FILED
DEC 07 2010
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ARTHUR STEWARD, No. 09-17089
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-02622-LKK-
CMK
v.
TOWN OF PARADISE, MEMORANDUM *
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence K. Karlton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 3, 2010
San Francisco, California
Before: NOONAN and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and DUFFY, District Judge.**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
Appellant Arthur Steward appeals from an order by the district court
granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, the Town of Paradise of
Paradise, on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims alleging as consitutional violations a
taking of his property without due process, and inverse condemnation without just
compensation. The district court granted summary judgment on the basis that
Steward’s federal claims were subject to claim preclusion based on prior state court
judgments. We affirm.
Analysis
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Buono v. Norton, 371
F.3d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 2004). “A district court’s ruling on claim preclusion is also
reviewed de novo.” Holcombe v. Hosmer, 477 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2007).
“Claim preclusion is a broad doctrine that bars bringing claims that were
previously litigated as well as some claims that were never before adjudicated.”
Holcombe, 477 F.3d at 1097 (quoting Clements v. Airport Auth. of Washoe Cnty.,
69 F.3d 321, 327 (9th Cir. 1995)). The Supreme Court has held that a state-court
judgment “has the same claim-preclusive effect in [a federal § 1983 case] that the
judgment would have in [the applicable] state court[].” Migra v. Warren City
School Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 85 (1984). In Migra, the Court
“rejecte[ed] the view that § 1983 prevents the judgment in petitioner’s state-court
proceeding from creating a claim preclusion bar in this case.” Id. at 84.
We apply California law of claim preclusion to the judgments at issue, as the
underlying judgments in this case were rendered in California. See San Diego
Police Officers’ Ass’n v. San Diego City Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 734 (9th
Cir. 2009) (applying California claim preclusion law to determine the effect of a
California judgment in a subsequent federal case). Under California’s claim
preclusion doctrine, “three requirements have to be met: (1) the second lawsuit
must involve the same ‘cause of action’ as the first one, (2) there must have been a
final judgment on the merits in the first lawsuit and (3) the party to be precluded
must itself have been a party, or in privity with a party, to that first lawsuit.” Id.
The parties do not dispute that the same parties are involved in the state cases and
the federal case. It is clear that Steward had a fair opportunity to litigate his claims
in state court.1
1
After dismissing Steward’s first and second amended complaints, discussed
infra, the state court subsequently granted summary judgment for the Town of
Paradise and against Steward on all of his remaining claims except his conversion
claim. The state court expressly rejected Steward’s “argument, with citation to
authorities, that a city can be liable for interfering with access of an abutting
landowner to a public street,” finding that “the authorities are not applicable
because [Steward] was not and is not an abutting landowner; his property is not
directly adjacent to a public street open to automobile traffic.” Steward abandoned
his appeal of these state-court decisions and filed this separate federal action
instead.
I. Same Cause Of Action
Under California law, whether two cases involve the same “‘cause of action’
for purposes of res judicata” is determined “by analyzing the primary right at
stake.” San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n, 568 F.3d at 734. Specifically, “if two
actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the
defendant then the same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the
plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or
adds new facts supporting recovery.” Id. (quoting Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 197
Cal. Rptr. 612, 614 (1983)).
The district court properly determined that Steward’s federal lawsuit
involves the same “cause of action” as his prior state court litigation. The state
court litigation and the current federal suit seek to vindicate the same primary
rights—Steward’s right to be free from economic injury to his property interest
allegedly caused by the Town of Paradise of Paradise’s taking of his right to cross
the railroad easement and/or the denial of access to his mobile home property—and
these rights were alleged in Steward’s state court lawsuit. Further, Steward alleged
no new facts in his federal case that would change the analysis from the state
court’s judgments.
II. Final Judgment On The Merits
The district court also properly concluded that the state court judgments
were “on the merits” under California law. The state court dismissed Steward’s
first amended complaint for failure to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. The state court also dismissed the inverse condemnation claim presented in
Steward’s second amended complaint for failure to allege facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. The state court next granted summary judgment in
favor of the Town of Paradise on all except one remaining claim in Steward’s
second amended complaint. The remaining claim (which is not relevant here) was
settled by the parties. Thus, the state court effectively passed on the merits of
Steward’s claims under California law. See Sterling v. Galen, 51 Cal. Rptr. 312,
315 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966). Steward’s first amended complaint, in relevant part,
pleaded that: (1) the Town of Paradise deprived him of use of his private driveway
and culvert for ingress and egress to his property, loss of earning capacity of his
mobile home park, and loss of marketable value of his real property; and (2) the
Town of Paradise violated his due process rights when it took and destroyed his
driveway and culvert without notice or a hearing, causing him damage as alleged in
the complaint. Steward’s second amended complaint also alleged loss of market
value of his real property, loss of development and economic value of his mobile
home park, and that the Town of Paradise of Paradise’s substantial impairment of
access to his property constituted an inverse condemnation.
Thus, the state court judgments in this case constituted final judgments on
the merits entitled to claim preclusive effect. Sterling, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 315 (citing
Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co., 282 P.2d 33, 34–35 (Cal. 1955)).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on the
ground that Steward’s federal claims are subject to claim preclusion based on prior
state court judgments.
AFFIRMED.