Government of the Virgin Islands v. Lewis

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_________________

No. 09-3245
_________________

GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

v.

MICHAEL LEWIS,

Appellant
_________________

On Appeal from the District Court
of the Virgin Islands, Appellate Division
(Crim. No. 2002-56)
Judges: Hon. Raymond L. Finch, Hon. Curtis V. Gomez,
and Hon. Patricia D. Steele
________________

Argued May 3, 2010
________________

Before: SMITH, CHAGARES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

(Filed September 8, 2010)

________________

David J. Cattie, Esq. (Argued)
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.
1336 Beltjen Road, Suite 201
St. Thomas, VI 00802
Counsel for Appellant

Ernest Bason, Esq.
Richard S. Davis, Esq. (Argued)
Office of the Attorney General of the Virgin Islands
Department of Justice
34-38 Kronprindsens Gade, GERS Complex, 2nd Floor
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, VI 00802
Counsel for Appellee
________________

OPINION
________________

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

Michael Lewis was convicted of unlawful possession of a
firearm in the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands, and was
sentenced to fifteen years in prison. He appealed to the District
Court of the Virgin Islands, Appellate Division, which affirmed the
conviction and sentence. He now appeals to this Court, arguing
principally that the trial court committed plain error by failing, sua
sponte, to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of
justification. For the reasons that follow, we disagree. We will
affirm the conviction without prejudice to Lewis’s right to
challenge his trial counsel’s effectiveness in a collateral
proceeding.

I.

This case revolves around the fatal shooting of Mackellis
George. At approximately 2:15 a.m. on September 29, 1998,
Lewis drove to the Callwood Command police station on the island
of St. Thomas and began yelling to Lieutenant Randolph DeSuza
that someone had just shot his friend. DeSuza approached and
discovered George, lying bloodied and fully reclined in the
passenger seat of the car that Lewis was driving. DeSuza directed
Lewis to follow him to a nearby hospital. Upon their arrival,
DeSuza contacted George’s family to inform them of the shooting.

At the hospital, Lewis told DeSuza and George’s family that
George had been shot in a drive-by shooting, but Lewis gave
conflicting details about the incident. He first claimed that he had
not seen the color or make of the vehicle the shooter had driven.
He later claimed that the color of the shooter’s car was white. Still
later, he said that it was blue. Lewis’s uncle, who was at the

2
hospital, told police that his nephew obviously was lying, and
suggested that his hands be checked for gunpowder – whereupon
Lewis doused his hands with rubbing alcohol sitting on a nearby
table. Meanwhile, a police officer overheard Lewis’s grandmother
mention that Lewis had shot and killed a dog earlier in the day.
The dog’s body was recovered, and forensic tests ultimately
showed that George and the dog had been shot by the same gun.
George died from the gunshot wounds.

Lewis was charged in a two-count information with first-
degree murder, in violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 922(a), and
unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit.
14, § 2253(a). He testified in his own defense, proffering yet
another version of events, which was as follows. Days before the
shooting, George provided Lewis with a drink that caused him to
fall asleep at George’s residence. Lewis awoke to find George
lying behind him, sexually assaulting him. Although he tried to
avoid George after that incident, Lewis went to George’s residence
on the evening of September 28 to collect some of his personal
belongings. When he arrived, George became enraged, accusing
Lewis of telling others that he (George) was a homosexual. George
pulled out a firearm, began “bursting” shots into the ground, and
then, pointing the gun at Lewis, ordered him to get into the
passenger’s seat of George’s car. Appendix (“App.”) 939.

Lewis testified that George began to drive, and at some
point started insulting him and “pushing” the gun repeatedly into
his (Lewis’s) head. In response, Lewis testified, he grabbed for the
gun and a struggle ensued. He claimed that the gun fired several
times during the struggle, but that he ultimately gained control of
it and shot George in self-defense. Lewis testified that he then put
George in the passenger’s seat. After “a while,” Lewis noticed that
George “look[ed] . . . dead” and that his shirt had ripped. App.
946-47. According to his testimony, this caused him to realize that
others would want to know why George’s shirt had been ripped.
Consequently, he stopped at a roadside “garbage pan” and
discarded the gun and George’s shirt. App. 947-48. He then
proceeded to the police station and, ultimately, the hospital. Lewis
admitted at trial that he fabricated the phony drive-by shooting
story because he did not think anyone would believe that he had

3
shot George in self-defense.1

At the close of trial, the Government and Lewis submitted
proposed jury instructions to the trial court. Lewis specifically
requested that a self-defense instruction be given to the jury with
respect to the murder charge, but did not request that a justification
instruction be given with respect to the unlawful possession charge.
The trial court instructed the jury as Lewis requested. The jury
thereafter acquitted Lewis of murder but convicted him of unlawful
possession of a firearm, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen
years in prison. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction
and sentence, and Lewis filed this timely appeal.2

II.

