United States v. Lee

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-10926 FEBRUARY 2, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 1:07-cr-00071-DHB-WLB-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SHAWNTRAIL J. LEE,
a.k.a. Billy Darkside,
a.k.a. Jathen Lee,
a.k.a. Jermaine Wilder,
a.k.a. Shawn Lee,
a.k.a. Rahshaun Frost,

Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________

(February 2, 2011)

Before WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and BUCKLEW,* District Judge.

_________________
* Honorable Susan C. Bucklew, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida,
sitting by designation.
BUCKLEW, District Judge:

Appellant Shawntrail J. Lee appeals his sentence of 120 months’

imprisonment, after a jury found him guilty of one count of being a felon in

possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The district court

sentenced Lee as a career offender under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Section

2K2.1(a)(2), after finding that he had two prior felony convictions for crimes of

violence. At issue is whether the district court erred in ruling that Lee’s prior New

Jersey felony convictions for eluding police in the second degree and for

conspiracy to commit armed robbery were crimes of violence, as defined in

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), for purposes of the career offender enhancement.

I. Background

Lee was indicted on one count of possession of a firearm and ammunition

by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). A jury found Lee guilty, and he was

initially sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment, after the district court

determined that he was an armed career criminal with three prior violent felony

convictions under New Jersey law: “walkaway” escape, eluding police in the

second degree, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery.

Lee appealed that conviction and sentence. This Court affirmed the

conviction, but vacated and remanded for resentencing, holding that one of Lee’s

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three prior felony convictions–the “walkaway” escape–was not a violent felony

under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) of the Armed Career Criminal Act. United

States v. Lee, 586 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2009). The Court declined to address the

eluding and conspiracy predicate convictions in that opinion. Id. at 874 n.11.

On remand, the probation officer prepared an amended presentence

investigation report, in which she categorized Lee’s eluding and conspiracy

convictions as crimes of violence. Because Lee had two predicate convictions for

crimes of violence, the probation officer recommended that he be sentenced as a

career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2).

At the re-sentencing hearing, Lee objected that his offense of eluding police

in the second degree was not a crime of violence. The district court also permitted

Lee to adopt and incorporate an objection that he lodged at the original sentencing

hearing that the government had not established that his prior conviction for

conspiracy involved the underlying offense of armed robbery, and that,

nevertheless, the conviction did not constitute a crime of violence.

The district court overruled these objections and found that the New Jersey

crime of eluding in the second degree was categorically a crime of violence

because the crime is defined as a flight or attempt to elude police that “creates a

risk of death or injury to any person.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-2b. The district

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court also reincorporated its finding at the original sentencing hearing that

sufficient judicial records from New Jersey established that Lee’s prior conviction

for conspiracy involved the underlying offense of armed robbery, and that such

conviction categorically constituted a crime of violence.

Lee was sentenced to the statutory maximum of 120 months, pursuant to 18

U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Lee challenges his 120 month sentence on the grounds that the district court

erred in finding that his prior New Jersey convictions for eluding police in the

second degree and for conspiracy to commit armed robbery were crimes of

violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). This Court reviews de novo whether a

defendant's prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under the U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Harris, 586 F.3d 1283, 1284 (11th Cir.

2009).

Under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Section 2K2.1(a)(2), felons receive a

base offense level of 24 if they committed a firearm offense “subsequent to

sustaining at least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a

controlled substance offense.” The Sentencing Guidelines provide the following

definition:

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 The term “crime of violence” means any offense under federal or state
law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that–
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another, or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves
use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). The phrase, “or otherwise involves conduct that presents a

serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” is referred to as the “residual

provision,” or residual clause. Harris, 586 F.3d at 1285. This appeal addresses

whether Lee’s prior violations of New Jersey’s eluding and conspiracy statutes,

N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:29-2b and 2C:5-2, fall under the residual clause.

We follow a three-step inquiry for determining whether a prior conviction

constitutes a crime of violence under the residual clause:

First, what is the relevant category of crime, determined by looking to
how the crime is ordinarily committed? Second, does that crime pose
a “serious potential risk of physical injury” that is similar in degree to
the risks posed by the enumerated crimes? Third, is that crime similar
in kind to the enumerated crimes?

United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280, 1287 (11th Cir. 2009). In making this

determination, we use the “categorical approach,” which “looks only to the fact of

conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense without examining

particular facts disclosed by the record of conviction.” United States v. Whitson,

5
597 F.3d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citations, internal quotations,

and alterations omitted).1

A. Eluding Police in the Second Degree

In Harris, this Court considered whether the second degree felony of

willfully fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer under Florida law, a crime

which required that the defendant drive at high speed or “demonstrate[] a wanton

disregard for the safety of persons or property,” constituted a crime of violence

under the Sentencing Guidelines. 586 F.3d at 1284 (quoting Fla. Stat. §

316.1935(3)(a)). Using the three-step inquiry listed above to analyze the crime as

it is ordinarily committed, the Court determined that the Florida offense was a

crime of violence because it was clear from the face of the statute that it was

similar in kind and degree of risk to the enumerated crimes. Id. at 1288. The

Court reasoned that “[f]leeing from the police at high speed or with ‘a wanton

disregard for the safety of persons or property’ does indeed ‘show an increased

likelihood that the offender is the kind of person who might deliberately point the

gun and pull the trigger.’” Id. (quoting Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(3)(a) and Begay v.

