United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued September 8, 2000 Decided January 16, 2001
No. 99-7196
Anise Jenkins, et al.,
Appellants
v.
Washington Convention Center and District of Columbia,
Appellees
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 98cv02404)
Daniel M. Schember argued the cause for appellants.
With him on the briefs was Alisa A. Wilkins.
Lutz Alexander Prager, Assistant Deputy Corporation
Counsel, argued the cause for appellee District of Columbia.
With him on the brief were Robert R. Rigsby, Corporation
Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Coun-
sel.
Glenn M. Young argued the cause for appellee Washington
Convention Center. With him on the brief were Mark D.
Poindexter and Frederick A. Douglas.
Before: Williams, Sentelle and Rogers, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.
Rogers, Circuit Judge: Appellants, who are 19 individuals
and one corporation,1 seek refunds of special District of
Columbia taxes enacted by the Council of the District of
Columbia ("D.C. Council") to finance a new convention center.
They alleged in their complaint that the Mayor exceeded his
authority under the District of Columbia Self-Government
and Governmental Reorganization Act2 by collecting the spe-
cial taxes under an expired statute, and that, notwithstanding
later ratifications of the taxes by the D.C. Council, they were
deprived of property without procedural due process and just
compensation. They also alleged tortious conversion of their
money. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, appellants contend
that the district court erred in holding that the District of
Columbia is a "State" for purposes of the Federal Tax
Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. s 1341 (1994) ("FTIA"), that the
FTIA barred their claims under 42 U.S.C. s 1983 (Supp. III
1997), and that their claims may only be presented in the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia after exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
We need not decide whether the FTIA applies to the
District of Columbia, nor whether the FTIA bars appellants'
__________
1 The individual appellants are Anise Jenkins, Philip Barlow,
Matthew D. Bernstein, Steven L. Block, Christopher Crowder,
Steven Donkin, Kathryn Eckles, Jennifer Ellingston, Deborah Han-
rahan, Harriet Hubbard, Eugene Dewitt Kinlow, Kevin M. McCar-
ron, Joseph Passonneau, Gastrel L. Riley, Sandra Seegars, Thomas
C. Smith, Bradford Snell, Elizabeth Solomon, and Karen A. Szulgit.
The corporate appellant is Planet Vox, Inc.
2 Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (December 24, 1973) (codified
at D.C. Code s 1-201 et seq. (1981)) ("Self-Government Act"); see
also D.C. Code s 1-242 (1981).
claim for monetary damages under s 1983. Because Con-
gress has granted exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to
District of Columbia tax assessments to the District of Co-
lumbia courts, see D.C. Code ss 11-921(a)(3)(B), 11-1201,
11-1202 (1981), we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.3
I.
The Washington Convention Center Authority Act of 1994,
D.C. Law 10-188 (codified as amended at D.C. Code s 9-801
et seq.) ("1994 Act"), increased certain D.C. income and
franchise taxes and certain D.C. sales and use taxes on meals,
beverages, auto rentals, and hotels. See 1994 Act ss 301-
303. The special taxes were dedicated to the construction of
a new convention center in the District of Columbia, see id.
ss 201(4), 208, and the Act required the Authority Board to
submit to the Mayor and D.C. Council, within 24 months, a
report including a financial statement and feasibility analysis
for the center's construction. See id. s 206(h). The 1994 Act
also included a sunset provision, providing that the special
taxes would expire after two years if the Authority Board
failed to submit the report within 24 months, or by Septem-
ber 28, 1996. See id. s 306(a).
Weeks prior to the deadline for submission of the report,
the D.C. Council concluded that it would be necessary to
extend the submission deadline, and thus extend the statute
imposing the special taxes. On October 1, 1996, the D.C.
Council passed an emergency act, effective September 28,
1996, extending the submission deadline to 30 months instead
of 24 months.4 On December 3, 1996, the D.C. Council
__________
3 The court may affirm the district court on grounds different
from those relied upon by the district court. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Settlemire v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 913, 920
(D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (citing Helvering v. Gowran,
302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937)).
4 See Washington Convention Center Authority Act of 1994
Emergency Amendment Act of 1996, D.C. Act 11-393, effective
passed a second emergency act, extending the submission
date to 29 months instead of 24 months, until February 28,
1997.5 On January 8, 1997, the D.C. Council also passed a
temporary act, effective after Congressional review on April
25, 1997, extending the submission deadline to February 28,
1997.6 Then, in June 1998, the D.C. Council passed perma-
nent legislation to repeal, as of February 27, 1997, the
submission deadline in the temporary act.7 The D.C. Council
Report of the Committee on Finance and Revenue stated that
"a repeal of the [sunset] provision would remove any concerns
that the continued collection of the taxes is contingent upon
factual determinations and conditions precedent." Report of
D.C. Committee on Finance and Revenue, dated June 1,
1998, at 9. Finally, in December 1998, the D.C. Council
passed permanent legislation that stated "[n]othwithstanding
any other law, surtaxes and dedicated taxes shall be collected
by the Mayor," for the convention center, until the tax
provisions "are repealed by legislation enacted after Septem-
ber 27, 1996."8 This legislation, effective after congressional
review on April 20, 1999, states that it applies as of Septem-
ber 27, 1996.
