FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 12, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 09-5037
v. (N.D. Oklahoma)
JUSTIN SPARKS, (D.C. No. 4:07-CR-00065-TCK-3)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant and appellant Justin Sparks pled guilty to one count of
conspiracy with intent to distribute and to distribute more than 100 kilograms of
marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii).
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Mr. Sparks subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the
district court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The court sentenced
Mr. Sparks to 210 months’ imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised
release. This appeal followed.
BACKGROUND
On August 10, 2007, Mr. Sparks was charged in a superceding indictment
with one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute
more than 100 kilograms of marijuana. In February 2008, Allen M. Smallwood
entered his appearance as retained counsel for Mr. Sparks. After initially
pleading not guilty and giving every indication that he was preparing for trial,
Mr. Sparks pled guilty right before trial was scheduled to commence, on April 7,
2008, when he learned of a new government witness.
In connection with that guilty plea, Mr. Sparks filed a “Petition to Enter a
Plea of Guilty.” Petition, R. Supp. Vol. 1 at 28. In that petition, he
acknowledged that he had received a copy of the charging document, that he had
discussed the charges and surrounding facts and circumstances with his attorney,
and that he had been advised of all defenses. He also acknowledged that he had
been advised of his right to a jury trial and the right to see, hear and confront any
witnesses against him. Id.
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The petition further explicitly noted that Mr. Sparks faced a mandatory
minimum sentence of five years, and that his sentence could be as high as forty
years. The petition also stated:
I offer my plea of “GUILTY” freely and voluntarily, and further state
that my plea of “GUILTY” is not the result of any force or threats
against me, or of any promises made to me other than those noted in
this petition. I further offer my plea of “GUILTY” with full
understanding of all the matters set forth in the Indictment/
Information and in this petition, and in the certificate of my attorney
which is attached to this petition.
Id. at 30. Mr. Sparks acknowledged in the petition that he had been advised about
the United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (“USSG”), and that
“sentencing is a matter left exclusively in the province of the Court after a review
of all relevant facts.” Id. Immediately above Mr. Sparks’ signature, the petition
stated, “I swear that I have read, understood, and discussed with my attorney,
each and every part of this Petition to Plead Guilty, and that the answers which
appear in every part of this petition are true and correct.” Id. at 31. Mr. Sparks
signed the petition under oath, in open court, during the change of plea
proceedings.
Furthermore, at the change of plea proceedings, the district court engaged
in the following colloquy with Mr. Sparks:
THE COURT: It’s my understanding you wish to withdraw
your plea of not guilty as to Count One and
enter a plea of guilty; is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
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THE COURT: Would your – has [your attorney] explained
to you about your right of trial by jury?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You have the right of trial by jury, you have
the right of assistance of your attorney at
such trial; do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Also, you have the right to confront,
examine, cross examine witnesses that
would appear at the trial and the right not to
be compelled to incriminate yourself at
such trial; you realize that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
Tr. of Change of Plea Proceedings, R. Vol. 2 at 27.
The district court then explained the consequences of waiving his right to a
trial by jury, and Mr. Sparks indicated he understood those consequences,
including the applicability of the advisory Guidelines. After ensuring that
Mr. Sparks had consulted appropriately with his counsel, the court approved his
waiver of a jury trial.
Next, the court read the charges to Mr. Sparks and advised him that the
minimum penalty would be no less than five years, with the maximum as much as
forty years’ imprisonment. The court reviewed Mr. Sparks’ petition to enter a
guilty plea and asked if he had reviewed it carefully with his attorney, which
Mr. Sparks confirmed they had. The court reviewed the factual basis for the
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guilty plea, as stated in the petition, and Mr. Sparks acknowledged its accuracy.
Specifically, Mr. Sparks acknowledged that between April of 2006 and February
of 2007 he had caused a co-conspirator to transport at least 100 kilograms of
marijuana to Pennsylvania, by way of Oklahoma. Mr. Sparks agreed, however,
that the court would ultimately determine the amount of marijuana involved and
“will take into consideration such conduct as the Court finds would be appropriate
for sentencing purposes.” Id. at 36.
