Government of the Virgin Islands v. Martinez

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_________________

No. 08-2694
_________________

GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

v.

KWANZA MARTINEZ,

Appellant
_________________

On Appeal from the District Court
of the Virgin Islands, Appellate Division
(Crim. No. 1:04-cr-00148-1)
Judges: Hon. Curtis V. Gomez, Hon. Raymond L. Finch,
and Hon. Audrey L. Thomas

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 4, 2010
_________________

Before: SMITH, CHAGARES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: September 8, 2010)

Martial A Webster, Sr., Esq.
116 Queen Cross Street
Frederiksted, St. Croix, V.I. 00851
Counsel for Appellant

Tiffany V. Robinson, Esq.
Office of the Attorney General of the Virgin Islands
34-38 Kronprindsens Gade, GERS Complex, 2nd Floor
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, VI 00802
Counsel for Appellee
 __________________

OPINION
__________________

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

Kwanza Martinez was convicted in the Territorial Court of
the Virgin Islands of kidnapping for rape, and he was sentenced to
thirty years in prison. The Appellate Division of the District Court
of the Virgin Islands affirmed the conviction. Three months later,
Martinez filed a notice of appeal in this Court. Concluding that the
Government has forfeited its ability to attack the appeal as untimely
pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b), we exercise
jurisdiction. Because we reject Martinez’s claims on the merits, we
will affirm the order of the Appellate Division.

I.

Taken in the light most favorable to the Government, the
pertinent facts are as follows. On the night of June 16, 2003,
Chenae Harvey, who was then sixteen, left her home in the Harbor
View housing community on the island of St. Croix. In a nearby
parking lot, she bumped into Martinez, her first cousin, who was
then twenty-one. Harvey entered Martinez’s car voluntarily,
expecting that he would drive her to her friend Amanda’s
apartment, also located in Harbor View. Instead, Martinez
unexpectedly passed Amanda’s apartment at a high rate of speed,
and Harvey quickly realized that he did not intend to take her there.
Harvey asked Martinez where he was taking her, but he did not
answer. She twice asked him to take her home, but again he was
unresponsive. When they reached the Princesse area, Harvey
began to cry, and screamed to Martinez that she wanted to go
home. Yet again, he did not respond. Finally, Harvey grabbed the
steering wheel in an attempt to stop the car. At that point, Martinez
ordered Harvey not to grab the wheel, and said that he had a gun in
the car and did not want to be stopped by the police. Martinez then
removed a firearm from the glove compartment and placed it in his
lap. The gun remained present for the duration of the encounter.

2
 Martinez’s excessive speed caused Harvey to be “afraid [for
her] life.” Joint Appendix (“JA”) 152. He continued his frenetic
pace until he reached a desolate area past the Salt River, 10.8 miles
from Harbor View. Martinez drove up a steep hill known as “The
Beast,” turned the car around at a dead end so that it faced down
the hill, and turned off the lights. With the gun still in his lap,
Martinez then demanded that Harvey have sex with him. She
declined, stating, “No, I don’t want to have sex with you because
you is my cousin.” Id. When she did not acquiesce, Martinez
ordered Harvey out of the car and sped away.

Five minutes later, Martinez returned, at which time Harvey
opened the rear passenger door and reentered the car. It is
undisputed that at some point thereafter, Martinez and Harvey
engaged in sexual intercourse. The nature of the sexual encounter,
however, is vigorously disputed: Martinez claimed that it was
consensual, and Harvey alleged that it was not. In any event,
whatever happened in fact is not critical to resolution of this
appeal.

The record is not entirely clear how long the episode lasted,
but it appears to have taken place over a period of about an hour.
Two days later, Harvey told her mother, Faye Martinez (who is the
defendant’s aunt), about the incident, and her mother then took her
to the hospital. Harvey gave a statement to police officers at the
hospital, after which the officers recovered her undergarments.
Analysis on the clothing tested positive for DNA consistent with
Martinez’s.

Martinez was arrested on July 9, 2003, and was charged in
a six-count criminal information with aggravated rape in the first
degree (in violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 1700); aggravated
rape in the second degree (in violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, §
1700a); kidnapping for rape (in violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14,
§ 1052(b)); two counts of unlawful sexual contact in the first
degree (in violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 1708); and
possession of a deadly weapon during a crime of violence (in
violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2251(a)). Martinez did not
dispute that he had sexual intercourse with Harvey, but claimed
that the encounter had been entirely consensual. After a three-day

3
trial, the jury convicted him of kidnapping for rape (Count Three),
but acquitted him of the other charges.1 The trial court sentenced
him to thirty years in prison. The Appellate Division affirmed the
conviction, and this appeal followed.

II.

We first consider our jurisdiction. The Appellate Division
exercised appellate jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a), and
entered its order affirming the conviction on February 27, 2008.
On May 20, 2008, the Appellate Division entered on its docket a
handwritten letter from Martinez, dated May 15, 2008, in which he
averred that he had only recently learned that his conviction had
been affirmed. He explained that his attorney had been disbarred
and had not forwarded him a copy of the Appellate Division’s
opinion and order. The court appointed new counsel, who filed a
notice of appeal on June 10, 2008, 104 days after entry of the
Appellate Division’s final order.

On June 17, 2008, the Clerk of this Court issued an order (1)
advising the parties that we may lack appellate jurisdiction, and (2)
directing them to file responses addressing the issue. The
Government did not file a response (and has never addressed the
jurisdictional issue in this Court); Martinez filed a response
through counsel. A motions panel thereafter referred the issue to
this merits panel to consider whether the time limitation in Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) is a jurisdictional requirement, or
a claim-processing rule subject to forfeiture.

“The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure govern appeals
to our [C]ourt from the District Court of the Virgin Islands[,
Appellate Division]. Therefore, the time limits for the filing of a
notice of appeal in a criminal case are those set out in Fed. R. App.
P. 4(b).” Gov’t of the V.I. v. Charleswell, 24 F.3d 571, 575 (3d
Cir. 1994) (citation and footnote omitted). Rule 4(b) required
Martinez to file a notice of appeal within ten days of the entry of

1
Before the case was submitted to the jury, the trial court
dismissed the charge of aggravated rape in the second degree.

