UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5095
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KELVIN DEMETRIUS WALKER, a/k/a Tweet, a/k/a Tweety, a/k/a
Derek Fenty,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:92-cr-00053-F-9)
Submitted: September 30, 2010 Decided: November 2, 2010
Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne
M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kelvin Demetrius Walker appeals the twenty-four-month
sentence imposed upon revocation of his term of supervised
release. Walker argues on appeal that his sentence is
procedurally unreasonable because the district court improperly
considered factors not permitted by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2006).
We affirm.
We will not disturb a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release that is within the prescribed
statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. United States
v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-39 (4th Cir. 2006). In making this
determination, we first consider whether the sentence is
unreasonable. Id. at 438. “This initial inquiry takes a more
deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the
exercise of discretion than reasonableness review for guidelines
sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The district court’s discretion is not unlimited,
however. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir.
2010). For instance, the district court commits procedural
error by failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence or by
not providing an individualized assessment based on the facts.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Although “[a]
court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
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revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-
conviction sentence, . . . it still must provide a statement of
reasons for the sentence imposed. Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The judge also
must “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he
has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis
for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” United
States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009).
Although a district court “ultimately has broad
discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of
imprisonment up to the statutory maximum,” Crudup, 461 F.3d at
439 (internal quotation marks omitted), the court must consider
the Chapter Seven policy statements in the federal sentencing
guidelines manual, as well as the statutory requirements and
factors applicable to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006). Chapter Seven provides, “at
revocation, the court should sanction primarily the defendant’s
breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree,
the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal
history of the violator.” USSG ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b). Section
3583 approves consideration of a majority of the factors listed
in § 3553(a), omitting only two. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Among
the omitted factors is the need “to reflect the seriousness of
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the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
In this case, the district court offered several
reasons for imposing a twenty-four-month sentence, an upward
departure from the policy statement range of six to ten months.
It considered Walker’s two sentence reductions from his original
sentence, Walker’s criminal history, and the circumstances under
which Walker violated the terms of his supervised release, which
included committing property and drug-related crimes, fleeing
from justice, and resisting arrest. While the court said that
the upward departure reflected the seriousness of Walker’s
revocation conduct, the grounds cited by the district court were
relevant to other required considerations, including the nature
and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C). Reviewing the court’s explanation in its
entirety, we find the court’s consideration of the stated
factors did not render Walker’s sentence procedurally
unreasonable.
Accordingly we conclude that Walker’s sentence is not
plainly unreasonable. We therefore affirm the judgment of the
district court. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
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materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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