FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 21, 2010
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 09-2304
WILMER LEYVA-MATOS,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. 2:08-CR-2410-MV-2)
Paul J. Rubino, Las Cruces, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant.
John M. Pellettieri (Kenneth J. Gonzales, United States Attorney, and Stephen H.
Wong, Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico; and Lanny
A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, and Greg D. Andres, Acting Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Washington, D.C., with him on the brief), United
States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Wilmer Leyva-Matos pleaded guilty to possessing marijuana with
intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and conspiring to possess
marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. In his plea
agreement, Defendant waived his right to appeal. The district court rejected certain
stipulations in Defendant’s plea agreement and sentenced him to twenty-six months
imprisonment, followed by two years of supervised release. Defendant appeals,
alleging the district court improperly considered certain information he provided the
Government with the understanding that it would not be used against him. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). See United States v.
Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1322, 1324 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (holding that we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over sentencing appeals “even when the
defendant has waived his right to appeal in an enforceable plea agreement”).
Because we conclude Defendant’s appellate waiver is valid and enforceable, we
dismiss this appeal without addressing the merits.
I.
In 2008, Border Patrol agents stopped Defendant and co-defendant Viktor
Elizalde at a checkpoint on Interstate 10 west of Las Cruces, New Mexico. During
a consensual search of the vehicle, Border Patrol agents discovered an unloaded
handgun in the vehicle’s center console and 26.2 kilograms of marijuana hidden
behind the car’s trim panels. They also discovered ammunition for the handgun in
Elizalde’s bag. Elizalde waived his Miranda rights and admitted the gun was his.
Further investigation revealed the car belonged to Defendant’s parents.
After a New Mexico grand jury returned an indictment against Defendant for
one count of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.
2
§ 841(a)(1) and one count of conspiring to possess marijuana with intent to distribute
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, Defendant entered into an agreement to plead guilty
to both charges. He also agreed to provide information about the crimes with which
he and Elizalde were charged in exchange for the Government’s promise that it
would not use any of the information he provided against him. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.8
(providing that “[w]here a defendant agrees to cooperate with the government by
providing information concerning unlawful activities of others, and as part of that
cooperation agreement the government agrees that self-incriminating information
provided pursuant to the agreement will not be used against the defendant, then such
information shall not be used in determining the applicable guideline range, except
to the extent provided in the agreement”). In the plea agreement, the Government
agreed to certain stipulations that, if accepted by the district court, would reduce the
range of Defendant’s sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines. The Government
also stated, however, that it did not agree to recommend a specific sentence nor to
support, oppose, or not oppose any sentence proposed by the Defendant. See Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11(c). Additionally, Defendant waived his appeal rights and agreed that
the district court could accept or reject the stipulations in its discretion. The plea
agreement provides:
The United States and the defendant understand that the above
stipulations are not binding on the Court and that whether the Court
accepts these stipulations is a matter solely within the discretion of the
Court after it has reviewed the presentence report. The defendant
understands and agrees that if the Court does not accept any one or
3
more of the above stipulations, the defendant hereby waives the right
to appeal the Court’s rejection of such stipulations.
R. Vol. 1 at 11 (emphasis added). A section titled “Waiver of Appellate Rights” also
provides:
The defendant is aware that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742
afford a defendant the right to appeal a conviction and the sentence
imposed. Acknowledging that, the defendant knowingly waives the right
to appeal this conviction and/or any sentence within the statutory
maximum authorized by law. In addition, the defendant agrees to waive
any collateral attack to this conviction and/or sentence pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255, except on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Id. at 11–12 (emphasis added).
At the sentencing hearing, the district court accepted certain stipulations in the
plea agreement but rejected others. The court’s calculations resulted in an offense
level of 16. With Defendant’s criminal history category of I, the Guidelines range
calculated by the district court was twenty-one to twenty-seven months
imprisonment. The court then considered the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
focusing on the disparity between the mandatory five years imprisonment Elizalde
faced for his gun possession conviction and Defendant’s Guidelines range, and
imposed a sentence of twenty six months, followed by two years of supervised
release. 1 On appeal, Defendant contends the district court improperly used
1
Neither party disputes the validity of the plea agreement, but the district
court does not appear to have explicitly accepted or rejected it. The magistrate judge
who conducted the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 plea colloquy accepted Defendant’s guilty
plea but said he would “defer acceptance of the plea agreement to the district court.”
