08-2648-cr
U.S. v. Ortiz
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term 2008
Heard: January 27, 2009 Decided: September 1, 2010
Docket No. 08-2648-cr
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ERIC ORTIZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Before: NEWMAN and POOLER,* Circuit Judges, and
RAKOFF,** District Judge.
Appeal from the May 27, 2008, judgment of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Dora L. Irizarry,
District Judge), sentencing the Defendant to imprisonment for 120
months for firearms and narcotics offenses. The Defendant primarily
contends that his non-Guidelines sentence violates the Ex Post Facto
*
Honorable Sonia Sotomayor, originally a member of the panel, was
elevated to the Supreme Court on August 8, 2009. The Clerk has
designated, by random selection, the Honorable Rosemary S. Pooler to
replace her. See Local Rule 0.14(2).
**
Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
Clause because an enhancement, used to calculate his Guidelines
sentencing range, was increased after the date of his offenses. The
Defendant’s sentencing range under the unamended Guidelines would have
been 151 to 188 months; under the amended Guidelines the range would
have been 168 to 210 months. However, the District Court imposed a
non-Guidelines sentence of 120 months.
Affirmed.
Zachary Margulis-Ohnuma, New York, N.Y.,
for Defendant-Appellant.
Jacqueline L. Spratt, Asst. U.S. Atty.,
Brooklyn, N.Y. (Benton J. Campbell,
U.S. Atty., Susan Corkery, Asst. U.S.
Atty., Brooklyn, N.Y., on the brief),
for Appellee.
JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.
This appeal primarily presents the issue of whether, and under
what circumstances, a more onerous guideline, issued by the United
States Sentencing Commission after the date of an offense, renders a
sentence imposed under the advisory Guidelines regime in violation of
the Ex Post Facto Clause. The issue arises on an appeal by Defendant-
Appellant Eric Ortiz from the May 27, 2008, judgment of the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York (Dora L. Irizarry, District
Judge). We conclude that such a sentence can violate the Clause, but
that the Clause was not violated in the circumstances of this case.
We therefore affirm.
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Background
A search of the Defendant’s residence in Brooklyn, New York,
uncovered five guns, ammunition, heroin, and cocaine. The Defendant
pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession of narcotics with intent to
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
At sentencing, the District Court agreed with the pre-sentence
report that two of the Defendant’s prior felony convictions were
crimes of violence: an assault conviction in Rhode Island in 2000 and
an attempted third-degree burglary conviction in New York in 2006.
Applying the 2006 Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing,1 the
Court used these two prior convictions to set the base offense level
for the firearms offense at 24, see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2), instead of
level 20, which would have applied if the Defendant had had only one
prior conviction for a crime of violence, see id. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).
The Court then made two adjustments, adding two levels for possession
of three to seven firearms, see id. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), and, pertinent
1
Courts must use the Guidelines manual in effect on the date of
sentencing unless they determine that such use would violate the Ex
Post Facto Clause, in which case they must use the manual in effect on
the date that the offense was committed. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(1);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(ii) (instructing courts to use the
Guidelines in effect on the date of sentencing).
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to this appeal, adding four levels because the serial number of one of
the firearms had been obliterated, see id. § 2K2.1(b)(4). The
Sentencing Commission had increased the adjustment for an obliterated
serial number from two levels to four levels on November 1, 2006, see
id. App. C, amend. 691, after the date of the Defendant’s offenses.
These two adjustments would have brought the adjusted offense level to
30, but the Guidelines cap at 29 the increased offense level that may
result from the (b)(1) and (b)(4) adjustments. See id. § 2K2.1(b)
(text following (b)(4)).
The Court then increased the capped offense level of 29 by four
levels for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony
offense (the narcotics offense), see id. § 2K2.1(b)(6), and subtracted
three levels for acceptance of responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1(b).
The resulting adjusted offense level of 30 in Criminal History
Category VI yielded a sentencing range of 168 to 210 months.2 The
Court imposed a non-Guidelines sentence of 120 months, 48 months below
the bottom of the applicable range.
The Defendant contended in the District Court that the New York
2
The narcotics offense did not require any change in the adjusted
offense level because, under the multi-count provisions, that offense
had been treated as a specific offense characteristic in determining
the offense level for the firearms offense and had therefore been
grouped with the firearms offense. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c).
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attempted burglary conviction was not a crime of violence and that the
obliterated serial number enhancement should not apply because the
Defendant was not aware that the number had been obliterated. No
objection was made to the fact that this enhancement was increased
from two to four levels after the date of the Defendant’s offenses.
