IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-50121
Summary Calendar
ALICE ROSAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. SA-97-CV-93
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July 15, 1999
Before DAVIS, DUHE’, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Alice Rosas appeals the district court’s affirmance of the
Social Security Commissioner’s decision to deny her disability
insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. She argues
that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) failed to follow
instructions contained in a remand order issued by the Appeals
Council and that the ALJ improperly applied a “no evidence”
standard to his determination of the onset date of her
disability. We review the ALJ’s decision to deny benefits by
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 98-50121
-2-
determining (1) whether the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards and (2) whether his decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Falco v. Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 162 (5th
Cir. 1994).
Rosas’ contention that the ALJ erred by failing to comply
with several instructions by the Appeals Council is
administratively barred, because she failed to raise such claims
in her second request for review by the Appeals Council. See
McQueen v. Apfel, 168 F.3d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1999). Assertions
by Rosas that the ALJ improperly discredited opinions by her
treating and consultative physicians on her disability-onset date
are meritless, because those doctors made no suggestion that she
was disabled on or before December 31, 1990, the date when her
disability-insured status expired. Rosas’ contention that the
ALJ applied a “no evidence” standard is also meritless; the
record reflects only that the ALJ determined that “no evidence”
supported a finding of disability on or before December 31, 1990.
We interpret the finding in question not as the application of an
improper evidentiary standard but as a mere factual
determination, a determination that was supported by substantial
evidence.
The ALJ applied correct legal standards, and his decision
was based upon substantial evidence.
AFFIRMED.