Lewis argues that his conviction for unlawful possession of

1
Although it is not directly pertinent to the central issue on
appeal, we note that the Government introduced substantial
testimonial and forensic evidence that undercut much of Lewis’s
exculpatory account. For instance, of the three bullets that hit
George, one had been fired from more than three feet away, one
had been fired from a distance of two or three feet away, and the
last had been fired from less than two feet away. That George was
shot from a distance of more than three feet away strongly
suggested that he could not have been struggling for the gun at the
time he was shot. Additionally, there were no bullet holes in the
car’s body or windows, and no bullets, cartridge casings, or blood
spatter patterns anywhere inside the car. Finally, George’s mother
testified that before the shooting, Lewis and her son were talking
outside of her home, but that the conversation was not heated, and
that she never heard any gunshots fired outside her home. This
undermined Lewis’s claim that George became enraged and fired
his gun into the ground.
2
The Appellate Division had jurisdiction pursuant to 48
U.S.C. § 1613a(a), and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 48 U.S.C.
§ 1613a(c).

4
a firearm3 must be vacated because the trial court failed to instruct
the jury on the affirmative defense of temporary justified
possession. He premises this argument on his theory that he
possessed the gun only long enough to defend himself in the car.
Thus, he argues, the jury should have been instructed to consider
whether his possession of the firearm was a legal necessity. Lewis
concedes that he did not request the trial court to give the
instruction that he now claims was required, so we review only for
plain error. Gov’t of the V.I. v. Fonseca, 274 F.3d 760, 765 (3d
Cir. 2001).4

The plain error “standard is met when there is an ‘error’ that
is ‘plain’ and that ‘affects substantial rights.’” United States v.
Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
A court’s deviation from a legal rule constitutes “error.” United
States v. Turcks, 41 F.3d 893, 897 (3d Cir. 1994). A “plain” error
is one that is “clear” or “obvious.” Id. An error “affects
substantial rights” if it was prejudicial – that is, if it affected the
outcome of the trial proceedings. Id. Even if this standard is
satisfied, Rule 52(b) leaves “the decision to correct the forfeited
error” to our discretion. United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 535
(3d Cir. 2009). We exercise that discretion “sparingly,” and will
correct the error only if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.

3
Section 2253(a) of the Virgin Islands criminal code
prohibits anyone, “unless otherwise authorized by law,” from
“ha[ving], possess[ing], bear[ing], transport[ing,] or carr[ying,]
either[] actually or constructively, openly or concealed[,] any
firearm . . . .” V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2253(a). The trial court
sentenced Lewis under the habitual offender statute, V.I. Code
Ann. tit. 14, § 61(a), and although he unsuccessfully appealed his
sentence to the Appellate Division, Lewis does not challenge it
here.
4
To be precise, we review the Appellate Division’s analysis
de novo, applying the same standard of review – plain error – that
the first appellate tribunal was required to apply. Semper v.
Santos, 845 F.2d 1233, 1235-36 (3d Cir. 1988).

5
 We first consider whether the trial court erred by failing, sua
sponte, to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of
justification. “As a general proposition, ‘a defendant is entitled to
an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists
evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.’”
Gov’t of the V.I. v. Isaac, 50 F.3d 1175, 1180 (3d Cir. 1995)
(quoting Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988)). We
must, therefore, view the facts “in the light most favorable to”
Lewis and “determine whether there was evidence presented to
support the theory of justification . . . .” United States v. Paolello,
951 F.2d 537, 539, 542 (3d Cir. 1991).5

5
The Appellate Division first analyzed whether a
justification defense is available at all, as § 2253(a) makes no
reference to any affirmative defenses. Unable to find any Virgin
Islands case law specifically directed to § 2253(a), the Appellate
Division looked to our decision in Paolello, in which we held that
a justification defense is available in prosecutions instituted
pursuant to the federal felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. §
922(g), which also contained no reference to affirmative defenses.
We explained “that Congress legislated against the backdrop of the
common law[,] which has historically recognized th[e justification]
defense,” and we therefore concluded that such a defense was
available under the statute. Paolello, 951 F.2d at 541.

