Case: 09-20639 Document: 00511337800 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/03/2011
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
January 3, 2011
No. 09-20639 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
MAURICE JABBAR CHARLES,
Petitioner-Appellant
v.
RICK THALER, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,
Respondent-Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
Before JONES, Chief Judge, PRADO, Circuit Judge, and O’CONNOR, District
Judge.*
EDITH H. JONES, Chief Judge:
Appellant Maurice Charles was sentenced as an adult to extended
imprisonment for crimes he committed while only fourteen years old. He seeks
a writ of habeas corpus to challenge sentences for aggravated robbery and
aggravated kidnapping. The district court denied relief but granted a certificate
of appealability. Charles contends that his attorney ineffectively represented
*
District Judge, Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
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him at trial. Viewed through the discriminating lens of AEDPA deference, we
affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
After Charles pled guilty to attempted burglary of a habitation, aggravated
robbery, and aggravated kidnapping, his punishment was tried to a jury. The
State presented evidence that on October 5, 2000, Charles and an accomplice
donned ski masks, armed themselves with a pistol and a shotgun, and attempted
to rob a pharmacy before they were thwarted by the armed pharmacist.
Undeterred, later that night Charles and a group of men accosted Guillermo
Perez and his girlfriend, Viviana Diaz, in a park in Jacinto City, Texas. They
beat Perez and Diaz, stole both of their cars, and kidnapped Diaz. The men
attempted to rob Diaz of her jewelry. They later beat her, and two of them,
including Charles, raped her.
Shortly afterward, a police officer who was investigating the attempted
pharmacy robbery observed two men throwing a woman into the trunk of their
car. The suspects led the officer on a high speed chase after they saw him.
Charles and his accomplices eventually abandoned their cars and fled on foot.
Diaz was rescued. Tips led the police to arrest Charles and the others several
days later. Diaz became pregnant due to the rape and underwent an abortion.
Charles testified in his own defense, as did twelve character witnesses,
some of whom were relatives. Charles testified that, although he did attempt to
rob the pharmacy and was remorseful, he was intoxicated from codeine pills and
slept in an accomplice’s car throughout the robbery of Perez and Diaz,
kidnapping, and rape. Charles denied that he had been expelled from school for
chasing another student with a knife, walking out of class, and acting
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disrespectfully toward school personnel. He also insisted that Texas Ranger
Andrew Carter and an accomplice, Marcos Ramirez, were lying when each stated
that Charles admitted hitting Diaz and said he intended to kill her.
Having been certified for punishment as an adult, Charles was sentenced
by the jury to concurrent terms of three years probation for attempted burglary,1
fifteen years imprisonment for aggravated robbery, and forty years
imprisonment for aggravated kidnapping. His convictions were affirmed on
direct appeal by the Fourteenth Court of Appeals of Texas and the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Charles filed a state habeas application challenging the aggravated
robbery and aggravated kidnapping sentences because of ineffective assistance
of counsel. The specific claims of ineffectiveness relevant to this appeal are:
1. Failure to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument asking the jury to
sentence Charles to forty-eight years imprisonment based on Texas parole
law.
2. Failure to object to Texas Ranger Andrew Carter’s testimony that he “felt
like he [Charles] was minimizing his role” in the crimes when Carter
interviewed Charles.
3. Failure to object to Ranger Carter’s testimony about Charles’s unrecorded
admission that he hit Viviana Diaz.
4. Eliciting Charles’s direct testimony that he had been expelled from school
for fighting, and failure to object to the prosecutor’s cross-examination
1
Charles does not contest, and we therefore do not address, the sentence for
attempted burglary. The attempted burglary occurred two months before the night in
question, when Charles broke into the home of his friend’s grandmother. He was apprehended
immediately. See Charles v. State, 146 S.W.3d 204, 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
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about the school misconduct when the prosecutor based his questions upon
school officials’ statements.
5. Failure to object to the prosecutor’s question asking what Charles would
say if he knew that co-defendant Marcos Ramirez told police Charles
intended to kill Diaz.