__________
October 1, 1996, ss 2, 4. This Act was effective for ninety days.
See D.C. Code s 1-229(a) (1981).
5 See Washington Convention Center Authority Act of 1994
Time Extension Emergency Amendment Act of 1996, D.C. Act
11-509, effective January 8, 1997, ss 2, 4. This Act was effective
for ninety days. See D.C. Code s 1-229(a) (1981).
6 See Washington Convention Center Authority Act of 1994
Time Extension Temporary Amendment Act of 1997, D.C. Law
11-262, effective April 25, 1997, s 2. By its terms, the temporary
act expired after 225 days, on December 6, 1997. Id. s 4(b).
7 See Washington Convention Center Authority Financing
Amendment Act of 1998, D.C. Law 12-142, effective August 12,
1998, s 2(l ) ("1998 Act").
8 See Technical Amendments Act of 1998, D.C. Law 12-264,
effective September 27, 1996, s 21 (codified at D.C. Code s 9-833)
("1999 Act").
The 1999 Act would appear to foreclose any argument that
the D.C. Council did not retroactively authorize the special
taxes.9 See generally United States v. Heinszen, 206 U.S.
370 (1907); Thomas v. Network Solutions, Inc., 176 F.3d 500,
506 (D.C. Cir. 1999). According to appellants' complaint,
however, the special tax laws expired "during all or portions
of the period from September 28, 1996 until August 12, 1998,"
yet the Mayor continued to collect, and appellants continued
to pay, the special taxes in an amount of not less than
$467.06.10 It is this amount, and similar amounts on behalf of
the class of similarly situated taxpayers, for which appellants
seek refunds. The Mayor's collection of the special taxes
after the statute had expired is the basis for appellants'
allegation that the Mayor acted ultra vires, beyond his au-
thority under the Self-Government Act. Appellants maintain
that the temporary act and the 1998 Act should not be
interpreted to have retroactive application, and that to the
extent the 1999 Act is intended to have blanket retroactive
effect, it is an unconstitutional taking of property without just
compensation if administrative remedies cannot reasonably be
pursued. Appellants further allege that because taxation is
planned and systematic, not random, any reliance by the
District of Columbia on post-collection ratification, rather
than prior legislative action, violates the due process clause,
citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127-30, 135-39
__________
9 See id.
10 Appellants allege in their complaint that the taxes expired on
February 28, 1997, because financial submission requirements were
not met by the date specified in the temporary act. Alternatively,
appellants allege that the taxes expired on December 6, 1997, due to
the expiration of the temporary act on that date. Appellants also
allege that because the first emergency act expired on December
30, 1996, and the second emergency act did not become effective
until January 8, 1997, taxing authority expired from December 30,
1996 to January 8, 1997. Appellants also allege that the taxes
expired from December 30, 1996 to April 25, 1997, because the
second emergency act was invalid. Additionally, appellants allege
that the taxes expired from September 28, 1996 to April 25, 1997,
because the first emergency act was invalid.
(1990). In addition, appellants allege the tortious conversion
of their money. They filed their complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, asserting
that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
ss 1331, 1343(a)(3), (4), and 1367.
In granting the motion of the Washington Convention
Center Authority and the District of Columbia to dismiss the
complaint, the district court ruled that the District of Colum-
bia was a "State" for purposes of the FTIA, 28 U.S.C. s 1341
(1994), and hence the FTIA barred appellants' constitutional
claims under s 1983 because appellants had an adequate
remedy under District of Columbia law that they had not
exhausted.11 Because appellants did not seek a declaratory
judgment or an order enjoining continued collection of the
taxes, the district court ruled that it could not exercise
jurisdiction under the "multiplicity of suits" rationale. Re-
garding appellants' statutory and tort claims under District of
Columbia law, the district court ruled that, in view of its lack
of subject matter jurisdiction over appellants' s 1983 claims,
it was precluded from exercising supplemental jurisdiction.
II.
