UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4385
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ARTHUR CLARENCE WRIGHT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:09-cr-00150-WO-1)
Submitted: October 20, 2010 Decided: October 29, 2010
Before KING and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, William S.
Trivette, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. John W. Stone, Jr., Acting United
States Attorney, Terry M. Meinecke, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM
Arthur Wright pled guilty to one count of possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e) (2006). The district court sentenced
him to 195 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Wright challenges
his sentence, maintaining that it is unreasonable because it is
longer than necessary to accomplish the purposes of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006). For the reasons stated below, we disagree and
affirm his sentence.
This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness,
using a deferential “abuse of discretion” standard. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v. Evans,
526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008). This review requires
appellate consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of a sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
In determining whether a sentence is procedurally
reasonable, we must first assess whether the district court
properly calculated the defendant’s advisory guideline range. ∗
Id. at 50. We must then assess whether the district court
failed to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and any
arguments presented by the parties, selected a sentence based on
∗
Wright does not challenge on appeal the computation of the
advisory guidelines range.
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“clearly erroneous facts,” or failed to sufficiently explain the
sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50-51.
At sentencing, the district court adopted the
presentence report (“PSR”), which proposed an advisory
guidelines sentencing range of 180 to 210 months’ imprisonment,
without objection. After considering the parties’ arguments and
with reference to the § 3553(a) factors, the district court
imposed a 195-month sentence.
The district court explained that its sentence was
largely predicated on Wright’s long criminal history. As
documented in his PSR, Wright repeatedly engaged in criminal
activity almost immediately upon being released from custody,
despite having served numerous terms of imprisonment, including
a lengthy state sentence for arson. The district court
commented on Wright’s manifest disrespect for the law: “it’s
hard . . . to conceive how at this point, given the history that
you showed, if you were not in prison how you would survive
without involving yourself in additional criminal conduct.” The
district court also found that Wright had a long-term substance
abuse problem and determined that he could benefit from
receiving substance abuse counseling while incarcerated. Hence,
we conclude that the court’s analysis and its concomitant
explanation for Wright’s sentence were sufficient, and this
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sentence is procedurally reasonable. See United States v. Lynn,
592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010).
Having established the procedural reasonableness of
Wright’s sentence, we must turn to the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. In doing so, we “tak[e] into
account the ‘totality of the circumstances, including the extent
of any variance from the Guidelines range.’” United States v.
Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gall, 552
U.S. at 51). Finally, this court affords a presumption of
reasonableness to a sentence that, like this one, is imposed
within the properly calculated Guidelines range. See United
States v. Wright, 594 F.3d 259, 267 (4th Cir. 2010); see also
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) (upholding
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness for a within-Guidelines
sentence).
Wright contends that his age and his attempt to become
a productive member of society by recently starting a
landscaping business rebut the presumption of reasonableness in
this case. Although Wright would have preferred that the
district court gave greater weight to his personal
characteristics, such as his age and the initiative he showed in
starting a landscaping business, its refusal to do so does not
constitute an abuse of discretion.
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A defendant’s criminal history and pattern of
recidivism are relevant to the assessment of several of the
statutory sentencing factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(A)-(C). And, it is the district court, not this court,
that is entrusted with the responsibility to balance these
factors and fashion a reasonable sentence. See United States v.
McNeill, 598 F.3d 161, 167 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n appellate
court should give due deference to the District Court’s reasoned
and reasonable decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on the
whole, justify the sentence.”) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted). When viewed in the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that Wright’s 195-month sentence is
substantively reasonable.
Because we determine that the sentence in this case
was both procedurally and substantively reasonable, we affirm
the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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