Finally, the court inquired of Mr. Sparks whether he was “under the
influence of any liquor, medication, anything that might in any way affect [his]
ability to fully understand and fully participate in this proceeding,” to which
Mr. Sparks responded he was not. Mr. Sparks then pled guilty, under oath, to
conspiring to have a hundred kilograms of marijuana transported from Arizona to
Pennsylvania, by way of Oklahoma. Id. at 39. After accepting Mr. Sparks’ guilty
plea, the district court referred the matter to the United States Probation Office
for preparation of a presentence report (“PSR”) for sentencing purposes.
The PSR ultimately recommended holding Mr. Sparks responsible for 877
kilograms of marijuana, which resulted in a base offense level under the
Guidelines of 30. The PSR further increased Mr. Sparks’ base offense level by
four because he was a leader/organizer, and then two more levels because he
attempted to obstruct justice by paying his girlfriend, Melissa Oliveras, $5,000 to
keep quiet about his involvement with drugs. With a criminal history category of
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I, the PSR calculated an advisory Guidelines sentencing range of 188 to 235
months.
On August 19, 2008, after he received a copy of the PSR and after he had
pled guilty, but prior to his sentencing, Mr. Sparks filed a pro se motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that (1) his guilty plea was “tendered by use of
subversion”; (2) his plea was “made without sufficient deliberation”; (3) his plea
was “involuntarily made without proper advice and a full understanding of the
consequences”; and (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Pro Se
Motion, R. Vol. 1 at 109-10. Mr. Smallwood filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel, which the court granted. The court then appointed James Fatigante as
substitute counsel, but denied Mr. Sparks’ request to find that Mr. Smallwood had
rendered ineffective assistance.
On March 2, 2009, Mr. Fatigante filed an amended motion to withdraw
Mr. Sparks’ guilty plea. He also filed objections to the PSR, objecting to the
quantity of marijuana attributed to Mr. Sparks and to the application of the
leader/organizer enhancement and the obstruction of justice enhancement.
On March 9 and 11, 2009, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on
both of Mr. Sparks’ motions to withdraw his guilty plea, followed by a hearing on
sentencing. Mr. Fatigante represented Mr. Sparks at the hearing, at which both
Mr. Sparks and Mr. Smallwood testified regarding the motion to withdraw the
guilty plea. Others testified regarding sentencing issues.
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Mr. Smallwood testified that he had been practicing law in Oklahoma since
1975 and that 97 to 98 percent of his practice was criminal defense. He explained
that he had been retained to represent Mr. Sparks in mid-January of 2008.
Mr. Smallwood further testified that he and Mr. Sparks had discussed “[m]any
times” the question of “going to trial versus entering a plea prior to the case being
called for trial.” Tr. of Proceedings at 6, R. Vol. 2 at 49. Mr. Smallwood stated
that Mr. Sparks “wanted to contest the allegations . . . and that was pretty much
what he had his mind set on from the beginning.” Id. at 50.
Mr. Smallwood said that he and Mr. Sparks had discussed a possible plea
and the effect of the Guidelines, and that the relationship between the two was
somewhat strained at times as they prepared for trial. Mr. Sparks and
Mr. Smallwood disagreed about various strategic aspects of the case.
Mr. Smallwood testified, however, that as of the day before trial was scheduled
(April 6, 2008), they both thought that they “were going to trial.” Id. at 55.
On the day of the trial, however, when Mr. Smallwood arrived at the
courthouse, government counsel informed him that Mr. Sparks’ girlfriend,
Melissa Oliveras, was going to testify at trial. Furthermore, Mr. Smallwood
received government witness statements indicating that her testimony would be
“contrary to the discovery [he] had on her with respect to what her testimony
would be.” Id. at 57. In particular, government counsel told Mr. Smallwood that
Ms. Oliveras would testify as to “marijuana trips and cocaine trips . . . [and] the
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use of a firearm and threats to her safety and her person . . .[and] physical
assaults . . . by Mr. Sparks on Ms. Oliveras.” Id. at 64.