Noting that §§ 922(g) and 2253(a) are substantially similar
provisions, the Appellate Division concluded that a common-law
justification defense likewise applies to unlawful-possession
prosecutions in the Virgin Islands. Both parties agree with this
conclusion, and so do we. While in Paolello we “confin[ed] our
opinion to what [wa]s before us,” id. at 542 n.5, we perceive no
sound reason why our reasoning should not apply with equal force
to § 2253(a) prosecutions. We also discern nothing in § 2253(a)
that would place the burden on the Government to demonstrate the
defendant’s ineligibility for a justification instruction. Because a
justification defense against a § 2253(a) prosecution – like those
instituted pursuant to § 922(g) – would not negate an element of
the offense, we conclude that the burden rested with Lewis to
establish his eligibility for the instruction by a preponderance of the
evidence. See United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340, 350 (3d Cir.

6
 Our decision in Paolello is of central importance here, so we
discuss the case in some detail. The defendant, Paolello, was
involved in a physical altercation with another person outside a bar.
Nearby police officers heard a gunshot and, upon approach, they
heard a bystander yell, “he’s got a gun.” Id. at 538. Moments
later, the officers saw Paolello run into an alley. They gave chase,
and saw that Paolello had a pistol in his hand. One of the officers
yelled, “freeze, police,” and at some point thereafter Paolello
stopped, turned around, and threw his weapon to the ground. Id.
He was apprehended and charged with being a felon in possession
of a firearm, and he requested at trial that the jury be instructed on
the defense of temporary justified possession.

Paolello, along with his stepson, testified that he (Paolello)
had been accosted by another man upon leaving the bar, and that
the man had a gun. Paolello testified that the man punched his
stepson in the face, fired a shot into the air, and that a struggle then
followed. Paolello testified that he was able to knock the gun from
the man’s hand, at which time he grabbed it to avoid being shot,
and then ran. He claimed that he immediately released the gun

2000) (holding that the defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating entitlement to a justification instruction in felon-in-
possession prosecution).

In the absence of controlling Virgin Islands precedent, we
believe that our analogy to Paolello and other § 922(g) cases is
necessary to decide the case before us. We are mindful, of course,
that the authority to interpret § 2253(a) lies centrally with the
newly created Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands. See Pichardo
v. V.I. Comm’r of Labor, __ F.3d __, __, No. 08-4259, 2010 U.S.
App. LEXIS 13957, at *2 (3d Cir. July 8, 2010) (holding that this
Court will “defer to decisions of the Supreme Court of the Virgin
Islands on matters of local law unless we find them to be
manifestly erroneous”). We do not mean by our decision today to
preclude the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands from offering its
own interpretation of § 2253(a), and whether and under what
circumstances a justification defense is available. Until that day
comes, however, we decide this case applying our most analogous
precedent.

7
when he realized that police officers were behind him. The district
court denied the requested justification instruction and the jury
found Paolello guilty.

We vacated the conviction. We adopted a four-part test to
determine whether a justification defense is available to a
defendant charged under § 922(g) with unlawfully possessing a
firearm. To meet this test, we explained, the evidence must
demonstrate that a jury reasonably could conclude the following:
(1) that the defendant was under an unlawful and present threat of
death or serious bodily injury; (2) that he did not recklessly place
himself in a situation where he would be forced to engage in
criminal conduct; (3) that he had no reasonable legal alternative to
both the criminal act and the avoidance of the threatened harm; and
(4) that there was a direct causal relationship between the criminal
act and the avoidance of the threatened harm. Paolello, 951 F.2d
at 540-41.

