UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4463
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KENNETH WRIGHT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:09-cr-00452-PMD-1)
Submitted: September 28, 2010 Decided: October 7, 2010
Before WILKINSON, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Gordon Baker, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles,
United States Attorney, Rhett DeHart Assistant United States
Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM
Kenneth Wright pleaded guilty to one count of theft of
United States mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (2006). At
sentencing, the district court granted the Government’s motion
for an upward departure from Wright’s sentencing range of
twenty-four to thirty months to the statutory maximum sentence
of sixty months, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 4A1.3(a)(4)(B), p.s. (2009).
On appeal, Wright argues that the district court
erroneously relied upon its exaggerated view of Wright’s threat
to society to support the extent of its upward departure. Thus,
Wright’s sole appellate contention is that his sentence is
substantively unreasonable. We have thoroughly reviewed the
record and conclude the district court amply justified the
upward departure and imposed a substantively reasonable
sentence.
This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness,
applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v.
Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010). Ordinarily, this
review requires appellate consideration of both the procedural
and substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at
51. However, because Wright does not challenge the procedural
reasonableness of his sentence, we only address whether Wright’s
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sentence is substantively reasonable. When reviewing the
substantive reasonableness of a sentence, this court “tak[es]
into account the ‘totality of the circumstances, including the
extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.’” United
States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
When the district court exercises its discretion and
departs from the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, it must
explain its reasons for doing so. United States v. Evans, 526
F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008). Although the district court must
“ensure that its justification supports ‘the degree of the
variance,’” it need not make “a finding of ‘extraordinary’
circumstances” in order to support its sentencing determination.
Id. (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 47). Whether the district court
departs from the advisory Guidelines “because of a Guidelines-
sanctioned departure, or because of one or more [18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006)] factors, or because of some other reason —
that is, no matter what provides the basis for a deviation from
the Guidelines range — we review the resulting sentence only for
reasonableness.” Id. at 164 (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 46, Rita,
551 U.S. at 350).
Wright’s sentence is substantively reasonable in light
of the § 3553(a) factors and the totality of the circumstances.
At sentencing, the district court relied primarily on Wright’s
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more-than-twenty-year history as a “flimflam man” and thief, and
observed that Wright’s numerous convictions and jail sentences
had “not made a dent” on Wright. Instead, Wright consistently
violated probation, failed to pay restitution, and committed
more crimes. Based on these facts, the district court found
Wright lacked any appreciable respect for the law, that his
prior terms of incarceration had failed to deter him from
further criminal conduct, and that there was an obvious need to
protect the public from Wright. The district court also noted
that an increased sentence would provide Wright with an
opportunity for vocational training and an incentive to remain
employed following his release from incarceration.
For these reasons, we hold that the district court
amply evaluated the relevant § 3553(a) factors and relied on
those factors to conclude that an upward departure was
justified. See United States v. McNeill, 598 F.3d 161, 167 (4th
Cir. 2010) (affirming the district court’s upward departure
based on, among other factors, McNeill’s extensive criminal
history, lack of work experience, and the need to deter McNeill
from future crimes). Further, the sentence is substantively
reasonable when viewed in the totality of the circumstances.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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