed but, rather, asks about the reasonable officer. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs’ argument—that Deputy Morrical’s later actions shed light on his
thoughts at the time of the shooting—does not assist us in objectively analyzing
whether the force used was excessive. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (“An
officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an
objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer’s good intentions make an
objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.”). Thus, we will consider
only whether the circumstances leading up to the shooting would make the use of
this force at issue here reasonable from the perspective of a reasonable officer.
6
Plaintiffs assert that the fact that Deputy Morrical shot Mr. Thomson
only one time and in the head, rather than firing twice at Mr. Thomson’s “critical
mass” as Utah police officers are trained to do, indicates that Deputy Morrical
was not in danger when he fired and the shooting was unjustified. Plaintiffs,
however, offer no authority for this proposition, point to no evidence regarding
Deputy Morrical’s training, and do not contradict Deputy Morrical’s assertions
that he only fired once because he saw Mr. Thomson fall after the first shot and
he aimed at Mr. Thomson’s head because that was what he could see best.
-24-
. . . the officer would be justified in using more force than in fact was needed.”
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11
(noting that the use of deadly force is not justified “[w]here the suspect poses no
immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others”).
Because Mr. Thomson had threatened his wife, refused to drop his weapon,
and pointed that weapon at the officers, this was not a case of a man who
appeared to be a danger only to himself and not to others, despite Plaintiffs’
argument. Given the totality of the circumstances, even if Deputy Morrical was
mistaken in his belief that Mr. Thomson posed a risk to him, it was not
objectively unreasonable for him to have that belief and hence to use deadly
force. See Estate of Larsen, 511 F.3d at 1260-61. “The undisputed evidence
paints a picture that [the officers] were faced with an armed suspect in an agitated
condition, who ignored repeated warnings to drop his weapon, and appeared
willing and able to attack.” Id. at 1263. Accordingly, we do not find this use of
force to be excessive under the circumstances revealed by the evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.
3. Creation of Need for Deadly Force
Plaintiffs also argue that even if the situation did allow for the use of
deadly force, the officers recklessly created the need for deadly force and so
could not take advantage of that situation. They claim that the officers created
the need for deadly force in three ways: (1) by releasing Chaos, (2) by doing so
-25-
without a warning, and (3) by failing to negotiate with Mr. Thomson. We
conclude that none of these actions recklessly created the need to use deadly
force.
The reasonableness of the officers’ use of force depends not only on
whether they believed they were in danger at the time but also on whether their
“own reckless or deliberate conduct during the seizure unreasonably created the
need to use such force.” Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 840 (10th Cir. 1997)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147,
1159-60 (10th Cir. 2008). The conduct of the officers before a suspect threatens
force is relevant only if it is “immediately connected” to the threat of force.
Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1132 (10th Cir. 2001). Additionally, the
officers’ conduct is only actionable if it rises to the level of recklessness. Sevier
v. City of Lawrence, 60 F.3d 695, 699 & n.7 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Mere negligent
actions precipitating a confrontation would not, of course, be actionable under §
1983.”); Medina, 252 F.3d at 1132. As we have recognized, this analysis is
“simply a specific application of the ‘totality of the circumstances’ approach
inherent in the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard.” Medina, 252 F.3d
at 1132.
None of the actions cited by Plaintiffs unreasonably created the need to use
force; the totality of the circumstances shows that the officers’ actions were
reasonable. Before any of the actions that allegedly recklessly created the need to
-26-
use force had even occurred, the officers had received a report that a man (Mr.
Thomson) had aimed a gun at his wife and was now somewhere in a residential
neighborhood with a gun. Aplt. App. at 159. It was objectively reasonable for
the officers to take the steps that they did to locate an armed man who was
agitated and running through a neighborhood. See Jiron, 392 F.3d at 418 (finding
an officer’s decision to coax a suspect out of a locked room by repeatedly
ordering the suspect to exit the room and attempting to enter the room herself
constituted a reasonable attempt “to prevent an armed and agitated suspect from
escaping”); Medina, 252 F.3d at 1132 (finding that officers’ failure to remain
undercover and attempt to stop a suspect after having released police dog
reasonable under the circumstances when the suspect had communicated that he
had a gun and emerged with what reasonably appeared to be a weapon).