At Defendant’s sentencing hearing, the district court never explicitly accepted or
(continued...)
4
information Defendant provided to aid in the Government’s prosecution of Elizalde
to calculate his sentence.
II.
We review de novo the question whether a defendant’s waiver of his appellate
rights in a plea agreement is enforceable. United States v. Ibarra-Coronel, 517 F.3d
1218, 1221 (10th Cir. 2008). The Government may raise this issue in its principal
brief, as it did in this appeal. Id. at 1221 n.3. In determining whether Defendant’s
appellate waiver is enforceable, we consider the three prongs outlined in Hahn: (1)
whether this appeal falls within the scope of Defendant’s waiver of his appellate
rights; (2) whether Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights;
and (3) “whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.”
Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325.
Defendant failed to file a reply brief and provided little analysis on the waiver
question at oral argument. When asked to explain why the appellate waiver should
not be enforced, Defendant’s counsel responded “that line of cases, Hahn, Porter, and
1
(...continued)
rejected the plea agreement but appears to have worked within its terms, discussing
which of the stipulations it would accept. In United States v. Smith, 500 F.3d 1206
(10th Cir. 2007), we concluded that when the district court operated within the terms
of the plea agreement by questioning the defendant about its terms during the Rule
11 colloquy and dismissing other counts, its actions amounted to constructive
acceptance of the plea agreement. Id. at 1213 n.3. Likewise, we conclude the
district court in the instant case constructively accepted the plea agreement by
working within its terms and accepting certain stipulations while rejecting others.
5
Shockey, allows for an exception to [the enforcement of appellate waivers], and I
respectfully submit we come underneath that exception.” When asked to elaborate
which exception applied here, counsel replied, “Miscarriage of justice is the one that
jumps out.” When asked, “How is there a miscarriage of justice?” counsel merely
responded, “Plain error,” then alleged that the district court committed plain error
when it “used information that was protected by the Kastigar debrief.” 2 We therefore
consider only the miscarriage of justice prong of the Hahn analysis.
Enforcement of an appellate waiver results in a miscarriage of justice only if
(1) “the district court relied on an impermissible factor such as race,” (2) counsel
provided ineffective assistance in connection with the negotiation of the waiver, (3)
“the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum,” or (4) the waiver itself is otherwise
unlawful. Id. at 1327 (internal quotations omitted). The district court does not
appear to have relied on an impermissible factor such as race in sentencing
Defendant. Nor does Defendant allege counsel provided ineffective assistance. At
his Rule 11 hearing, Defendant acknowledged that the maximum statutory penalties
for his offense are up to five years in prison, a fine of $250,000, two years of
supervised release, and a $100 special penalty assessment. Defendant’s sentence of
2
Both parties refer to Defendant’s meetings with the Government as “Kastigar
briefings.” See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The agreement to
keep confidential the information Defendant shared at these meetings seems to be
properly made under § 1B1.8. We are unsure why the parties describe these
briefings or debriefings as “Kastigar” debriefings.
6
twenty six months and two years of supervised release per offense, to run
concurrently, does not exceed the statutory maximum. It appears Defendant’s
argument, then, is that enforcing the appellate waiver would result in a miscarriage
of justice because the waiver is “otherwise unlawful.”
An appellate waiver is “otherwise unlawful” only if it seriously affects “the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at
1327. “This exception looks to whether the waiver is otherwise unlawful, not to
whether another aspect of the proceeding may have involved legal error.” United
States v. Smith, 500 F.3d 1206, 1213 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). “An appeal waiver is not ‘unlawful’ merely because the
claimed error would, in the absence of waiver, be appealable. To so hold would
make a waiver an empty gesture.” United States v. Sandoval, 477 F.3d 1204, 1208
(10th Cir. 2007).
