United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued November 15, 2000 Decided December 26, 2000
No. 00-5130
William A. Warren,
Appellant
v.
United States of America, et al.,
Appellees
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 97cv02415)
Gene A. Bechtel argued the cause for appellant. With him
on the briefs was Patrick C. Clary.
David J. Lazerwitz, Attorney, United States Department of
Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the
brief were Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, and
Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Attorney, United States Department of
Justice.
Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Sentelle and Henderson,
Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.
Edwards, Chief Judge: William A. Warren appeals from
the District Court's dismissal of his suit to quiet title to
Navassa Island and its deposit of guano (bird droppings rich
in nitrogen and phosphate). The District Court held that the
12-year limitations period in the Quiet Title Act ("QTA"), 28
U.S.C. 2409a(g) (1994), barred Warren's claim because he and
his predecessors in interest knew, or should have known, of a
claim by the United States to the Island asserted more than
12 years before Warren brought his action in February 1997.
The District Court also found that, even if it had jurisdiction
over the action, Warren had failed to demonstrate a legally
cognizable interest in Navassa Island and its guano, because
Warren's predecessors in interest possessed merely a revoca-
ble license to mine guano that the United States terminated
as early as 1916.
We agree that Warren's action is barred. Numerous
events establish that, at least 12 years before Warren filed his
action, there was notice, both actual and constructive, of the
United States' claim of sole and exclusive ownership of the
Island and its mineral resources. None of Warren's prede-
cessors in interest challenged any of the Government's claims,
and there is no support for Warren's contention that the
Government abandoned its claim to the Island in 1996.
Even were jurisdiction proper over Warren's quiet-title
action, we agree with the District Court that neither Warren
nor his predecessors in interest possessed a legally cognizable
fee ownership interest in Navassa Island. Warren's prede-
cessors in interest possessed nothing more than a revocable
license to occupy the Island for the purpose of mining guano,
and the United States revoked that license in the early 1900s.
I. Background
Navassa Island is an island of less than three square miles,
located in the Caribbean Sea between Haiti and Jamaica,
approximately 100 miles south of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
See Office of the General Counsel, U.S. General Account-
ing Office, Pub. No. GAO/OGC-98-5, Report to House Comm.
on Resources, U.S. Insular Areas: Application of the U.S.
Constitution 47 (1997); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202,
205 (1890). Peter Duncan discovered the Island, and claimed
it for the United States on November 18, 1857, pursuant to
the Guano Islands Act of August 18, 1856, 48 U.S.C. ss 1411-
1419 (1994). See Jones, 137 U.S. at 204-06, 217.
The Guano Islands Act provides for islands, rocks, or keys,
not within the jurisdiction of any other government, to "be
considered as appertaining to the United States," if a United
States citizen discovers upon them a deposit of guano and
provides notice of discovery to the Department of State. 48
U.S.C. ss 1411, 1412. Upon giving the appropriate notice,
"[t]he discoverer, or his assigns ... may be allowed, at the
pleasure of Congress, the exclusive right of occupying such
island, rocks, or keys, for the purpose of obtaining guano, and
of selling and delivering the same to citizens of the United
States." 48 U.S.C. s 1414.
On December 8, 1859, then-Secretary of State, Lewis Cass,
issued a proclamation granting Edward Cooper, the assignee
of Peter Duncan, "all the privileges and advantages intended
by [the] act." Jones, 137 U.S. at 206. Cooper subsequently
assigned his interest to the Navassa Phosphate Company.
See Warren v. United States, Civ. No. 97-2415, Transcript of
Motions Hearing before the Honorable Paul L. Friedman
("Hearing Tr.") at 30 (Feb. 16, 2000).
In 1889, an employee of the Navassa Phosphate Company
was tried and convicted in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland for the murder of his supervisor on
Navassa Island. See Jones, 137 U.S. at 203-04. The defen-
dant argued that a federal court in the United States did not
have the authority to try him because Navassa Island was not
within the jurisdiction of the United States. See id. at 209.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the only issue
was the status of Navassa Island as a possession of the
United States. The Supreme Court ruled that the question
of the United States' sovereignty over Navassa Island was for
the political branches of government, the Congress and the
Executive, to determine. The opinion of the Court examined
in detail the history of the exercise of United States sover-
eignty over Navassa Island and concluded that "the Guano
Islands Act of August 18, 1856 ... is constitutional and valid;
... the Island of Navassa must be considered as appertaining
to the United States." Id. at 224.