4
the Appellate Division’s final order.2 It is undisputed that he did
not do so. Our decisions have repeatedly noted that the failure to
file a timely notice of appeal in a criminal case deprives us of
appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Carelock, 459
F.3d 437, 440-43 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Kress, 944 F.2d
155, 161 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Vastola, 899 F.2d 211,
220 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 497 U.S. 1001 (1990);
United States v. Grana, 864 F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 1989).

While a panel of our Court is bound by the precedential
decisions of earlier panels, that rule does not apply “when the prior
decision[s] conflict[] with a Supreme Court decision.” United
States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 2009); see also United
States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 2001); Third
Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 9.1. Three recent Supreme
Court decisions compel us to revise our prior jurisdictional view of
Rule 4(b): Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004); Eberhart v.
United States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005) (per curiam); and Bowles v.
Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007). In accordance with the uniform
holdings of our sister courts of appeals following these decisions,3
we now hold that Rule 4(b) is not jurisdictional and is subject to
forfeiture.

In Kontrick, the Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 4004 – which sets forth a sixty-day window
for a creditor to file a complaint objecting to a debtor’s discharge
– is not jurisdictional. 540 U.S. at 447. The Court explained that

2
Rule 4(b) now prescribes a fourteen-day window to file a
notice of appeal in a criminal case. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b).
3
See, e.g., United States v. Neff, 598 F.3d 320, 323 (7th Cir.
2010); United States v. Urutyan, 564 F.3d 679, 685 (4th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Byfield, 522 F.3d 400, 403 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2008);
United States v. Frias, 521 F.3d 229, 233 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 289 (2008); United States v. Garduno, 506 F.3d 1287,
1290-91 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Martinez, 496 F.3d 387,
388-89 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); United States v. Sadler, 480
F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 2007).

5
the term “jurisdictional” properly applies only to “prescriptions
delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the
persons (personal jurisdiction)” implicating “a court’s adjudicatory
authority.” Id. at 455. With respect to the former, the Court
emphasized, “[o]nly Congress may determine a lower federal
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 452 (citing U.S. Const.
art. III, § 1).

Though other bankruptcy-related time constraints appear in
the judicial code, the Court noted that the specific statutory
“provision conferring jurisdiction over objections to discharge . .
. contains no timeliness condition.” Id. at 453. Instead, the time
limitation governing objections to discharge is governed solely by
Rule 4004, a court-prescribed rule established for the “practice and
procedure” in bankruptcy actions. Id. The Court recognized that
it and other courts had been “less than meticulous” in
distinguishing between statutory provisions circumscribing a
court’s authority to hear a case and “emphatic time prescriptions in
rules of court.” Id. at 454. Clarifying the distinction, the Court
explained that while “subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be
expanded to account for the parties’ litigation conduct[,] a
claim-processing rule, . . . even if unalterable on a party’s
application, can nonetheless be forfeited if the party asserting the
rule waits too long to raise the point.” Id. Because the debtor there
had not raised the objector’s untimeliness until after the objection
had been litigated on the merits, the Court held that the argument
had been forfeited and that jurisdiction had been properly
exercised.

In Eberhart, the Court, relying on Kontrick, held that
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 – which at the time gave a
criminal defendant seven days to file a motion for a new trial – is
not jurisdictional. 546 U.S. at 13. Rejecting the notion that court-
prescribed rules by themselves provide the “keys to the kingdom of
subject-matter jurisdiction,” id. at 17, the Court explained that Rule
4004 and Rule 33(a) are “virtually identical provisions.” Id. at 16.
The Court concluded that the latter, like the former, is a rigid
claim-processing rule, but one whose protection is subject to
forfeiture if not properly invoked.

6
 Finally, in Bowles, the Supreme Court held that Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) – which governs a district
court’s authority to extend the time to appeal in civil cases – is
jurisdictional. 551 U.S. at 213. Though the Court stated generally
that “time limits for filing a notice of appeal are jurisdictional in
nature,” id. at 206, it repeatedly grounded its holding on “the
jurisdictional significance of the fact that a time limitation is set
forth in a statute.” Id. at 210 (emphasis added); see also id. (stating
that Kontrick, Eberhart, and other cases had not “call[ed] into
question our longstanding treatment of statutory time limits for
taking an appeal as jurisdictional.” (emphasis added)); id. at 211-12
(noting the “jurisdictional distinction between court-promulgated
rules and limits enacted by Congress”); Lizardo v. United States,
__ F.3d __, __, No. 08-2044, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16489, at *9
(3d Cir. Aug. 10, 2010) (“The Bowles Court explained that time
limits that are not based on a statute . . . are not jurisdictional rules,
but claim-processing rules.”).

Because 28 U.S.C. § 2107 prescribes time limits for filing
a civil appeal – and because the constraints imposed by Rule
4(a)(6) are also required by the statute – the Bowles Court
concluded that the time to file a notice of appeal in a civil case and
the statutory provisions governing extensions of that time limit are
jurisdictional. Notably, the Court bolstered its holding by
contrasting Rule 4(a) with its criminal counterpart: “we have
treated the rule-based time limit for criminal cases differently,
stating that it may be waived because the procedural rules adopted
by the Court for the orderly transaction of its business are not
jurisdictional . . . .” 551 U.S. at 212 (quotation marks omitted); see
also Lizardo, __F.3d at __, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16489, at *10
(noting the Bowles Court’s distinction between the rules governing
civil and criminal appeals).

