United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
__________________________
DIAMOND SAWBLADES MANUFACTURERS
COALITION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
SAINT-GOBAIN ABRASIVES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
HEBEI JIKAI INDUSTRIAL GROUP CO., LTD., and
HUSQVARNA CONSTRUCTION PRODUCTS
NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
EHWA DIAMOND INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
BOSUN TOOLS GROUP CO., LTD.,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
2010-1024, -1090
__________________________
DIAMOND SAWBLADES v. US 2
Appeals from the United States Court of International
Trade in case no. 09-CV-0110, Senior Judge R. Kenton
Musgrave.
___________________________
Decided: December 9, 2010
___________________________
DANIEL B. PICKARD, Wiley Rein LLP, of Washington,
DC, argued for plaintiff-appellee. With him on the brief
was MAUREEN E. THORSON.
DELISA M. SANCHEZ, Trial Attorney, Commercial Liti-
gation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department
of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-
appellant United States. With her on the brief were TONY
WEST, Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON,
Director, and FRANKLIN E. WHITE, JR., Assistant Director.
KENNETH GEORGE WEIGEL, Alston & Bird, LLP, of
Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellants Hebei
Jikai Industrial Group Co., Ltd, et al. With him on the
brief for Hebei Jikai Industrial Group Co, Ltd, and
Husqvarna Construction Products North America, Inc.
was ELIZABETH M. HEIN.
LYNN M. FISCHER FOX, Fischer Fox Global PLLC, of
Washington, DC, for defendant-appellant Saint-Gobain
Abrasives, Inc.
J. DAVID PARK, Akin, Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld
LLP, of Washington, DC, for defendant-appellant Ehwa
Diamond Industrial Co., Ltd. Of counsel were JARROD M.
GOLDFEDER, SPENCER S. GRIFFITH and LISA W. ROSS.
3 DIAMOND SAWBLADES v. US
GREGORY S. MENEGAZ, Dekieffer & Horgan, of Wash-
ington, DC, for defendant-appellant Bosun Tools Group
Co., Ltd. Of counsel was JAMES KEVIN HORGAN.
__________________________
Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and DYK, Circuit Judges.
BRYSON, Circuit Judge.
In this antidumping case, the Court of International
Trade issued a writ of mandamus to the Department of
Commerce directing Commerce to issue antidumping duty
orders and require the collection of cash deposits on
certain merchandise imported from China and Korea.
Commerce and several importers appealed, arguing that
Commerce had no duty to issue such orders prior to the
termination of all judicial proceedings challenging the
underlying determination of the International Trade
Commission. We affirm the order of the Court of Interna-
tional Trade.
I
An antidumping duty investigation begins when an
interested party files a petition with Commerce and the
International Trade Commission seeking the imposition
of antidumping duties on designated imports. 19 U.S.C. §
1673a(b). Based on the petition and other available
information, the Commission first determines whether
there is a reasonable indication that a domestic industry
is materially injured or threatened with material injury
by the subject imports. Id. § 1673b(a)(1). If the Commis-
sion makes an affirmative preliminary determination, it
waits for Commerce to determine whether the subject
merchandise is, or is likely to be, sold at less than fair
DIAMOND SAWBLADES v. US 4
value in the United States (“the LTFV determination”).
Id. § 1673b(b)(1)(A).
If Commerce makes an affirmative final LTFV deter-
mination, the Commission then makes a final injury
determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b)(1). The Commission
is required to notify the parties and Commerce of its
determination and to publish notice of that determination
in the Federal Register. Id. § 1673d(d). If the Commis-
sion’s final determination of material injury or threat of
material injury is affirmative, Commerce is required,
within seven days after being notified by the Commission
of the determination, to publish an antidumping duty
order and begin collecting cash deposits for duties due
under the order. See id. § 1673e(a) (obligation to publish
antidumping duty order after notification); id.
§ 1673e(a)(3) (obligation to collect deposit of estimated
antidumping duties pending liquidation of entries of
subject goods).