The removal of guano from Navassa Island continued until
1898 when, at the outset of the Spanish-American War,
President William McKinley ordered all inhabitants of Navas-
sa Island removed. See Hearing Tr. at 30. Thereafter, the
Navassa Phosphate Company was placed in receivership, and
its assets were sold at auction to pay creditors. See id. It is
not clear how the interests of the Navassa Phosphate Compa-
ny were ultimately divided. For purposes of the proceeding
before this court, the Government accepts Warren's chain of
title to the rights and interests of the Navassa Phosphate
Company. It is not disputed that all guano mining on
Navassa Island ended by 1901 and that the Navassa Phos-
phate Company was dissolved in 1924. See id.
By an Act of October 22, 1913, 38 Stat. 224 (1913), Con-
gress appropriated $125,000 "[f]or a light station on Navassa
Island, in the West Indies." Subsequently, by a Proclamation
of January 17, 1916, 39 Stat. 1763 (1916), President Woodrow
Wilson declared that the "Island of Navassa in the West
Indies be and the same is hereby reserved for lighthouse
purposes, such reservation being deemed necessary in the
public interests." In support of this reservation of Navassa
Island, the Proclamation recited the Guano Islands Act and
the 1913 congressional appropriation.
Construction of the lighthouse was completed on October
21, 1917. Though originally tended by keepers, the light-
house was eventually automated. The Coast Guard main-
tained lighthouse facilities on Navassa Island until September
1996, at which time the Coast Guard removed its equipment
and facilities from the property. See Hearing Tr. at 31.
On July 16, 1996, Warren requested permission from the
Coast Guard to land on Navassa Island to shoot a documenta-
ry. See Letter from Bill Warren, to Commander of the
Seventh U.S. Coast Guard District (July 16, 1996), reprinted
in Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 191, 470. He stated therein,
"[a]lthough Navassa is U.S. owned, we understand that even
U.S. Citizens such as ourselves are required to get your
permission to land there." Id. On September 11, 1996, the
United States granted Warren's request to visit the Island,
subject to his submission of a waiver of liability and accep-
tance of responsibility form prior to landing. See Letter from
B.W. Hadley, Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, to Bill Warren
(Sept. 11, 1996), reprinted in J.A. 192. The following day,
Warren submitted a letter providing "notice of his discovery,
occupation and possession of Navassa Island." See Letter
from Charles P. LeBeau, Esq., to Warren Christopher, Secre-
tary of State (Sept. 12, 1996), reprinted in J.A. 148-49. The
letter claimed that the Coast Guard had abandoned the
Island, and requested that the Department of State enter and
certify Warren's claim of discovery under the Guano Islands
Act. See id. at 149.
On January 7, 1997, the Department of State sent an
interim response to Warren, indicating that Navassa Island
was already under United States' jurisdiction and that the
matter had been taken under advisement. See Letter from
T. Michael Peay, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Depart-
ment of State, to Charles P. LeBeau, Esq. (Jan. 7, 1997),
reprinted in J.A. 194. On January 16, 1997, the Secretary of
the Interior issued Order No. 3205, placing the civil adminis-
tration of Navassa Island under the Director of the Office of
Insular Affairs. See Secretary's Order No. 3205, Department
of the Interior (Jan. 16, 1997), reprinted in J.A. 361; Secre-
tary's Order No. 3205, Amendment No. 1, Department of the
Interior (Jan. 14, 1998), reprinted in J.A. 363. Order No.
3205 was superseded by a Memorandum of Understanding
entered between the Office of Insular Affairs and the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service on April 22, 1999, pursuant to which
the Fish and Wildlife Service currently manages Navassa
Island as a National Wildlife Refuge. See Memorandum of
Understanding between the Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service and the Director, Office of Insular Affairs (Apr. 22,
1999), reprinted in J.A. 388-90.
On February 13, 1997, Warren filed a pro se complaint in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California
seeking an injunction against an alleged sale of Navassa
Island and "full and complete title to the Island, buildings and
guano." Complaint, Warren v. United States, Civ. No. 97-
242-B (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 1997). Warren amended his com-
plaint two more times to include additional parties such as
Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt and Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright as defendants. See First Amended
Complaint, Warren v. United States, Civ. No. 97-242-B (S.D.
Cal. Aug. 26, 1997); Second Amended Complaint, Warren v.
