UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1619
BONONO MOBOMBO,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: October 21, 2010 Decided: December 3, 2010
Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joshua A. Moses, JOSHUA MOSES & ASSOCIATES, Silver Spring,
Maryland, for Petitioner. Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General, Ernesto H. Molina, Jr., Assistant Director, Jeffery R.
Leist, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Bonono Mobombo, a native and citizen of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, petitions for review of an order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal
from the immigration judge’s decision denying his applications
for asylum, withholding of removal and withholding under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) and denying asylum as a
derivative beneficiary based on his wife’s asylee status. We
deny the petition for review.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3) (2006), a spouse of an
alien granted asylum may be granted the same status if the
spouse accompanied the alien or followed to join the alien.
Under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.21(c) (2010), the procedure for seeking
derivative status for a spouse not included in the refugee’s
asylum application is as follows:
When a spouse or child of an alien granted asylum is
in the United States, but was not included in the
asylee’s application, the asylee may request
accompanying or following-to-join benefits for his/her
spouse or child by filing for each qualifying family
member a separate Form I-730, Refugee/Asylee Relative
Petition, and supporting evidence, with the designated
Service office, regardless of the status of that
spouse or child in the United States. A recent
photograph of each derivative must accompany the Form
I-730. The photograph must clearly identify the
derivative, and will be made part of the derivative’s
immigration record for identification purposes.
Additionally, a separate Form I-730 must be filed by
the asylee for each qualifying family member before
February 28, 2000, or within 2 years of the date in
which he/she was granted asylum status, whichever is
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later, unless it is determined by the Service that
this period should be extended for humanitarian
reasons.
The Board held that without an approved Form I-730,
the immigration judge could not grant Mobombo asylum based on
his wife’s status. We review legal issues de novo, “affording
appropriate deference to the [Board]’s interpretation of the INA
and any attendant regulations.” Li Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 517
F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008). “[A]s the holder of much of
the Attorney General’s delegated power, the [Board] should be
accorded Chevron * deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms
concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case
adjudication.” Fernandez v. Keisler, 502 F.3d 337, 344 (4th
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the
procedure of filing an I-730 and having it granted as a
predicate to seeking derivative status is a “creature” of the
Attorney General’s regulations, “his interpretation of it is
. . . controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)
(alteration added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
conclude the Board’s interpretation controls in this instance
and there was no error.
*
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Insofar as Mobombo sought asylum and withholding of
removal by filing his own application, we find substantial
evidence supports the denial of relief. The INA authorizes the
Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) (2006). It defines a refugee as a person unwilling or
unable to return to his native country “because of persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
“Persecution involves the infliction or threat of death,
torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of one
of the enumerated grounds. . . .” Qiao Hua Li v. Gonzales, 405
F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility
for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir.
2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2010), and can establish
refugee status based on past persecution in his native country
on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)
(2010). “An applicant who demonstrates that he was the subject
of past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of
persecution.” Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir.
2004).
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Without regard to past persecution, an alien can
establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected
ground. Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 187. The well-founded fear
standard contains both a subjective and an objective component.
The objective element requires a showing of specific, concrete
facts that would lead a reasonable person in like circumstances
to fear persecution. Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d
351, 353 (4th Cir. 2006).
A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or
withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings of
fact, including findings on credibility, are conclusive unless
any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the
contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006). This court will
reverse the Board only if “the evidence . . . presented was so
compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the
requisite fear of persecution.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at
483-84; see Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325 n.14 (4th Cir. 2002).
Furthermore, “[t]he agency decision that an alien is not
eligible for asylum is ‘conclusive unless manifestly contrary to
the law and an abuse of discretion.’” Marynenka v. Holder, 592
F.3d 594, 600 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D)
(2006)).
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In Mobombo’s case, substantial evidence supports the
finding that he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution.
We also conclude that the denial of asylum based on humanitarian
grounds was not an abuse of discretion. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(b)(1)(iii) (2010).
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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