Mr. Smallwood discussed this development with Mr. Sparks, and the
district court gave them a little bit of additional time, prior to the start of trial, to
decide what course of action to take. Mr. Smallwood testified that he “told
[Mr. Sparks] that if [Ms. Oliveras’s] testimony is believed, it’s going to be
extremely difficult [for Mr. Sparks] to be successful in this trial.” Id. at 65. He
further stated that the “bottom line is, if she came off as a good-faith credible
witness and could explain the discrepancies in her testimony, . . . it was going to
be a very powerful piece of evidence against him.” Id. at 66. Mr. Smallwood
also testified that Mr. Sparks was “emotional” and “visibly affected” by this turn
of events. Id. at 59.
After discussing with Mr. Sparks the impact of Ms. Oliveras’s testimony,
Mr. Smallwood advised government counsel that Mr. Sparks was interested in
entering a plea. The parties agreed on a plea that would limit the quantity of
drugs Mr. Sparks pled guilty to possessing, but leaving the exact quantities to
sentencing. As a result, Mr. Sparks signed the petition to enter a guilty plea,
described above. Mr. Smallwood stated that he went over the petition with
Mr. Sparks and answered his questions concerning the petition. He testified that
Mr. Sparks indicated that all the averments in the petition were “truthful and
correct,” and he never insisted that “he was actually innocent of the offense.” Id.
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at 70. Thus, as Mr. Smallwood summed it up, Mr. Sparks entered his guilty plea
“freely and voluntarily, but very reluctantly.” Id. at 71. Finally, Mr. Smallwood
testified that, although he discussed with Mr. Sparks the possibility of filing a
motion to withdraw the guilty plea, Mr. Sparks never, in fact, asked him to file
that motion.
By contrast, Mr. Sparks testified that he and Mr. Smallwood disagreed
about whether he should plead guilty. Mr. Sparks testified that, prior to April 7,
2008, the day the guilty plea was entered, he had never told Mr. Smallwood that
he was guilty or that he was interested in pleading guilty. Mr. Sparks stated that,
on April 7, 2008, “about ten minutes before trial,” he was told of Ms. Oliveras’s
potential testimony. Id. at 80. This information made him “emotionally
distraught[,] [c]loud-minded[,] . . . real upset[,] confused.” Id. at 81. He further
stated that he “felt like [he] was forced into the plea agreement”; that
Mr. Smallwood “used [his] daughter against [him]” by saying that “if [he] didn’t
plead guilty . . . [he] wouldn’t see her and . . . wouldn’t see her graduate.” Id. at
82. Mr. Sparks further asserted that he had not read the plea petition in full
before going into court to enter his guilty plea, and that he could “barely see” the
petition because he was “crying and shaking.” Id. at 84. Mr. Sparks testified that
he pled guilty because he was “scared and intimidated” by the district court judge;
that he lied when he made the admissions he made under oath at the hearing, and
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that he lied when he pled guilty. He further stated that he was innocent of the
charges against him.
Mr. Sparks then testified that he first asked Mr. Smallwood about
withdrawing his guilty plea the day after he pled guilty. He averred that, when he
told Mr. Smallwood that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea, Mr. Smallwood
told him he “couldn’t do it.” Id. at 86. He further stated that when he learned
some two months later that he could file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he
did so pro se four months after his guilty plea.
After hearing the testimony of Mr. Sparks and Mr. Smallwood, the district
court denied Mr. Sparks’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court noted that
Mr. Sparks had the burden of establishing a fair and just reason for withdrawal.
Applying the factors listed in United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567 (10th Cir.
1993), the court concluded that Mr. Sparks had not met his burden and denied his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court subsequently sentenced Mr. Sparks
to 210 months’ imprisonment. Mr. Sparks appeals both the denial of his motion
to withdraw, as well as certain aspects of his sentence. We affirm.
DISCUSSION
I. Denial of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea:
Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e), “[i]f a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
. . . is made before sentence is imposed, the court may permit the plea to be
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withdrawn if the defendant shows any fair and just reason.” See United States v.
