UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4481
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIE MYERS, JR., a/k/a Junior,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:08-cr-01072-RBH-7)
Submitted: November 17, 2010 Decided: December 10, 2010
Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Rafael Rodriguez, Miami, Florida, for Appellant. Arthur
Bradley Parham, Rose Mary Sheppard Parham, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Willie Myers, Jr. pled guilty to conspiracy
to distribute fifty or more grams of cocaine base and five
kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) (2006). The district court sentenced
Myers to 240 months’ imprisonment. Myers timely appealed.
Myers’ attorney has filed a brief in accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning the
adequacy of Myers’ Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing and the
reasonableness of Myers’ sentence. Counsel states, however,
that he has found no meritorious grounds for appeal. Myers
received notice of his right to file a pro se supplemental
brief, but did not file one. Because we find no meritorious
grounds for appeal, we affirm.
First, Myers questions whether the district court
adequately advised him during his Rule 11 hearing. Prior to
accepting a guilty plea, a district court must conduct a plea
colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and determines
that the defendant comprehends, the nature of the charge to
which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum penalty, the
maximum possible penalty he faces, and the rights he is
relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b);
United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991).
“In reviewing the adequacy of compliance with Rule 11, this
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Court should accord deference to the trial court’s decision as
to how best to conduct the mandated colloquy with the
defendant.” DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 116.
We have thoroughly reviewed the record in this case,
and conclude that the district court complied with the mandates
of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting Myers’
guilty plea. The record affirmatively shows there was a factual
basis for Myers’ plea, Myers understood the constitutional
rights he waived in pleading guilty, and Myers’ guilty plea was
knowing and voluntary.
Next, Myers challenges the reasonableness of his
sentence. This court reviews a district court’s sentence for
reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v.
Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473-74 (4th Cir. 2007). When sentencing a
defendant, a district court must: (1) properly calculate the
Guidelines range; (2) determine whether a sentence within that
range serves the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006);
(3) implement mandatory statutory limitations; and (4) explain
its reasons for selecting a sentence. Pauley, 511 F.3d at 473.
In the Fourth Circuit, “[a] sentence within the proper
Sentencing Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.”
United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007); see
also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347-56 (2007)
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(upholding presumption of reasonableness for a within-Guidelines
sentence).
Here, the district court followed the necessary
procedural steps in sentencing Myers. It properly calculated
the Guidelines sentence, meaningfully considered the arguments
of counsel in light of the § 3553(a) factors, and sentenced
Myers to the mandatory minimum sentence for his crime. Hence,
we determine that the sentence imposed by the district court was
reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Myers, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Myers requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Myers.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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