6. Failure to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument telling the jurors to
“think about this. You could be in the same situation as Ms. Diaz. Let me
ask you this: Could it be you or your daughter being in the same situation
as that girl?”
The state habeas court found that Charles’s counsel was constitutionally
deficient in one regard—failing to object to improper closing argument about
parole law—but it determined that Charles was not prejudiced and thus denied
habeas relief. See In re Charles, No. 873406-A (262d Dist. Ct., Harris County,
Tex. Jul. 31, 2008). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed without
written order.
Charles then petitioned for federal habeas relief. The federal magistrate
judge agreed with the state court’s deficiency finding but also found counsel
deficient on additional grounds: (1) his failure to object to Ranger Carter’s
testimony that Charles had minimized his role in the offenses and (2) the
prosecutor’s questions based upon non-testifying co-defendant Ramirez’s
statement that Charles intended to kill Diaz. The magistrate judge found no
ultimate prejudice to Charles, however, and the district court adopted the
magistrate’s recommendations to deny relief but also to grant a COA. Charles
now appeals.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In a habeas corpus appeal, we review the district court’s findings of fact
for clear error and review its conclusions of law de novo, applying the same
standard of review to the state court’s decision as the district court.” Evans v.
Cain, 577 F.3d 620, 622 (5th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). The standard of
review applied by the district court was, correctly, whether the state court’s
adjudication
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State Court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). A state court decision is “contrary” to the Supreme
Court’s clearly established precedent if it applies a legal rule contradictory to
that set forth by the Court or arrives at a result different from the Court’s cases
on materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06,
120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519 (2000). A state court decision “unreasonably applies” the
Supreme Court’s clearly established precedent if it correctly identifies the legal
rule but applies it in an objectively unreasonable manner to the facts. Id. at
407–09, 120 S. Ct. at 1520–21.
The relevant legal rule is the standard of Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), which requires a habeas petitioner alleging
ineffective counsel to show (1) that counsel’s performance was “deficient,”
meaning he committed “errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” and (2) that the
deficient performance “prejudiced” the defense, meaning the “errors were so
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serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”
Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Deficiency is measured by the “reasonableness”
of attorney performance under “prevailing professional norms,” id. at 688,
104 S. Ct. at 2065, and review is accompanied by a strong presumption that
counsel’s performance was adequate and the product of reasoned trial strategy.
Dale v. Quarterman, 553 F.3d 876, 880 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Prejudice in the state sentencing context turns on whether, “absent counsel’s
errors, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant’s sentence would
have been ‘significantly less harsh’ . . . .” Id. (quoting Spriggs v. Collins,
993 F.2d 85, 88–89 (5th Cir. 1993)).
DISCUSSION
In accordance with the COA, we consider each of Charles’s claims of error.
I. Failure to Object to Prosecutor’s Closing Argument on Texas
Parole Law
In his closing argument, the prosecutor asked the jury to sentence Charles
to forty-eight years imprisonment because, under Texas parole law, Charles
might serve only half of his sentence and would need to serve 24 years before he
turned forty (the age at which the prosecutor believed recidivism unlikely). In
Texas, a prosecutor is not authorized to inform the jury during the punishment
phase about how parole laws could affect the defendant’s time served in prison.
See, e.g., Chester v. State, 167 S.W.3d 935 (Tex. App. 2005). The state habeas
court found Charles’s counsel deficient for failing to object, the district court
agreed, and the state acknowledges prosecutorial error.
The state court found, however, that defense counsel’s failure to object did
not prejudice Charles because his sentence was based on the specific facts of his
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case and was proportionate to the heinous nature of his crimes. The district
court found this to be a reasonable application of Strickland because
(1) Charles’s sentences were in the bottom half and fourth of the respective
punishment ranges for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery; (2) his
sentences were less than the prosecutor urged in the improper parole law
argument; and (3) the combination of aggravating and mitigating factors
justified the sentences.