II
Diamond Sawblades Manufacturers Coalition
(“DSMC”) represents domestic manufacturers of diamond
sawblades. In 2005, DSMC petitioned Commerce to
impose antidumping duty orders on certain diamond
sawblades imported from China and Korea. Commerce
and the International Trade Commission initiated anti-
dumping investigations in response to the petition. The
Commission made a preliminary determination that there
was a reasonable likelihood that an industry in the
United States was materially injured or threatened with
material injury. Diamond Sawblades and Parts Thereof
from China and Korea, 70 Fed. Reg. 43,903 (Int’l Trade
Comm’n July 29, 2005). Commerce then made prelimi-
nary and final determinations that the subject imports
were being sold at less than fair value in this country.
5 DIAMOND SAWBLADES v. US
Diamond Sawblades and Parts Thereof From the People’s
Republic of China, 70 Fed. Reg. 77,121 (Dep’t of Com-
merce Dec. 29, 2005) (preliminary determination); Dia-
mond Sawblades and Parts Thereof From the Republic of
Korea, 70 Fed. Reg. 77,135 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 29,
2005) (preliminary determination); Diamond Sawblades
and Parts Thereof From the People’s Republic of China, 71
Fed. Reg. 29,303 (Dep’t of Commerce May 22, 2006) (final
determination), amended by 71 Fed. Reg. 35,864 (Dep’t of
Commerce June 22, 2006); Diamond Sawblades and Parts
Thereof From the Republic of Korea, 71 Fed. Reg. 29,310
(Dep’t of Commerce May 22, 2006) (final determination).
The International Trade Commission subsequently pub-
lished its final “material injury” determination. In that
determination, the Commission found that the diamond
sawblades industry in the United States was not materi-
ally injured or threatened with material injury by imports
of diamond sawblades from China and Korea. Diamond
Sawblades and Parts Thereof From China and Korea, Inv.
Nos. 731-1092 & 1093, USITC Pub. 3862 (July 2006),
notice published at 71 Fed. Reg. 39,128 (Int’l Trade
Comm’n July 11, 2006). The administrative antidumping
proceedings therefore came to an end.
DSMC filed a complaint in the Court of International
Trade challenging both the Commission’s final negative
injury determination and Commerce’s LTFV determina-
tions. The court stayed the claim pertaining to Commerce
pending the disposition of the claim pertaining to the
Commission. On the merits, the court then ruled that the
Commission had not provided an adequate explanation or
substantial evidentiary support for its negative injury
determinations. Diamond Sawblades Mfrs. Coal. v.
United States, slip op. No. 2008-18 (Ct. Int’l Trade Feb. 6,
2008). The court therefore remanded the case to the
Commission for further proceedings. On remand, the
DIAMOND SAWBLADES v. US 6
Commission in May 2008 entered a new final determina-
tion, which partially reversed its earlier final determina-
tion. Diamond Sawblades and Parts Thereof from China
and Korea, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-1092 & 1093, USITC Pub.
4007 (May 2008) (Final) (Remand). The Commission
again found that the domestic diamond sawblades indus-
try was not materially injured by the dumping of the
subject imports, but this time it found that the subject
imports threatened material injury to the domestic dia-
mond sawblades industry. The Court of International
Trade sustained that determination. Diamond Sawblades
Mfrs. Coal. v. United States, slip op. No. 2009-05 (Ct. Int’l
Trade Jan. 13, 2009).
Shortly after the court issued its order, the Commis-
sion notified Commerce by letter that the court had
upheld its final affirmative injury determination. In
response, Commerce ordered that liquidation of the
subject imports be suspended pending the final resolution
of the antidumping dispute. DSMC then requested that,
in addition to suspending liquidation of the subject im-
ports, Commerce issue antidumping duty orders and
begin collecting cash deposits in connection with the
ongoing imports of the subject goods. Commerce, how-
ever, declined to issue antidumping duty orders at that
time or to begin collecting cash deposits in connection
with the ongoing imports. Instead, Commerce took the
position that under the governing statutes it was not
required to issue antidumping duty orders or to collect
cash deposits until the final conclusion of the litigation
challenging the predicates for entering antidumping
orders, i.e., until Commerce received notice from the
Commission that no appeal would be taken to this court
or, if an appeal was taken, until this court issued a “con-
clusive decision” upholding the decision of the Court of
International Trade.