United States, Civ. No. 97-2415 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 1998). In
October 1997, the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of California transferred the case to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia. See Warren v. United
States, Civ. No. 97-242-B, (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9. 1997) (order
transferring venue).
In 1998, Warren obtained a quit claim deed and assignment
of interest from heirs of two individuals--James A. Wood-
ward and George W. Grafflin--alleged assignees of the inter-
est of the Navassa Phosphate Company. On September 17,
1998, Warren filed a third amended complaint, adding claims
based on an unconstitutional taking of his property rights and
violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, and request-
ing the imposition of penalties against three members of
Congress and the President of the United States for failing to
represent adequately his interests. See Third Amended
Complaint, Warren v. United States, Civ. No. 97-2415
(D.D.C. Sept. 17, 1998).
On November 25, 1998, the United States filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that the District Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Warren's claims and, in the alternative,
moved for summary judgment. Warren filed a motion for
leave to file a fourth amended complaint that the District
Court subsequently granted. See Plaintiff's Motion for Leave
to File Amended and Supplemental Complaint, Civ. No.
97-2415 (D.D.C. Apr. 5, 1999). The complaint set forth four
claims based entirely on the quit claim deed and assignments
of interest. Claims one and two sought declaratory relief
establishing Warren's ownership and rights to Navassa Is-
land. See id. In claim three, Warren claimed that Order No.
3205, "violat[ed] the separation of powers between the execu-
tive and legislative branches of government as provided in the
Constitution of the United States," id., and sought an injunc-
tion against continuing "such wrongful and unlawful conduct."
Id. Claim four stated the takings claim. Id.
On February 16, 2000, the District Court held a hearing
and dismissed Warren's claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Hearing Tr. at 39-40. In the alternative, the
District Court rejected the claim of fee title ownership of
Navassa Island, finding that the Guano Islands Act conveyed
only a revocable license, and that the President possessed the
authority to reserve Navassa Island for navigational use,
thereby revoking such license, based on Congress's authoriza-
tion of funds for the lighthouse and the President's implied
power to reserve public lands. See id. The District Court
also dismissed the takings claim from which Warren does not
appeal.
II. Analysis
The Quiet Title Act ("QTA") is the "exclusive means by
which adverse claimants [may] challenge the United States'
title to real property." Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273,
286 (1983). The statute operates as a waiver of the United
States' sovereign immunity as to certain quiet title actions.
See 28 U.S.C. s 2409a(a). That waiver is limited in scope,
however, and the terms of the Act "define the extent of the
court's jurisdiction." United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834,
841 (1986); see also United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,
586 (1941). One limitation specified in the Act is the require-
ment that:
[a]ny civil action under this section, except for an action
brought by a State, shall be barred unless it is com-
menced within twelve years of the date upon which it
accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have accrued
on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest
knew or should have known of the claim of the United
States.
28 U.S.C. s 2409a(g).
A "test of reasonableness" applies to determine whether a
plaintiff, or his predecessors in interest, "knew or should have
known" of a federal claim of interest in property. See D.C.
Transit System, Inc. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1438, 1441
(D.C. Cir. 1983). "Knowledge of the claim's full contours is
not required. All that is necessary is a reasonable awareness
that the Government claims some interest adverse to the
plaintiff's." Knapp. v. United States, 636 F.2d 279, 283 (10th
Cir. 1980).
In this case, there is undisputed evidence in the record
demonstrating that Warren and his predecessors in interest
"knew or should have known" that the United States claimed
an interest in Navassa Island more than 12 years before
Warren filed his quiet title action. Actual notice of the
United States' adverse claim of title to Navassa Island was
given to Warren's predecessor in interest, James Woodward,
as early as 1915, in a letter from the Assistant Secretary of
the Department of Commerce. See Letter from E.S. Sweet,
Assistant Secretary, Department of Commerce, to James
Woodward (Apr. 14, 1915), reprinted in J.A. 315. In re-
sponse to a communication from Woodward to President
Wilson in which Woodward offered to sell Navassa Island to
the United States, Assistant Secretary Sweet informed Wood-
ward that "as the title to the island [of Navassa] is in the
United States it is considered unnecessary to take any mea-
sures looking to the purchase of land on the island in connec-
tion with the establishment of a lightstation thereon." Id.
Warren's predecessors in interest were also afforded con-
structive notice of the United States' claim to Navassa Island.
