PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 09-5114
DAVID THOMAS CLENNEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
T. S. Ellis, III, Senior District Judge.
(1:09-cr-00135-TSE-1)
Argued: December 10, 2010
Decided: February 3, 2011
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and DUNCAN,
Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Shedd and Judge Duncan joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Marvin David Miller, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellant. Lisa Owings, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Heather Golias, LAW OFFICES OF MARVIN
2 UNITED STATES v. CLENNEY
D. MILLER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H.
MacBride, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellee.
OPINION
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
David Clenney appeals his conviction for possessing a fire-
arm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Finding no merit in
his various contentions, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.
I.
On March 12, 2009, David Clenney was indicted for pos-
session of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The charge resulted from a firearm found
in Clenney’s residence on January 30, 2009. Clenney filed a
motion to suppress the firearm. At the outset of the suppres-
sion hearing, the district court noted that Clenney was seeking
to adduce evidence that would show that the arrest and search
warrant applications included false statements or material
omissions that would defeat probable cause. Initially, the dis-
trict court told Clenney that he could not present such evi-
dence because he had not met the burden that would entitle
him to a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154
(1978). But the district court reversed course later in the day
and allowed Clenney to present the evidence, granting him a
Franks hearing "as a matter of grace and out of an abundance
of caution."
A.
The evidence presented at the hearing revealed the follow-
ing facts. On the morning of January 30, 2009, one Jaclyn
UNITED STATES v. CLENNEY 3
Doherty told Detective Michael Fernald of the Prince William
County Police Department that an unknown man called her
and claimed that he had her 2007 tax records. The caller told
Doherty that "he wanted to help everyone out by making
some money for himself" and also by getting drug money for
Gary Booher, the son of Doherty’s tax preparer, Patricia Boo-
her, and the man from whom the caller claimed to have
obtained the records. The caller explained that Gary Booher’s
brother, Blair Booher, had frequently stolen tax records of his
mother’s clients and then used the records to procure drug
money. And now Gary Booher was following in his brother’s
footsteps.
The caller also warned Doherty that he used to be an FBI
informant and knew that the police could not help her. The
caller refused to give Doherty his name, refused to meet with
her, and refused to provide her with her original tax returns,
offering instead only a copy. When Doherty asked the caller
to prove that he had her tax records, he did so by reading her
personal identifying information. But when the caller read the
line from her tax form stating that Doherty was employed by
Prince William County, he became noticeably nervous and
abruptly hung up the phone.
Doherty also explained that earlier that same day, her
mother, Carolyn Hawkins, had received a call from an
unknown person who told her that he obtained her tax records
from her tax preparer, Patricia Booher, and that he was inter-
ested in returning them to her. The caller did not ask for
money. Doherty stated that Hawkins "felt very comfortable
when she got off the phone with him, but she was a little
uneasy at why he called in the first place."
At this point, Detective Fernald asked Doherty to make a
recorded phone call to the number from which the caller had
called, which was listed on Doherty’s phone. During this
recorded call, the caller refused Doherty’s offer of money in
exchange for the records. But Doherty recognized a marked
4 UNITED STATES v. CLENNEY
change in the caller’s demeanor, from threatening in the first
call to conciliatory in the second.
Fernald continued his investigation and called the phone
number again, reaching the voicemail for a company called
AMC Design 6. Doherty indicated that the voice on the voice-
mail matched the voice of the man who had called her. Fer-
nald confirmed through phone records that this phone number
was the source of outgoing calls to Hawkins and Doherty. He
connected AMC Design 6 with an address on Wembley Cen-
tral Terrace in Loudoun County, Virginia, and he learned that
Clenney lived at that address.
After these steps in the investigation, Fernald obtained an
arrest warrant charging Clenney with attempted extortion.
Along with other officers, he arrested Clenney at his home at
approximately 6:00 p.m. Fernald read Clenney his Miranda
rights, which he waived, and Clenney suggested that they talk
in the living room. When Fernald entered the living room, he
noticed a Boost Mobile phone, which, according to the phone
records, was the make of the phone belonging to the phone
number from which the call to Doherty had originated. Fer-
nald then interviewed Clenney. Clenney admitted that he had
called Doherty and Hawkins that morning, and he further
explained that he had Doherty’s tax records in his basement.
After Clenney withheld consent to search the home, Fer-
nald left to obtain a search warrant. Several officers remained
behind with Clenney. The search warrant application was sup-
ported by Fernald’s affidavit, which included many of the
facts he had learned during the course of his investigation. At
approximately 8:05 p.m., the magistrate issued the warrant,
and Fernald notified the officers who had remained at the
home that they could begin the search. During the search, the
officers found a Crown Royal bag in the back of the closet.