7 DIAMOND SAWBLADES v. US
DSMC then petitioned the Court of International
Trade for a writ of mandamus directing Commerce to
publish antidumping duty orders and immediately begin
collecting cash deposits of the antidumping duties for
imported merchandise falling within the scope of the
antidumping duty orders. Over Commerce’s objection, the
court granted the writ. Commerce then took this appeal,
joined by the importers of the subject goods. While this
appeal was pending and before oral argument in this case,
this court affirmed the decision of the Court of Interna-
tional Trade in the underlying appeal from that court’s
decision upholding the Commission’s affirmative threat of
injury determination. Diamond Sawblades Mfrs. Coal. v.
United States, 612 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
III
This case presents a highly technical issue of statu-
tory construction that is of some significance to the ad-
ministration of the antidumping laws. The issue involves
an interpretation of several related statutory provisions
governing administrative antidumping proceedings before
Commerce and the International Trade Commission, and
judicial review of those proceedings by the Court of Inter-
national Trade and this court. The precise question
before us is whether, in a case in which the Court of
International Trade has remanded a negative injury
determination to the Commission, and the Commission on
remand has made an affirmative injury determination
and notified Commerce of that determination, Commerce
must issue antidumping duty orders and begin collecting
cash deposits of the antidumping duties while a challenge
to the material injury determination is still pending
before the courts. The appellants argue not only that
Commerce is not required to issue the antidumping duty
orders and collect cash deposits during the pendency of
that challenge, but that it does not have the authority to
DIAMOND SAWBLADES v. US 8
do so. The appellees argue, consistently with the holding
of the Court of International Trade, not only that Com-
merce may issue antidumping duty orders and collect
cash deposits during the pendency of that challenge, but
that it is required to do so absent a stay from the court.
We agree with the Court of International Trade and the
appellees.
By statute, the Commission is required to notify
Commerce when it makes an affirmative final injury
determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(d). That was done in
this case. After the Commission made its affirmative
“threat of material injury” determination on remand from
the February 6, 2008, order of the Court of International
Trade, it notified Commerce of that determination by
letter. The Commission, however, delayed that notifica-
tion until January 22, 2009, after the Court of Interna-
tional Trade upheld the Commission’s remand
determination. 1
After receiving the requisite statutory notification,
Commerce was required to publish appropriate antidump-
ing duty orders within seven days of being notified by the
Commission of its affirmative determination. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673e(a). The duty to collect cash deposits in the
amount of the antidumping duties accompanies the duty
to publish antidumping duty orders. Id. § 1673e(a)(3).
Interpreting the statutory requirements according to their
terms, the Court of International Trade concluded that
1 The Commission waited until after the Court of
International Trade sustained its remand determination,
even though the governing statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(d),
requires that notification of a determination be made
“[w]henever the . . . Commission makes a determination”
under section 1673d; the statute does not require or
contemplate that the notification will issue only after
court review of the Commission’s remand determination.
9 DIAMOND SAWBLADES v. US
Commerce had a clear statutory duty to publish anti-
dumping duty orders and begin collecting cash deposits at
that time.
The appellants contend that those statutes do not ap-
ply in the manner described above. Quite the opposite,
they argue, the statutes do not allow Commerce to issue
antidumping duties or collect cash deposits in a case such
as this one until the challenge to the Commission’s injury
determination has completed its course through the
courts. The appellants’ arguments, however, disregard
the plain statutory text and, contrary to their contentions,
are not supported by prior decisions of this court.
The appellants acknowledge that in the usual case
Commerce is required to issue antidumping duty orders
and begin collecting cash deposits from the affected im-
porters promptly after being notified by the Commission
of its affirmative final injury determination. See, e.g., Ad
Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United States, 515
F.3d 1372, 1376-78 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Thus, when the
Commission makes an affirmative final determination of
material injury or threat of material injury at the conclu-
sion of its investigation, the Commission notifies Com-
merce of its affirmative determination and publishes
notice of its determination in the Federal Register. 19
U.S.C. § 1673d(d). Commerce then has the duty, within
seven days after being given such notice by the Commis-
sion, to publish an antidumping order. Id. § 1673e(a).