Black, 201 F.3d 1296, 1299 (10th Cir. 2000). “It is the defendant’s burden to
establish a ‘fair and just reason’ for the withdrawal of the plea.” Id. (quoting
Gordon, 4 F.3d at 1572). In Gordon, we set out the seven factors that courts
should consider in determining whether to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea:
(1) whether the defendant has asserted his innocence; (2) whether the
government will be prejudiced if the motion is granted; (3) whether
the defendant has delayed in filing the motion; (4) the inconvenience
to the court if the motion is granted; (5) the quality of the
defendant’s assistance of counsel; (6) whether the plea was knowing
and voluntary; [and] (7) whether the granting of the motion would
cause a waste of judicial resources.
Black, 201 F.3d at 1299-30 (citing Gordon, 4 F.3d at 1572). Further, while “we
engage in de novo review of the question of whether the plea was knowing and
voluntary, we review the district court’s denial of the motion to withdraw the
guilty plea for an abuse of discretion, considering the seven factors outlined in
Gordon.” Id. at 1300 (further citations omitted). Finally, as the district court
noted, while it is “within the sound discretion of the district court to determine
what circumstances justify granting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, such
motions should be freely allowed, viewed with favor, treated with liberality, and
given a great deal of latitude.” United States v. Jones, 168 F.3d 1217, 1219 (10th
Cir. 1999) (further quotation omitted).
The district court carefully and meticulously went through each Gordon
factor, explaining why, considered together, they compelled the denial of
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Mr. Sparks’ motion. We cannot add anything more to that thoughtful analysis,
other than to point out a few highlights. With respect to the first factor – whether
Mr. Sparks has asserted his innocence – the court questioned Mr. Sparks’
credibility and truthfulness in his assertions, at the hearing on his motion to
withdraw, that he was innocent, in light of his previous admissions of guilt,
including during the plea colloquy, and in light of his inability to provide any
indicia of innocence other than his conclusory statements.
With respect to the third factor – whether Mr. Sparks delayed in filing the
motion – the court noted that Mr. Sparks waited four months to file his motion,
and case law indicates that a four-month delay militates against granting a
motion to withdraw. Regarding the fifth factor – the quality of Mr. Sparks’
assistance of counsel – the court stated that it found no indications that
Mr. Smallwood’s performance was inadequate, and observed that Mr. Sparks told
the court during his plea colloquy that he was satisfied with Mr. Smallwood’s
representation. On the matter of the sixth factor – whether the plea was knowing
and voluntary – the court questioned Mr. Sparks’ credibility in his testimony that
he was so emotionally distraught by the possibility of Ms. Oliveras’s testimony
that his plea was not knowing and voluntary, and further noted that the transcript
gave no indication of such emotional trauma.
In sum, as the district court stated, “[i]n this case, the defendant clearly
answered the questions posed by the Court [during the plea colloquy], gave no
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suggestion that he was under any sort of duress or coercion. Were the Court now
to find that these answers were now involuntary, such a ruling would render this
Court’s plea colloquy and the whole process meaningless.” Tr. of Proceedings at
78, R. Vol. 2 at 121. We accordingly affirm the district court’s denial of
Mr. Sparks’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 1
II. Sentencing Issues:
Following the denial of Mr. Sparks’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the
district court proceeded to sentencing. As indicated above, Mr. Sparks was
sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment, based upon, inter alia, a finding that the
drug quantity involved was 877 kilograms of marijuana, that Mr. Sparks was a
leader/organizer of the conspiracy, and that he had obstructed justice when he
paid Ms. Oliveras $5000 to keep quiet about the conspiracy. Mr. Sparks
challenges each of those findings. 2
1
The fact that Mr. Sparks has a bachelor of arts degree in business
administration from college further supports our conclusion that Mr. Sparks
knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty. We have no doubt that he was able to
comprehend the pleading materials presented to him.
2
We now review all sentences under an abuse-of-discretion reasonableness
standard. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v.
Parker, 551 F.3d 1167, 1173 (10th Cir. 2008). Reasonableness encompasses both
a procedural and a substantive component. Parker, 551 F.3d at 1173. A sentence
is procedurally unreasonable if the advisory Guidelines sentencing range was not
properly calculated. Id. Mr. Sparks’ challenge is to the procedural
reasonableness of his sentence.