Until 1948, the deadline to file a notice of appeal in both
civil and criminal cases was prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2107. See
United States v. Frias, 521 F.3d 229, 233 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 289 (2008). Since then, however, § 2107 – together with
Rule 4(a) – has governed only the deadline to appeal in civil cases.
Rule 4(b), by contrast, has governed the time to file a notice of

7
appeal in criminal cases since 1968 – absent statutory mandate.4
Because Rule 4(b) is not grounded in statute, therefore, we are not
deprived of appellate jurisdiction if a party fails to invoke the rule
properly upon an untimely notice of appeal.5

We repeat that Rule 4(b)’s deadline is rigid. Upon proper
invocation of the rule when a notice of appeal is filed out of time,
we must dismiss the appeal. In this case, however, the Government
has never invoked Rule 4(b). It did not respond to the Clerk’s
order directing it to advise us on its position, and it did not mention
the issue in its merits brief. Because the Government has clearly
forfeited the untimeliness argument available to it, we exercise
jurisdiction.6 We do so pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c).

4
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 governed the time
to file a notice of appeal in criminal cases from 1948 to 1968.
5
In United States v. Carelock – decided before Bowles but
after Kontrick and Eberhart – we held that an appellant’s failure to
file a notice of appeal compliant with Rule 3(c) (governing the
contents of a notice of appeal) deprived us of jurisdiction. 459
F.3d at 441-43. By the time a proper notice of appeal had been
filed, Rule 4(b)’s deadline had run. Id. at 443. In a footnote, we
identified the issue that Kontrick and Eberhart raised with respect
to Rule 4(b). Id. at 440 n.6. We noted in dicta that “the language
and commentary of the rules, along with their prior treatment by
the Supreme Court and this Court, strongly support the conclusion
that Rules 3 and 4 govern subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. But
because the Government had raised a proper objection to the non-
compliant notice of appeal, we did not answer the question at that
time. Id. In light of Bowles and the holdings of our sister circuits,
we believe it is clear that Rule 4(b) can no longer be considered a
jurisdictional limitation. Because it is not before us, we need not
consider the jurisdictional implications of Rule 3(c).
6
It remains an open question whether this Court may invoke
Rule 4(b)’s time limit sua sponte and dismiss an untimely criminal
appeal absent a motion by a party. See Frias, 521 F.3d at 234 n.5
(declining to answer the question). At least one other court of
appeals has answered that question affirmatively, retaining

8
 III.

Martinez argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain
the kidnapping for rape conviction under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, §
1052(b). We exercise plenary review over Martinez’s sufficiency
challenge, United States v. Bornman, 559 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir.
2009), yet that review is narrow. United States v. Rawlins, 606
F.3d 73, 80 (3d Cir. 2010). We will accept the jury’s verdict if,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government, “‘any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)) (emphasis in
Jackson). “[W]e examine the totality of the evidence, both direct
and circumstantial, and must credit all available inferences in favor
of the [G]overnment.” United States v. Sparrow, 371 F.3d 851,
852 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted).

Section 1052(b) of the Virgin Islands Code provides in its
entirety:

Whoever abducts, takes or carries
away any person by force or threat
with the intent to commit rape is guilty
of kidnapping and shall be imprisoned
for not less than 15 years and shall not
be eligible for parole until he has
served at least one-half of [the]
sentence imposed.

discretion to invoke the rule “when judicial resources and
administration are . . . implicated and the delay has . . . been
inordinate.” United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 750 (10th
Cir. 2008); see also id. at 752-55 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (agreeing
that courts of appeals have discretion to dismiss an untimely appeal
when an appellee fails to invoke Rule 4(b), but disagreeing that
such discretion should be so narrowly circumscribed). We leave
this question for another day.

9
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 1052(b). Section 1052(b) required the
Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that Martinez
abducted, took, or carried away Harvey against her will; (2) that he
did so by force or threat; and (3) that he intended to commit rape
while doing so.7 With respect to the kidnapping component of the
crime, we must consider (1) the duration and distance of
asportation of the victim, and (2) whether the asportation created
a significant danger to the victim independent of that posed by a
separate ongoing offense. Gov’t of the V.I. v. Ventura, 775 F.2d
92, 96-98 (3d Cir. 1985) (modifying four-factor test set forth in
Gov’t of the V.I. v. Berry, 604 F.2d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 1979)).8

7
The Virgin Islands Code specifies several classes of rape.
Aside from the independent offenses of unlawful sexual contact in
the first and second degrees, see V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, §§ 1708-
09, the Code delineates the crimes of rape in the first, second, and
third degrees, and aggravated rape in the first and second degrees.
See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, §§ 1700-03. But § 1052(b) does not
specify which version of rape a defendant must intend to commit
during a kidnapping to violate the statute. We can readily discern
the answer. The statute does not require a defendant to intend to
commit aggravated rape, for it plainly says only “intent to commit
rape.” Conversely, the crimes of rape in the second and third
degrees are statutory-rape prohibitions, in which the crime is
defined based on the respective ages of the perpetrator and the
victim, not on the perpetrator’s intent or the victim’s consent. See
Gov’t of the V.I. v. Richards, 44 V.I. 47, 55 (Terr. Ct. 2001).
Accordingly, we believe it is it clear that § 1052(b) requires the
Government to prove that the defendant intended to commit (at
least) rape in the first degree. Relevant here, such a crime occurs
when a defendant engages in sexual intercourse or sodomy with
another “when the [victim’s] resistance is forcibly overcome.” V.I.
Code Ann. tit. 14, § 1701(2).
8
In Berry, we interpreted § 1052 (then a general kidnapping
statute) narrowly to preclude its “overzealous enforcement . . .
[against] persons who have committed such substantive crimes as
robbery or assault[, and] which inherently involve the temporary
detention or seizure of the victim . . . .” 604 F.2d at 226. Lest
those defendants be punished for kidnapping when “in reality

10
 Martinez first argues that because Harvey entered the car
voluntarily at the Harbor View parking lot, the evidence was
insufficient to prove that he took her away against her will. We
disagree. No language exists in § 1052(b) that would absolve the
abduction of an unconsenting victim merely because the victim’s
initial interaction with the perpetrator was voluntary. We hold – as
have the majority of courts considering similar proposed
interpretations of the federal kidnapping statutes – that § 1052(b)
reaches the abduction of an individual during an otherwise
consensual encounter if consent is withdrawn at some point after
the encounter commences. 9 Harvey’s testimony that she several