The most significant instance of such notice arose in 1916,
when President Woodrow Wilson, pursuant to a congressional
authorization, issued a Proclamation declaring that all of
Navassa Island was unqualifiedly reserved for a lighthouse
base. The Proclamation stated that
the said Island of Navassa in the West Indies be and the
same is hereby reserved for lighthouse purposes, such
reservation being deemed necessary in the public inter-
ests, subject to such legislative action as the Congress of
the United States may take with respect thereto.
39 Stat. 1763 (1916) (emphasis added).
Warren contends that the presidential Proclamation was
not inconsistent with private ownership of the Island or the
right to occupy such lands to mine guano. He contends that
the lighthouse on Navassa takes up only a portion of the
Island, and refers to a lighthouse located on Fenwick Island,
Delaware, which allegedly operates in close proximity to
private ownership interests. Whether or not the situation of
Fenwick Island is as Warren asserts it to be, its status is
unquestionably inapposite. Here we have a presidential
Proclamation that clearly and lawfully reserved the entire
Island of Navassa for use by the United States Government.
The reservation of the Island served to terminate any con-
trary private interest in the land, if any existed at that point.
And nearly 50 years after the issuance of the 1916 Proclama-
tion, federal officials were still citing it as evidence of the
United States' claim. In 1962, for example, in response to an
inquiry regarding the status of Navassa Island, the Coast
Guard replied that
[t]his Island is under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States pursuant to 48 U.S.C. 1411, and by
Proclamation of the President dated 17, January, 1916,
the entire Island was reserved for lighthouse purposes.
Therefore, it is unlike other possessions of the United
States in that the entire Island is a government (Coast
Guard) reservation.
Letter from D. McG. Morrison, Vice Admiral, U.S. Coast
Guard, Acting Commandant, to Francis K. Campbell (Oct. 11,
1962), reprinted in J.A. 423-24.
Warren questions the President's authority to revoke any
interest in Navassa Island. He notes that by the express
provisions of the Act, the rights accorded to private tenants
were terminable only "at the pleasure of Congress." See 48
U.S.C. s 1414 (emphasis added). But he ignores the impor-
tant sequence of events leading to the reservation of Navassa
Island as a navigational aid. In 1913, Congress sanctioned
the termination of guano mining interests on Navassa Island
by appropriating $125,000 for the construction of a lighthouse.
See 38 Stat. 224 (1913). Three years later, the President
formalized the revocation of guano mining interests in the
Proclamation which referred to the congressional appropria-
tion, and declared that it was "necessary" and in the "public
interest" to reserve the Island for lighthouse purposes. See
39 Stat. 1763 (1916).
Warren contends that, even if the United States expressed
an interest in Navassa Island sufficient to threaten claims of
fee simple ownership, the President's act and subsequent
Government acts of "ownership" did not provide constructive
notice that the Government's interest was adverse to pre-
existing mining rights, nor would, Warren asserts, the subse-
quent administration and maintenance of the Island by the
Coast Guard. See Michel v. United States, 65 F.3d 130, 132
(9th Cir. 1995) ("[W]hen the plaintiff claims a non-possessory
interest such as an easement, knowledge of a government
claim of ownership may be entirely consistent with a plain-
tiff's claim"). We find no merit in Warren's position.
"The sufficiency of actual and open possession of property
is to be judged in the light of its character and location."
United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256, 279 (1947). In
this case, Warren and his predecessors "knew or should have
known the government claimed the exclusive right" to use the
Island and to deny access to all others. Michel, 65 F.3d at
132 (emphasis added). Although the United States did not
avail itself of the opportunity to mine the guano itself, there
were significant acts, sufficient to place Warren's predeces-
sors in interest on notice that their mining rights were in
jeopardy. No private mining ventures operated on the Island
after 1901. Indeed, there is no evidence of sustained occu-
pancy on the Island by private parties after the early 1900s.
Beginning in 1963 and until at least 1967, the Island was
posted with signs prohibiting trespassing, and for many years
the Coast Guard denied access to the Island to all but federal
employees. From 1970 until 1996, the Coast Guard restricted
access to Navassa, and no person was able to enter Navassa
Island legally without the Coast Guard's express permission.
Since 1978 the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration ("NOAA") of the U.S. Department of Commerce has
issued nautical charts clearly stating that
Navassa Island is a reservation administered through the
Commander, Seventh Coast Guard District. Landing or
entry on the island is prohibited, except under permit
signed by the Commander, 7th U.S. Coast Guard Dis-
trict.
