In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 09-3719
N ONA R AY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
C ITY OF C HICAGO AND C HICAGO P OLICE
O FFICER M ALINOWSKI #7028,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 08 CV 7274—James B. Zagel, Judge.
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 16, 2010—D ECIDED JANUARY 5, 2011
Before C UDAHY, R OVNER and E VANS, Circuit Judges.
C UDAHY, Circuit Judge. In October 2008, Malinowski,
a police officer, stopped Nona Ray for operating a motor
vehicle at night without headlights. During this stop,
Malinowski and his partner discovered a package con-
taining controlled substances within Ray’s car. The
officers arrested Ray and took her to a nearby police
station, where she was detained for several hours
before being charged with possession of a controlled
2 No. 09-3719
substance and subsequently released. Ray later filed
suit against the City of Chicago and police officer
Malinowski, alleging that their actions violated the Con-
stitution’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures and
deprived her of her rights to due process and equal
protection under the law.
The district court dismissed Ray’s claims for failure
to allege facts sufficient to support a finding that her
constitutional rights had been violated. We affirm.
I. Background
On October 17, 2008, Malinowski observed Ray oper-
ating an automobile at night without its headlights
turned on. Malinowski and his partner pulled Ray over,
instructing Ray and her passenger to leave the vehicle.
Shortly thereafter, Malinowski or his partner discovered
a plastic bag containing what they believed to be
cocaine inside Ray’s car. The officers placed Ray under
arrest and took her to a nearby police station, where
she was eventually charged with possession of a con-
trolled substance. The exact length of Ray’s detention
is unclear, however the parties’ pleadings agree that
Ray was detained for several hours. The criminal
charge against Ray for possession was dropped at her
first court appearance.
Pursuant to Section 7-24-225 of the Municipal Code
of Chicago, Malinowski impounded Ray’s vehicle fol-
lowing her arrest. Section 7-24-225 of the Code provides
that, when arresting individuals for possession of a con-
No. 09-3719 3
trolled substance in a motor vehicle, police officers
“shall provide for the towing of the vehicle to a facility
controlled by the city” and that “the owner of record
of any motor vehicle that contains any controlled
substance . . . shall be liable to the city for an administra-
tive penalty . . . plus any applicable towing and storage
fees.”
On November 19, 2008, Ray contested the seizure of
her vehicle at a proceeding before the City of Chicago’s
Department of Administrative Hearings (DOAH). She
argued that she had been unaware that there were drugs
in her car, that the drugs did not belong to her and,
hence, that she should not have to pay the statutory fine
or the costs associated with impounding her vehicle.
The City’s counsel argued that the ordinance imposed
strict liability on the owners of vehicles that contain
controlled substances. At the conclusion of the pro-
ceeding, the hearing officer agreed with the City’s inter-
pretation of the ordinance and entered a finding ordering
Ray to pay $2,180 in fees and costs.
On December 12, 2008, Ray filed a complaint against
the City of Chicago and Officer Malinowski in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Ray’s
complaint alleged that she was deprived of rights
secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. It
also included a supplemental state claim seeking ad-
ministrative review of the DOAH’s finding, as well as
a challenge to the constitutionality of the ordinance.
On October 7, 2009, the district court granted defen-
dants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. The district court
4 No. 09-3719
found that Ray’s complaint failed to allege facts sufficient
to support any of her claims for relief. Ray currently
appeals from the district court’s dismissal of her claims.
II. Discussion
We apply the de novo standard when reviewing a
district court’s determination that a plaintiff has failed
to state a claim for which relief can be granted, accepting
as true all well-pleaded allegations and drawing all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Bielanski v.
County of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 2008). How-
ever, we “need not accept as true legal conclusions, or
threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements.” Brooks v.
Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Complaints need
only provide a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” that is
“sufficient to provide the defendant with fair notice of
the claim and its basis.” Windy City Metal Fabricators &
Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663,
667 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007)). While the federal pleading standard is
quite forgiving, our recent decisions have emphasized
that “the complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d
461, 463 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___,
129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)).