Discussion
Recognizing that he has received a non-Guidelines sentence, Ortiz
nevertheless contends that his sentence is unlawful because the
Guidelines calculation, which the District Court made as the first
step in the sentencing process, was incorrect. Because a district
court “should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly
calculating the applicable Guidelines range,” Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (emphasis added), we review the correctness of
that calculation even if a non-Guidelines sentence is imposed, see id.
at 51 (appellate court “must first ensure that the district court
committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to
calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range”); United
States v. Carr, 557 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2009) (same). The Defendant
challenges the calculation on three grounds: (1) his conviction for
attempted burglary in the third degree under New York Penal Law §
140.20 was not a crime of violence, (2) the enhancement for an
obliterated serial number was improper because he did not know of the
obliteration, and (3) even if the enhancement was applicable, the use
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of the amended enhancement violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.
1. Attempted Burglary Conviction as a Crime of Violence
The Appellant’s challenge to the enhancement for a crime of
violence is without merit. We have ruled that third-degree burglary
under New York law is a “crime of violence” for purposes of a firearms
offense enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), see United States v.
Brown, 514 F.3d 256, 268-69 (2d Cir. 2008), and have also ruled that
the enhancement applies to attempted third-degree burglary, see United
States v. Hurell, 555 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2009).
2. Obliterated Serial Number Enhancement
The Appellant’s challenge to the enhancement for an obliterated
serial number is also unavailing. He contends that the enhancement
requires scienter, but we have previously ruled that the enhancement
applies “regardless of whether the defendant knew or had reason to
believe that the firearm . . . had an . . . obliterated serial
number,” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, comment. (n.8(B)). See Brown, 514 F.3d at
269.
3. Ex Post Facto Challenge to Use of the Amended Guideline
The Appellant contends that use of the amended guideline for an
obliterated serial number is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause
because the amendment was adopted after the date of his offense. The
Defendant’s sentencing range under the unamended Guidelines would have
been 151 to 188 months; under the amended Guidelines the range would
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have been 168 to 210 months. However, the District Court imposed a
non-Guidelines sentence of 120 months.
A preliminary issue is the standard of review. At oral argument
the Government contended that plain-error review applies because the
Defendant did not make an Ex Post Facto Clause argument in the
District Court. The Defendant responded that the Government has
forfeited insistence on the strict standard of plain-error review
because the Government did not urge that standard in its appellate
brief.
We have found no decision explicitly considering this “sauce for
the goose” argument in the context of a sentencing appeal. In other
contexts, however, the argument has prevailed. In Gronowski v.
Spencer, 424 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2005), after a verdict and judgment for
the plaintiff, the defendants unsuccessfully moved for judgment n.o.v.
under Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On appeal,
the defendants sought reversal on the ground that their compliance
with a civil service law precluded the plaintiff’s claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at 297. The plaintiff contended that the
defendants had waived that defense by failing to raise it in their
Rule 50(a) motion for a directed verdict at the close of the
plaintiff’s case, although it had been raised in their Rule 50(b)
motion. See id. We ruled that the plaintiff had waived her waiver
argument by failing to assert it in her opposition to the defendants’
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Rule 50(b) motion. See id. See also Atkins v. N. Y. City, 143 F.3d
100, 103 (2d Cir. 1998) (by not objecting in district court, appellees
waived their argument that appellant waived his objection to the jury
verdict by not objecting to jury charge or to inconsistent verdicts);
Gibeau v. Nellis, 18 F.3d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1994) (by not objecting in
district court, appellees waived their argument that appellants had
waived their right to judgment n.o.v. by not moving for directed
verdict); cf. Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141, 147 n.4 (2d Cir. 2010)
(Government waived objection to appellant’s failure to exhaust issue
on appeal to Board of Immigration Appeals).
These waive-the-waiver (more accurately, forfeit the forfeiture)
rulings suggest that the same approach should apply in the sentencing
context, especially in view of the relaxed standard of plain-error
review that we have sometimes found applicable for unpreserved
sentencing errors because a resentencing is not nearly as burdensome
as a retrial. See, e.g., United States v. Gamez, 577 F.3d 394, 397 (2d
Cir. 2009); United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 456-57 (2d Cir.
2005); United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2003). We
need not rule definitively on the standard of review, however, because
even if the alleged claim of error is available for appellate review,
we reject it on the merits, as we now explain.
Whether application of a guideline amended after the date of an
offense violates the Ex Post Facto Clause under the advisory
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Guidelines regime, as it did when the Sentencing Guidelines were
mandatory, see Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 432-36 (1987), has
divided the courts of appeals.3 In United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d
791 (7th Cir. 2007), the Seventh Circuit ruled that the Clause was not
violated because the applicable guideline, used to make the initial
Guidelines calculation, only “nudges” the sentencing judge toward the
sentencing range, but the judge’s “freedom to impose a reasonable
sentence outside the range is unfettered.” Id. at 795. See also
United States v. Barton, 455 F.3d 649, 655 n.4 (6th Cir. 2006). Other
3
Our decision in United States v. Kilkenny, 493 F.3d 122, 130 (2d
Cir. 2007), remanding for resentencing because of an enhanced
guideline, contained no discussion of the effect of the advisory
Guidelines regime on challenges under the Ex Post Facto Clause, and “a
sub silentio holding is not binding precedent,” Getty Petroleum Corp.
v. Bartco Petroleum Corp., 858 F.2d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 1988) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Our recent decision in United States v.
