FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 10, 2010
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
LAWRENCE M. JACKSON,
Petitioner - Appellant, No. 09-4173
v. (D. Utah)
CLINT FRIEL, Warden, (D.C. No. 2:05-CV-00365-DB)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this matter. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Petitioner and appellant Lawrence M. Jackson, proceeding pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”), in order to appeal the denial of a pending
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to alter or amend the district court’s prior judgment
denying Mr. Jackson’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We decline to grant a
COA and dismiss this matter.
In 1998, Mr. Jackson pled guilty to rape of a child and was sentenced to a
term of fifteen years to life. His sentence was affirmed on direct appeal by the
Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of
certiorari. Mr. Jackson then filed a post-conviction petition, which was
dismissed, and that dismissal was affirmed on appeal. He did not file for
certiorari review in the Utah Supreme Court.
In this § 2254 action, he raised all of the issues raised on direct appeal and
in his post-conviction petition, as well as six new issues. The district court held
that all of the issues except for the two which he presented to the Utah Supreme
Court on direct appeal were unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Further, the
court held Mr. Jackson was unable to establish cause for his procedural default.
Thus, the court did not address the merits of those issues. It did address the two
exhausted issues, with respect to which the Utah Supreme Court had denied
certiorari on Mr. Jackson’s direct appeal. Regarding those two issues, the district
court observed that the first issue was an allegation that the state trial court had
violated state law, which is not properly the subject of a federal habeas action,
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and the second issue had been properly analyzed by the Utah Supreme Court
under the standards mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (“AEDPA”). The court therefore denied relief on those issues, and it denied
Mr. Jackson’s motion to alter or amend that judgment. The court also denied a
COA.
The issuance of a COA is jurisdictional. We will issue a COA “only if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make this showing, Mr. Jackson must demonstrate
“that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Where the district court has rejected a
claim on its merits, the “petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would
find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong.” Id. When the district court dismisses a petition on procedural grounds,
the applicant must not only make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right; he must also demonstrate that the district court’s “dismissal
on procedural grounds was debatable or incorrect.” Id. at 485. “Where a plain
procedural bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of
the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district court erred
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in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed
further.” Id. at 484.
Mr. Jackson fails to make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right, nor does he address the procedural grounds, other than to
seek permission to now exhaust his unexhausted claims, which he cannot do.
Accordingly, we deny Mr. Jackson a COA. We also deny Mr. Jackson permission
to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis. 1
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY a COA and DENY permission to
proceed ifp.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
1
Mr. Jackson filed a motion before the district court to stay his habeas
action so that he could exhaust his issues in state court. The district court denied
this motion. No notice of appeal from that denial has been filed.
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