[they] committed lesser or different offenses, of which temporary
seizure or detention played an incidental part,” id., we set forth four
factors to determine whether a defendant was guilty of the separate
crime of kidnapping: (1) the duration and distance of the detention
or asportation; (2) whether the detention or asportation occurred
during the commission of a separate offense; (3) whether the
detention or asportation which occurred is inherent in the separate
offense; and (4) whether the asportation or detention created a
significant danger to the victim independent of that posed by the
separate offense. Id. at 227. After we decided Berry, the Virgin
Islands legislature added § 1052(b), ultimately prompting our
decision in Ventura. There, we explained that by enacting the
kidnapping-for-rape statute, “the legislature was not concerned, as
was the Berry court, about the risk of over-zealous application of
the kidnapping charge to impose a sentence substantially greater
than that attached to the underlying crime.” 775 F.3d at 96. We
held that while the statutory amendment marginalized the second
and third Berry factors, the first and fourth factors remained
applicable to § 1052(b). Id. at 97-98. We emphasized, however,
that “the modified Berry test used in § 1052(b) cases is not a
stringent one.” Id. at 98 n.12. Here, Martinez argues that Berry
compels reversal of his conviction. He ignores Ventura entirely.
In this opinion, we refer to the “first” and “second” Ventura
factors, which are synonymous with the first and fourth Berry
factors.
9
See, e.g., United States v. Tian, 339 F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir.
2003) (“The Hostage Taking Act . . . does not require that a seizure

11
times pleaded with Martinez to take her home easily supported the
jury’s finding that she had been detained against her will during the
car ride.

Martinez next argues that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain the element that force or threat be used to carry out the
kidnapping. We disagree. Harvey’s testimony that Martinez
brandished the gun in the car (where it remained on his lap for the
duration of the ride) was sufficient to permit the jury to find that
Martinez detained Harvey by force or threat. Introduction of the
gun into the equation stopped Harvey’s attempt to grab the steering
wheel instantly. Alternatively, immediately before Martinez
actually brandished the gun, he ordered Harvey not to grab the
steering wheel because he had a gun and did not want to be stopped
by the police. This threat alone established the element of force or
threat, whether the gun itself was ever introduced or not. See
United States v. Macklin, 671 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting
that a kidnapping offense requires a defendant to use “some means
of force – actual or threatened, physical or mental – . . . so that the
victim is taken, held and transported against his or her will”

or detention be against a hostage’s will from its inception.”);
United States v. Carrion-Caliz, 944 F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 1991)
(“The dispositive question is not whether [the hostages] initially
agreed to go to [the hostage taker’s] house, but rather whether [the
hostages] later were detained or confined there against their will.”);
United States v. Eagle Thunder, 893 F.2d 950, 952 (8th Cir. 1990)
(“Even if [the victim] had initially consented to accompanying [the
defendant in his car], that fact would not prevent the occurrence of
a kidnapping because [the defendant] thereafter detained [the
victim] despite her repeated requests to be taken home or to her
mother.”); United States v. Redmond, 803 F.2d 438, 439 (9th Cir.
1986) (“The fact that one originally accompanies another without
being forced does not prevent the occurrence of a kidnapping
where force is later used to seize or confine the victim.”); United
States v. McBryar, 553 F.2d 433, 434 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(kidnapping conviction upheld where defendant agreed to take
victim to one destination but drove in opposite direction and
refused her requests to be let out of automobile).

12
(emphasis added)).

Martinez next argues that any asportation in this case was
“minimal.” We disagree. The evidence readily established the first
Ventura factor (distance or duration of the asportation). Martinez
transported Harvey 10.8 miles from Harbor View to the secluded
area where the sexual encounter occurred, and the entire episode
appears to have lasted about an hour. This is plainly sufficient.
See Gov’t of the V.I. v. Alment, 820 F.2d 635, 638 (3d Cir. 1987)
(concluding that evidence of asportation from “one environment .
. . to another” over a distance of approximately seventy feet was
sufficient); Ventura, 775 F.2d at 98 (explaining that dragging
victim indoors, over a period of several minutes and for a distance
of eighty-eight feet was sufficient degree of asportation under the
less-stringent modified Berry framework).

Martinez also claims that “no evidence regarding
[independent] significant danger was ever presented at trial.”
Martinez Br. at 19. We disagree. The second Ventura factor was
satisfied by testimony regarding: (1) Martinez’s reckless driving
en route to the Salt River area; (2) the presence of the firearm
throughout the episode; and (3) the fact that the alleged kidnapping
occurred several minutes before the sexual encounter itself. See
Ventura, 775 F.2d at 98 (explaining that harm of being dragged
“through the bushes by the ear while [the defendant was] carrying
a gun” is significant danger, and independent of the rape
committed). The threat posed by the firearm and Martinez’s
driving clearly presented a danger independent of any harm posed
by the alleged sexual assault.

Finally, Martinez argues that the evidence was insufficient
to establish that he formed the specific intent to commit rape during
the asportation because the acquittal on the rape charge removes
any possible inference that he had formed the intent to commit rape
at an antecedent moment. We disagree. As an initial matter, even
accepting for the moment that the jury acquitted Martinez of rape
because it determined that the sexual intercourse was consensual,
we reject the underlying premise of the claim. There is no logical
or temporal inconsistency between a finding that Martinez intended
to rape Harvey at one point in time, and a finding that Harvey

13
nevertheless acquiesced to Martinez’s sexual advances several
minutes later.