The pertinent inquiry is whether the state court reasonably concluded
that, absent the prosecutor’s improper argument concerning parole law, there
was no reasonable probability that Charles’s sentences would have been
significantly less harsh. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct.
at 2068. Charles argues that the 40-year sentence was extremely harsh for a
juvenile who had no prior record and was eligible for probation. He contends
that if the punishment assessed in relationship to the maximum sentence is “all
that matters,” no petitioner charged with a first degree felony in Texas, which
carries a maximum of 99 years or life, will ever be able to show prejudice.
Further, because sentences greater than sixty years are treated as 60-year
sentences for purposes of calculating parole eligibility, Charles’s 40-year
kidnapping sentence was just twenty years shy of the effective maximum.
Charles’s arguments are unavailing. First, contrary to his claim, a
comparison of his sentences to the allowed maximums is not “all that matters.”
The Strickland prejudice inquiry in this context “tak[es] into account ‘such
factors as . . . the potential minimum and maximum sentences that could have
been received, [and] the placement of the actual sentence within the range of
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potential sentences . . . .’” Dale, 553 F.3d at 880 (citations omitted). Both the
state court and the federal district court explicitly considered the aggravating
factors present in Charles’s vicious crimes. Moreover, Charles’s argument that
the 40-year sentence was twenty years less than the maximum sentence
permitted in parole calculations in no way establishes that, but for counsel’s
deficiency, the sentence would have been “significantly less harsh.”
Second, the jury was instructed not to consider the effect of parole law on
Charles’s sentence; Charles presents no reason to overcome the usual
presumption that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions. See Galvan v.
Cockrell, 293 F.3d 760, 765 (5th Cir. 2002). That the jury did not sentence
Charles in accordance with the prosecutor’s request of 48 years also supports the
conclusion that the jury was not influenced by the improper parole argument.
The state court thus reasonably concluded that there was no reasonable
probability that Charles would have received a significantly less harsh sentence
had the prosecutor not made an improper parole argument.
II. Failure to Object to Testimony that Charles “minimized” his Role
Texas Ranger Andrew Carter, who interviewed Charles during detention,
testified that he “felt like [Charles] was minimizing his role” in the crimes.
Charles asserts that this testimony was inadmissible and prejudicial opinion
testimony from a law enforcement officer, and that his counsel was deficient in
failing to object.
The state habeas court disagreed on the admissibility of this testimony,
finding it to represent a permissible lay opinion “since it was (i) rationally based
upon Carter’s investigation into the offenses, knowledge of the co-defendants’
statements, and personal perceptions from his interview with” Charles, and
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“(ii) helpful to the jury in determining an issue of fact.” Moreover, the habeas
court held that in any event, Charles had failed to present any evidence of
prejudice suffered from his attorney’s failure to object.
The federal district court, however, disagreed as to counsel’s deficiency
because it disagreed with the state court’s interpretation of Texas evidence law.
The federal court believed that Texas does not allow evidence of one witness’s
opinion about the credibility of another witness. See, e.g., Arzaga v. State,
86 S.W.3d 767 (Tex. App. 2002).
We reject the district court’s conclusion. Because the state determined
that Carter’s testimony was permissible lay opinion under state evidentiary law
notwithstanding his comment on Charles’s attitude, a federal habeas court may
not conclude otherwise. See Schaetzle v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d 440, 448–49 (5th Cir.
2003) (“[W]e defer to [the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’s] determination of
state law. ‘It is not our function as a federal appellate court in a habeas
proceeding to review a state’s interpretation of its own law . . . .’”) (citation
omitted). See also Weeks v. Scott, 55 F.3d 1059, 1063 (5th Cir. 1995) (same);
Moreno v. Estelle, 717 F.2d 171, 178–79 (5th Cir. 1983) (same). Under § 2254,
federal habeas courts sit to review state court misapplications of federal law. A
federal court lacks authority to rule that a state court incorrectly interpreted its
own law. When, as here, a state court’s legal conclusions are affirmed by the
highest court in that state, those conclusions are state law.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ failure to explain the reasons for its
affirmance does not change the analysis. We have held only that when the state
courts fail to address the merits of a Strickland deficiency claim by deciding the
prejudice prong of the inquiry alone, the federal courts owe no AEDPA deference
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on the deficiency prong. See, e.g., Henderson v. Cockrell, 333 F.3d 592, 601 (5th
Cir. 2003). In White v. Thaler, 610 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2010), for example, we
concluded that the Strickland deficiency determination of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”) did not merit AEDPA deference because the court
“assumed without deciding that counsel’s performance was deficient.” 610 F.3d
at 899 (emphasis in original). Pursuant to Henderson, this court became free of
AEDPA deference on the first Strickland prong.
