FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 29, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
PAUL PAYNE,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 09-2089
v. (D.C. No. 07-CV-01017)
(D.N.M.)
TIM LEMASTER, Warden;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-Appellant Paul Payne, an inmate appearing pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) allowing him to appeal the district court’s
order dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus with prejudice. 28
U.S.C. § 2254. To obtain a COA, Mr. Payne must make “a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). We conclude that he has not made the
requisite showing, therefore we deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
In a June 2002 bench trial, Mr. Payne was convicted of first-degree murder,
conspiracy, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner. 1 R. at 64. All
three charges stemmed from the June 1999 murder of a fellow inmate at the Lea
County Correctional Facility. 2 R. at 13-14. He was sentenced to life
imprisonment plus nine additional years and five years’ parole, to run
consecutively to a previous sentence for escape from prison. 1 R. at 64-65. The
New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. 1 R. at
135-50. A state district court denied his motion to withdraw his waiver of a jury
trial, as well as his state petition for habeas corpus. 1 R. at 395-98. He sought
certiorari on the state habeas petition but it was denied. 1 R. at 430.
In his federal habeas petition, Mr. Payne listed fourteen claims forming the
basis for relief. 1 R. at 9-20. The magistrate judge grouped these claims into five
areas: (1) waiver of the right to a jury trial due to prosecutorial misconduct, (2)
breach of the jury waiver agreement, (3) use of an unavailable witness’s
preliminary hearing testimony in violation of the confrontation clause, (4)
ineffective assistance of counsel, and (5) non-cognizable claims. 2 R. at 17, 21,
34, 44, 59. 1 The magistrate judge recommended that Mr. Payne’s § 2254 petition
be denied. 2 R. at 61.
Mr. Payne objected to the magistrate judge’s proposed findings and
recommended disposition. 2 R. at 75-109. He claimed that the magistrate judge
erred (1) in applying the deferential standards of review under 28 U.S.C. §
1
The page numbers refer to the record’s page numbers, not to the page
numbers of the magistrate judge’s memorandum.
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2254(d) rather than de novo review; (2) in not considering exculpatory facts; (3)
in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing; (4) in analyzing the waiver of a jury
trial claim; (5) in analyzing the confrontation clause claim; (6) in analyzing the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and (7) in concluding that the remaining
claims were non-cognizable. 2 R. at 75-109. The district judge overruled Mr.
Payne’s objections. 2 R. at 132-34.
In seeking a COA, Mr. Payne relies upon those objections. Application for
COA at 2; Aplt. Br. at 2-4. On appeal, Mr. Payne’s restyled brief raises only two
issues that he did not raise in his original § 2254 petition: the applicability of
deferential standards of review and the district court’s refusal to hold an
evidentiary hearing. In conducting our review of claims “adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings,” we must uphold the State court decision unless
it “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” § 2254(d); see Aycox v. Lytle,
196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999).
Mr. Payne argues that this deferential standard does not apply because the
state district court treated his habeas corpus petition as a successive petition and
therefore it was not “adjudicated on the merits,” as § 2254(d) requires. Aplt. Br.
at 7-8. Mr. Payne’s characterization of the state court proceedings is not correct.
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Although the state district judge disposed of Mr. Payne’s habeas petition in a
brief letter ruling, he recognized the ineffective assistance claims and concluded
that “Petitioner was ably represented by counsel.” 1 R. at 398. The state district
judge never referred to Mr. Payne’s petition as “successive.” Because state courts
adjudicated Mr. Payne’s claims on the merits, the deferential standard applies.
An independent review of Mr. Payne’s federal habeas petition, his appellate
brief, and the record shows that reasonable jurists would not debate the district
court’s assessment of his constitutional claims. As discussed by the magistrate
judge, the prosecutor’s conduct during voir dire was unobjectionable and did not
cause Mr. Payne to waive his right to a jury trial. 2 R. at 17-21. The State of
New Mexico did not breach its promise to Mr. Payne in exchange for his waiver
of a jury trial. The record supports the state district judge’s conclusion that the
State only promised to attempt to transfer Mr. Payne to a prison in a state other
than Utah or New Mexico. 1 R. 395-96. It also supports that the State made good
on its promise to seek a transfer, an attempt which ultimately failed. 1 R. 396; 2
R. at 25-33. The trial court’s admission of a police officer’s preliminary hearing
testimony did not violate Mr. Payne’s right to confront the witnesses against him.
2 R. at 34-44. Supreme Court precedent has established that such an admission
does not violate the confrontation clause if the witness was unavailable and the
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. See Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59, 68 (2004); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 73-74
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(1980). The witness was unavailable for trial (because of brain damage from a
motorcycle accident) and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
him at the preliminary hearing. 2 R. at 34, 40. Regarding Mr. Payne’s several
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court applied the correct
standard and did not err in finding a lack of deficient representation or prejudice.
2 R. at 44-58. Lastly, Mr. Payne’s other claims do not raise any cognizable
violations of federal law. 2 R. at 59-61. Because the record establishes that Mr.
Payne’s claims are without merit, he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007).
We DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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