In any event, Martinez appears to argue that, having found
the sexual act voluntary as to the rape charge, the jury was not
permitted to use Harvey’s testimony about that act in determining
his earlier intent as to the kidnapping charge. Again we disagree.
Each count of the criminal information was independent of the
next; the jury was permitted – indeed, required – to assess all of the
evidence as it pertained to each individual count. Hypothesizing
about contradictory jury verdicts does not afford a basis for
reversing a conviction on sufficiency-of-the-evidence review. See
United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 62 (1984) (reaffirming that
“[c]onsistency in the verdict is not necessary” (quoting Dunn v.
United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932))); United States v.
Mussare, 405 F.3d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]here is no
requirement that a jury’s verdict be consistent.”).

If, as Martinez presumes, the jury determined that the sexual
act was consensual as it considered the rape charge, it was not
beholden to that conclusion when it considered the kidnapping
charge. We, in turn, may not reverse purely because the jury’s
resolution of the historical facts might seem inconsistent:

[A] criminal defendant already is afforded protection
against jury irrationality or error by the independent
review of the sufficiency of the evidence undertaken
by the trial and appellate courts. This review should
not be confused with the problems caused by
inconsistent verdicts. Sufficiency-of-the evidence
review involves assessment by the courts of whether
the evidence adduced at trial could support any
rational determination of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. This review should be independent of the
jury’s determination that evidence on another count
was insufficient. The Government must convince
the jury with its proof, and must also satisfy the
courts that given this proof the jury could rationally
have reached a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. We do not believe that further safeguards

14
 against jury irrationality are necessary.

Powell, 469 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added, citations omitted); see
also United States v. Alicea, 205 F.3d 480, 484 (1st Cir. 2000) (“In
a single, multi-count trial, acquittal on one or more counts does not
preclude conviction on other counts based upon the same evidence,
as long as that evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding of
guilt on the count(s) of conviction.” (emphasis added)); United
States v. Church, 955 F.2d 688, 695 (11th Cir. 1992).

Thus, while the jury found that the Government had not
proved the crimes of aggravated rape and unlawful sexual contact
beyond a reasonable doubt, it was free to use Harvey’s testimony
that Martinez raped her when considering whether he had formed
the specific intent to rape at an earlier point in time. See United
States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 747 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding
evidence of sexual assault relevant to show defendant’s motive in
kidnapping victim); United States v. Bradshaw, 690 F.2d 704, 708
(9th Cir. 1982) (“This Court has previously held evidence of sexual
relations admissible because of its relevance to motive in a
kidnapping case.”). In sum, the jury’s acquittal on the other counts
“is irrelevant to our singular focus on and determination of whether
the evidence adduced at trial supports” the conviction on Count
Three. United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1253 (11th Cir.
1998).10

Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Government, we conclude that it was sufficient to support a
finding that Martinez possessed an intent to rape Harvey during the
car ride. Within a span of several minutes, Martinez took Harvey
against her will to a secluded area, brandished a firearm and
threatened her in doing so, immediately demanded that she have
sex with him (a demand she refused), whereupon he ordered her
out of the car before driving away. Additionally, Dawn Callwood,

10
Similarly, although it acquitted Martinez of unlawful
possession of a deadly weapon during a crime of violence, the jury
was entitled to accept Harvey’s testimony that Martinez used a gun
to carry out the kidnapping.

15
Martinez’s unrelated “aunt,” testified that some time after the
incident, Martinez called her and admitted that “something just
happened . . . [s]omething just came over him. . . . [S]omething
just popped . . . just went pop in his head.” JA 116. Callwood also
testified that Martinez attempted to “justify himself” to her, id., and
that he admitted that “something happened to Chenae.” JA 117.
Corroborating this account was Faye Martinez’s testimony that the
defendant called her after the incident and, “sound[ing] very
afraid,” said that he knew Harvey’s father and uncle were looking
for him, but that it was “not going to go down like that.” JA 217.

Drawing all reasonable inferences in the Government’s
favor, the evidence surrounding the sexual encounter, along with
Martinez’s own statements and the evidence of his aggressive,
threatening, overbearing, and violent conduct, was sufficient to
sustain the jury’s determination of Martinez’s specific intent at the
time of the kidnapping. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135,
149 n.19 (1994) (“A jury may, of course, find the requisite
knowledge on [the] defendant’s part by drawing reasonable
inferences from the evidence of [the] defendant’s conduct . . . .”).

* * * *

For these reasons, we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient to support the kidnapping for rape conviction.

IV.

Martinez claims that the Government violated his right to
due process by questioning him on his post-arrest silence, in
violation of the rule announced in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610
(1976). The facts underlying this claim are as follows. Martinez
testified in his own defense that earlier in the day on June 16, 2003,
Harvey asked him for $500 or $600 and said that if he gave her the
money she “would make it worth [his] while.” JA 338-39.
Martinez testified that he understood this to mean that Harvey
“wanted to have sex.” JA 339. He then testified: (1) that the
sexual episode later that evening was consensual; (2) that Harvey
thereafter demanded the money she had requested; (3) that she
threatened to tell everyone that he had raped her if he did not

16
provide the money; and (4) that when he did not give her the
money, she accused him of rape.

The Government sought to dispel Martinez’s exculpatory
account on cross-examination. The prosecutor first asked: “Did
you make a statement to Officer Berrios about what you told us
here today?” JA 350. The trial court sustained defense counsel’s
objection, and before Martinez could answer, it interjected, “You
don’t have to answer.” Id. After the prosecutor pressed Martinez
as to whether Harvey had ever before requested money from him
(Martinez admitted that she had not), this disjointed exchange
ensued:

Q. Did you ask Chenae if she had some type of problem
that she would need this 5 or $600?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you tell [Faye] Martinez that
Chenae might be in some trouble and
needed 5 or $600?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you tell your mother that Chenae demanded 5 or
$600 from you?

[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your
Honor.

The Court: Overruled.

Q. Did you tell your mother that Chenae was
trying to shake you down for 5 or $600?

[Defense Counsel]: Objection as to shake
down.

The Court: Sustained.

17
 Q. Did you tell your mother that Chenae
demanded 5 or $600 from you and said she
would make it worth your while?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you tell anyone other than today that
Chenae demanded 5 or $600 from you?

[Defense Counsel]: Objection, your Honor.

