FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 31 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HECTOR REYES RODRIGUEZ; Nos. 06-72227
MARINA REYES; HECTOR DAMIAN 07-71332
REYES,
Agency Nos. A075-745-316
Petitioners, A075-745-317
A075-745-318
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, MEMORANDUM *
Respondent.
On Petitions for Review of Orders of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted August 10, 2010 **
Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
In these consolidated petitions for review, Hector Reyes Rodriguez, Marina
Reyes, and Hector Damian Reyes, natives and citizens of Mexico, petition for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) orders dismissing their
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying cancellation of
removal, and denying their motions to remand and reopen. Our jurisdiction is
governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a
motion to remand, Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008),
and de novo questions of law, Hernandez v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th
Cir. 2008). We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review in No. 06-
72227, and we deny the petition for review in No. 07-71332.
We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary determination that
petitioners failed to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a
qualifying relative. See Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 891 (9th Cir.
2003). Petitioners’ contention that the IJ erred by not considering their continuous
physical presence and good moral character is unavailing because the IJ properly
considered her hardship determination dispositive in denying their applications for
cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
To the extent petitioners contend that the BIA violated their due process
rights by disregarding their evidence of hardship, this contention is not supported
by the record and does not amount to a colorable constitutional claim. See
Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]raditional
2 06-72227/07-71332
abuse of discretion challenges recast as alleged due process violations do not
constitute colorable constitutional claims that would invoke our jurisdiction.”).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners’ first motion to
remand because the BIA considered the evidence submitted and acted within its
broad discretion in determining that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a
remand. See Romero-Ruiz, 538 F.3d at 1062 (“The BIA abuses its discretion if its
decision is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”) (internal quotations omitted).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners’ motion to
reopen as untimely because it was filed nearly seven months after the BIA’s March
8, 2006, order dismissing their underlying appeal, and petitioners failed to
demonstrate that they qualified for an exception to the time limit. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(2)-(3).
IN No. 06-72227: PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part,
DENIED in part.
IN No. 07-71332: PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
3 06-72227/07-71332