PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 09-4833
DANA MICHAEL IDE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Parkersburg.
Joseph R. Goodwin, Chief District Judge.
(6:01-cr-00256-3)
Argued: September 24, 2010
Decided: November 12, 2010
Before SHEDD and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and
Robert J. CONRAD, Jr., Chief United States District Judge
for the Western District of North Carolina,
sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Keenan wrote the opin-
ion, in which Judge Shedd and Judge Conrad joined.
2 UNITED STATES v. IDE
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appel-
lant. Blaire L. Malkin, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender,
Christian M. Capece, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller,
United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appel-
lee.
OPINION
KEENAN, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal, we consider whether a term of supervised
release is tolled under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) while a defendant
is held in pretrial detention on charges for which he is later
convicted. We agree with the majority of our sister circuits
that have addressed this question and hold that, under these
circumstances, the defendant’s supervised release term is
tolled. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
I.
In February 2002, Dana Michael Ide entered a guilty plea
to one count of conspiracy to distribute heroin in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846. The district court sentenced Ide to thirty
months’ imprisonment, and ordered a supervised release term
of three years to follow Ide’s prison sentence. Ide’s three-year
term of supervised release began when he was released from
federal prison on February 11, 2004.
Ide served about eleven months of his supervised release
term before being arrested by West Virginia state authorities
UNITED STATES v. IDE 3
in January 2005, on charges of participating in a conspiracy
to operate a methamphetamine laboratory. Ide did not post
bond and remained in state custody through the end of his
trial.
A jury convicted Ide on the state charges in September
2005. Ide was sentenced in November 2005 to a two-to-five
year term of imprisonment, and was given credit for the seven
months and six days that he spent in pretrial detention. Ide
was released from state custody in July 2007, after spending
twenty-two months and twenty-two days in prison since the
date of his conviction on the state charges.
In June 2009, the government petitioned the district court
to revoke Ide’s term of supervised release originally imposed
in May 2002 as part of his sentence on the federal charge. The
government alleged that Ide’s commission of an additional
state offense, along with his failure to file monthly reports,
violated the conditions of his supervised release.
Ide filed a motion to dismiss the revocation petition, con-
tending that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider
the government’s petition because it was not timely filed. Ide
argued that he had served about forty-one months of super-
vised release at the time the government’s revocation petition
was filed, a period longer than the thirty-six month supervi-
sory period imposed by the district court. Ide’s calculation of
forty-one months included the period of seven months and six
days that he had spent in pretrial detention.
In response, the government contended that Ide’s term of
supervised release was tolled under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) dur-
ing his pretrial detention on the state charges. Therefore,
according to the government, Ide’s term of supervised release
would have expired on August 9, 2009, more than two months
after the government filed its revocation petition.
The district court agreed with the government’s interpreta-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), and held that Ide’s supervised
4 UNITED STATES v. IDE
release term was tolled during the period prior to his convic-
tion in which he was detained on the state charge. Thus, the
district court held that the government’s petition for revoca-
tion was timely filed, and denied Ide’s motion to dismiss.
The district court further held that Ide had violated the con-
ditions of his supervised release. Based on Ide’s violation of
these conditions, the district court revoked Ide’s supervised
release term and sentenced Ide to a six-month prison term fol-
lowed by a seven-month period of supervised release. Ide
timely filed a notice of appeal.
II.
The sole question presented in this appeal is whether Ide’s
term of supervised release was tolled under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3624(e) during his pretrial detention for an offense for
which he was later convicted. Ide does not challenge the dis-
trict court’s holding that he violated the terms of his super-
vised release.
The parties agree that if Ide’s term of supervised release
was not tolled by the statute during his pretrial detention on
the state charge, the government’s revocation petition was
untimely. If, however, the statute tolled Ide’s term of super-
vised release during this period, the government’s petition to
revoke was timely filed and was properly before the district
court.
This issue of statutory interpretation presents a question of
law that we review de novo. See United States v. Segers, 271
F.3d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 2001). The period during which a term
of supervised release remains in effect is addressed in 18
U.S.C. § 3624(e), which states in relevant part:
The term of supervised release commences on the
day the person is released from imprisonment and
runs concurrently with any Federal, State, or local
UNITED STATES v. IDE 5
term of probation or supervised release or parole for
another offense to which the person is subject or
becomes subject during the term of supervised
release. A term of supervised release does not run
during any period in which the person is imprisoned
in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State,
or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a
period of less than 30 consecutive days.
(Emphasis added). Thus, we must determine whether a person
held in pretrial detention is "imprisoned" "in connection with
a conviction," within the meaning of § 3624(e).
When interpreting a statute, we first consider the plain
meaning of the statutory language. United States v. Abdel-
shafi, 592 F.3d 602, 607 (4th Cir. 2010). In examining a stat-
ute’s plain meaning, we consider all the words employed and
do not review isolated phrases. United States v. Mitchell, 518
F.3d 230, 233-34 (4th Cir. 2008). Our analysis of particular
statutory language also is informed by "the specific context in
which that language is used, and the broader context of the
statute as a whole." Yi v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 412 F.3d
526, 530 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)).