When faced with appellate waivers like the one in this case, we have
consistently applied this principle and enforced such waivers accordingly. In United
States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2005), the defendant pleaded guilty but
appealed his sentence, contending, among other things, that United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005), entitled him to resentencing because the district court treated
the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory. His plea agreement included a waiver of
his appellate rights, however, and we explained the relevant inquiry was not whether
the defendant’s “sentence is unlawful in light of Booker’s remedial holding, but
7
whether subsequent changes in the law render his appeal waiver itself
unenforceable.” 405 F.3d at 1144. We dismissed the appeal, concluding Booker did
not compel us to hold that the defendant’s waiver was unlawful and that enforcing
the waiver did not “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of . . . judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1145. Again, in United States v. Shockey, 538
F.3d 1355 (10th Cir. 2008), the defendant’s plea agreement included an appellate
waiver. The defendant nonetheless appealed, alleging his sentence was ambiguous
and inherently contradictory and arguing that enforcing his appellate waiver in such
a situation would result in a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 1356. We noted that our
precedent foreclosed such an argument; despite the “inscrutable” nature of the
defendant’s sentence, “enforcement of his plea agreement’s appellate waiver would
not render the waiver itself unlawful.” Id. at 1357. Thus, we dismissed the
defendant’s appeal. Id. at 1358.
Likewise, nothing in this case indicates that the waiver itself is unlawful.
Defendant bears the burden to demonstrate that enforcing the waiver would result in
a miscarriage of justice, and he has not done so. 3 United States v. White, 584 F.3d
3
In criticizing the majority opinion, the dissent makes much of the
Government’s promise not to use the information Defendant provided against him.
The dissent argues the Government breached its promise by giving this information
to the district court. The dissent further argues this action “taint[ed] the district
judge,” and that we should, therefore, remand for resentencing before a different
judge. Dissent at 5.
The Government submitted a § 5K1.1 motion in this case, requesting a
(continued...)
8
935, 948 (10th Cir. 2009). We reject counsel’s invitation to consider whether the
merits of Defendant’s appeal reveal plain error. Because we conclude Defendant’s
waiver of his right to appeal his sentence is enforceable, we dismiss Defendant’s
appeal.
3
(...continued)
downward departure for Defendant’s substantial assistance. When the district court
requested the information Defendant provided, the Government appropriately
submitted it in accordance with § 1B1.8(b)(5). This provision specifically states:
The provisions [restricting the Government’s use of the protected
information in determining the applicable guideline range] shall not be
applied to restrict the use of information: . . . in determining whether,
or to what extent, a downward departure from the guidelines is
warranted pursuant to a government motion under § 5K1.1 (Substantial
Assistance to Authorities).
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.8(b)(5). The Government did not attempt to use this information
against Defendant. Consequently, the Government did not breach any agreement it
made with Defendant.
Additionally, Defendant did not raise the argument the dissent crafts. Rather,
Defendant explained in his brief at page nine: “Application note 1 [to § 1B1.8]
clarifies that ‘This provision does not authorize the government to withhold
information from the court but provides that self-incriminating information obtained
under a cooperating agreement is not to be used to determine the defendant’s
guideline range.’” Defendant then argued: “This provision requires a sentencing
court to honor the government’s promise that self-incriminating information
volunteered by the defendant under a cooperation agreement would not subject a
defendant to a harsher sentence.” At oral argument, when asked why he did not
object to the Government’s providing this information to the district court, defense
counsel responded: “Well, your honor, as I understand the law, the judge can ask for
that information, and the Government can’t say ‘I’m not going to give it to you.’”
Thus, Defendant himself acknowledges the Government did not breach any promise
merely by providing protected information to the district court. Nor was the district
court irremediably tainted by considering Defendant’s protected information because
it is permitted to consider such information when evaluating a § 5K1.1 motion.
9
APPEAL DISMISSED.
10
09-2304 - United States v. Leyva-Matos
HARTZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The government breached its promise to Mr. Leyva-
Matos when it disclosed to the district court what he had said in his post-plea
debriefings. The district court then used what he said to increase his offense level
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and sentenced him accordingly. I
would hold that the government’s breach frees Mr. Leyva-Matos from his promise
not to appeal his sentence. I would then hold that the use by the district court of
Mr. Leyva-Matos’s debriefings requires that we set aside his sentence and remand
for resentencing by another judge.
Mr. Leyva-Matos executed his plea agreement on February 10, 2009, and
was debriefed on February 27 and June 22. The agreement contemplated that he
would provide information to the government. It states:
If the defendant meets all of the criteria set forth at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, including providing a complete and
truthful statement to the Government concerning all information and
evidence the defendant has about the offense or offenses that were
part of the same course of conduct underlying this agreement, the
defendant is entitled to a reduction of two (2) levels, pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(11).