We also explained that the test should be applied
restrictively, requiring a “defendant [to] meet a high level of proof
to establish the defense of justification.” Id. at 542; accord United
States v. Alston, 526 F.3d 91, 94-95 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting
that the justification defense is “rarely granted” and “should be
construed narrowly”). In endorsing this restrictive view, we
approved as “sound” the requirement that “an interdicted person
possess the firearm no longer than absolutely necessary.” Paolello,
951 F.2d at 541.

Applying the test, we held that “the evidence presented by
Paolello, if believed, supported his defense, and [that] the district
court should have instructed the jury accordingly.” Id. at 542. We
first explained that sufficient evidence existed to permit a jury to
conclude that “Paolello was subject to a threat of death or serious
bodily harm.” Id. Indeed, both Paolello and his stepson testified
that a man had attacked him outside the bar, brandished and then
fired a gun, and that Paolello then knocked the gun out of his hand
and picked it up to avoid his “well-grounded fear” of being shot.
Id. Second, we explained that Paolello had not recklessly placed
himself in a position to commit criminal conduct, as he had done
no more than attend “a public place of business.” Id. at 541.

8
 Finally, we concluded that, viewing the evidence in
Paolello’s favor, the third and fourth requirements had been
satisfied. Because it is pertinent to our analysis in this case, we
quote our reasoning at length:

[T]he evidence supported a conclusion that Paolello
did not have a reasonable opportunity to escape the
threatened harm without taking the gun, and that
there was a direct causal relationship between that
action and the avoidance of the threatened harm, i.e.,
being shot. Paolello stated that he grabbed the gun
after it had fallen to the ground to avoid being shot
or to prevent [his stepson] from being shot. He ran
down the alley with the gun because he was afraid
the man or his friends would attack him. This
testimony indicates that there was no other way for
Paolello to take preventive action other than by
grabbing the weapon. It is true that [an officer]
testified that he chased Paolello down the alley,
ordering him to stop running and identifying himself
as a policeman, and that Paolello disobeyed the
orders. If [the officer’s] testimony is believed, this
would severely undercut Paolello’s justification
defense because it would appear that Paolello had an
opportunity to dispose of the gun and stop running
earlier than he did, so that he possessed the firearm
longer than absolutely necessary.

Yet Paolello testified that, in contrast to [the
officer’s] rendition of the events, he ran down the
alley because he was afraid that the man who had
punched [his stepson] and had argued with Paolello
would instruct his “friends” to chase Paolello. He
also testified that as he “was running into the
alleyway, I didn’t know anybody was behind me. . .
. I heard somebody say ‘Stop,’ you know? And I
turned around, and I dropped the gun. . . . He said
‘I’m an officer’ and I just stopped.” Because we
must accept in the procedural posture of this case
Paolello’s version of the facts in the record, it
appears that Paolello did not maintain possession of

9
 the weapon any longer than absolutely necessary.
Thus, even if we find Paolello’s testimony
unpersuasive, his credibility should be judged by the
jury. In sum, Paolello put forth sufficient evidence
concerning each of the elements of the justification
defense and the district court should have instructed
the jury on that theory.

Id. at 542-43 (emphases added, ellipses in original, footnote and
citations omitted).

In this case, the Appellate Division concluded that the first
and second Paolello requirements had been satisfied. We agree.
Viewing the relevant evidence in the light most favorable to Lewis,
we reject the Government’s argument that the episode involved
“little more than . . . an angry friend who was carrying a gun and
insulting [Lewis].” Gov’t Br. at 15. Lewis’s testimony that
George brandished a firearm, fired several shots into the ground,
and then pointed the gun at Lewis and ordered him into the car
(after which George several times “pushed” the gun into Lewis’s
head), could reasonably be viewed by a jury as an imminent threat
on Lewis’s life. We also reject the Government’s argument that
Lewis recklessly placed himself in danger when he got into the car.
Viewing Lewis’s testimony in his favor, we agree with the
Appellate Division that a jury could determine that he only entered
the car at an armed and angry man’s directive – and reasonably so.

The Appellate Division next concluded that the third
Paolello requirement – that Lewis had no reasonable legal
alternative to both the criminal act and the avoidance of the
threatened harm – had been satisfied in part. Specifically, the court
explained that a jury could conclude that Lewis could not have
avoided the threat George posed without taking immediate
possession of the gun while in the car. We agree. Lewis’s
testimony on this point is materially indistinguishable from our
conclusion in Paolello that the defendant did not have a reasonable
alternative to being shot without possessing the gun. See Paolello,
951 F.2d at 542. If Lewis’s account is believed, a jury could
conclude that taking possession of the gun was Lewis’s only viable
alternative to being shot.