Kumar, No. 06-5482, slip op at __ n.12 (2d Cir. Aug. 12, 2010), which
concerned application of the so-called one-book rule, see U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.11(b)(3), assumed that the Ex Post Facto Clause applied to the
advisory Guidelines regime in view of the Government’s explicit
disclaimer of reliance on the contrary position of the District Court
in Kumar. The issue thus remains open in this Circuit.
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circuits, in holdings or dicta, have stated that an amended guideline
enhancing punishment can violate the Ex Post Facto Clause even under
the advisory Guidelines regime. See United States v. Duane, 533 F.3d
441, 446 & n.1 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Thompson, 518 F.3d
832, 870 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Carter, 490 F.3d 641, 643
(8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez, 488 F.3d 316, 322-
24 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Wood, 486 F.3d 781, 790-91 (3d
Cir. 2007).
The D.C. Circuit has also upheld an Ex Post Facto Clause
challenge to a non-Guidelines sentence that was thought to have been
influenced by a post-offense increase in the Guidelines sentencing
range, but adopted a more nuanced approach to the issue. In United
States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2008), the D.C. Circuit
held that a 33-month sentence, even though imposed under the advisory
Guidelines regime, violated the Clause where the sentencing judge
sentenced at the bottom of a guideline range that had been increased,
after the offense, from 21-27 months to 33-41 months. See id. at 1100.
The Court explained that, had the sentencing judge looked to the
unamended guideline range, “it is likely that [the defendant’s]
sentence would have been less than 33 months.” Id. The Court’s
rationale, however, does not apply to every sentence imposed after
calculation of a guideline range that has been increased after the
date of the offense. As the Court further explained, “[the defendant]
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did not have to show definitively that he would have received a lesser
sentence had the district court used the [unamended] Guidelines. It
is enough that using the [amended] Guidelines created a substantial
risk that [the defendant’s] sentence was more severe, thus resulting
in a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Id. (citation omitted).
The risk was deemed substantial in Turner’s case because of the
likelihood that the judge whose non-Guidelines sentence was at the
bottom of the amended sentencing range would have given a non-
Guidelines sentence below that range had a lower sentencing range been
calculated based on the unamended guideline. The judge would not
necessarily have sentenced at the bottom of the unamended range, but
there was at least a substantial risk that the sentence would have
been below the bottom of the amended range.
We think the “substantial risk” standard adopted by the D.C.
Circuit appropriately implements the Ex Post Facto Clause in the
context of sentencing under the advisory Guidelines regime, and is
faithful to Supreme Court jurisprudence explaining that the Clause
protects against a post-offense change that “create[s] a significant
risk of increas[ing] [the] punishment,” Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244,
255 (2000). This standard does not invalidate every sentence imposed
after a Guidelines range has been increased after the date of the
offense, but, unlike the approach of the Seventh Circuit, which
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rejects an Ex Post Facto challenge to any non-Guidelines sentence,4 it
recognizes that there may be circumstances where an amended Guidelines
range can influence a sentence that violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.
In the pending appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit’s “substantial
risk” standard does not benefit Ortiz. His adjusted offense level
under the unamended Guidelines would have been 29, yielding a
sentencing range, in Criminal History Category VI, of 151 to 188
months. Under the amended Guidelines, his adjusted offense level was
30, yielding a sentencing range of 168 to 210 months.5 The non-
4
Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner gave examples of
governmental actions that created some slight risk of increased
punishments that would not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. These
were a joint congressional resolution urging heavier sentences for
white-collar criminals, a statute requiring victim impact statements
for all offenses, appropriating more money for prisons to lessen
overcrowding as a reason for short sentences, or appointing judges
pledged to give severe sentences. See Demaree, 459 F.3d at 794.
“[T]he effect on the values animating the ex post facto clause,” he
noted, “would be attenuated . . . .” Id. As Turner illustrates, the
effect of an enhanced guideline on the risk of increased punishment
can, in some circumstances, be so much less attenuated as to encounter
a valid Ex Post Facto challenge.
5
Although the amended guideline raised the adjustment for an
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Guidelines sentence imposed was 120 months, 48 months below the bottom
of the applicable sentencing range. We conclude that there is no
substantial risk, indeed, no risk at all, that the sentencing judge,
having made such a generous deviation from the amended Guidelines
range, would have imposed a non-Guidelines sentence of less than 120
months had the bottom of the applicable sentencing range been 151
months, as it was before the Guidelines amendment, rather than 168
months.
Conclusion
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
obliterated serial number by two levels, the effect for Ortiz was an
increase in the adjusted offense level of only one level because of
the capping effect of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b) (text following (b)(4)).
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