An officer opened the bag and discovered a firearm, which
was seized because the officers knew Clenney was legally
prohibited from having a firearm.
UNITED STATES v. CLENNEY 5
At approximately 8:45 p.m., while the search was ongoing,
Fernald returned to the home. He turned on the Boost Mobile
phone he had seen earlier and, using his own phone, called the
number from which the call to Doherty had originated. The
Boost Mobile phone began to ring, confirming his suspicion
that the Doherty call had been made from that phone. Fernald
also asked Clenney about the firearm the other officers had
found, and Clenney admitted that it was his. The officers then
brought Clenney before a magistrate in Prince William
County at approximately 11:30 p.m.
B.
Following the suppression hearing, the district court denied
Clenney’s motion to suppress. Clenney later entered a condi-
tional guilty plea to the indictment. The plea agreement per-
mitted him to appeal the court’s adverse determinations
concerning the motion to suppress. Clenney now appeals
these rulings.
II.
Clenney argues that the arrest and search warrants were
invalid under Franks because the warrant applications con-
tained false statements and material omissions. But Clenney
is wrong on both counts. Detective Fernald made no false
statements in the warrant applications. And the facts Fernald
omitted were not material; their inclusion would not have
defeated probable cause.
A.
In Franks, the Supreme Court delineated the limited cir-
cumstances in which a defendant can attack a facially suffi-
cient warrant affidavit. 438 U.S. at 155-56. The Court set
forth a two-step process for defendants seeking to challenge
such affidavits. Id. First, a defendant must make the rigorous
showing necessary to obtain a hearing:
6 UNITED STATES v. CLENNEY
[W]here the defendant makes a substantial prelimi-
nary showing that a false statement knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,
was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit,
and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to
the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amend-
ment requires that a hearing be held at the defen-
dant’s request.
Id. This showing "must be more than conclusory" and should
include affidavits or other evidence to overcome the "pre-
sumption of [the warrant’s] validity." Id. at 171. Second, a
defendant faces additional burdens at the hearing stage:
In the event that at that hearing the allegation of per-
jury or reckless disregard is established by the defen-
dant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with
the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affi-
davit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish
probable cause, the search warrant must be voided
and the fruits of the search excluded to the same
extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face
of the affidavit.
Id. at 156.
Clenney claims that Fernald made two false statements in
his warrant applications. First, in both the arrest and search
warrant affidavits Fernald stated that the caller had asked for
money in exchange for the tax records. Second, in the search
warrant application Fernald checked the box indicating that he
had personal knowledge of the facts in the affidavit. While
Clenney is correct that Fernald made these two statements,
neither of them is false.
As for Fernald’s statements that the caller sought money,
this was a sound conclusion in light of the facts. In particular,
Fernald relied upon what Doherty told him, and that reliance
UNITED STATES v. CLENNEY 7
was altogether reasonable. During the initial interview,
Doherty informed Fernald of the following situation. An
unknown man had called her, refused to give his name, and
informed her that he had procured her tax records from Gary
Booher, the son of her tax preparer. He then explained he
wanted to "help everyone out," help that presumably involved
obtaining money both for himself and for Booher. The caller
told Doherty that Gary Booher’s brother had supported his
drug habit by profiting off of tax records of his mother’s cli-
ents, and now Gary was doing the same. The unknown caller
then made a none too subtle threat, expressing his desire to
make sure Doherty’s tax records did not fall into the wrong
hands. Before ending the call, the man told Doherty that he
was familiar with police procedures from his time as an FBI
informant and that the police could not help her. Fernald and
Doherty testified to the above sequence of events, and the dis-
trict court found their testimony to be credible.
Clenney tries to spin these facts by pointing out that the
caller never explicitly asked Doherty for payment. This fact,
Clenney insists, proves that he was actually a good Samaritan
seeking to right a wrong and safeguard Doherty’s tax records.
But a good Samaritan seeking to return tax records for no
remuneration would not make references to wanting money.
A good Samaritan would not refuse to give his name and
warn Doherty against going to the police. Indeed, if Clenney
had sought to return the records, he could have simply
returned them to Doherty or left them at some reputable and
responsible location instead of making a cryptic and thinly
veiled threat. After observing Clenney’s demeanor and
reviewing his past crimes of dishonesty, the district court rea-
sonably concluded that the caller was seeking money in
exchange for the tax records and in effect seeking to sell
Doherty’s own tax returns back to her. Nothing about Fer-
nald’s conduct in securing a warrant even approaches negli-
gence, much less the higher standard Franks requires.