10
 Quoting a decision by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, however, the Appellate Division suggested that “[s]ome
attempt to place [the] pistol into the hands of the police is an
irreducible minimum in evaluating” whether a defendant is entitled
to a temporary justification defense. App. P (quoting United States
v. Al-Rekabi, 454 F.3d 1113, 1123 (10th Cir. 2006)). The
Appellate Division concluded, in essence, that Lewis did not take
sufficient corrective action after the altercation to make him
eligible for a justification instruction. The court reasoned that
“Lewis never reported the gun to the police[] or attempted to leave
the gun in a safe place where it could be found by police. Rather,
Lewis disposed of the gun in a ‘garbage pan’ where it could have
been easily found by others.” App. O. Additionally, the Appellate
Division explained, Lewis’s own testimony demonstrated that he
“maintained possession of the firearm in order to hide it and avoid
responsibility for the shooting,” App. N, and therefore did not
throw the gun in the “garbage pan” until after he determined that
the circumstances were such that he could be criminally implicated.
App. O (citing App. 947-48).6 “Lewis’[s] failure to contact the

6
Lewis’s relevant testimony was as follows:

Q. Now, where did you go after
Mr. George sustain[ed] the
injuries?

A. I tried to push the man over in
the passenger seat. I recline[d]
the seat.

Q. So, he was in the driver’s side?

A. Yes.

Q. And what did you do next?

A. I put him over in the passenger
seat.

Q. And what happened?

11
A. I start looking around, you
know. I see h[is] shirt rip up .
. . , so I start driving and I start
to wonder what it is I going to
do, and I look at the man and
when I look at him, I realize
where he get shoot, I see he get
shoot in his face or . . . some
place else, so I say he look like
he dead.

A. And what did you do?

Q. I just been there for a while
wondering what to do and I
just start driving and as I start
driving, [there] is a garbage
pan in that area, that’s when I
notice, I say they going –
people going to want to know
how come his shirt rip and all
of that, so I take his shirt and
the gun and I throw it in the
garbage pan and I keep on
going, and I went straight,
come down Contant Hill, come
straight down, went straight up
town, while going towards the
hospital, Officer Allan happen
to be walking out the police
station and I see him, so I stop,
I stop and I tell the man
somebody just shot –
somebody just shot my partner.
I never get out the car or
nothing, I just told the man
that. Another officer came,
flash the flashlight, look at me,
look at him, and . . . he say go,

12
authorities or to safely dispose of the gun,” the court concluded,
“rendered a jury instruction on the justification defense
inappropriate.” App. P.

Lewis argues that the Appellate Division erroneously
extended Paolello by imposing an affirmative obligation to place
the gun in the hands of the police before a justification instruction
will be appropriate. To the extent that the Appellate Division
fashioned a bright-line rule that applies uniformly to an infinite
universe of factual scenarios (and it is unclear whether it did), we
agree. Nothing in Paolello’s logic or letter mandates a pre-
ordained course of conduct that is required for a criminal defendant
to become eligible for a justification instruction, and we decline to
prescribe one now. See United States v. Ricks, 573 F.3d 198, 204
(4th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the Government’s argument that a
“bright-line rule that the only reasonable way for a felon to
dispossess himself of a gun he has justifiably come to possess is to
turn that gun over to the police”). Indeed, in Paolello itself, the
defendant did not hand the firearm to the police officers, yet we
held that he was entitled to the requested instruction.

Our decision in Paolello does, however, set forth general
parameters to which a defendant’s conduct must adhere. Multiple
times we explained that a defendant who possesses a firearm any
“longer than absolutely necessary” would be ineligible for a
justification instruction. Paolello, 951 F.2d at 541-43; accord
United States v. White, 552 F.3d 240, 248 (2d Cir. 2009); United
States v. Mooney, 497 F.3d 397, 408 (4th Cir. 2007) (concluding
that a defendant was entitled to a justification instruction, in part
because he “did not unnecessarily delay or detour at any point” in
dispossessing himself of the gun, and because his “manifest
intention from seizure to hand-over was the single-minded effort
to rendezvous with the police”); United States v. Singleton, 902
F.2d 471, 473 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that a defendant asserting a

go, go . . . . I just went . . .
straight to the hospital by
myself.