Ray contends that the district court erred when it dis-
missed her complaint. Our review of the district court’s
No. 09-3719 5
decision is somewhat complicated by the vague and
inarticulate claims for relief that are set forth in Ray’s
complaint and the variety of ways that her counsel
has interpreted these claims over time. Yet, because
we find that Ray has failed to plead facts that are
sufficient to support any of the claims she could have
plausibly meant to assert, we affirm the district court’s
judgment.
A. Claims Based on Ray’s Arrest and Post-Arrest
Detention
Ray’s complaint appears to allege that the police vio-
lated her Fourth Amendment rights when they arrested
and detained her. On appeal, Ray has clarified the bases
of her claim, arguing (1) that her arrest constituted an
illegal seizure because the police officers lacked probable
cause to believe that she was guilty of possessing a con-
trolled substance and (2) that the officers detained her
for an unreasonably long period of time after arresting her.
The district court did not err in dismissing Ray’s arrest-
related claim. Where a police officer “has probable cause
to believe that an individual has committed even a very
minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without
violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). This
is true even if the minor criminal offense is a traffic
offense. United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 953 (7th Cir.
2002) (en banc). So long as a police officer has probable
cause to believe that a person has committed a crime,
then it is not constitutionally relevant whether “the
6 No. 09-3719
person was arrested on . . . charges for which there was
no probable cause.” Holmes v. City of Hoffman Estates,
511 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2007). Ray has conceded that
she committed a traffic violation in the presence of
Malinowski and his partner. Under Atwater and Childs,
this provided the police with all of the probable cause
they needed to arrest Ray without violating the Fourth
Amendment. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 324-25.
The district court’s dismissal of Ray’s post-arrest de-
tention claim was also proper. Ray is correct in asserting
that the law does not grant police officers carte blanche
after issuing a traffic citation to detain a motorist to
investigate other possible criminal activity. United States
v. Figueroa-Espana, 511 F.3d 696, 702-03 (7th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275 (7th Cir. 1996).
Indeed, we have held that in such situations the police
are required to release individuals “as soon as the
officers have assured themselves that no skullduggery
is afoot.” Childs, 277 F.3d at 952. The rules are con-
siderably different, however, when police officers
actually arrest an individual—such individuals “need not
be released as quickly as possible.” Id. at 952. A person
arrested without a warrant may be held prior to a
judicial determination of probable cause for a “brief
period” to carry out “the administrative steps incident
to arrest.” Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740,
746 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
113-14 (1975)). When considering this issue in a case
presenting analogous facts, we held that detention
times ranging from three to fourteen and one-half
hours were not constitutionally unreasonable absent
No. 09-3719 7
any evidence that the delay in releasing the arrested
individuals was motivated by an improper purpose.
Chortek, 356 F.3d at 747-48. Because Ray has not
alleged that the length of her detention exceeded this
time frame or that it was the result of illicit motives, she
has failed to state a claim for which we can grant relief.
B. Claims Based on Ray’s Allegedly Malicious Pros-
ecution
Ray’s complaint contains a claim that could be inter-
preted to include an allegation that Defendants vio-
lated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by
causing her to be charged with possession of a controlled
substance. On appeal, Ray has argued that her com-
plaint states that the police planted the drugs that pro-
vided the basis for Ray’s possession charge and, hence,
that it alleges facts sufficient to support a malicious
prosecution tort claim.
The district court decision to dismiss this claim was
correct. Federal courts are rarely the appropriate forum
for malicious prosecution claims. We have previously
stated that individuals do not have a “federal right not
to be summoned into court and prosecuted without
probable cause, under either the Fourth Amendment or
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Procedural Due Process
Clause.” Tully v. Barada, 599 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2010).
See also Bielanski, 550 F.3d at 638-42 (“[T]he interest in
not being prosecuted groundlessly is not an interest that
the Fourth Amendment protects.”) (internal citations
omitted). While we have also held that we will allow
8 No. 09-3719
individuals to bring Section 1983 malicious prosecution
suits when the relevant state’s law does not provide
them with a way to pursue such claims, Newsome v.
McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 750-51 (7th Cir. 2001), Illinois law
recognizes tort claims for malicious prosecution. See
Swick v. Linutard, 662 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Ill. 1996). Hence,
it was appropriate for the district court to refuse to
hear Ray’s claims and conclude that the appropriate
venue for her claims is Illinois state court.
On appeal, Ray has attempted to recast the malicious
prosecution claim set forth in her complaint as a Brady
claim, but even if she had originally presented the
district court with a Brady claim, it too would have
been properly dismissed. Ever since the Supreme Court’s
decision in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), we
have permitted individuals to file Section 1983 suits
alleging that they have been denied a fair trial because
the state has failed to provide them with access to
material exculpatory evidence. See Newsome, 256 F.3d at
752. Ray has failed to identify a single instance, how-
ever, where we have allowed such suits when the indi-
vidual is merely charged with a crime, but never fully
prosecuted. See, e.g., Garcia v. City of Chicago, 24 F.3d 966,
971-72 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that there was no basis
for a Brady claim where the charges against an individual
were nolle prossed); Pope v. City of Chicago, No. 08-c-4715,
2009 WL 811625, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2009) (“The rule
against bringing malicious prosecution claims . . . cannot
be avoided by mischaracterizing malicious prosecution
claims based on providing false information . . . as Brady
violations for failing to disclose that the information is
No. 09-3719 9
false.”) (citing Gauger v. Hendle, 349 F.3d 354, 360 (7th
Cir. 2003)). Because Ray concedes that the charges
against her were dropped at her first post-arrest court
appearance, her claim falls outside of the exception recog-
nized in Brady. As Ray has not identified any other excep-
tion that would save her from the general bar against
malicious prosecution claims, we are left to conclude
that the district court was correct in finding her claim to
be irreparably flawed.
C. Claims Concerning Section 7-24-225 of the Municipal
Code of Chicago
Finally, Ray’s complaint asserts a supplemental state
claim, pursuant to Illinois’ Administrative Review Act,
735 ILCS 5/301 et seq. (2010), seeking review of the
DOAH’s finding that Ray was liable under Section 7-24-225
of the Municipal Code of Chicago. Ray has argued that
her claim also includes a direct challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the ordinance. On appeal, Ray raises only one
argument concerning the district court’s ruling. She
contends that we should reverse the district court’s
ruling because the court inappropriately considered
materials outside of the complaint—a transcript of the
DOAH hearing—when deciding whether to dismiss her
claims.
Ray’s argument suffers from several problems. First, it
is well established that district courts may take judicial
notice of certain documents—including records of admin-
istrative actions—when deciding motions to dismiss. See,
e.g., Fornalik v. Perryman, 223 F.3d 523, 529 (7th Cir. 2000);
10 No. 09-3719
Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d
1074, 1080 (7th Cir. 1997). Hence, even if the district court
had relied on the hearing transcript when deciding
whether it should dismiss Ray’s claim, it is not apparent
that its actions would have constituted error. Second, a
review of the district court’s opinion establishes that
its decision was not based on the transcript, but on
Ray’s failure to plead “facts to support her allega-
tion[s] that the challenged ordinance is unconstitu-
tional . . . [and that] the finding of the Dept. of Administra-
tive Hearings is arbitrary, unreasonable, and against
the manifest weight.” Because the district court’s deci-
sion to dismiss Ray’s claim was based on deficiencies
that it found in her complaint and her only argument on
appeal focuses exclusively on issues related to the tran-
script, she has failed to identify grounds for reversal.
Finally, our own independent assessment of the suf-
ficiency of Ray’s complaint leads us to the same conclu-
sion as the district court. The complaint simply does not
contain allegations of fact sufficient to support Ray’s
claims that DOAH’s findings were arbitrary or that the
ordinance is unconstitutional.
III. Conclusion
For all of the reasons set forth above, the ruling of the
district court is
A FFIRMED.
1-5-11