More specifically, focusing first on Plaintiffs’ argument about the release
of Chaos, Plaintiffs base their claim on the statement of an expert who opined that
“using the dog to attack and bite was tactically inadvisable and in contravention
of principles of officer safety” because it increased the risk of injury to the
officers and to Mr. Thomson. Aplt. App. at 208. Despite Plaintiffs’ assertion,
however, “[w]e evaluate the officer’s reasonableness from the on-scene
perspective, not with the advantage of 20/20 hindsight.” Jiron, 392 F.3d at 418.
We cannot now consider whether other actions would have been more appropriate
or, indeed, optimal. Instead, we consider whether it was reasonable to release a
-27-
police dog to locate an armed suspect in a residential neighborhood; the facts
suggest that Deputy Morrical “adequately performed his duties as a reasonable
law enforcement officer by taking steps to prevent an armed and agitated suspect
from escaping.” Id. As explained above, the totality of the circumstances made
the decision reasonable at the time, even if an outside observer might now find it
“inadvisable.”
Furthermore, we decline to accept Plaintiffs’ second argument that
unleashing Chaos without a warning created the need to use deadly force. A
warning is not invariably required even before the use of deadly force, let alone
here, where the release of the dog was nondeadly force used in the face of an
imminent threat. 7 See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12 (“[I]f the suspect threatens the
officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed
a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm,
deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible,
some warning has been given.” (emphasis added)); cf. Johnson, 576 F.3d at 660-
7
Furthermore, we emphasize that even if it might be possible to
consider the unwarned release of Chaos to be negligent, the disputed conduct
must rise to the level of recklessness. Medina, 252 F.3d at 1132 (“In addition to
considering whether the officers reasonably believed they were in danger at the
time they used force, we have considered whether [the officers’] own reckless or
deliberate conduct during the seizure unreasonably created the need to use such
force.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). We conclude
that there is simply no evidence to support such a finding, especially in light of
our determination in Part II(B)(1) supra, that the evidence indicates that it was
objectively reasonable for the officers to release Chaos.
-28-
61 (acknowledging that, although there was no oral warning before the police dog
was released, the suspect did not and could not credibly argue that a warning
would have made a difference where there was no real opportunity to warn
because the fleeing suspect made a last-minute surrender immediately before the
pursuing police dog bit him); Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, 486 F.3d 385, 392
(8th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (finding that, even assuming it could be objectively
unreasonable for an officer to fail to warn before using a police dog, a municipal
policy was not facially unconstitutional despite being silent regarding when an
officer should provide a warning before a canine is directed to bite and hold).
Third, Plaintiffs claim that a failure to negotiate with Mr. Thomson created
the need to use deadly force. This argument, however, mainly relates to the
actions of Lieutenant Wardle, who is not a party in this case. To successfully
show a constitutional violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants
themselves caused him or her to suffer an injury. See Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1162
(“Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the
alleged constitutional violation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiffs’
only assertion regarding Deputy Morrical’s failure to negotiate is simply a
recasting of their failed argument that the officers should have issued a warning
before releasing Chaos and that they used excessive force. This assertion
therefore carries no weight in our assessment of their excessive force claim.
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a violation of a constitutional right and
-29-
therefore have not met their burden in opposing summary judgment on this claim.
Accordingly, our analysis of this issue ends with our determination that there was
no constitutional violation. See Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1088, 1092. Deputy
Morrical is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim.
C. Failure to Train
Plaintiffs also assert that Salt Lake County failed to adequately train its
officers on how to treat suicidal suspects. To establish the County’s liability
under § 1983 for inadequate training in the use of force, Plaintiffs must show that:
(1) the officers exceeded constitutional limitations on the use
of force; (2) the use of force arose under circumstances that
constitute a usual and recurring situation with which police
officers must deal; (3) the inadequate training demonstrates a
deliberate indifference on the part of the city toward persons
with whom the police officers come into contact[;] and (4)
there is a direct causal link between the constitutional
deprivation and the inadequate training.
