FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 20 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAYE ELLEN STILES, No. 11-15903
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 4:07-cv-00670-RCC
v.
MEMORANDUM *
PARAGON REALTY, DBA TPI Vista
Montana, LLC; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Raner C. Collins, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 17, 2012 **
Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Raye Ellen Stiles appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in her action alleging, among other claims, housing discrimination. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
11-15903
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo and may affirm the
district court on any ground supported by the record. Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d
730, 733–34 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
Summary judgment on Stiles’ claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, aggravation of preexisting conditions, and public humiliation was proper
because she already litigated these claims in Arizona state court, and, thus, res
judicata precludes her from bringing such claims in federal court. See Sunkist
Growers v. Fisher, 104 F.3d 280, 283–84 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that under
Arizona law a litigant may not bring a claim identical to one she has previously
litigated).
Summary judgment on Stiles’ federal claims and her state law conspiracy
claims based on her eviction was also proper because Stiles is collaterally estopped
from relitigating the issue of whether her landlord had a valid, non-pretexual
motive for evicting her. See Chaney Bldg. Co. v. Tucson, 716 P.2d 28, 30 (Ariz.
1986) (discussing the differences between issue and claim preclusion).
Summary judgment on Stiles’ claim that defendants failed to repair her
apartment out of discriminatory or retaliatory animus in violation of the Federal
Housing Act was proper because she failed to raise a material dispute of fact as to
whether there was disparate treatment based upon a federally protected ground.
2 11-15903
See Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 711
(9th Cir. 2009); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986)
(plaintiff may not survive summary judgment based on conclusory allegations in
complaint).
Stiles’ other contentions, including those concerning discovery issues and
alleged attorney misconduct, are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
3 11-15903