That duty arises as soon as the Commission notifies
Commerce of its determination, regardless of whether one
of the parties institutes judicial review proceedings to
challenge the Commission’s material injury determination
or Commerce’s LTFV finding. 2
2 In its opening brief, the government emphatically,
but mistakenly, asserted that section 1673e(a) “clearly
DIAMOND SAWBLADES v. US 10
While agreeing with the above description of the
statutory scheme as applied in the normal case, the
appellants argue that the statutory scheme applies differ-
ently when the Commission’s affirmative determination is
issued following a remand from the Court of International
Trade. In that situation, the appellants contend, the
statutory scheme does not require Commerce to issue
antidumping duty orders following notification of the
affirmative determination by the Commission.
The government makes several arguments as to why
section 1673e(a) did not require Commerce to issue anti-
dumping duty orders when the Commission issued a final
determination following the remand in this case. First,
addressing the facts of this case, the government argues
that the January 22, 2009, letter from the Commission to
Commerce did not provide the statutorily required notifi-
cation because the letter did not “state that the remand
determination constitutes a section 1673d(b) ‘final deter-
mination’ of affirmative injury.” That contention is frivo-
lous. In the January 22, 2009, letter, the Commission
stated that it had “issued affirmative determinations on
remand” from the earlier decision of the Court of Interna-
tional Trade. It is unclear what the government believes
was missing from that recitation that kept it from being a
sufficient notification to satisfy section 1673e(a). In the
letter, the Commission referred to its affirmative deter-
and unambiguously provides that Commerce’s duty to
publish antidumping orders is triggered by the ITC’s
publication of a notice.” After the appellees pointed out
that the government’s characterization of section 1673e(a)
was incorrect, and that the duty to issue antidumping
duty orders is triggered by notification, not publication,
the government in its reply brief withdrew from its posi-
tion that publication is the step required under section
1673e(a) to trigger Commerce’s duty to issue antidumping
duty orders.
11 DIAMOND SAWBLADES v. US
mination, and in its citation to that determination, it used
the term “final.” The Commission also included a copy of
its May 2008 remand determination, which was desig-
nated “final.” We assume the government is not contend-
ing that the omission of a citation to section 1673d(b)
prevented the January 22, 2009, letter from serving as
the requisite notification for purposes of section 1673e(a);
any such contention would be fatuous.
The government’s second argument is that a different
statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a, in effect renders inoperative
the obligation that would otherwise be imposed by section
1673e(a). The problem with that argument is that the
portions of section 1516a on which the government relies
deal with liquidation of entries and the suspension of
liquidation during judicial review proceedings. Those
provisions do not address the issues in this case, which
relate to the issuance of antidumping duty orders and the
collection of cash deposits.
Section 1516a governs judicial review of a final de-
termination by Commerce or the Commission in an anti-
dumping case. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(1). Subsection (c) of
section 1516a provides that unless liquidation is enjoined
by the court, entries of merchandise covered by an anti-
dumping duty order will be liquidated in accordance with
the order if they are entered on or before the publication
of notice of a decision of the Court of International Trade
or this court that is “not in harmony” with some aspect of
the antidumping duty order. Id. § 1516a(c)(1). Subsec-
tion (e) of section 1516a provides that if a final determina-
tion is challenged and the Court of International Trade or
this court sustains the challenge in whole or in part, the
entries of subject merchandise, including entries as to
which liquidation was previously suspended, “shall be
liquidated in accordance with the final court decision in
the action.” Id. § 1516a(e).
DIAMOND SAWBLADES v. US 12
The liquidation of entries is normally irrevocable. See
Cambridge Lee Indus. v. United States, 916 F.2d 1578,
1579 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The provisions of section 1516a
regarding the suspension of liquidation are thus designed
to ensure that the rights of the parties are not irrevocably
compromised before the judicial review process has been
completed and the rights of the respective parties are
settled. However, subsections 1516a(c) and (e) do not
apply to the issuance of antidumping duty orders or the
collection of cash deposits, neither of which has the ir-
revocable consequences of liquidation. See Decca Hospi-
tality Furnishings, LLC v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 2d
1249, 1264 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006) (subsections 1516a(c)(1)
and (e) “speak[] only to the liquidation of entries; they do
not speak to the handling of cash deposits during court
proceedings or as a result thereof”). Thus, when cash
deposits are collected pursuant to an antidumping duty
order with respect to which liquidation has been sus-
pended, the deposits are subject to return with interest if
the antidumping duty order is invalidated or altered in
the importer’s favor. 3 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673f(b).