The Court: Overruled.

Q. Other than your attorney –

[Defense Counsel]: Objection, your Honor.

The Court: Sustained as to the attorney.

Q. Did you tell anyone –

[Defense Counsel]: Objection. M ay we
approach, Your Honor?

The Court: You may.

JA 351-53.

At sidebar, defense counsel objected to the question whether
Martinez had told “anyone” his story, but the trial court was
unconvinced:

[Defense Counsel]: Y o u r Honor, the
defendant has a right
not to say anything to
anyone, your Honor;
has a right to remain
silent. He has a right to
privilege against self-
incrimination. He has a

18
 right not to say
anything.

The Court: He has a right not to say
anything to law
enforcement officers,
but – as I see it, the
object of the
g o v e r n m e n t ’ s
[questions] is to
indicate that the
defendant recently made
up the story.

[Defense Counsel]: Well, that may very
well be so if that’s their
object. If they can get it
in, they can’t get it in
through this kind of
questioning. He has a
right not to say anything
to anyone.

The Court: I understand he has a
right not to say anything
to anyone, but they can
ask him if he said it.

JA 353. After the sidebar, this colloquy followed:

Q. Sir, did you tell anyone that Chenae
demanded 5, $600 from you?

A. Excuse me, sir?

Q. Did you tell anyone that Chenae demanded 5
to $600 from you?

A. My attorney.

19
 [Defense Counsel]: I continue my objections.

The Court: Yes.

JA 354. The Government then moved to another line of
questioning.

During his summation, the prosecutor challenged Martinez’s
story that Harvey had falsely implicated him of rape. The
prosecutor emphasized Martinez’s admissions that he had never
before flirted with Harvey and that Harvey had never before
requested money from him. Accordingly, the prosecutor argued,
it would be nonsensical to believe that Harvey sought from her
cousin money in exchange for sex out of the blue. The prosecutor
never referred, however, to the fact that Martinez had proffered his
exculpatory account for the first time at trial, nor did he mention
Martinez’s post-arrest silence more generally.

“[P]articularly concerned” with the breadth of the
prosecutor’s questions whether Martinez had ever told “anyone”
his exculpatory account, the Appellate Division held that the
Government had violated Doyle. JA 578. But the court concluded
that the constitutional error was harmless because “overwhelming”
evidence existed such that “the jury could have determined that
Martinez [took] Harvey away by threat or force with the intent to
rape her.” JA 581.

Our review of this constitutional question is plenary. Gov’t
of the V.I. v. Davis, 561 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2009). As we
explain below, violations of Doyle are subject to harmless error
analysis. Accordingly, we ask first whether a violation occurred
and, if it did, we ask whether it had an effect on the jury’s verdict
beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. We share the Appellate
Division’s concern with some of the prosecutor’s questions. We
also agree, albeit for different reasons, that any Doyle violation was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

A.

Once a criminal defendant receives the prophylactic

20
warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), it
is improper under Doyle “for a prosecutor to cause the jury to draw
an impermissible inference of guilt from a defendant’s post-arrest
silence.” Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 947 (3d Cir.
1998). This is so because Miranda warnings carry the
Government’s “implicit assurance” that an arrestee’s invocation of
the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent will not later be used
against him. Davis, 561 F.3d at 163-64 (quoting Wainwright v.
Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 290-91 (1986)); United States v.
Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 2002). Because a defendant’s
post-Miranda warning silence could be nothing more than an
invocation of his right to silence, it would be fundamentally unfair
to permit a breach of that assurance by allowing impeaching
questions as to why he failed to give an exculpatory account to the
police after receiving the warnings. See Davis, 561 F.3d at 163.11
Not every reference to a defendant’s silence, however,
results in a Doyle violation. Where “no governmental action
induce[s] the defendant to remain silent,” Fletcher v. Weir, 455
U.S. 603, 606 (1982), the Miranda-based fairness rationale does
not control. Consequently, the Government permissibly may
impeach a defendant’s testimony using his pre-arrest silence,
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980); his post-arrest, pre-
Miranda warning silence, Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605-07 12 ; and any

11
The Government argues that Doyle is limited only to a
defendant’s silence immediately after receiving Miranda warnings,
not to his general silence in the lead-up to trial. The Government
argues that this case is controlled instead by Raffel v. United
States, 271 U.S. 494, 496 (1926) (holding that Fifth Amendment
“immunity from giving testimony is one which the defendant may
waive by offering himself as a witness”), and that inquiry into
Martinez’s general pretrial silence was therefore proper. We
rejected an identical argument in Davis, and therefore we need not
address the claim at length here. See 561 F.3d at 164-65; accord
Hassine, 160 F.3d at 947-49; United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427,
439 (3d Cir. 1996).
12
The Government argues that Martinez failed to lay an
evidentiary foundation that he received Miranda warnings, and
accordingly that no Doyle violation occurred under Fletcher. It is

21
voluntary post-Miranda warning statements, Anderson v. Charles,
447 U.S. 404, 408-09 (1980). Additionally, under Greer v. Miller,
483 U.S. 756 (1987), “there may be no Doyle violation where the
trial court sustains an objection to the improper question and
provides a curative instruction to the jury, thereby barring the
prosecutor from using the silence for impeachment.” Davis, 561
F.3d at 164 (citing Greer, 483 U.S. at 764-65).

Having scrupulously reviewed the trial transcript, we share
the Appellate Division’s concern with some of the Government’s
questions. Referring to Martinez’s exculpatory account, the
prosecutor first asked: “Did you make a statement to Officer
Berrios about what you told us here today?” JA 350. The
prosecutor clearly sought by this question to undermine Martinez’s
story by highlighting his failure to tell the officer that same version
at an earlier point in time. We cannot say with certainty, however,
that the question was improper, because a crucial ambiguity exists
in the record regarding Officer Berrios. Harvey’s testimony on
cross-examination reveals circumstantially that the officer took her
statement at the hospital two days after the incident. JA 181-85,
189. But Officer Berrios did not testify at trial, and the record does
not disclose what role he played in Martinez’s arrest, or whether
Martinez’s failure to give the exculpatory story to him occurred
before or after the arrest, or before or after Miranda warnings had
been given.

