[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-11763 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar DECEMBER 29, 2010
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-00506-ODE-LTW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DONEY ALEXANDER PINEDA-FUENTES,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(December 29, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant-appellant Doney Alexander Pineda-Fuentes was deported to
Honduras in 2006 after being convicted of sexual battery. He illegally reentered
the United States the following year. In 2009, he was arrested in connection with
a state charge of battery that was later dismissed. He was then charged in federal
court with illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), and he pleaded guilty.
The district court determined Pineda-Fuentes’ sentencing guideline range as
46 to 57 months’ imprisonment. The statutory maximum sentence under § 1326 is
twenty years’ imprisonment. Pineda-Fuentes argued that the court should vary
downward from the guideline range because he had returned to the United States
to visit his son, who required multiple surgeries to correct a cleft palate. After
considering all of the sentencing factors, the district court determined that a
guideline sentence was necessary to deter Pineda-Fuentes from committing future
crimes. The court sentenced him to 46 months’ imprisonment.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Under the
abuse of discretion standard, we will affirm the sentence “unless we find that the
district court has made a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Frazier, 387
F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). “[W]e will not second guess the
weight (or lack thereof) that the [district court] accorded to a given factor . . . as
long as the sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable in light of all the
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circumstances presented.” United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th Cir.
2010) (quotation omitted).
The district court is required to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The § 3553(a)(2) purposes include the need to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just
punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct, protect the public from the
defendant’s future criminal conduct, and provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training or medical care. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The
court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the
defendant’s history and characteristics, the kinds of sentences available, the
applicable guideline range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing
Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to
provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
We determine whether a sentence was substantively reasonable by
examining the sentence in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. United
States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). “The party challenging a
sentence has the burden of establishing that it was unreasonable.” Snipes, 611
F.3d at 872.
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Here, we conclude that the sentence imposed is reasonable and Pineda-
Fuentes has not shown otherwise. The 46-month sentence represented the lowest
sentence within the applicable guideline range and we ordinarily expect such a
sentence to be reasonable. United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 735
(11th Cir. 2010). Pineda-Fuentes’s sentence was also well below the 20-year
statutory maximum penalty, further indicating that it was a reasonable sentence.
United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S.Ct. 2848 (2009). In addition, the sentence met the § 3553(a) sentencing goals;
considering Pineda-Fuentes’s criminal history and disregard for the criminal and
immigration laws of the United States, a sentence within the guideline range was
necessary to promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, deter Pineda-
Fuentes from further criminal activity, and protect the public. Furthermore,
although Pineda-Fuentes argues that his guideline sentence was unreasonably
long, his low-end sentence indicates that the court considered Pineda-Fuentes’s
characteristics, history, and reason for returning to the United States. We will not
re-weigh these factors. Snipes, 611 F.3d at 872. Accordingly, the sentence is
AFFIRMED.
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