Turning to the personal knowledge issue, Clenney is cor-
rect that Fernald marked the box indicating that he had per-
8 UNITED STATES v. CLENNEY
sonal knowledge of the facts in the affidavit. But that is not
the end of the matter. Fernald had to check one of two boxes,
the first indicating that he had personal knowledge of the facts
set forth in the affidavit and the second indicating that an
informant was the source of the facts and providing space for
detailing the credibility of the informant. Fernald checked the
first box, but he also wrote "See Affidavit" in the space for
informant credibility information. Fernald testified that he
filled out the form in this manner because he thought that nei-
ther of the two options fit his situation perfectly. Accordingly,
he tried to cover all of his bases and give the magistrate all
the information. The affidavit makes clear that his knowledge
of the content of the first phone call is based on his interview
with Doherty. And Clenney presented no evidence of an effort
to deceive the magistrate into thinking that Fernald was pres-
ent for that phone call. Once more, Clenney has failed to meet
his burden under Franks.
B.
As for Clenney’s assertion that Fernald omitted several
facts from the warrant affidavits, the Franks threshold is even
higher for defendants making claims of omissions rather affir-
mative false statements. United States v. Tate, 524 F.3d 449,
454-55 (4th Cir. 2008). Merely identifying factual omissions
is insufficient. Id. Rather, to obtain a Franks hearing, the
defendant must show that the omissions were "designed to
mislead, or . . . made in reckless disregard of whether they
would mislead" and that the omissions were material, mean-
ing that their "inclusion in the affidavit would defeat probable
cause." United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 301 (4th Cir.
1990). To prevail at the hearing, the defendant must then
prove these points by a preponderance of the evidence.
Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56.
Clenney offers a litany of omissions. On both the arrest and
search warrant applications, Fernald made no mention of the
call to Hawkins or the second, recorded call to Doherty. He
UNITED STATES v. CLENNEY 9
also did not go into detail regarding how he obtained the
address of AMC Design 6 and how he determined that Clen-
ney was the owner of the property. Additionally, on the arrest
warrant application, Fernald did not explain how he deter-
mined that Clenney was the unknown caller. The fact that
these omissions occurred is undisputed. But these omissions
were not designed to mislead the magistrate. And none of
them were material.
To begin with, warrant affidavits "are normally drafted by
nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investiga-
tion." United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965).
If we "desire to encourage use of the warrant process by
police officers," Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237 n.10
(1983), the worst course of action would be to pick apart war-
rant affidavits from the pristine perch of hindsight or to penal-
ize officers for securing what the law requires. Obtaining a
warrant is a process overseen by a neutral magistrate. Magis-
trates make an independent judgment about the sufficiency of
the warrant affidavit. They are free to reject warrant applica-
tions that provide scant or insufficient evidence. Indeed, an
important rationale for the Franks ruling was a respect for the
warrant process and the capabilities of magistrates. Franks,
438 U.S. at 166-67.
Moreover, Fernald had legitimate reasons for his omis-
sions. The phone call to Hawkins involved a different victim,
and the evidence of whether the caller was seeking money
from Hawkins was inconclusive. Though Hawkins felt "com-
fortable" about the call, she also indicated that she was "un-
easy."
Doherty’s second, recorded call was similarly ambiguous.
While the caller did refuse monetary payment in that call,
there were indications that the caller suspected police involve-
ment. Indeed, in the initial call, the caller abruptly hung up
after learning that Doherty worked for the county govern-
ment. Add to that the caller’s professed expertise on law
10 UNITED STATES v. CLENNEY
enforcement procedures, and it becomes clear that the caller’s
about-face in the second phone call may have been an act to
avoid police detection.
Fernald thus discounted the importance of these two calls,
all the more so because he believed Doherty’s statement that
the caller sought money in the first phone call, a belief the
district court found to be credible. And while Clenney argues
that the other calls can be viewed as potentially exculpatory,
the protections of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), do
not apply to warrant application proceedings. Colkley, 899
F.2d at 302-03. The Supreme Court has shown no inclination
to impart the panoply of trial protections into the warrant
application process with all the attendant burdens and delays
such a step would entail. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 166-72.
As for Clenney’s complaints about Fernald not fully
explaining how he arrived at various factual conclusions—
specifically, how he linked the unidentified caller to the name
David Clenney and the address on Wembley Central Terrace
–- we are not convinced that Fernald exhibited an intent to
deceive the magistrate by choosing to omit these facts. The
process of preparing a warrant affidavit requires affiants to
exercise discretion by selecting certain facts for inclusion and
others for omission. Tate, 524 F.3d at 454-55. "An affiant
cannot be expected to include in an affidavit every piece of
information gathered in the course of an investigation." Colk-
ley, 899 F.2d at 300.