Allen, 119 F.3d at 841-42. Because we have already decided that the use of force
was objectively reasonable, Plaintiffs’ claim fails at the first factor; the officers
did not “exceed[] constitutional limitations on the use of force.” Id. at 841; see
also City of L.A. v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (“[None] of our cases
authorize[] the award of damages against a municipal corporation based on the
actions of one of its officers when in fact . . . the officer inflicted no
constitutional harm.”). Accordingly, our determination that Plaintiffs suffered no
constitutional injury is dispositive of this claim. See Estate of Larsen, 511 F.3d
-30-
at 1264.
D. State-law Claims
Plaintiffs’ final argument pertains to their state-law claims. Under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, 8 a plaintiff’s claim against a governmental entity or
employee is barred by sovereign immunity unless the plaintiff can demonstrate
that the government officials “acted or failed to act through fraud or malice.”
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3)(b)(i) (2003). Plaintiffs argue that their state-law
claims for assault, battery, and wrongful death should be allowed to proceed
because Defendants acted with malice. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs did not
assert this malice theory below and, consequently, they are barred from raising it
on appeal. See Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 720-22 (10th Cir.
1993) (noting that generally “issues not passed upon below will not be considered
on appeal”). Plaintiffs concede that they did not expressly characterize their
evidence as that of “malice,” but counter that they are pointing to the same
evidence that they presented to the district court and thus this should not be
deemed a new argument on appeal. It appears from the record that Defendants
are correct: Plaintiffs did not argue the malice exception theory to the district
court, instead relying on the assertion that summary judgment was not appropriate
because Deputy Morrical was not acting in self-defense—self-defense being the
8
The portions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act at issue were
repealed in July 2004, after the date of the incident. We therefore refer to the
statute as it was in effect on April 19, 2004, when the incident occurred.
-31-
state-law statutory defense raised by Defendants to the claims.
Even if we were inclined to deviate from our general rule and consider the
merits of this argument, as we have discretion to do, see id. at 721, we would
conclude that summary judgment was proper on these state-law claims.
Plaintiffs’ argument that malice was present appears to be limited to their belief
that Deputy Morrical fired his weapon when he may not have been in immediate
danger and failed to follow County protocol; 9 that Mr. Thomson may have
threatened Deputy Morrical’s dog and, as a dog handler, Deputy Morrical loves
his dog; and that Lieutenant Wardle instructed the officers to continue their
search for the armed Mr. Thomson rather than negotiating with him by
telephone. 10 The totality of the circumstances demonstrates the reasonableness of
the officers’ actions, however, and none of the specified acts would support an
inference of malice, which would permit Plaintiffs to survive summary judgment.
See Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 927-28 (10th Cir. 2007) (defining malice to
include “an improper motive such as a desire to do harm” (quoting Russell v.
Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 904 (Utah 1992))). Thus, we agree
with the district court that these claims are barred by sovereign immunity.
9
Presumably by “protocol” Plaintiffs are referring to the targeted
location and number of shots fired by Deputy Morrical. See supra note 6.
10
Plaintiffs additionally suggest that the County’s failure to properly
train its employees could amount to malice as an element underlying their state-
law claims. In addition to being a theory newly raised on appeal, Plaintiffs
provide no authority for this proposition. Furthermore, as explained in Part II(C)
supra, Plaintiffs cannot establish a failure to train claim against the County.
-32-
Next, Plaintiffs argue that their negligence claim should be allowed to
proceed because the Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not bar negligence
claims. Although it is true that immunity “is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope
of employment,” Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (2003), numerous exceptions to this
rule exist. One such exception, relevant here, is when “the injury arises out of, in
connection with, or results from . . . assault, battery, . . . or violation of civil
rights.” Id. § 63-30-10(2); see also id. § 63-30d-301(5)(b).