R., Vol. 1 at 11.
The written agreement does not include a provision that Mr. Leyva-Matos’s
statements could not be used against him. But there is no question that the
government so promised. The government’s answer brief in this court says: “In
accordance with Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the government
agreed not to use the information Leyva-Matos provided at the debriefings in any
criminal case against him.” Aplee. Br. at 6. (Kastigar held that the government
can compel testimony from an unwilling witness if the witness is conferred
immunity from use of the compelled testimony in later criminal proceedings.)
The brief refers to a postsentencing letter sent on December 4, 2009, by the
prosecutor to Mr. Leyva-Matos’s attorney. That letter ends: “[W]e unequivocally
affirm that when we met with Mr. Leyva-Matos we did not intend for the
information from his debriefings to be used against him at sentencing, absent an
extenuating circumstance not present in this case.” Unopposed Motion to
Supplement the Record on Appeal, Ex. B, United States v. Leyva-Matos,
No. 09-2304 (10th Cir. filed May 15, 2010). The letter was in response to a
request from Mr. Leyva-Matos’s attorney for a copy of the Kastigar agreement.
The letter explained that “although we did have an understanding regarding the
use of information provided by your client during the debriefs, we never reduced
an agreement to writing.” Id.
Because of the government’s promise, the district court should not have
been informed of what Mr. Leyva-Matos said in his debriefings. In United States
v. Shorteeth, 887 F.2d 253, 257 (10th Cir. 1989), this court interpreted USSG
§ 1B1.8 to “require the [plea] agreement to specifically mention the court’s
ability to consider defendant’s disclosures during debriefing in calculating the
appropriate sentencing range before the court may do so.”
-2-
Nevertheless, the debriefing statements were disclosed to the district court.
Before the sentencing hearing the court conducted a telephone status conference
with the prosecutor and defense counsel. During the conference the court
requested investigator notes and reports of Mr. Leyva-Matos’s debriefings. The
court may well have assumed that it was entitled to review the debriefings
because § 1B1.8(b)(5) states that debriefing information can be used “in
determining whether, or to what extent, a downward departure from the guidelines
is warranted pursuant to a government motion under § 5K1.1 (Substantial
Assistance to Authorities).” Paragraph (b)(5) was added to the guidelines in
1992, after Shorteeth. In any event, neither counsel objected, and the materials
were provided to the court.
At Mr. Leyva-Matos’s sentencing hearing on November 9, 2009, however,
the district court relied on his debriefing statements for purposes other than to
determine whether a § 5K1.1 departure was warranted. It found, contrary to the
stipulations in the plea agreement, that several enhancements should be applied to
Mr. Leyva-Matos’s offense level under the guidelines. For example, the court
said:
First, with respect to the enhancement for possession of the weapon,
Mr. Leyva-Matos admitted . . . . These admissions are sufficient to
support a two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous
weapon during a drug trafficking offense pursuant to Section
2D1.1(b)(1).
-3-
R., Vol. 4 at 32–33. 1
Mr. Leyva-Matos’s attorney did not object at the hearing to the district
court’s use of his debriefing statements. On November 18, however, his attorney
filed an “Unopposed Motion to Reconsider” on the ground that the court had
“improperly used information provided by the Defendant pursuant to his plea
agreement and pursuant to his Kastigar debriefing to determine the applicable
guideline range, to deny the stipulations in the plea agreement and to deny the
government’s downward departure motion.” (footnote omitted). United States v.
Leyva-Matos, No. CR-08-2410-MV, Doc. 109 at 1 (D.N.M. November 18, 2009).
(Contrary to this statement in the motion, the district court granted the
government’s downward-departure motion under § 5K1.1.) The government did
not object to the motion on the ground of untimeliness or file a response. On
November 30 the district court entered a judgment on Mr. Leyva-Matos’s
sentence. Two months later the court entered an order denying the motion.
Addressing the merits of Mr. Leyva-Matos’s motion, the court ruled that even if
the debriefing statements were privileged, “the Court finds ample support for
Mr. Leyva-Matos’s sentence without consideration of the information he provided
in his debriefing sessions with the government.” Id., Doc. 123 at 6 (January 27,
2010).