Moreover, even if Fernald’s omission of certain facts were
somehow improper, the omissions were not material. The
inclusion of facts omitted in the warrant affidavits would not
defeat probable cause. With the omitted facts included, the
magistrate would have been presented with substantially simi-
lar affidavits. The strong evidence of an extortion attempt in
the first phone call to Doherty would still have been included.
There would also be mention of the two additional phone
calls, but these calls were ambiguous at best. The statements
UNITED STATES v. CLENNEY 11
regarding the content of the first Doherty phone call would
thus remain unrefuted. As the trial court noted, the caller
declining to demand money in other phone calls does not
mean he did not seek payment in the first Doherty call.
Furthermore, the so-called omitted facts provide an illustra-
tion of the need to be careful what one wishes for. The Haw-
kins call and the second Doherty call in fact serve to confirm
Clenney’s identity as the caller as well as the highly unusual
nature of Clenney’s contact with Doherty in the first place.
Thus, the added investigative details Clenney seeks would
presumably only bolster Fernald’s conclusions as stated in the
affidavits. Accordingly, the affidavits Clenney proposes
would continue to contain a sufficient showing for probable
cause to believe that he attempted to extort money from
Doherty and that evidence of this extortion could be found at
his residence.
III.
Clenney next argues that Fernald violated the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA"), Pub. L. No.
99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, and Virginia law when he obtained
Clenney’s cellular phone records. Specifically, he claims that
Fernald failed to secure a subpoena or warrant for the records,
as is required by the ECPA and Virginia law.
The exclusion of inculpatory evidence represents a judi-
cially implied remedy for a constitutional violation. It has no
innate statutory roots. The usual avenue for suppression—
operation of the exclusionary rule occasioned by a Fourth
Amendment violation—is not available to Clenney. Fernald
did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he obtained the
cellular phone records. Phone customers have no constitution-
ally cognizable privacy interests in basic subscriber informa-
tion. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-46 (1979);
United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010).
Accordingly, Fernald’s procurement of Clenney’s phone
12 UNITED STATES v. CLENNEY
records did not amount to a constitutional violation, and Clen-
ney is left with his statutory argument for suppression.
A.
The ECPA protects electronic communications against
unauthorized intrusions. United States v. Suarez, 906 F.2d
977, 980-82 (4th Cir. 1990). Title II of the ECPA focuses on
stored communications. Id. at 981 n.8. This part of the ECPA
draws a distinction between the content of a communication
and the records pertaining to a communication service
account. 18 U.S.C. § 2703. To obtain an electronic communi-
cation customer’s records from a service provider, a govern-
mental entity must follow the procedures outlined in
§ 2703(c). Absent customer consent, § 2703(c)(1) requires the
government to obtain a warrant or court order for the records.
The government can bypass these procedures and simply sub-
poena the records if it seeks only basic subscriber informa-
tion, such as the name and address of the customer and
telephone call logs. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2). Virginia law
imposes similar safeguards on customer records, requiring a
grand jury subpoena, search warrant, or court order to obtain
them without customer consent. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-70.3.
B.
The phone records Fernald obtained fall within the scope of
both § 2703(c) and § 19.2-70.3. In fact, they contain many of
the elements listed in § 2703(c)(2), including the name and
address of the customer and basic information regarding
incoming and outgoing calls on that phone line. Therefore,
ECPA procedures should have been followed. But Clenney
has failed to present any evidence suggesting that Fernald did
not follow these procedures. Clenney offers as an excuse that
the district court prohibited his line of questioning related to
this matter, but any such exchange occurred before the district
court decided to grant him a Franks hearing. Clenney had
UNITED STATES v. CLENNEY 13
ample opportunity at the hearing to raise the issue, but he
chose not to do so.
Furthermore, even if Clenney had shown that Fernald vio-
lated the ECPA and Virginia law, the exclusionary rule would
not be the appropriate remedy for these violations. As noted,
"there is no exclusionary rule generally applicable to statutory
violations." United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir.
2006); see United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1295 n.1
(4th Cir. 1995). In the statutory context, suppression is a crea-
ture of the statute, and its availability depends on the statutory
text: "The availability of the suppression remedy for . . . statu-
tory, as opposed to constitutional, violations . . . turns on the
provisions of [the statute] rather than the judicially fashioned
exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth
Amendment rights." United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413,
432 n.22 (1977).