The instant case differs from White. Here, the state habeas court explicitly
concluded that Charles could satisfy neither Strickland prong. That is, the state
habeas court held Charles’s counsel did not perform deficiently, and even if he
did, Charles suffered no prejudice. The TCCA affirmed. That is sufficient for
AEDPA deference to attach. As we have held previously, it is the state court’s
“ultimate decision” that is to be tested for unreasonableness. Neal v. Puckett,
286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). Therefore, “the test is whether the
state court’s decision – that [Charles] did not make the Strickland showing – was
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the standards, provided by the
clearly established federal law (Strickland), for succeeding on his”
ineffectiveness claim. Schaetzle, 343 F.3d at 444 (emphasis in original).1
1
Schaetzle reviewed a habeas claim for ineffective assistance due to counsel’s failure
to raise an issue on direct appeal, but contrary to Charles’s argument, this court deferred to
the state court’s interpretation of state law in assessing the conclusion that no prejudice
occurred. Charles’s reliance upon Ward v. Dretke, 420 F.3d 479, 494 (5th Cir. 2005) is also
unpersuasive. That court did not, as Charles states, “conclude[ ] that the federal courts were
required to conduct an independent analysis of state law because counsel’s failure to object to
irrelevant and prejudicial evidence at the punishment stage impacted the defendant’s federal
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Ward examined the requirements
of state evidentiary law, but there was no suggestion that the state habeas court had made a
contrary ruling on admissibility. The issue upon which the state habeas court and the federal
court disagreed was whether allowing the inadmissible evidence was reasonable strategy, an
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Charles is not entitled to relief based on his counsel’s failure to object to Carter’s
testimony. The testimony was admissible; counsel did not err.
III. Failure to Object to Carter’s Testimony That Charles Confessed to
Hitting Diaz
Carter testified that Charles admitted he hit Diaz.2 That admission,
however, was not recorded by the interrogation equipment. Charles argues that
his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to that testimony. We disagree.
Texas law provides that “[n]o oral . . . statement of an accused made as a
result of custodial interrogation shall be admissible against the accused in a
criminal proceeding unless: (1) an electronic recording . . . is made of the
statement . . . .” T EX. C ODE C RIM. P ROC. A NN. art. 38.22, § 3(a) (Vernon 2005).
The state court found no deficiency, however, because counsel’s decision not to
draw undue attention to Carter’s statement through an objection was a
reasonable strategy. See Walker v. United States, 433 F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir.
1970) (“Since an objection may tend to emphasize a particular remark to an
otherwise oblivious jury, the effect of objection may be more prejudicial than the
original remarks of opposing counsel.”). The district court noted that while such
a strategy may have been unwise, the state court did not unreasonably apply
Strickland due to the strong presumption in favor of finding reasonable
performance and the fact that this aspect of Carter’s testimony was very brief.
issue pertinent to federal constitutional law alone. Ward, 420 F.3d at 492.
2
“Q: Who made [Diaz] take off her clothes? Did he [Charles] say?
A: Well, in his statement he said ‘we’; but he did mention that she was acting dumb;
so he hit her.
Q: Who hit her?
A: Maurice Charles did.” R. at 164.