App. 947-48.

13
necessity defense must “show that he did not maintain possession
any longer than absolutely necessary”); United States v. Parker,
566 F.2d 1304, 1305-06 (5th Cir. 1978) (concluding that a
defendant was not entitled to a justification instruction where he
retained possession of a gun for up to thirty minutes after being
attacked in his home).

A natural and logical corollary to this requirement is that the
defendant must dispossess himself of the firearm in an objectively
reasonable manner. See Ricks, 573 F.3d at 203 (agreeing with the
Government that “a defendant seeking a justification instruction
must produce evidence that he took reasonable steps to dispossess
himself of the weapon once the threat entitling him to possess it
abated” (quotation marks omitted)); Al-Rekabi, 454 F.3d at 1123
(“Although some leeway needs [to] be given to individuals
responding to an emergency, they must still act in the most
responsible manner available under the circumstances.”).7
Although we did not expressly require in Paolello that a
defendant must dispose of the weapon in a reasonable fashion, we
had no occasion to do so. The police officers were in the
immediate vicinity of the weapon that Paolello discarded, and thus
recovered the weapon immediately upon apprehending the
defendant. We explained that Paolello’s testimony, if believed,
indicated that he dropped the weapon as soon as he realized that
law enforcement officers were in the vicinity.

Clearly implicit in our analysis, then, was the premise that
dropping the firearm in the alley was a reasonable response to the
officers’ directives for Paolello to freeze. In sum, we believe that
a reasonableness requirement flows inexorably from the principles

7
We do not read, as Lewis apparently does, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s statement in Al-Rekabi – that
handing the gun to police is “an irreducible minimum” – as
prescribing any bright-line rules. Rather, it is clear that the court
merely set forth a minimum standard of acceptable conduct.
Indeed, the court listed other potential alternatives that the
defendant could have undertaken, such as returning the gun to the
owner or attempting to leave it in a safe place where it could be
found by the police. Al-Rekabi, 454 F.3d at 1123.

14
upon which Paolello is premised. It is entirely proper – and
entirely consistent with our restrictive application of the test set
forth in Paolello – to “[d]emand[] a prompt and appropriate
remedial response to the claimed ‘necessity’ . . . .” Al-Rekabi, 454
F.3d at 1124 (emphasis added). We agree, moreover, with those
courts of appeals holding that a defendant’s efforts to dispossess
himself of the gun must be assessed for reasonableness under all
relevant circumstances. See Ricks, 573 F.3d at 203-04; Al-Rekabi,
454 F.3d at 1123.

In light of the factual circumstances presented by this case,
we now refine Paolello: in order to satisfy the third requirement
for a justification instruction, a defendant (1) must possess the
firearm no longer than is absolutely necessary to avoid the
imminent threat; and (2) must dispossess himself of the gun in an
objectively reasonable manner once the threat has abated.8

Applying these standards, we conclude that Lewis did not
meet his burden of establishing that he was entitled to a
justification instruction. We accept, arguendo, Lewis’s assertion
that, because the altercation occurred inside the car, instantaneous
dispossession of the weapon may not have been a feasible choice.
For example, if Lewis had immediately flung the gun out of the
car’s window, he would be particularly ill-situated to argue that his
response, albeit immediate, was reasonable. In such circumstances,
Lewis argues that he faced a “Hobson’s choice”: either
immediately dispossess himself of the gun – and risk it later being
deemed unreasonable, or wait to dispossess himself of the gun until
flagging down a police officer – and risk it later being deemed too
late.

Whatever merit such an argument has in the abstract, we
easily reject it here. If Lewis had either (1) immediately discarded
the firearm from the car, or (2) waited until arriving at the police

8
A defendant must, of course, continue to establish that the
possession of the firearm was absolutely necessary in the first place
– that “he had no reasonable legal alternative []to both the criminal
act and the avoidance of the threatened harm[].” Paolello, 951 F.2d
at 540.

