F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
MAY 28 1997
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
GERALD PAYNE,
Petitioner - Appellant, No. 96-6221
v. W.D. Oklahoma
DENISE SPEARS; THE ATTORNEY (D.C. No. CIV-96-139)
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
OKLAHOMA,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before ANDERSON, HENRY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. This cause is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Gerald Payne appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and requests a certificate of appealability.1 Mr.
Payne is currently serving a forty-year sentence in the Oklahoma State Correctional
Facility at Atoka following his conviction for conspiracy to manufacture a controlled
dangerous substance. He appealed his conviction to the Oklahoma Criminal Court of
Appeals, alleging three grounds of error in his jury trial. The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction.
Mr. Payne then brought this section 2254 action in the district court, alleging the
same three trial errors he raised in the Oklahoma court,2 as well as a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel. Since the ineffective assistance claim had admittedly not been
raised in the Oklahoma courts, the magistrate judge determined the petition must be
dismissed because it contained an unexhausted claim along with the exhausted claims.
See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510, 522 (1982) (holding district court must dismiss
mixed petitions, i.e., those containing any claims that have not been exhausted in the state
1
Mr. Payne filed with this court a “petition for certificate of probable cause.”
However, because his habeas action was pending on the effective date of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (April 24, 1996), we construe his
petition as an application for a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c);
Lennox v. Evans, 87 F.3d 431, 434 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 746 (1997).
2
Mr. Payne alleged in state court, and alleges in his habeas petition that: (1)
because the verdicts were ambiguous and uncertain the trial court invaded the province of
the jury by ignoring the jury’s verdict on a misdemeanor count and sentencing him on the
felony count; (2) the trial court erred by permitting the state to materially amend the
information during trial; and (3) discovery abuses denied him a fundamentally fair trial.
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courts). The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed Mr.
Payne’s petition without prejudice, and subsequently denied him a certificate of
appealability.
In his appellate brief, Mr. Payne concedes that he never raised his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel with any Oklahoma court, and has therefore failed to
exhaust his state-court remedies on that issue. Instead, he argues that pursuing state-court
remedies on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Oklahoma is futile because he
failed to raise that issue on direct appeal, and the Oklahoma courts will not allow him to
raise it in a post-conviction proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (“An application for
a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court shall not be granted unless it appears that . . . the applicant has exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State . . . or circumstances exist that render such
process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” ).
We are unpersuaded by this argument. As the magistrate judge noted, while
Oklahoma generally bars collateral review of ineffective assistance claims not raised on
direct appeal,3 there are exceptions to this rule. Thus, we cannot say that Mr. Payne is
unable to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in an Oklahoma post-conviction
3
This court has specifically refused to enforce a procedural bar based on
Oklahoma’s rule that ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be raised on direct
appeal or will be deemed waived. See Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1364 (10th
Cir. 1994).
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proceeding. See Paxton v. State, 910 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996) (noting
exceptions to rule that ineffective assistance claims not raised on direct appeal are
waived); Pickens v. State, 910 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996) (stating that for
ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the first time in post-conviction
proceedings, the court will “review each case on its individual merits, examining each
specific proposition in connection with the specific facts of each case as the need arises”).
We agree with the district court that Mr. Payne must fully exhaust his Oklahoma post-
conviction remedies before bringing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim under
section 2254 in federal court.
Accordingly, Mr. Payne has failed to make “a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right,” and therefore, we DENY his application for a certificate of
appealability, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and DISMISS the appeal. The mandate shall
issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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