UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4243
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RAYMOND CHARLES WEBBER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:08-cr-00048-RLV-DSC-4)
Submitted: November 18, 2010 Decided: November 29, 2010
Before SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Steven T. Meier, MEIER LAW, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney,
Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Raymond Charles Webber pled guilty to mail fraud, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 341 (2006). The district court
sentenced Webber to 125 months’ imprisonment. On appeal,
counsel for Webber has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal, but challenging the sentence
imposed. Specifically, counsel suggests Webber’s sentence at
the top of the Sentencing Guidelines range is too harsh and that
the district court erred in not giving to Webber credit for time
Webber spent in custody on an allegedly related charge. Webber
has filed a pro se supplemental brief raising similar issues.
The Government elected not to file a response. We affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). This review requires appellate consideration of
both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a
sentence. Id. This court must assess whether the district
court properly calculated the advisory Guidelines range,
considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, analyzed any
arguments presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained
the selected sentence. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576
(4th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n individualized explanation must accompany
every sentence.”); United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330
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(4th Cir. 2009) (same). In addition, this court presumes a
sentence within a properly determined advisory Guidelines range
is substantively reasonable. United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d
178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007).
We conclude that Webber’s sentence is both
procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district court
properly calculated Webber’s Guidelines range, treated the
Guidelines as advisory, and considered the applicable § 3553(a)
factors. See United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th
Cir. 2007). Moreover, the district court based its sentence on
its individualized assessment of the facts of the case. Carter,
564 F.3d at 328. Last, we conclude that Webber has not rebutted
the presumption that his within-Guidelines sentence is
presumptively reasonable. With respect to Webber’s assertion
that the district court erred in not crediting him for time
served on a related offense, the record reflects that the
district court did not conclusively deny credit, rather it
stated it would leave the record open for a ruling on credit
because what was before the court was “too nebulous to permit a
credit to be granted at the present time.” We conclude the
district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the
chosen sentence.
As required by Anders, we have reviewed the record and
Webber’s pro se supplemental brief and find no meritorious
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issues for review. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Webber in
writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United
States for further review. If Webber requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Webber. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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