Turning to the statutes at issue, neither provides suppres-
sion of the evidence in federal court as a remedy. The ECPA
empowers a victim of a § 2703(c) violation to bring a civil
action for appropriate relief against violators other than the
United States and provides procedures for administrative dis-
cipline of federal officials involved. 18 U.S.C. § 2707. There
is no mention of a suppression remedy for such a violation,
and § 2708 makes clear that "[t]he remedies and sanctions
described in this chapter are the only judicial remedies and
sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter."
Moreover, Congress has shown that it knows how to create
a statutory suppression remedy. It did so in 18 U.S.C. § 2515,
which provides for suppression of evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the statutes governing wiretaps. Yet it chose not to do
so in the context of § 2703(c) violations. Therefore, Congress
has made clear that it did not intend to suppress evidence
gathered as a result of § 2703(c) violations. See United States
v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003).
14 UNITED STATES v. CLENNEY
The relevant Virginia statutes similarly provide remedies
for violations, including a prohibition on the introduction of
evidence in Virginia state court obtained in violation of the
statutory procedures. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-65. But Virginia
law does not attempt to direct federal courts to exclude evi-
dence obtained in violation of state statutes. And, in any
event, Virginia does not have that power: Federal not state
law "governs the admissibility of evidence obtained by state
officers but ultimately used in a federal prosecution." United
States v. Clyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 616 (4th Cir. 1994).
IV.
Clenney next claims that his waiver of his Miranda rights
was not knowing and intelligent because he was not informed
of the charges against him. But this argument fails for two
reasons. First, the evidence suggests that Clenney was aware
of the crimes the officers were investigating. When Fernald
asked him if he understood why the officers were at his house
with an arrest warrant, Clenney said that he thought he knew
why the officers were there and then explained that all of it
was a misunderstanding.
There is a second flaw in Clenney’s argument. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), does not require that the sus-
pect be informed of the charges against him. Miranda requires
four warnings before law enforcement officers commence a
custodial interrogation:
[A suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning
[1] that he has the right to remain silent, [2] that any-
thing he says can be used against him in a court of
law, [3] that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and [4] that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any question-
ing if he so desires.
Id. at 479. "The four warnings Miranda requires are invari-
able . . . ." Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1204 (2010).
UNITED STATES v. CLENNEY 15
Accordingly, this court has rejected attempts to add additional
warnings to the time-tested Miranda formulation. See Harris
v. Riddle, 551 F.2d 936, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1977).
Harris is instructive. It involved a suspect who believed
incorrectly that oral confessions were inadmissible and that
the elements of felony murder included proof that the defen-
dant had fired the weapon that killed the victim. Id. at 937.
The police did not correct these mistaken beliefs and allowed
the suspect to confess. Id. But we held that the police were
under no obligation to go beyond the four Miranda warnings:
"When the police have fully and fairly given a suspect the
Miranda warnings their duty is discharged, and we hold that
they are under no further and additional duty whether or not
the suspect acts wisely or foolishly or misapprehends either
the facts or the law." Id. at 938-39. The defendant’s waiver
was knowing and intelligent because he understood his
Miranda rights, even if he failed to recognize his incorrect
factual and legal beliefs. Id. at 939.
Similarly, we decline Clenney’s invitation to add a fifth
warning to Miranda. There is a value to keeping things simple
and certain. The officers complied with Miranda, and that
ends the matter. Clenney received valid Miranda warnings,
understood them, and then waived them. And while it is true
that the officers did not inform Clenney of the charges against
him, Miranda does not impose a duty on law enforcement to
do so.
V.
Clenney’s final argument is that there was an unreasonable
delay between the time of his arrest and his appearance before
a magistrate. But the law and facts indicate that the delay was
justified. After being arrested, a defendant must be brought
before a magistrate without unnecessary delay. Fed. R. Crim.
P. 5. Delays of up to six hours are presumptively reasonable.
18 U.S.C. § 3501(c); Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558,
16 UNITED STATES v. CLENNEY
1571 (2009). Clenney attempts to undermine this federal stan-
dard by citing Virginia law, but Virginia does not have the
power to impose rules of evidence on federal courts: "[I]n a
federal criminal prosecution, federal standards govern the
admissibility of evidence." United States v. Glasco, 917 F.2d
797, 798 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Mealy, 851
F.2d 890, 907 (7th Cir. 1988)).
Clenney appeared before a magistrate approximately five
and one-half hours after his arrest, thus falling within the six
hour window. And the facts of the situation reinforce the pre-
sumption of reasonableness. The officers arrested Clenney,
interrogated him at his home, secured a search warrant from
a Loudoun County magistrate, and then transported Clenney
to a Prince William County magistrate. All of this took time,
and, considering all of the facts, the delay was within the
bounds of reasonableness.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is
AFFIRMED.