1
I have deleted the specific admissions so that a new judge conducting the
sentencing would not be tainted by the information.
-4-
Putting aside for a moment the procedural issues on appeal, this seems to
me to be a clear case for reversal: The government breached its promise to
Mr. Leyva-Matos that his debriefing statements could not be used against him.
Those statements were provided to the district court and used by the district court
to enhance his offense level at the time of sentencing. This court’s practice has
been that when the prosecution taints the district judge by making a presentation
in violation of its agreement with the defendant, we must reverse the sentence and
remand for resentencing by another judge, even though there has been no
misconduct by the sentencing judge herself, and even if the sentence imposed
would have been a perfectly justified and reasonable one in the absence of the
taint. See United States v. Cachucha, 484 F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th Cir. 2007); see
also United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049, 1055–56 (11th Cir. 1989) (breach of
promise not to use debriefing statements). Because sentencing is an exercise of
judicial discretion, it is impossible to know if the taint affected the judge’s
decision making.
I now turn to the procedural issues which could bar relief for Mr. Leyva-
Matos. First, in his plea agreement he waived his right to appeal his sentence.
But his promise not to appeal is not binding if the government first broke its
promise to him. As we have said, “‘[A]n appellate waiver is not enforceable if
the Government breaches its obligations under the plea agreement.’” United
States v. Trujillo, 537 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2008), quoting United States v.
-5-
Rodriguez-Rivera, 518 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 2008). I am not aware of any
case in which we have held that an appeal waiver bars the defendant from raising
on appeal the contention that the government breached its obligations under a plea
agreement. Not only should this result follow from considerations of contract
law, but to rule otherwise would be a manifest miscarriage of justice. To be sure,
Mr. Leyva-Matos’s attorney has done a poor job of raising this point on appeal, as
the majority opinion clearly describes. But the burden is on the government, as
the movant, to establish that the appeal should be dismissed. In my view, it has
not satisfied its burden.
Even if this appeal is allowed, however, there is a second potential
procedural barrier. Mr. Leyva-Matos did not raise a timely objection to the
disclosure of his debriefing statements to the judge. He did, however, raise an
objection several days after sentencing; and the district court rejected the
objection on the merits, not on the ground that it was untimely. Ordinarily, we do
not hold on appeal that an objection was untimely if the opposing party did not
object on the ground of timeliness and the district court did not dispose of the
tardy objection on that ground. See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19
(2005) (per curiam) (“where the Government failed to raise a defense of
untimeliness until after the District Court had reached the merits, it forfeited that
defense”); Hicks v. Franklin, 546 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2008) (the state forfeited
its right to object to untimely objection to magistrate judge’s report). I do not
-6-
wish to minimize the importance of making timely objections. Mr. Leyva-
Matos’s attorney should have objected when the district court requested the
debriefing statements, although he may have assumed that USSG § 1B1.8(b)(5)
overrode the government’s promise, at least so long as the district court used the
statements only in considering the motion under USSG § 5K1.1. 2 (He also should
have objected at sentencing; but by that time the judge had been tainted, so
resentencing by another judge would have been required regardless.) On the
other hand, the failure to object is perhaps less culpable than usual because the
court’s request was on the telephone, the prosecutor should also have objected,
and any objection by defense counsel (as opposed to the prosecutor) would have
implicitly informed the court that the debriefing statements could be harmful to
Mr. Leyva-Matos at sentencing. In any event, I think that this is an appropriate
case to address the merits of Mr. Leyva-Matos’s claim, rather than awaiting a
possible habeas claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
I am disappointed that my colleagues on this panel disagree with my views.
But I am much more disappointed in the government. It appears to acknowledge
2
It seems to me that if a district court wishes to review debriefing materials in
considering a § 5K1.1 motion, it should not review them until it has made its
findings on all other factual matters disputed at sentencing. Only then can one be
confident that the materials did not affect those findings. Otherwise the
government’s promise that the defendant’s debriefing statements will not be used
against him at sentencing will be a promise of questionable value, and—perhaps
more importantly—defense counsel will be reluctant to advise clients to agree to
such debriefings.
-7-
that it breached its promises to Mr. Leyva-Matos. I would have hoped that rather
than challenging his appeal, it would have confessed error. Such a confession
would not have injured its relationship with the judge below, because the error
was solely the government’s.
-8-