15
station to hand the gun over to Lieutenant DeSuza, perhaps we
might have been forced to weigh the relative merits of greater
expediency versus greater safety. But Lewis availed himself of
neither alternative, and we must assess the reasonableness of what
he actually did, not what he could have done. Cf. Al-Rekabi, 454
F.3d at 1124 (“A claim of necessity may be little more than an
ex-post attempt by defense counsel to exculpate a client. Such a
claim is easily made and so must be factually justified.”). Rather,
Lewis’s “cavalier response,” id. at 1123, was anything but a
reasonable effort to dispossess himself of the gun.

Lewis admitted unequivocally that he decided to discard the
gun in the garbage pan: (1) after “wondering what to do” “for a
while,” App. 947; (2) upon noticing that George appeared dead, id.;
and (3) upon realizing that “people going to want to know how
come [George’s] shirt [was] rip[ped].” App. 948. His testimony
reveals that it was these facts that prompted him to discard the
weapon into the garbage pan. When he reached Lieutenant
DeSuza, he intimated (falsely) that someone else had “just shot
[his] partner.” Id. Continuing the charade, he lied outright at the
hospital when he stated that George had been shot in a drive-by
shooting. Lewis further admitted at trial that he concocted the
drive-by shooting story because he thought that no one would
believe his self-defense story. App. 958. We reject Lewis’s
proposition that his false accounts after he disposed of the gun are
irrelevant to determining whether his dispossession was objectively
reasonable. They reveal his underlying motivations in discarding
the gun, and, while subjective motivations do not determine
objective reasonableness, they can give insight. When the motive
is a self-serving cover-up, as it was here, the likelihood that the
dispossession will be objectively reasonable is drastically reduced.

We are required, of course, to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to Lewis. Even in that light, Lewis’s testimony is
devoid of anything that would support the notion that his behavior
was reasonable. While we might imagine a scenario in which
discarding a weapon into a dumpster is objectively reasonable, that
is not the case here. Far from evincing a “single-minded effort” to
divest himself of the gun safely, return it to law enforcement
officers, or even to report to authorities the circumstances
necessitating his possession of it, Lewis’s own testimony

16
demonstrates just the opposite: a furtive effort to obscure from law
enforcement his role in George’s death, as well as the physical
evidence substantiating it. Indeed, Lewis’s testimony establishes
that he acknowledged neither his role in the shooting nor his
conduct after the shooting until his first few exculpatory accounts
proved futile.

We recognize that generally “the reasonableness of the
defendant’s course of conduct is a question for a jury.” Ricks, 573
F.3d at 204; cf. Paolello, 951 F.2d at 543 (“[E]ven if we find
Paolello’s testimony unpersuasive, his credibility should be judged
by the jury.”). But this rule is not so strict that it strips the trial
court of its gatekeeping function entirely. See Al-Rekabi, 454 F.3d
at 1123 (explaining that when reviewing a court’s refusal to give
a necessity instruction, “[w]e respect the trial judge’s role as
gatekeeper”). We have little difficulty holding that a surreptitious
effort to secrete a firearm in order to evade criminal sanction is not
a reasonable mode of dispossession. Rather, we conclude that such
conduct cannot satisfy the objective requirement that a defendant
“act in the most responsible manner available under the
circumstances.” Al-Rekabi, 454 F.3d at 1123.9

Under Paolello as we have refined it, we conclude that the
evidence in this case cannot support a justified possession defense
with respect to the § 2253(a) charge. Accordingly, the trial court’s
failure to provide a justification instruction in this case was not
error,10 and thus does not afford a basis for disturbing Lewis’s

9
Because we conclude that Lewis did not satisfy the third
Paolello requirement, we need not discuss whether he satisfied the
fourth.
10
Although, as we have said, a reasonableness requirement
logically follows from our decision in Paolello, we recognize that
the opinion does not refer explicitly to “reasonable” dispossession.
Even assuming that one could interpret Paolello’s literal terms to
have required the trial court to provide a justification instruction,
the opinion is not so clear as applied to the particular factual
circumstances presented here to rise to the level of a “plain” error.
Given Lewis’s admitted obfuscatory conduct, neither Paolello nor

17
conviction.11

III.