Declaration of David B. MacFarland, Captain, NOAA, War-
ren v. United States, Civ. No. 97-2415 (May 18, 1999), re-
printed in J.A. 407-11 (emphasis added). The nautical charts
are significant, because there is no way to approach Navassa
Island except by sea. In addition, beginning in July 1984, the
NOAA has released a publication describing Navassa Island
as a federally restricted area and informing the public that
requests to visit Navassa should be made to the Commander,
Seventh District Coast Guard, Miami, Florida. It was pre-
sumably for this reason that Warren sought permission from
the Commander of the Seventh District Coast Guard in
Miami, Florida, to land on Navassa Island in July 1996.
The presidential Proclamation reserving Navassa Island for
lighthouse purposes, coupled with the Coast Guard's practice
of restricting access, and, for some years, denying access
altogether, to the Island, as well as the Government's consis-
tent claims of sole and exclusive ownership, reasonably and
clearly indicated that the United States had revoked any
outstanding rights or interests to "occupy" Navassa Island for
the purpose of mining guano. Warren's predecessors in
interest therefore had actual and constructive notice of the
United States' claims to Navassa Island and its resources
more than 12 years before Warren brought his suit to quiet
title to the Island in his favor.
Warren makes an alternative argument: that the Coast
Guard's removal of lighthouse equipment from Navassa Is-
land in August 1996 was a formal abandonment of the United
States' claim to the Island, and triggered a new statute of
limitations period. We reject this assertion. In the first
place, the Government cannot abandon property without con-
gressional authorization. See Royal Indem. Co. v. United
States, 313 U.S. 289, 294 (1941); see also United States v.
California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947). Moreover, the undisputed
facts do not support the abandonment claim. Before disman-
tling the lighthouse, the Coast Guard explained, in a 1995
communiquE to the American Embassy in Haiti, that "[t]he
discontinuation of the lighthouse operations is in no way
intended to affect U.S. possession of or jurisdiction over
Navassa Island." CommuniquE from Commandant Cogard,
to American Embassy, Port Au Prince, (Mar. 1995), reprinted
in J.A. 466. Indeed, following the Coast Guard's removal of
the lighthouse equipment, the United States continued to
assert its jurisdiction over the Island, and it has continued to
regulate and restrict access to the Island. In contrast, there
is no proof that any of Warren's predecessors in interest ever
set foot on the Island after 1901, or even inquired of the
continuing viability of their rights. There is, thus, no evidence
that the United States abandoned its claim to the Island, and
Warren's attempt to resurrect mining interests long since
terminated is based on a meritless claim. The District Court
correctly determined that it was without subject matter juris-
diction to hear Warren's claim.
Even if the Court had jurisdiction to hear the quiet title
action, it is abundantly clear that the Guano Islands Act did
not convey any fee ownership interest in the land or minerals
to a discoverer. As the Supreme Court explained in Duncan
v. Navassa Phosphate Co., 137 U.S. 647 (1891), the interest
conveyed under the Act was in the nature of a "usufruct" or
license to mine guano that was terminable "at the pleasure of
Congress." Id. at 652-53. "The whole right conferred upon
the discoverer and his assigns is a license to occupy the island
for the purpose of removing the guano." Id. at 651. The Act
conveyed only a license that was revocable at will by the
United States, and that revocation occurred when the Presi-
dent reserved Navassa Island for navigational purposes in
1916 pursuant to the 1913 congressional appropriation.
Warren's final argument is that this court should recognize
his fee title claim to Navassa based on a "federal common
law" ownership doctrine culled from the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256 (1947).
In Fullard-Leo, the Supreme Court recognized the interests
of private claimants (against the United States) in Palmyra
Island, a former possession of the Kingdom of Hawaii. See
id. Fullard-Leo does not, however, establish a "federal
common law" right of ownership in "remote islands." Indeed,
the Court expressly dismissed the possibility, stating that
"[w]e are not dealing with an explorer's claim of title to lands
of a savage tribe or that of a discoverer of a hitherto unknown
islet." Id. at 268. Rather, the Court considered the doctrine
of "lost grant," which, it observed, was an established doc-
trine in Hawaiian common law before its annexation by the
United States, and could therefore be applied against the
United States, as the successor to Hawaii. See id at 269-70.
The lost grant doctrine has no application in this case.
III. Conclusion
Warren's action is barred by the 12-year limitations period
in the Quiet Title Act. Even were Warren's claim timely, it
would fail for lack of merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the
District Court is affirmed.
So ordered.