UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4248
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
IBRAHIMA SARR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Mark S. Davis, District
Judge. (2:09-cr-00119-MSD-DEM-1)
Submitted: October 6, 2010 Decided: November 8, 2010
Before KING, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brett D. Lucas, GABRIEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Virginia Beach,
Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States
Attorney, Stephen W. Haynie, Assistant United States Attorney,
Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ibrahima Sarr was convicted after a trial of one count
of false impersonation of United States citizenship, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 911 (2006). On appeal, Sarr claims
(1) the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for a continuance; (2) the court erred in denying his
motion for judgment of acquittal; and (3) the evidence was
insufficient to support the conviction. Finding no error, we
affirm.
This court reviews the district court’s denial of a
motion for a continuance for abuse of discretion. United States
v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 738-39 (4th Cir. 2006). “[E]ven if
such an abuse is found, the defendant must show that the error
specifically prejudiced her case in order to prevail.” Id. at
739 (internal quotation marks omitted). A trial court abuses
its discretion only when its denial of a motion for continuance
is “an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness
in the face of a justifiable request for delay.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). There being no justifiable request
for delay, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion for a continuance.
This court reviews “de novo a district court’s denial
of a motion, made pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, for judgment of acquittal.” United
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States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2006). We find no
error in the court’s decision denying Sarr’s motion for judgment
of acquittal.
A jury’s verdict “must be sustained if there is
substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the
Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 80 (1942). “Substantial evidence is that evidence which a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Cardwell, 433 F.3d 378,
390 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). This
court does not review the credibility of witnesses and assumes
the factfinder resolved all contradictions in the testimony in
favor of the Government. United States v. Sun, 278 F.3d 302,
313 (4th Cir. 2002). We conclude there was substantial evidence
supporting the jury’s verdict.
Accordingly, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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