In seeking to bring this case within the ambit of sec-
tion 1516a, the appellants rely on our decision in Timken
3 Because the antidumping duty order can simply
be altered or revoked and the cash deposits returned if
the judicial challenge is successful in whole or in part, the
issuance of an antidumping duty order and the collection
of cash deposits do not present the risks associated with a
constantly changing set of rules applicable to subject
imports, as asserted by the appellants. The suspension of
liquidation thus avoids the “yo-yo effect on liquidations”
that could result absent suspension during the review
process. Melamine Chems., Inc. v. United States, 732 F.2d
924, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1984). As noted, while liquidation
normally cannot be undone, the collection of cash deposits
has no irreparable consequences.
13 DIAMOND SAWBLADES v. US
Co. v. United States, 893 F.2d 337 (Fed. Cir. 1990), but
that case does not help them. The judicial review provi-
sions analyzed in Timken, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c) and (e),
dealt only with liquidation; they did not address the
issuance of antidumping duty orders, and nothing in the
Timken decision purported to apply those provisions to
the issuance of such orders. Our holding today that
Commerce is required to publish antidumping duty orders
upon notice of a final affirmative injury determination by
the Commission is not affected by, and does not disturb
Timken.
In Timken, we held that section 1516a(c)(1) requires
that, within ten days of any court decision that is “not in
harmony with” a final LTFV determination, Commerce
must publish a notice of that decision. 893 F.2d at 341.
We held that the effect of that notice, now known as a
Timken notice, is to suspend liquidation of the subject
entries until there is a final and conclusive court decision
in the action, i.e., until judicial review proceedings of the
antidumping duty order have been completed. See 19
U.S.C. § 1516a(e).
The government asserts that “it was clear error for
the Trade Court to conclude that Commerce’s publication
of the Timken notice required Commerce to publish anti-
dumping duty orders and collect cash deposits in accor-
dance with a decision of the Trade Court that is pending
appeal and is neither final nor conclusive.” That argu-
ment conflates the statutory obligation to publish notice
of a court decision that is “not in harmony” with the
agency’s decision under review, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)—an
obligation that results in suspension of liquidation—with
the separate statutory obligation of the Commission to
advise Commerce of its final material injury determina-
tion, id. § 1673d(d)—an obligation that compels Com-
merce to issue antidumping duty orders and collect cash
DIAMOND SAWBLADES v. US 14
deposits, id. §§ 1673e(a), 1673e(a)(3). The two notice
obligations are entirely distinct. Section 1516a(c) applies
when a court issues a decision that is contrary to the
pertinent agency’s prior determination. Sections 1673d(d)
and 1673e(a) apply when the Commission issues a mate-
rial injury determination, regardless of whether that
determination is made in the first instance or on remand,
and regardless of whether there is any subsequent judi-
cial review of that determination. 4
To be sure, as we have noted, the Commission in this
case issued its notification to Commerce at the time of the
court decision upholding its remand determination, rather
than at the time of the remand determination itself. In
that respect, the Commission appears to have erroneously
assumed that its obligation to issue a notice under section
1673d(d) was triggered by the court decision upholding its
remand determination, rather than by the issuance of the
remand determination itself. Nonetheless, the Commis-
sion’s notice, even if late, still constituted a valid notifica-
tion of the Commission’s final determination on remand
for purposes of section 1673d(d), and it therefore triggered
Commerce’s obligation to issue an antidumping duty
4 The appellants seize on a statement by the Court
of International Trade that in the context of judicial
review, Commerce’s publication of a Timken notice under
section 1516a(c)(1) “effectively stands in the place of
1673d(d) notice publication.” Without endorsing that
statement, we believe the point the court was making was
simply that, as it said earlier in the same passage, publi-
cation of notice of the court’s decision “serves to give
notice of the affirmative remand determination that it
sustained.” The court’s statement does not alter the
requirement in section 1673d(d) that the Commission give
notice to Commerce of its final determination, triggering
Commerce’s duty to publish antidumping duty orders and
collect cash deposits under section 1673e(a).
15 DIAMOND SAWBLADES v. US
order under section 1673e(a). Nothing in Timken or any
other decision of this court is to the contrary.