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At the sentencing hearing, Ms. Oliveras testified that she had lived with
Mr. Sparks for five years in Pennsylvania. She further testified that she had
traveled with Mr. Sparks to Florida, Texas, and Arizona and transported drugs on
each trip. When she carried drugs in vehicles, they were hidden in big black
duffle bags. Ms. Oliveras testified she could not recall how many times she had
transported drugs because there were so many trips. She stated that the people
who worked for Mr. Sparks included “Philly,” “Lousy,” “Smokey,” “Gator,” and
Lorie Sparks, Mr. Sparks’ sister.
Ms. Oliveras further testified that, after the DEA searched their house in
Norristown, Pennsylvania, Mr. Sparks was on the run and told Ms. Oliveras not to
say anything, in exchange for which he paid her $5,000. She also told of the
times Mr. Sparks abused her physically and threatened her with harm.
Lorie Sparks then testified, describing the multiple trips she made to pick
up drugs or deliver money for her brother, Mr. Sparks. In May of 2006, Lorie
made three trips, all involving her driving to Houston to pick up a duffle bag of
cocaine from a man named Gator, which she then took back to her home in
Florida. Upon her return to Florida, Mr. Sparks came down from Philadelphia to
pick up the drugs and pay Lorie $1500 for each trip. Mr. Sparks gave Lorie
instructions on how to avoid police suspicion during these trips.
Lorie testified that she took multiple trips to Arizona to pick up large
quantities – typically 520 pounds – of marijuana. On these trips, Mr. Sparks
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introduced Lorie to a man named “Philly,” who worked for Mr. Sparks. She
described other trips in August, October, November and December of 2006, in
which Lorie would drive to Houston to pick up duffle bags of cocaine or
marijuana, at times delivering them to Smokey or Philly. She testified that on one
occasion, she helped others bag cocaine in the basement of Mr. Sparks’ house in
Philadelphia.
In January and February of 2007, Lorie drove a big bag of money to
Phoenix, where she met Mr. Sparks and Philly. In February, she picked up 520
pounds of marijuana and began driving it back to Florida. While driving through
Oklahoma, Lorie was pulled over for a traffic violation, arrested, and agreed to
help apprehend others by participating in a controlled delivery. Accordingly,
Lorie delivered the marijuana to Mr. Sparks’ house in Philadelphia, where
Smokey unloaded it. At that time, police rushed in and arrested everyone, thereby
putting an end to the conspiracy. In total, Lorie testified to taking at least three
trips involving at least 500 pounds of marijuana per trip, as well as another trip
involving “500-some-odd pounds.” Tr. of Proceedings at 164, R. Vol. 2 at 121.
She also testified to transporting three large duffle bags containing something less
than the 500-pound loads.
The final person to testify at Mr. Sparks’ sentencing hearing was James
Wilcoxen, a Tulsa police officer and drug task force member. He corroborated
some of Lorie’s testimony by summarizing various telephone, airline, credit card,
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and vehicle rental records which comported with her descriptions of trips she took
for Mr. Sparks delivering drugs.
The district court found Mr. Sparks responsible for 877 kilograms of
marijuana. The court noted that “[t]here’s a likelihood that there were more drugs
possessed, but that is a minimum amount that the Court finds.” Id. at 192.
Mr. Sparks challenges that calculation of drug quantity. “The district court’s
determination of drug quantity is a factual finding that must be supported by a
preponderance of the evidence and is reviewed for clear error.” United States v.
Zapata, 546 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 772 (2008). “To
be clearly erroneous, the finding must be simply not plausible or permissible in
light of the entire record on appeal.” Id. (further quotation omitted). Our review
of the record indicates that there was ample evidence supporting the district
court’s drug quantity calculation. We accordingly find no error in that
determination.
Mr. Sparks also challenges the district court’s determination that
Mr. Sparks was a leader/organizer and that he obstructed justice by paying
Ms. Oliveras to keep quiet. Our review of the record demonstrates that the
district court committed no error in those determinations. We conclude that
Mr. Sparks’ sentence was reasonable.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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