[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPT 17, 2010
No. 09-14418 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 08-00165-CV-1-MMP-WCS
TASES MILLS, SR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner Of The Social
Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(September 17, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, CARNES and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Tases Mills, Sr., appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of his application for supplemental security income, 42
U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). First, Mills contends that the Administrative Law Judge erred
in the second step of its analysis by finding that he did not suffer from a severe
mental impairment as a result of chronic pain and depression. Second, Mills
contends that during a second hearing following remand from the Appeals Council,
the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to elicit expert medical testimony
regarding the full extent of his impairments.
I.
When the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review, we
review the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final decision. Doughty v.
Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). We review the Commissioner’s
decision regarding disability “to determine whether it is supported by substantial
evidence.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). Substantial
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. We will not reweigh the evidence, decide
the facts anew, or make credibility determinations. Id.
We conclude that the ALJ’s finding that Mills did not suffer from a severe
mental impairment stemming from chronic pain and depression was supported by
substantial evidence. Despite Mills’s complaints of pain and possible depression,
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records of his treating, consultative, and reviewing physicians showed that he had
normal orientation, and only mild difficulty maintaining concentration, persistence,
or pace, and was malingering regarding the magnitude of his symptoms.
Moreover, Mills denied feeling anxious, ever attempting suicide, or having suicidal
thoughts, and he did not list his mental health as a reason why he had stopped
working. His own testimony established that he was never treated for mental health
issues, and he lived a functional existence that included talking with friends on the
telephone, singing in a church chorus, fishing, some cooking, and grocery
shopping with his wife. Furthermore, the ALJ’s decision to disregard Dr. Legum’s
statement that Mills had marked mental limitations in his ability to perform work-
related activities was supported by good cause since Dr. Legum’s opinion was
inconsistent with his own medical records and there was evidence to support a
contrary finding. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240–41 (11th Cir. 2004).
The ALJ also had good cause to discount Mills’s claim of total disability in light of
his own inconsistent testimony regarding his daily activities. See id.
II.
“[T]he ALJ has a basic obligation to develop a full and fair record.” Ellison
v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003); see also 20 C.F.R.
§§ 416.912(d), 416.927(f)(2). We review de novo an ALJ’s application of legal
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principles, Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211, and we must reverse if the ALJ has failed to
provide “sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has
been conducted.” Keeton v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066
(11th Cir. 1994).
In this case, the ALJ did not err by failing to elicit expert medical testimony
at the second hearing regarding the nature and extent of Mills’s back impairment.
The Appeals Council merely ordered the ALJ to “[o]btain evidence from a medical
expert to clarify the nature and severity of the claimant’s back impairment,” citing
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(f) and 416.927(f). According to both of those sections, the
ALJ “may . . . ask for and consider opinions from medical experts on the nature
and severity of [the] impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(f)(2)(iii) and
416.927(f)(2)(iii). Thus, the ALJ was not required to obtain evidence in the form
of expert medical testimony so long as it “consider[ed]” additional evidence in
some form. It is undisputed that Mills submitted and the ALJ considered
additional documentary evidence from treating physicians about his back
condition, and the record reflects that evidence was sufficient to develop a full and
fair record.
AFFIRMED.
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