UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4105
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CRAIG F. BRYANT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (6:09-cr-00578-HMH-4)
Submitted: October 4, 2010 Decided: October 15, 2010
Before AGEE and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ray Coit Yarborough, Jr., LAW OFFICE OF RAY COIT YARBOROUGH,
JR., Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Kevin F. McDonald,
Acting United States Attorney, William J. Watkins, Jr.,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Craig F. Bryant appeals his fifty-seven month total
sentence imposed following his guilty plea to conspiracy to
utter counterfeit checks, possession and intent to use false
identification documents or identification documents of another,
and possession without authority of the means of identification
of another person. On appeal, he contends that the district
court failed to adequately explain the basis for his sentence
and therefore that his sentence is unreasonable. * For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
“Regardless of whether the sentence imposed is inside
or outside the [g]uidelines range, the appellate court must
review the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Appellate courts
are charged with reviewing sentences for reasonableness,
considering both the procedural and substantive reasonableness
of a sentence. Id.
In determining procedural reasonableness, we first
assess whether the district court properly calculated the
defendant’s advisory guidelines range. Id. We then determine
*
Bryant also challenged the enforceability of his waiver of
his right to appeal. Because the Government concedes that the
appeal waiver is not enforceable under United States v. Manigan,
592 F.3d 621 (4th Cir. 2010), we will not enforce the waiver.
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whether the district court failed to consider the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006) factors and any arguments presented by the
parties, treated the guidelines as mandatory, selected a
sentence based on “clearly erroneous facts,” or failed to
sufficiently explain the selected sentence. Id.; United
States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007). “The
district court ‘must make an individualized assessment[,]’
apply[ing] the relevant § 3553(a) factors to the specific
circumstances of the case before it.” United States v. Carter,
564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. at 50 (2007)).
Additionally, a district judge must express in open
court the reasons behind his chosen sentence, “‘set[ting] forth
enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the
parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his
own legal decisionmaking authority.’” Id. (quoting Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). Finally, we review
the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “taking into
account the ‘totality of the circumstances, including the extent
of any variance from the [g]uidelines range.’” Pauley, 511 F.3d
at 473 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
Here, it is clear that Bryant’s sentence is
procedurally reasonable. The district court properly calculated
his guidelines range at 27 to 33 months on the first two
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offenses and a mandatory consecutive 24 months on the third
offense. The court also addressed the § 3553(a) factors,
expressly questioning Bryant about his employment history. The
court then found that a within-guideline sentence was
appropriate and sentenced Bryant to 57 months’ total
imprisonment on the three offenses. We hold that this sentence
is procedurally reasonable. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 359 (holding
that district court’s determination that sentence was
“appropriate” was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an
individualized sentence). As the Rita Court explained, “We
acknowledge that the judge might have said more. . . . Where a
matter is as conceptually simple as in the case at hand and the
record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the
evidence and arguments, we do not believe the law requires the
judge to write more extensively.” Id.
Bryant’s sentence was within the guidelines range, and
therefore presumptively reasonable. United States v. Abu Ali,
528 F.3d 210, 261 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312
(2009). Accordingly, we affirm Bryant’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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