UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4536
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
LEJUANNE WALKER,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:09-cr-00369-CCB-2)
Submitted: November 9, 2010 Decided: December 3, 2010
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Steven F. Wrobel, ROSENBERG|MARTIN|GREENBERG, LLP, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Cheryl L. Crumpton, Assistant United States Attorney,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lejuanne Walker appeals his 144-month sentence
following a guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (2006). On appeal, Walker argues that the district
court committed procedural error when it classified him as a
career offender and failed to explicitly address his request
that the career offender guidelines be rejected based on their
racially disproportionate impact.
We review the district court’s sentence under a
“deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). In conducting this review, we
must first examine the sentence for “significant procedural
error,” including “failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range . . . or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence.” Id. at 51. In reviewing the
district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines, we
review findings of fact for clear error and questions of law de
novo. United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 334 (4th Cir.
2009).
Section 4B1.1(a) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual (“USSG”) (2009) provides that a defendant is a career
offender if, among other conditions, he “has at least two prior
felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
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substance offense.” USSG § 4B1.1(a)(3). A “controlled
substance offense” is a federal or state offense, punishable by
more than one year in prison, “that prohibits the manufacture,
import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled
substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a
controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to
manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” USSG
§ 4B1.2(b). To determine whether a conviction qualifies as a
prior offense for purposes of the career offender guidelines, a
sentencing court must take a categorical approach, examining
only the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the
prior offense. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 17
(2005); see also United States v. Dean, 605 F.3d 169, 175 (4th
Cir. 2010) (recognizing that the categorical approach has been
extended to the career offender provisions).
Here, the district court did not err in determining
that Walker qualified as a career offender for purposes of the
Guidelines. Walker’s career offender designation was based on a
2002 Maryland conviction, the validity of which Walker
questions, and a 2006 Maryland conviction. Specifically, Walker
suggests that a notation made by the state court on the record
referring to possible probation before judgment lends enough
ambiguity to the 2002 conviction’s felony status that the
district court should have disregarded that conviction. The
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district court’s determination, however, was consistent with the
categorical approach. The court considered the state court
record, the electronic docket, and the definition of the prior
offense to determine that Walker did, in fact, plead guilty to a
qualifying offense. Further, the court concluded that the state
court’s notation only reflected the possibility of probation
before judgment upon a motion for reconsideration; because the
state court took no action to impose probation before judgment,
the district court correctly held that the 2002 conviction was a
felony for career offender purposes.
Walker also argues that his sentence was unreasonable
because the district court failed to consider his argument that
it should disregard the career offender guidelines because of
their racially disproportionate effect. To avoid procedural
error, a sentencing court must “state in open court” the
particular reasons that support its chosen sentence. United
States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). The
court’s explanation need not be exhaustive; it must be
“sufficient ‘to satisfy the appellate court that [the district
court] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.’”
United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)).
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The district court in this case explicitly considered
the seriousness of the offense, Walker’s criminal history and
characteristics, and the nonviolent nature of Walker’s
convictions. It made an individualized assessment and its
explanation sufficiently reflected that assessment. Cf. Rita,
551 U.S. at 356 (“[W]e cannot read the statute (or our
precedent) as insisting upon a full opinion in every case. . . .
Sometimes a judicial opinion responds to every argument;
sometimes it does not. . . . The law leaves much, in this
respect, to the judge’s own professional judgment.”). Moreover,
it appears from the court’s explanation of its chosen sentence
that it did consider Walker’s policy-based argument against
applying the career offender guidelines in deciding to vary
downward from the applicable Guidelines range. Thus, we
conclude that the district court’s explanation was sufficient
and did not constitute procedural error resulting in an
unreasonable sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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