Accordingly, we cannot discern whether the prosecutor’s
question was permissible under Jenkins, Fletcher, or Anderson on
the one hand, or whether it violated Doyle on the other.13 The

the Government, however, that bears the burden of establishing
that no Miranda warnings were given if post-arrest silence is to be
used. United States v. Cummiskey, 728 F.2d 200, 206 (3d Cir.
1984). Because it does not ultimately affect our disposition, we
will assume arguendo that Martinez received the warnings.
13
If the question was improper, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Greer does not cure it. While defense counsel
immediately and successfully interposed an objection to the
question (thus precluding Martinez’s silence from actually being

22
context of the question and the lack of relevant evidence
underlying it give us pause, and our analysis below is mindful of
these uncertainties. Unable to answer definitively whether the
question violated Doyle, we turn to the questions that Martinez
centrally challenges on appeal – those in which the prosecutor
asked whether Martinez had ever told “anyone” his exculpatory
account.14

We also share the Appellate Division’s concern that these
questions “were overly broad and [their] breadth and obscurity
affect the applicable review . . . .” JA 578. Because the prosecutor
placed no personal or temporal specifications on the questions, they
might well have been construed as targeting Martinez’s post-arrest,
post-Miranda warning failure to proffer his story to the police. See
United States v. Dodd, 111 F.3d 867, 869 (11th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam) (“A comment is deemed to be a reference to a defendant’s
silence if . . . it was of such a character that the jury would naturally
and necessarily understand it to be a comment on a defendant’s
silence.” (quotation marks omitted)).

The Appellate Division was hesitant to construe such open-
ended and ambiguous questions against Martinez. So are we.
Under the circumstances, we think that the prosecutor’s
questioning in this case approached the constitutional line, and
likely crossed it. However, we need not decide definitively
whether the Government’s questions violated Doyle, because we
will affirm the District Court’s judgment even assuming that they

submitted to the jury, see Johnson, 302 F.3d at 147), the trial court
failed to provide a curative instruction to the jury that it was not to
consider Martinez’s post-arrest silence against him. We have
emphasized on several occasions the importance of such an
instruction in order for Greer to apply. See Davis, 561 F.3d at 164;
Johnson, 302 F.3d at 148 n.10; Hassine, 160 F.3d at 948.
Additionally, the prosecutor went on to ask other potentially
problematic questions.
14
Martinez does not take issue with the questions regarding
whether he told his story to Faye Martinez or his mother, and we
therefore do not address them.

23
did. See United States v. Rodriguez, 43 F.3d 117, 122 (5th Cir.
1995) (assuming for the sake of argument that a Doyle violation
occurred where the “prosecutor’s questions were sufficiently broad
as to be construed as commentary on [the defendant’s] failure to
come forward with his alibi (1) prior to arrest, (2) immediately after
arrest and Miranda warnings . . . , and (3) during the time period
prior to trial but following his arrest”); cf. United States v. Balter,
91 F.3d 427, 440 (3d Cir. 1996) (assuming arguendo that the
prosecutor’s questions violated Doyle and proceeding to harmless-
error analysis).

B.

We hold that any Doyle violation here was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967) (holding that a constitutional error is harmless where it can
be “prove[d] beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained
of did not contribute to the verdict obtained”); Balter, 91 F.3d at
440 (“The Supreme Court has held ‘that Doyle error fits squarely
into the category of constitutional violations which [it] has
characterized as trial error.’” (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507
U.S. 619, 629 (1993)) (alteration in Balter)).

Before explaining why, we pause to note that the Appellate
Division’s analysis suffers from the same deficiencies that we
recently identified in Davis. The court held in this case that any
Doyle error was harmless because “the evidence of Martinez’[s]
guilt . . . was overwhelming” and accordingly that “even without
the prosecutor’s inappropriate question, the jury could have
determined that Martinez [committed kidnapping for rape].” JA
581. By comparison, in Davis, the Appellate Division held that the
Doyle error was harmless because there existed “significant
evidence from which the jury could have found guilt.” 561 F.3d at
165 (quotation marks omitted). Rejecting that formulation, we
reminded the court that the relevant question under Chapman “is
not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty
verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty
verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to
the error.” Id. (quoting United States v. Korey, 472 F.3d 89, 96 (3d
Cir. 2007)). Our ensuing explanation applies equally here:

24
 [W]e are unsatisfied with this conclusion insofar as
the Appellate Division focused on whether the
evidence was sufficient to convict despite the error,
as opposed to whether there was a reasonable
possibility that the error contributed to the jury
verdict. See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249,
258-59 (1988) (“The question, however, is not
whether the legally admitted evidence was sufficient
. . . but rather, whether the [Government] has proved
‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained
of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’”
(quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24)).

Id. at 166. We are compelled to reiterate that constitutional
harmless-error analysis is not merely a review of whether the jury
“could have” returned a verdict absent the constitutional error.
Such an analysis improperly conflates sufficiency-of-the-evidence
review with the appropriate Chapman standard.

We are similarly unconvinced – as we were in Davis, see id.
– that the evidence proffered against Martinez can be characterized
as “overwhelming.” Martinez did not dispute at trial that he took
Harvey to the Salt River in his car, nor did he deny that he had
sexual intercourse with her. Consequently, the central issue in the
case concerned whether the episode was consensual, and thus it
turned on the credibility of Harvey, Dawn Callwood, Faye
Martinez, and the defendant. Although Callwood and Faye
Martinez both testified that the defendant called them after the
incident and implicated himself (thus corroborating Harvey’s
account and strengthening the Government’s case), these witnesses
were subject to rigorous cross-examination concerning their
possible biases. See id. (highlighting the “close associations”
between the three eyewitnesses whose testimony purportedly
provided “overwhelming evidence” against the defendant). At
bottom, a critical issue in the case largely required the jury to
choose sides in a classic he-said, she-said contest. While we agree
that the evidence was solid, we cannot agree with the Appellate
Division that overwhelming evidence against Martinez alone
rendered any error harmless.