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Charles has provided no reason to doubt that conclusion. Charles points
out that Carter’s testimony may have seemed inconsistent with the defense
theory that Charles was a minor player in the crimes, but this argument does
not refute counsel’s explanation that he preferred not to draw attention to such
testimony. Charles contends that counsel’s strategy wrongly assumes jurors do
not pay attention to all testimony, but this is a dubious proposition at best, and
at worst reflects hindsight rather than the conscientious, reasoned effort of trial
counsel. Further, Charles misplaces reliance on Lyons v. McCotter, 770 F.2d
529, 534 (5th Cir. 1985). Lyons stated that “to pass over the admission of
prejudicial and clearly inadmissible evidence . . . has no strategic value,” but
Lyons sets forth no constitutional rule that counsel must make, or not overlook,
every possible objection to unfavorable testimony. Charles’s counsel reasonably
explained that Carter’s testimony was not prejudicial in light of his guilty pleas
to two violent crimes and his testimony denying that he hit Diaz. In fact, both
Perez and Diaz testified that they were hit by the assailant who fit Charles’s
description. Finally, the pre-trial motions in limine now urged by Charles were
not feasible because counsel could not have anticipated Carter’s testimony, and
his view that counsel should have objected outside the presence of the jury would
also have called undue attention to Carter’s testimony.
The state court’s conclusion that counsel made a reasonable strategic
decision not to object raises no Strickland concerns.
IV. Ineffectively Handling Testimony on Charles’s School Misconduct
Charles argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
(1) eliciting Charles’s testimony that he had been kicked out of school; and
(2) failing to object to the prosecutor’s cross-examination about the school
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misconduct. The state habeas court, affirmed by the TCCA, concluded under
Strickland that Charles’s counsel was not deficient, and in any case, Charles
showed no prejudice. These conclusions were not unreasonable.
1. Direct Examination
Charles asserts that his attorney was deficient because he elicited
Charles’s admission that he was expelled from school without any reason to
believe that the prosecution would or could offer evidence of the misconduct.
Trial counsel’s strategy, however, was to portray Charles as a good kid with a
nearly blameless past, a strategy that necessarily exposed Charles to cross-
examination regarding specific instances of misconduct. Knowing this, counsel
reasonably decided to “draw the sting” and appear honest to the jury by asking
about the misconduct on direct examination.
Charles’s first argument is that, pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure article 37.07, § 3(g), trial counsel should have requested notice of the
state’s intent to offer evidence of extraneous bad acts. Failing that, counsel had
no reason to expect the prosecutor to present evidence of school misconduct and
therefore seriously erred by offering unfavorable evidence from Charles himself.
As the district court correctly noted, article 37.07, § 3(g) requires notice only if
the state intends to offer extraneous acts evidence in its case-in-chief, not if it
does so in cross-examination and rebuttal. Jaubert v. State, 74 S.W.3d 1, 2–4
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Moreover, counsel explained that his entire purpose was to show that
Charles had never been arrested or convicted before. This was a reasonable
strategy, although it required candor about Charles’s school record and risked
cross-examination about the specific details of his school misconduct. According
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to counsel’s affidavit, Charles led counsel to believe that his only school
misconduct was fighting. Apparently, Charles did not reveal the other trouble
the prosecutor referred to, such as chasing another student with a knife,
showing disrespect to school personnel, and leaving class without permission.
The reasonableness of counsel’s representation may depend on the information
provided by the defendant. See Bryant v. Scott, 28 F.3d 1411, 1415 (5th Cir.
1994). Under these circumstances, the state court did not misapply Strickland.
In any event, counsel defused the impact of this testimony by pointing out the
state’s lack of proof of Charles’s misconduct as well as Charles’s denial of the
incidents.
2. Cross-Examination
Charles argues that, even if counsel’s direct examination was not deficient,
counsel’s failure to object to the prosecution’s cross-examination was deficient
because the prosecutor asked Charles, “Why would the school tell us they did?”
when Charles denied the events the state raised. Charles argues that this
statement was hearsay and violated the Confrontation Clause and that the
prosecutor could not prove the extraneous acts beyond a reasonable doubt.