The precise issue before us already has been considered by
four of our sister circuits, namely, the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits. The Ninth Circuit addressed this issue first
in United States v. Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir.
1999), and held that a defendant’s pretrial detention does not
toll his period of supervised release. The court concluded that
the plain language of the term "imprisoned in connection with
a conviction" in § 3624(e) requires "an imprisonment result-
ing from or otherwise triggered by a criminal conviction." Id.
at 1105. According to the Ninth Circuit, pretrial detention is
incompatible with this requirement "because a person in pre-
trial detention has not yet been convicted and might never be
convicted." Id.
6 UNITED STATES v. IDE
Each of the other three circuit courts that have addressed
this issue have disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion.
The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Goins, 516 F.3d 416
(6th Cir. 2008), held that pretrial detention on a charge for
which a defendant later is convicted tolls a term of supervised
release. The Sixth Circuit observed that "[i]f the Ninth Circuit
were correct that Congress uses ‘imprisonment’ only when it
wishes to refer to a confinement that is the result of a penalty
or sentence, then the phrase ‘in connection with a conviction’
becomes entirely superfluous." Id. at 421. The Sixth Circuit
further reasoned that the plain language of the phrase "impris-
oned in connection with a conviction" includes persons whose
pretrial detentions later are connected to a conviction. Id. at
422. According to the Sixth Circuit, the statutory phrase at
issue "eschews any temporal limitations." Id.
The Fifth Circuit confronted this issue in United States v.
Molina-Gazca, 571 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2009). Examining the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ respective holdings in Goins and
Morales-Alejo, the Fifth Circuit held that the Sixth Circuit’s
approach was preferable because the holding in Goins used a
"plain meaning interpretation of § 3624(e) [that] gives effect
to all of its terms." Id. at 474. Soon thereafter, the Eleventh
Circuit agreed with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, and con-
cluded that pretrial detention on a charge for which a defen-
dant later is convicted falls within the meaning of the term
"imprisoned" in § 3624(e). United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d
1310, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2009). The Eleventh Circuit there-
fore held that a defendant’s period of supervised release is
tolled during such a pretrial detention. Id.
After reviewing the parties’ arguments and the cases dis-
cussed above, we agree with the decisions of the Fifth, Sixth,
and Eleventh Circuits and hold that a defendant’s term of
supervised release is tolled while the defendant is held in pre-
trial detention on charges for which he is later convicted.1 We
reach this result for several reasons.
1
Our holding is limited to situations, as in the present case, in which the
period of incarceration that the defendant spends in pretrial detention later
UNITED STATES v. IDE 7
We conclude, like the majority of our sister circuits resolv-
ing this issue, that § 3624(e) is unambiguous and plainly pro-
vides for tolling the term of supervised release under the
circumstances presented here. In conjunction with our reading
of the entire language of this statute, two key phrases in
§ 3624(e) mandate our conclusion.
We observe that Congress included the phrase "during any
period" in the same sentence as the phrase "imprisoned in
connection with a conviction." The phrase "during any
period" necessarily includes all time periods, both before and
after a conviction, for which an imprisonment is connected
with that conviction. In contrast, acceptance of Ide’s argument
effectively would nullify the word "any," which is a result we
will not reach. See Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d
226, 231 (4th Cir. 2007). Similarly, we decline Ide’s invita-
tion to read the word "following" into the statute, as it is not
this Court’s province to redraft legislation.
We agree with the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning that the phrase
"in connection with a conviction" necessarily includes a
period of pretrial detention for which a defendant receives
credit against the sentence he ultimately receives. Goins, 516
F.3d at 422. A contrary conclusion would render the phrase
"in connection with" superfluous, a result that we will avoid
whenever possible.2 See United States v. Talebnejad, 460 F.3d
563, 568 (4th Cir. 2006).
is credited toward the prison sentence that he receives following his con-
viction. We express no view regarding whether the supervised release
term may be tolled in instances in which the defendant does not receive
credit for time spent in pretrial detention.
2
Although Ide also argues that the possibility of a defendant’s convic-
tion in a jurisdiction outside the United States would allow the phrase "in
connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime" to have
the meaning that he advocates, we reject this argument because we find
no indication in the statute that Congress was concerned with foreign con-
victions.
8 UNITED STATES v. IDE
While § 3624(e) does not define the word "imprisoned," we
note that Congress, in a separate statute, has used this identi-
cal word in a context that includes pretrial detention. In 18
U.S.C. § 3041, the general arrest statute, Congress provided
that "the offender may . . . be arrested and imprisoned or
released . . . for trial." In that statute, therefore, Congress
plainly used the word "imprisoned" to refer to detention that
occurs before a trial. Thus, Ide’s contention that the word
"imprisoned" can only refer to confinement following a con-
viction is incorrect. Accordingly, we agree with the district
court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e).
III.
We hold that Ide’s term of supervised release was tolled
during the period that he spent in pretrial detention awaiting
trial on the West Virginia charge for which he later was con-
victed. Thus, the district court correctly determined that the
government’s petition to revoke Ide’s term of supervised
release was timely filed.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.3
AFFIRMED
3
Because we conclude that the language of § 3624(e) is plain, we need
not address the various public policy arguments that each side advances
in support of their respective interpretations of the statute.