Lewis also argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally
deficient under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). He

any of our other cases, see, e.g., United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d
702 (3d Cir. 1989) clearly compelled the trial court to give a
justification instruction. Rather, the application of Paolello at the
time of Lewis’s trial was, at most, “subject to reasonable dispute”
insofar as it pertained to the factual circumstances of this case.
Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2009). Such a
reasonably debatable issue does not rise to the level of plain error.
Id. Even if one could characterize the trial court’s failure to
provide a justification instruction as “error” under the
jurisprudence of the day, such an error was hardly clear or obvious.

Moreover, trial courts generally are under no duty to raise
affirmative defenses on behalf of a criminal defendant. See, e.g.,
United States v. Atkins, 487 F.2d 257, 259 (8th Cir. 1973) (finding
no plain error in the trial court’s failure to give an alibi instruction
sua sponte because “[a] trial court need not give such an instruction
in the absence of a request therefor”); Roper v. United States, 403
F.2d 796, 798 (5th Cir. 1968) (same); United States v. Sferas, 210
F.2d 69, 71 (7th Cir. 1954) (“[A]ppellate courts will not, generally
speaking, pass upon defenses which have not been previously
brought to the attention of the trial court.”). Indeed, by raising
affirmative defenses sua sponte, a trial court might actually harm
a criminal defendant by undermining defense counsel’s strategic
decisions. Cf. United States v. Van Kirk, 935 F.2d 932, 934 (8th
Cir. 1991) (“[A] competent defense lawyer could well have
concluded that urging an entrapment defense . . . would have
undermined the effort to avoid all the charges on the ground that
the defendant was simply not guilty.”)).
11
Lewis argues that, should we agree that the conviction
must be vacated, the Double Jeopardy Clause, U.S. Const. amend.
V, bars a retrial. Our conclusion that the conviction be affirmed
renders Lewis’s Double Jeopardy claim moot.

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asserts two independent claims. First, he contends that counsel was
deficient by failing to request the justification defense discussed
above. Second, he contends that counsel was deficient because he
failed to object to both the Government’s references to his
nickname (“Rambo”) and his alleged possession of a knife many
years before.

Lewis acknowledges the well-settled rule in this Court that
Strickland claims are “generally not entertained on direct appeal.”
United States v. McLaughlin, 386 F.3d 547, 555 (3d Cir. 2004)
(citing United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir.
1991)); see also United States v. Chorin, 322 F.3d 274, 282 n.4 (3d
Cir. 2003) (“[T]his Court has expressed a preference that
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims be brought as
collateral challenges . . . rather than . . . on direct appeal . . . .”).
“Where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on
attorney incompetence, the lack of a fully developed record often
precludes a comprehensive inquiry into the elements of strategy or
tactics that may have entered into defense counsel’s challenged
decision.” McLaughlin, 386 F.3d at 555. The Appellate Division
dismissed Lewis’s Strickland claims on this basis. App. R.
Invoking a narrow exception to the general rule, Lewis argues that
the present “record is sufficient to allow [a] determination of
ineffective assistance of counsel, [and thus] an evidentiary hearing
to develop the facts is not needed.” Headley, 923 F.2d at 1083.
With respect to the first Strickland claim (based on
counsel’s failure to request a justification instruction), we agree
with Lewis that the record is sufficient to adjudicate the claim at
this time. We disagree, however, that the claim has any merit.
Given our analysis above, the claim fails as a matter of law because
counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to request an instruction to
which Lewis was not entitled. See Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105,
121 n.7 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that counsel was not ineffective in
failing to object as there was no reason to object); Parrish v.
Fulcomer, 150 F.3d 326, 328-29 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting counsel’s
assistance “does not become ineffective by failing to raise an issue
when convincing Supreme Court case law shows it to be without
merit”). Accordingly, we reject – on the merits and with prejudice
– Lewis’s first Strickland claim.

With respect to the second Strickland claim (counsel’s

19
failure to object to the Government’s references to Lewis’s
nickname and possession of a knife), we conclude that the appellate
record is inadequate to adjudicate the claim. Aside from his ipse
dixit that counsel’s relevant deficiencies were clear in light of the
proceedings, Lewis does not explain why or how the record in this
case differs from the ordinary appellate record, and we decline to
depart from our standard practice. Accordingly, we will affirm the
Appellate Division’s order dismissing Lewis’s second Strickland
claim. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to Lewis’s ability
to assert it in a collateral proceeding. We express no view as to the
merits of that claim.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the
Appellate Division.

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