25
 The foregoing does not inexorably lead us to doubt that the
prosecutor’s questions played no part in the verdict here. While
many of our Doyle cases focus on the quantum of evidence against
the defendants, see, e.g., Balter, 91 F.3d at 440, harmless-error
analysis must, by necessity, take into account the totality of the
circumstances. We have never held, nor do we now, that the
amount of incriminating evidence is the only factor implicated in
a Doyle harmless-error analysis. Cf. Rodriguez, 43 F.3d at 123
(analyzing whether Doyle error was harmless in light of “the entire
record”); United States v. Thomann, 609 F.2d 560, 566 (1st Cir.
1979) (“In the light of all the circumstances in this case . . . , we
find that . . . [the error] was harmless and not grounds for
reversal.”). Under all of the circumstances presented by this case,
two related factors ultimately convince us beyond doubt that any
error did not affect the jury’s verdict.

First is the garbled nature of the challenged colloquy
between court, counsel, and witness. Compare United States v.
Agee, 597 F.2d 350, 359 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc) (finding any
Doyle error harmless where the challenged question was
ambiguous, and explaining that it was unlikely the jury “understood
and recollected” the question as anything more than an innocuous
reference), with Davis, 561 F.3d at 167 (finding Doyle error not
harmless where the prosecutor’s questions directly and clearly
undermined the plausibility of the defense), and United States v.
Curtis, 644 F.2d 263, 270-71 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding Doyle
violation not harmless where the improper questions were “neither
isolated nor ambiguous”).

The challenged questions before the sidebar – which we
have already described as overly broad and ambiguous – were
either interrupted or immediately followed by objections from
defense counsel (some the trial court sustained, some it overruled),
preventing the jury from learning or inferring the answers to the
questions and thus compounding the ambiguity surrounding them.
The questions posed and the answers given after the sidebar were
no clearer. Martinez himself needed the prosecutor to repeat his
question, and he then referenced his attorney, provoking yet
another immediate objection (on an altogether different basis),
before the prosecutor promptly moved to another subject. The

26
prosecutor’s open-ended questions and attempted questions, the
barrage of intermittent objections and interruptions, the varying
responses by the trial court, and the partial answers by the
defendant all combine to obfuscate further what was already an
unclear allusion to Martinez’s post-Miranda warning silence.
Having studied the transcript, we believe it is exceedingly unlikely
that the jury was able to arrive at a negative inference based on the
oblique and muddled manner in which Martinez’s silence was put
before them.

Second, while the challenged questions cannot be said to be
“isolated” (as the prosecutor asked a number of times whether
Martinez had told his story to “anyone”), see Curtis, 644 F.2d at
270-71; Agee, 597 F.2d at 359, the questions were plainly not a
focal point of the cross-examination. In context, the questions
were far from flagrant violations of Doyle, but instead came and
went in relative passing. See Davis, 561 F.3d at 166 (looking to
“the severity of the Doyle violation” when conducting the
harmless-error analysis); United States v. Scott, 47 F.3d 904, 907
(7th Cir. 1995) (finding Doyle error harmless where references to
post-arrest silence “were limited in their intensity and frequency”).

The challenged questions here covered only a small fraction
of the furious cross-examination covering multiple subjects and
spanning twenty pages of the trial transcript, and were hardly the
type of frontal assaults on post-arrest, post-Miranda warning
silence that our Court and other courts have held not to be
harmless. Additionally, the prosecutor not once referred to
Martinez’s post-arrest silence or the prior questions about it during
summation. Instead, he attacked the veracity of the defendant’s
account only on the basis that it lacked consistency with his and
Harvey’s relationship and their conduct before the incident. This
fact, in our view, is critical. Compare Scott, 47 F.3d at 907
(finding single improper reference during summation to be
harmless), and Agee, 597 F.2d at 359 (noting that counsel did not
refer during summation to an arguably improper reference to post-
arrest silence), with Davis, 561 F.3d at 162, 167 (finding no
harmless error where prosecutor repeatedly emphasized the
defendant’s post-arrest silence during summation), and United
States v. Cummiskey, 728 F.2d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding

27
Doyle error not harmless, in part because “[t]he prosecutor
emphasized Cummiskey’s silence . . . both during the trial and
extensively during closing argument.” (emphasis added)).15

* * * *

The challenged colloquy here was ambiguous and
disjointed, and was riddled with interruptions and half-answers.
The prosecutor did not highlight Martinez’s silence, and after a
passing moment he moved on, never referencing the point again.
Under all of the circumstances here, we conclude that any error
played no role in the jury’s verdict. It was therefore harmless.

V.

Martinez asserts two final claims on appeal: (1) that the trial court
committed reversible error by admitting implicit and prejudicial
hearsay during Harvey’s testimony; and (2) that the trial court’s
jury instructions with respect to the kidnapping charge were
impermissibly incomplete. A thorough review of the record
convinces us that these claims are entirely without merit, and we
reject them without further discussion.

15
We recognize, of course, that in this case the trial court
did not give an immediate curative instruction, for it did not
recognize the potential problem that the questions posed. See
Davis, 561 F.3d at 167 (explaining that “the absence of a curative
instruction by the Territorial Court likely left the jury with the false
impression that the prosecutor’s references to Davis’s silence . . .
were appropriate”). We reiterate the manifest importance of
immediate curative instructions whenever a defendant’s post-
Miranda warning silence is mentioned before the jury. We also
emphasize that many Doyle violations will not be harmless
precisely because the court did not provide an instruction. It is not
the case, however, that a court’s failure to give a curative
instruction precludes in all cases satisfaction of the Chapman
harmless-error standard. It is the vague and ultimately
inconsequential nature of the violation that compels the result in
this case.

28
 VI.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the
Appellate Division.

29