Utah courts have recognized that the question of immunity under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act focuses on the conduct out of which the injury arose
rather than the theory of liability argued by a plaintiff. See Ledfors v. Emery
County Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Utah 1993) (“The determinant of
immunity is the type of conduct that produces the injury . . . .”). Here, the injury
complained of—Mr. Thomson’s death—arose out of the battery that occurred
when he was shot. Thus, this act falls within one of the listed exceptions of § 63-
30-10 that restores governmental immunity and is not the type of claim for which
Utah waives liability of its employees. See id. (“[The exception] immunizes the
negligence of the state employee when that negligence results in injuries ‘arising
out of’ an assault or battery.”); Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp., 740 P.2d 1337,
1340 (Utah 1987) (rejecting an argument phrased as a negligence claim when
officers beat a suspect during an arrest, indicating that battery was a cause of the
-33-
injury). Accordingly, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act bars Plaintiffs’
negligence claim.
III. CONCLUSION
We hold that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to
Defendants. First, Plaintiffs failed to establish a constitutional violation under
the Fourth Amendment because they did not meet their burden of demonstrating
that the release of a police dog or the shooting of Mr. Thomson was objectively
unreasonable under the circumstances. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ argument that it
was error to grant summary judgment to Deputy Morrical on the basis of qualified
immunity cannot succeed. Furthermore, having failed to establish a constitutional
violation, Plaintiffs cannot proceed on their failure to train claim. Finally,
Plaintiffs’ state-law claims are barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
-34-
06-4304, Thomson v. Salt Lake County
HOLMES, J., Concurring.
I fully join the lead opinion in this case. However, Plaintiffs’ arguments
have underscored for me the need to offer some clarifying words for litigants and
district courts about the application of the summary judgment standard of review
in the qualified immunity context. More specifically, Plaintiffs have argued in
part that the district court erred in entering summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds because there were genuine issues of material fact that should
properly be determined by a jury. See, e.g., Aplt. Opening Br. at 8 (“[T]here is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the County deputies or any third party
was in danger at the time Chad was fatally shot, which would render Morrical’s
exercise of force through the use of a gun unconstitutional.”). For the reasons
outlined below, this line of argument is fundamentally misguided and courts
should be attuned to recognize its infirmities.
Application of the summary judgment standard of review in the qualified
immunity context may at first glance seem straightforward. However, in practice,
application of the standard frequently has proven to be challenging. 1 See United
1
E.g., Flatford v. City of Monroe, 17 F.3d 162, 166 (6th Cir. 1994)
(“[T]he difficulty for all judges with qualified immunity has not been articulation
of the rule, but rather the application of it.”); see also Alan K. Chen, The Facts
About Qualified Immunity, 55 Emory L.J. 229, 230 (2006) (“The legal system
continues to struggle with qualified immunity . . . .”); Teressa E. Ravenell,
Hammering in Screws: Why the Court Should Look Beyond Summary Judgment
(continued...)
States ex rel. Burlbaw v. Orenduff, 548 F.3d 931, 940 n.6 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e
acknowledge our long-standing view that the task of district courts, and
consequently appellate courts, is different in reviewing motions for summary
judgment under traditional standards and qualified immunity principles. Indeed,
courts should exercise care not to confuse the two analytic frameworks.
Admittedly, at least in some instances, this apparently is easier said than done.”
(citations omitted)). Courts and litigants alike often have difficulty analyzing
whether summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is appropriate.
“Lower courts struggle with the doctrine’s application, finding that, at least
in some circumstances, contested factual issues preclude summary judgment.”
Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the
Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 4, 5 (1997)
[hereinafter Chen, Burdens of Qualified Immunity] (“While the qualified
immunity defense has long been recognized, its application and administration
continue to perplex courts and provoke a substantial amount of scholarly
commentary.”). Appellate courts also have struggled with the application of the
(...continued)
When Resolving § 1983 Qualified Immunity Disputes, 52 Vill. L. Rev. 135, 136
(2007) (noting scholars’ argument that courts “have difficulty resolving qualified
immunity disputes before trial because qualified immunity is an inherently fact-
based inquiry”); Michael M. Rosen, A Qualified Defense: In Support of the
Doctrine of Qualified Immunity in Excessive Force Cases, With Some Suggestions
for Its Improvement, 35 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 139, 173 (2005) (“[T]his
seemingly simple qualified immunity standard actually contains great
complexity.”).