1
However, a court may examine the underlying facts of the conviction, if “ambiguities in the
judgment make the crime of violence determination impossible from the face of the judgment
itself.” Harris, 586 F.3d at 1286 n.1 (quoting United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 842–43
(11th Cir. 2009)).

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United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146, 128 S. Ct. 1581, 1587, 170 L. Ed. 2d 490

(2008)).

The Court determined that the act of fleeing the police was “undeniably

purposeful,” as willfulness is an explicit element of the statute. Harris, 586 F.3d

at 1288. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the offense was violent and aggressive

because, “[i]n the ‘ordinary case,’ roadways are populated by other travelers whom

the offender and the officer will have to avoid hitting in the course of a high speed

chase.” Id. (quoting James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208, 127 S. Ct. 1586,

1597, 167 L. Ed. 2d 532 (2007)). Thus, fleeing the police at high speed is “like

holding a weapon out, ready to fire,” or “[l]ike an arsonist lighting a fire without

regard for harm the fire may cause.” Id. at 1288–89.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court distinguished second degree eluding

from third degree eluding, a crime which the Court found not to be a violent

felony in United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2009). Id. at 1287.

In Harrison, the Court concluded that the Florida crime of third degree eluding, as

ordinarily committed, did not constitute a violent felony because it did not require

either high speed or a wanton disregard for safety, and therefore did not entail the

same high level of risk as the enumerated crimes. 558 F.3d at 1294.

Harris is instructive due to the similarities between the Florida and New

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Jersey crimes of second degree eluding.2 Here, the parties agree that Lee was

convicted under Section 2C:29-2b of the New Jersey Statutes, which reads:

Any person, while operating a motor vehicle on any street or highway
in this State . . . who knowingly flees or attempts to elude any police
or law enforcement officer after having received any signal from such
officer to bring the vehicle . . . to a full stop commits a crime of the
third degree; except that, a person is guilty of a crime of the second
degree if the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death or injury
to any person.

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-2b. We begin by reading the face of the statute “itself to

discern the crime as it is ordinarily committed.” Harris, 586 F.3d at 1288. This

statute contains elements that are very similar to the Florida second degree eluding

statute: (1) a law enforcement officer signals a motorist to stop; (2) the motorist

knowingly flees or attempts to elude the officer; and (3) the flight or attempt to

elude “creates a risk of death or injury to any person.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-2b.

We next “rely on our own common-sense analysis of whether this [crime]

poses a serious potential risk of physical injury.” United States v. Alexander, 609

F.3d 1250, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010). Like the Florida eluding statute, it is clear from

the face of the New Jersey statute that this crime presents a serious potential risk

2
The Court is also persuaded by caselaw from other circuits in which analogous state eluding
laws were found to be predicate offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). See
Harris, 586 F.3d at 1285, 1289 n.2 (listing cases and noting that the definition of a violent felony
under the ACCA is “virtually identical” to the definition of a crime of violence under the
Sentencing Guidelines).

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of physical injury that is similar in degree to the risks posed by the enumerated

crimes. This is because, like the Florida statute’s requirement that the flight be

committed with “a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property,” this

statute contains the essential element that the flight “creates a risk of death or

injury to any person.” Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(3)(a); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-2b.

Furthermore, the New Jersey crime of second degree eluding must be

committed “knowingly” after the motorist receives a signal from law enforcement,

and therefore, it involves a purposeful act. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-2b; see Harris,

586 F.3d at 1288 (noting that, because willfulness is an expressed element of the

Florida statute, this “suggests that the driver has seen the siren and lights of the

police car, recognized that the officer wanted him to stop, and deliberately

disobeyed the order in a dangerous fashion”). The New Jersey offense is also

necessarily violent and aggressive because it requires that the motorist flee law

enforcement in such a way that the flight “creates a risk of death or injury to any

person.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-2b; see Harris, 586 F.3d at 1288 (reasoning that

“[t]he offender who eludes a police officer at [high] speeds . . . necessarily poses a

powerful risk to the arresting officer, pedestrians, and other drivers and passengers

in their own cars”).

We reject Lee’s contention that, because second degree eluding under New

9
Jersey law criminalizes flight that creates a risk of injury to “any person,”

including the defendant himself, it is a strict liability offense that cannot qualify as

a crime of violence. Cf. United States v. Harris, 608 F.3d 1222, 1224 (11th Cir.

