FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 24 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CYNTHIA FRAMPTON, No. 10-35194
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:08-cv-01400-PK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Paul J. Papak, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 4, 2010**
Portland, Oregon
Before: W. FLETCHER and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and JONES, District
Judge.***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable James P. Jones, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Cynthia Frampton appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
determination of the administrative law judge (ALJ) that Frampton is not disabled
and is therefore not entitled to disability insurance benefits. We affirm.
The ALJ did not deny Frampton due process by ending the hearing before
Frampton’s testimony had concluded and without hearing the testimony of her
husband, James Frampton. The ALJ’s decision to allot only one hour for the
hearing causes some concern, but the ALJ offered to consider a supplemental
hearing in Portland and allowed Frampton to submit written testimony in lieu of an
additional hearing. Those alternatives afforded Frampton an adequate opportunity
to be heard. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). Frampton’s due
process rights were not violated.
The ALJ’s decision to discredit the controverted opinion of treating
physician Dr. Kent was based on specific and legitimate reasons that were
supported by substantial evidence. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th
Cir. 1996). The ALJ discredited Dr. Kent’s opinion based on inconsistencies
within his own reports and contradictions between those reports and the
evaluations of other examining physicians. Dr. Kent’s reports note discrepancies
between Frampton’s bright, animated affect and her alleged depression.
Furthermore, his evaluation of Frampton’s depression was inconsistent with the
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opinion of examining physician Dr. Clausel. The inconsistencies noted by the ALJ
in discrediting Dr. Kent’s opinion were supported by substantial evidence in the
record.
In discrediting the testimony of James Frampton, the ALJ offered specific
reasons germane to his testimony. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288. The ALJ found
his statements inconsistent with the medical evidence and Cynthia Frampton’s
occupational history. She noted that James Frampton’s characterization of
Cynthia’s condition was contradicted both by the opinions of examining physicians
and by evidence of her ability to work as a tanning salon attendant and as a flower
deliverer. The cited inconsistencies were supported by substantial evidence in the
record, and the ALJ did not improperly discredit James Frampton’s testimony. See
Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005).
We reject Frampton’s challenges to the residual functional capacity (RFC)
assessment. The ALJ adequately considered all symptoms arising from
Frampton’s alleged impairments, even though the ALJ did not mention every
impairment by name. Although she did not explicitly discuss the side effects of
Frampton’s medications, the ALJ discussed and rejected the more general
complaints to which the side effects relate. Furthermore, she was not required to
consider work limitations described by Dr. Kent and James Frampton because she
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properly discredited each of their opinions. See Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217. Nor
was the ALJ required to consult a medical expert, because the record was well
developed and was not ambiguous. See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60
(9th Cir. 2001).
AFFIRMED.
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