UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4880
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES BRYANT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:12-cr-00164-RBH-1)
Submitted: May 7, 2013 Decided: May 23, 2013
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James P. Rogers, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Arthur Bradley Parham, Assistant
United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James Bryant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to forcibly assaulting a federal correctional officer,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2006). The district
court sentenced Bryant to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment. On
appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning the district
court’s compliance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11
and the reasonableness of the sentence. Bryant was informed of
his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not
done so. The Government declined to file a responsive brief.
Following a careful review of the record, we affirm.
Because Bryant did not move in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, we review the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
proceedings for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277
F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). To prevail under this standard,
Bryant must establish that an error occurred, was plain, and
affected his substantial rights. United States v. Massenburg,
564 F.3d 337, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2009). Our review of the record
establishes that the district court fully complied with the
requirements of Rule 11 and ensured that Bryant’s plea was
knowing and voluntary.
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We review Bryant’s sentence under a deferential abuse-
of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). This review requires consideration of both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id.;
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010). After
determining whether the district court correctly calculated the
advisory Guidelines range, we must decide whether the court
considered the § 3553(a) factors, analyzed the arguments
presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the
selected sentence. Lynn, 592 F.3d at 575-76; United States v.
Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009).
Once we have determined that the sentence is free of
procedural error, we consider the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the
circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; Lynn, 592 F.3d at 575.
If the sentence is within the appropriate Guidelines range, we
presume that the sentence is reasonable. United States v.
Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2010). Such a
presumption is rebutted only if the defendant demonstrates “that
the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379
(4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that the district court committed neither
procedural nor substantive error in sentencing. The court fully
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evaluated and resolved Bryant’s objection to the presentence
report. Upon resolution of the objection, the court accurately
calculated and considered as advisory Bryant’s Guidelines range.
The court then heard argument from counsel for a downward
variance, and Bryant allocuted. The district court considered
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors and explained that the
within-Guidelines sentence was warranted in light of the
seriousness of the offense. Counsel does not offer any grounds
to rebut the presumption on appeal that Bryant’s within-
Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable, and our review
reveals none. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Bryant.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Bryant’s conviction and sentence.
This court requires that counsel inform Bryant, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Bryant requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Bryant.
AFFIRMED
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