2010) (acknowledging “the holding of Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 143,

128 S. Ct. 1581, 1585, 170 L. Ed. 2d 490 (2008), that strict liability crimes are not

‘roughly similar’ to burglary, arson, extortion, or an offense involving the use of

explosives and therefore do not come within the residual clause”). We are

required to analyze how the crime is ordinarily committed. Harris, 586 F.3d at

1288. “In the ‘ordinary case,’ roadways are populated by other travelers whom the

offender and the officer will have to avoid hitting in the course of a high speed

chase.” Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, the motorist who knowingly flees from

law enforcement in such a way that the flight creates a risk of death or injury to

“any person” poses a risk not only to himself, but to other drivers, passengers,

pedestrians, and law enforcement officers.

In analyzing the New Jersey crime of second degree eluding as it is

ordinarily committed, we reach the same conclusion that we reached in Harris:

that knowingly fleeing law enforcement, when that flight creates a risk of death or

injury to any person, is categorically a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. §

4B1.2(a). As we stated in Harris, “[f]leeing at high speed or with wanton

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disregard for safety amounts to holding a finger on the trigger of a deadly weapon,

without care for whom the bullet may strike.” 586 F.3d at 1289.

B. Conspiracy to Commit Armed Robbery

The next issue is whether Lee’s felony conviction for conspiracy to commit

armed robbery, under New Jersey Statute Section 2C:5-2, qualifies as a crime of

violence under the residual clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). After the Court heard

oral arguments, the government conceded that Lee’s conspiracy conviction does

not qualify categorically as a crime of violence. With the government’s

concession in mind, the Court proceeds to address the merits of this issue.

The Court first must determine if the New Jersey crime of conspiracy to

commit armed robbery is a non-overt act conspiracy, or an overt act conspiracy.

This is because a “non-overt act conspiracy is not a section 4B1.1 ‘crime of

violence.’” Whitson, 597 F.3d at 1223 (emphasis added).3 “[C]riminal conspiracy

is only a ‘crime of violence’ if the conspiracy, in itself, involves conduct that is

purposeful, violent, and aggressive.” Id. at 1222. If the conspiracy does not

require an overt act, then there is no such “purposeful, violent, [or] aggressive

conduct” to make it a crime of violence under Begay. Id.

3
The district court conducted Lee’s re-sentencing hearing on February 18, 2010–one week
before Whitson was decided on February 24, 2010, and thus did not have the benefit of this case
when it considered whether the New Jersey conspiracy was a crime of violence.

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 The New Jersey criminal conspiracy statute provides the following:

A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to
commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its
commission he:
(1) Agrees with such other person or persons that they or
one or more of them will engage in conduct which
constitutes such crime . . . ; or
(2) Agrees to aid such other person or persons in the
planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt
or solicitation to commit such crime.

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:5-2a. Furthermore, regarding an overt act, the statute

provides:

No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit a crime other
than a crime of the first or second degree . . . unless an overt act in
pursuance of such conspiracy is proved to have been done by him or
by a person with whom he conspired.

Id. at d (emphasis added). In other words, if the object of the conspiracy is a crime

of the first or second degree, the state need not prove that the defendant committed

an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. State v. Scherzer, 694 A.2d 196, 214

(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (holding that “[w]hen the State prosecutes a

defendant for conspiracy to commit a first or second degree crime, it need not

prove that [the] defendant committed an overt act in pursuance of the

conspiracy”).

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 In New Jersey, armed robbery is a crime of the first degree.4 N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 2C:15-1b (providing that “[r]obbery is a crime of the second degree, except that

it is a crime of the first degree if in the course of committing the theft the actor . . .

is armed with . . . a deadly weapon”). Therefore, conspiracy to commit armed

robbery does not require an overt act under New Jersey law. And, because it is a

non-overt act conspiracy, under Whitson, it is also not a crime of violence under

the Sentencing Guidelines.

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred when it ruled that

Lee’s New Jersey conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery was

categorically a crime of violence.

III. Conclusion

Lee appeals his sentence of 120 months on the grounds that the district

court erred in finding that his prior New Jersey convictions for eluding police in

the second degree and for conspiracy to commit armed robbery were crimes of

violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). We conclude that the New Jersey felony of

eluding police in the second degree is a crime of violence, but that the New Jersey

4
At oral argument, Lee abandoned his position that the government had not established that
the conspiracy involved the underlying offense of armed robbery, a first degree offense. Lee in
fact conceded that the object of the conspiracy was robbery in at least the second degree. Proof
of an overt act is not required for conspiracy to commit either first or second degree robbery.
Scherzer, 694 A.2d at 214.

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felony of conspiracy to commit armed robbery is not. Accordingly, because Lee’s

conspiracy conviction is not a crime of violence, we VACATE his sentence, and

REMAND to the district court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

VACATED and REMANDED.

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