Charles’s contention fails. Counsel was not deficient for failing to object
to a proper question. Otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence may be offered
to impeach the defendant on a topic to which he has opened the door, and no
violation of the Confrontation Clause arises. See Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d
267, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); McClenton v. State, 167 S.W.3d 86, 94 (Tex.
App. 2005).
Finally, even if Charles’s counsel should have objected to this cross-
examination, Charles suffered no prejudice. Defense counsel argued at closing
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that the state had presented no evidence of Charles’s school misconduct, and the
jury was instructed that it could not consider such evidence if not proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. Our presumption is that the jury followed this instruction.
See Galvan, 293 F.3d at 765. The state court did not unreasonably deny habeas
relief for counsel’s approach to Charles’s alleged misconduct in school.
V. Failure to Object to Cross-Examination Regarding Ramirez
During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Charles what he would
say if he knew that co-defendant Marcos Ramirez told police Charles intended
to kill Viviana Diaz.3 Charles contends that his attorney’s failure to object to
this question constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The state habeas
court found that the prosecutor’s questions were not improper and that counsel
was not ineffective for failing to object. The state habeas court found further
that even if counsel had been deficient, Charles demonstrated no prejudice. The
federal district court disagreed, however, and held that counsel was deficient in
failing to object because the questions contained hearsay under Texas law and
violated the Sixth amendment confrontation clause.
In this instance, the district court was wrong. First, the Confrontation
Clause does not apply in the context of non-capital sentencing. See United States
v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 332 n.20 (5th Cir. 2007). Second, the state court held
that the prosecutor’s questions were proper, and the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed that conclusion. As has been earlier explained, that legal
3
“Q: What would you say, sir, if I told you that Marcos told the police that you were
going to kill that girl?
A: I don’t have anything to tell you ‘cause I didn’t say it.
Q: So Marcos is lying?
A: Yes, sir.” State Trial R. at Vol. 4, p. 62–63.
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conclusion of state evidentiary law is entitled to deference. Charles makes no
allegation that the state court unreasonably applied the facts underlying this
conclusion. Thus, the state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland’s
deficiency prong.
VI. Failure to Object to the “Same Situation” Closing Argument
Charles argues next that his counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s
closing remarks rendered his counsel ineffective. The prosecutor urged the jury:
“[T]hink about this. You could be in the same situation as Ms. Diaz. Let me ask
you this: Could it be you or your daughter being in the same situation as that
girl?” The state court determined, and the district court agreed, that under
Texas law this argument constituted a proper plea for law enforcement and a
plea to understand the pain and suffering experienced by the victim, not an
improper plea to consider how the victim would want the defendant punished or
to punish the defendant as if he had attacked the juror or his family. See Torres
v. State, 92 S.W.3d 911, 920 (Tex. App. 2002, pet. ref’d) (approving “I want you
to close your eyes and think of how that young man felt.”); Linder v. State,
828 S.W.2d 290, 302–03 (Tex. App. 1992, pet. ref’d.) (approving “Can you
imagine what it was like to be that woman?”). Cf. Williams v. State, 732 S.W.2d
762, 765 (Tex. App. 1987, no pet.) (disapproving “Place yourself in the shoes of
the victim, the most personal violation of her body. How would you feel? What
would you want?”).
The district court properly deferred to the state court’s determination of
state law. The state court’s application of Strickland was correct.
VII. Cumulative Effect of Prejudice
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Finally, Charles argues that taken together, the alleged errors about
which he complains rendered the state court sentencing proceeding invalid. The
state habeas court found one instance of ineffective assistance of counsel – the
failure to object to the prosecution’s mention of Texas parole law – but it
concluded that the prejudice from that violation was not sufficient to overcome
Strickland’s high threshold for reversal. We agree. There are no additional
instances of ineffective action by counsel that must be cumulated.
CONCLUSION
The state habeas court issued a holding as to each Strickland prong for all
Charles’s claims. Those conclusions are entitled to AEDPA deference. Because
the state court did not apply Strickland in an objectively unreasonable manner,
Charles is not entitled to habeas relief. The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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