The appellants contend that Hosiden v. United States,
85 F.3d 589 (Fed. Cir. 1996), supports their position, but
it does not. In that case, this court addressed the ques-
tion whether, after the Court of International Trade held
an antidumping duty order improper, section 1516a
required the suspension of liquidation to end prior to the
expiration of any appeals from that order. This court held
that under section 1516a(e), resumption of liquidation
was not appropriate until after “the final court decision in
the action,” i.e., when all appeals had been exhausted and
the decision in the case became final. Id. at 591. The
court did not address the issuance of antidumping orders
or the collection of cash deposits.
The government’s argument that Commerce was not
required to issue antidumping orders and begin collecting
cash deposits “in the absence of a final and conclusive
court decision affirming an affirmative injury determina-
tion by the ITC” is unsupported by statute or case law.
The government’s reliance on a footnote in Co-Steel Rari-
tan, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, 357 F.3d
1294, 1302 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2004), is misplaced, as that
footnote simply explains that an appeal to this court
prevents the decision of the Court of International Trade
from becoming “final and conclusive” for purposes of 28
U.S.C. § 2645(c). It does not suggest that the fact that the
court’s decision is not final for purposes of section 2645(c)
(or “final and conclusive” for purposes of section 1516a(e))
affects the Commission’s duty to notify Commerce of its
final remand determination or Commerce’s duty to issue
antidumping duty orders following receipt of that notifica-
tion. If accepted, the government’s position would be
inconsistent with Commerce’s routine practice of issuing
antidumping duty orders and beginning to collect cash
DIAMOND SAWBLADES v. US 16
deposits following initial material injury determinations,
even when those determinations are appealed to the
Court of International Trade. Neither section 1516a nor
section 1673d requires different procedures for the issu-
ance of antidumping duty orders and the collection of cash
deposits depending on whether the Commission’s final
material injury determination is an initial determination
or one made on remand. 5
Finally, to the extent the appellants argue that the
Commission’s affirmative determination on remand was
not a “final determination,” that conclusion is plainly
wrong. The statute refers to a “final determination” by
the Commission as a determination that sets forth the
Commission’s ultimate conclusion as to whether an indus-
try in the United States is materially injured or threat-
ened with material injury, or whether the establishment
of an industry in the United States is materially retarded
by reason of the imports of the subject goods. 19 U.S.C. §
1673d(b)(1). That determination is considered “final,”
even though by statute it is subject to judicial review. See
id. § 1516a(a)(2)(B). The Commission’s remand determi-
nation in this case was a “final determination,” just as
was its previous determination in the same case, and
when notice of that determination was given to Com-
merce, that notice triggered Commerce’s duty to issue
5 Although section 1673d does not explicitly discuss
the possibility of remand, the Commission’s remand final
determination must be made under that section. Other-
wise, Commerce would have no grounds for imposing
antidumping duties in accordance with the Commission’s
remand determination, even at the conclusion of all
judicial review proceedings. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(b)
(authorizing imposition of antidumping duties following
the Commission’s “final determination under section
1673d(b)”).
17 DIAMOND SAWBLADES v. US
antidumping duty orders and begin collecting cash depos-
its on the subject entries. 6
IV
The Court of International Trade did not abuse its
discretion in ordering Commerce to publish antidumping
duty orders upon receipt of notice from the International
Trade Commission of a final affirmative injury determi-
nation. Congress addressed the uncertainty in duty rates
arising from remand proceedings by providing for the
suspension of liquidation. It did not extend the same
treatment to the issuance of antidumping duty orders and
the collection of cash deposits. To the contrary, the statu-
tory scheme imposes a mandatory duty on Commerce to
issue antidumping duty orders covering the subject en-
tries upon being notified of the Commission’s final deter-
mination, a notification that in this case occurred on
January 22, 2009. In light of Commerce’s breach of its
clear statutory duty to issue antidumping duty orders and
begin collecting cash deposits, a breach not remediable in
any other manner, the Court of International Trade
properly issued a writ of mandamus to compel Commerce
to comply with its obligations under the statute.
AFFIRMED
6 We have no occasion in this case to address
whether the Commission could respond to a remand from
the Court of International Trade in a manner that would
not fall within section 1673d(b) and thus not trigger its
obligations under section 1673d(d).