-2-
doctrine. Judge Charles Wilson of the Eleventh Circuit has noted that “[w]ading
through the doctrine of qualified immunity is one of the most morally and
conceptually challenging tasks federal appellate court judges routinely face.”
Charles R. Wilson, “Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments in the
Qualified Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 445, 447 (2000).
At both judicial levels, the confusion at the summary judgment stage
appears to relate primarily to the decisional significance of disputed material
factual issues and the related question of burden shifts between plaintiff and
defendant. Cf. Chen, Burdens of Qualified Immunity, supra, at 6 (noting that
“[m]any of the dilemmas experienced in the understanding and application of the
qualified immunity doctrine reflect th[e] fundamental misconception about the
role of facts under the doctrine and the possibility of resolution on summary
judgment”). The plaintiff first must shoulder a heavy two-part burden. In
determining whether a plaintiff has carried its two-part burden of proving (1) that
defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) that the right was clearly
established, ordinarily courts must “adopt” plaintiff’s “version of the facts.”
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); see id. at 378 (“[C]ourts are required to
view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the [summary judgment] motion. In qualified immunity cases, this
usually means adopting . . . the plaintiff’s version of the facts.” (second alteration
in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see Riggins v.
-3-
Goodman, 572 F.3d 1101, 1107 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that generally in the
qualified immunity context in addressing the legal inquiry “we accept the facts as
the plaintiff alleges them”); see also Whittier v. Kobayashi, 581 F.3d 1304, 1307
(11th Cir. 2009) (“We resolve all issues of material fact in favor of the plaintiff,
and then, under that version of the facts, determine the legal question of whether
the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.”).
However, because we are beyond the pleading phase of the litigation,
plaintiff’s version of the facts must find support in the record. See Scott, 550
U.S. at 380 (“At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to
those facts.” (emphasis added)); see Estate of Larsen ex rel. Sturdivan v. Murr,
511 F.3d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Weigel v. Broad, 544 F.3d 1143,
1156-57 (10th Cir. 2009) (O’Brien, J., dissenting) (“The first step is to distill the
record to uncontested facts and contested material facts favorable to the party
claiming injury. But only genuine issues of contested material fact are entitled to
favored status.” (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2387 (2009). More
specifically, plaintiff’s version of the facts cannot be “so utterly discredited by
the record that no reasonable jury could have believed” it. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
In addressing the legal issue in the qualified immunity context of a
violation vel non of a clearly established constitutional right, however, the
principal purpose of assessing whether plaintiff’s evidence gives rise to genuine
-4-
issues of material fact is different than it is in the traditional summary judgment
analytic paradigm. Specifically, contrary to the latter, the objective is not to
determine whether a plaintiff survives summary judgment because plaintiff’s
evidence raises material issues that warrant resolution by a jury. Instead, the
principal purpose is to determine whether plaintiff’s factual allegations are
sufficiently grounded in the record such that they may permissibly comprise the
universe of facts that will serve as the foundation for answering the legal question
before the court. Cf. Green v. Post, 574 F.3d 1294, 196-97 & n.4 (10th Cir. 2009)
(citing Scott in the context of qualified immunity summary judgment review and
declining to incorporate into the universe of relevant facts an allegation refuted
by a video-tape in the record); Weigel, 544 F.3d at 1156-57 (O’Brien, J.,
dissenting) (noting that after the relevant universe of facts is “distilled” from the
record the “next step” is determine whether those facts “demonstrate” the
violation of a clearly established constitutional right). Compare Pearson v.
Callahan, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16 (2009) (“First, a court must decide
whether the facts that a plaintiff has . . . shown (see [Federal] Rules [of Civil
Procedure] 50, 56) make out a violation of a constitutional right.”), with Scott,
550 U.S. at 380 (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which
is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it,
a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a
motion for summary judgment.”).
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It is only after plaintiff crosses the legal hurdle comprised of his or her
two-part burden of demonstrating the violation of a constitutional right that was
clearly established, that courts should be concerned with the true factual
landscape—as opposed to the factual landscape as plaintiff would have it. Based
upon that true factual landscape, courts should determine whether defendant can
carry the traditional summary judgment burden of establishing that there are no
genuine issues of material fact for jury resolution and that defendant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 2 See Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th
2
Certain language in Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304 (10th
Cir. 2002), might suggest that we also have lost our way in the analytic morass of
qualified immunity analysis. There, we noted that “we will not grant a defendant
official qualified immunity if material facts are in dispute,” and criticized the
district court for “fail[ing] to take into account several disputed factual issues in
granting summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity” in favor of the
officer defendant. 312 F.3d at 1313. However, a careful reading of Olsen belies
any suggestion of confusion because we expressly operated under the correct
summary judgment standard for the qualified immunity context. More
specifically, we recognized that in that context, we review summary judgment
questions “differently from other summary judgment decisions.” Id. at 1312
(internal quotation marks omitted). And we remarked that it is only “[i]f the
plaintiff indeed demonstrates that the official violated a clearly established
constitutional or statutory right,” that “the burden shifts back to the defendant” to
bear “the normal summary judgment burden of showing that no material facts
remain in dispute that would defeat the qualified immunity defense.” Id. The
referenced language from Olsen and its conclusion that summary judgment was
inappropriate are best read as reflecting our antecedent determination that the
defendant officer had failed to carry his burden at the third stage of demonstrating
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 1313 (discussing
defendant officer’s failure to carry his burden and noting that “the case before us
is not one in which [Plaintiff-]Appellant asserts that the sun rises in the west and
demands a jury trial to resolve the issue”). At that stage, focusing on the true
factual picture, the existence of genuine disputes of material fact would indeed be
(continued...)
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Cir. 2001) (“If the plaintiff successfully establishes the violation of a clearly
established right, the burden shifts to the defendant, who must prove that there are
no genuine issues of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Holland ex rel. Overdorff v.
Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Medina); see also
Gallegos v. City & County of Denver, 984 F.2d 358, 361 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Only
after plaintiff has met this initial [two-part qualified immunity] burden does the
burden shift to defendants to prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists.”);
cf. Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 327 & n.4 (3d Cir. 2009) (recognizing (a) that
it “must accept” plaintiff’s version of the facts as true, (b) that “qualified
immunity analysis and summary judgment legal standards for a constitutional
claim are not susceptible to fusion[,] and [c] that denying summary judgment
because a material issue of fact remains on an excessive force claim is improper
on a qualified immunity inquiry,” but identifying disputed issues of material fact
that apparently precluded summary judgment once the burden shifted to the
(...continued)
relevant. See id. at 1312-13 (discussing operative standards and noting that
“[w]hen there are unresolved disputes of historical fact relevant to whether the
officer had probable cause and to what information he possessed—and thus to
whether he may properly claim qualified immunity, a court may not grant
summary judgment based on qualified immunity because the officer would not
have shown that no genuine dispute exists as to material fact” (emphasis added));
see also id. at 1313 (noting that because of the officer’s failure to demonstrate an
absence of genuine issues of material fact “we believe that a jury must resolve
[the] disputed facts”).
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defendants).
Plaintiffs here have fallen prey to this confusion surrounding application of
the summary judgment standard of review in the qualified immunity context.
Throughout their argument concerning the legal constitutional question (i.e., in
the area relating to Plaintiffs’ two-part burden), Plaintiffs appear to focus on the
inquiry appropriate for traditional summary judgment analysis: that is, on the
inquiry into whether there are genuine issues of material fact (i.e., material
factual disputes) for resolution by a jury. However, as detailed herein, because at
issue is the legal qualified immunity question, that focus is misplaced. See, e.g.,
Goddard v. Urrea, 847 F.2d 765, 770 (11th Cir. 1988) (Johnson, J., dissenting)
(observing that, even if factual disputes exist, “these disputes are irrelevant to the
qualified immunity analysis because that analysis assumes the validity of the
plaintiffs’ facts”).
I am in full agreement with the lead opinion and, in my view, the foregoing
observations are entirely consistent with it. However, I write separately in the hope
of shedding some clarifying light on the process of applying the summary judgment
standard of review in the qualified immunity setting.
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