On appeal, appellants contend that the district court erred
as a matter of law in holding that the District of Columbia is
a "State" under the FTIA and in dismissing their claims
under s 1983 pursuant to the FTIA. Appellants also contend
that they were not required to exhaust their remedies under
District of Columbia law, and, alternatively, if exhaustion is
required, the administrative remedies were inadequate and
__________
11 The Federal Tax Injunction Act provides that:
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where
a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the courts
of such State.
28 U.S.C. s 1341 (1994).
exhaustion of them would be futile. In this regard, appellants
maintain that because the money was taken from members of
the class in countless daily transactions, each involving small
amounts of money, it would be unreasonable to require them
to keep records of each transaction in order to obtain relief
under administrative tax refund remedies, see D.C. Code
ss 47-1812.11(a)(2), 47-2020 (1981), and that because the
District of Columbia's position throughout this lawsuit has
been adverse to their claims in every important respect,
pursuing administrative remedies under District of Columbia
law would be futile.
In contending that the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction of their complaint, appellants rely on D.C. Transit
System, Inc. v. Pearson, 250 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1957). They
read that case to stand for the proposition that where antici-
patory relief is not sought (and appellants do not seek to
enjoin current or future assessment or collection of the
special taxes) a suit in district court is not barred by the D.C.
Tax Injunction Act, D.C. Code s 47-3307 (1981).12 In Pear-
son, the court held that in view of adequate remedies under
District of Columbia law, a suit to enjoin collection of a
District of Columbia tax would not lie in the district court.
250 F.2d at 765. Our review of appellants' jurisdictional
contention is de novo. See Zappia Middle East Construction
Co. Ltd. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 249 (2nd Cir.
2000); Trauma Service Group v. United States, 104 F.3d
1321, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Because Congress has vested
exclusive jurisdiction in the District of Columbia courts over
all challenges to assessments and claims for refunds of Dis-
trict of Columbia taxes, we hold that the district court lacked
jurisdiction of appellants' complaint, and we do not reach
appellants' contentions regarding the FTIA and the D.C. Tax
Injunction Act.
__________
12 The D.C. Tax Injunction Act provides that "[n]o suit shall be
filed to enjoin the assessment or collection by the District of
Columbia or any of its officers, agents, or employees of any tax."
D.C. Code s 47-3307 (1981).
A.
For many years the courts of the District of Columbia were
courts of limited jurisdiction and a variety of matters arising
under District of Columbia law were litigated in the federal
courts of the District of Columbia. Congress changed that in
the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Proce-
dure Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473, (July 29, 1970)
(codified at D.C. Code s 11-101 et seq. (1981)) ("Court Re-
form Act"). Acting pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 17
of the United States Constitution, Congress established a
state-type court system for the District of Columbia and
transferred jurisdiction over matters arising under District of
Columbia law from the federal courts to the new District of
Columbia courts. See Court Reform Act, Title I, s 111
(codified at D.C. Code ss 11-921 through 11-923 (1981)); see
also Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 392 n.2 (1973);
cf. Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 962 n.35 (D.C. Cir.
1973). As a result, the District of Columbia courts ceased to
be courts of limited jurisdiction, and the federal courts in the
District of Columbia assumed the traditional role of the
federal courts in our judicial system. See Andrade v. Jack-
son, 401 A.2d 990, 992 (D.C. 1979); Reichman v. Franklin
Simon Corp., 392 A.2d 9, 12 (D.C. 1978).
Section 111 of the Court Reform Act provided that the
newly established Superior Court of the District of Columbia
would have jurisdiction of "any civil action or other matter, at
law or in equity, which involves an appeal from or petition for
review of any assessment of tax (or civil penalty thereon)
made by the District of Columbia." Court Reform Act, Title
I, s 111 (codified as D.C. Code s 11-921(a)(3)(B) (1981)).
Further, s 111 provided that "[t]he Tax Division of the
Superior Court shall be assigned exclusive jurisdiction of all
appeals from and petitions for review of assessments of tax
(and civil penalties thereon) made by the District of Columbia
and all proceedings brought by the District of Columbia for
the imposition of criminal penalties pursuant to the provisions
of the statutes relating to taxes levied by or in behalf of the
District of Columbia." Id. (codified as D.C. Code s 11-1201
(1981)). Section 111 also provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the jurisdic-
tion of the Tax Division of the Superior Court to review
the validity and amount of all assessments of tax made
by the District of Columbia is exclusive. Effective on
and after the effective date of the [Court Reform Act],
any common-law remedy with respect to assessments of
tax in the District of Columbia and any equitable action
to enjoin such assessments available in a court other than
the former District of Columbia Tax Court is abolished.
Actions properly filed before the effective date of that
Act are not affected by this section and the court in
which any such action has been filed may retain jurisdic-
tion until its disposition.
Id. (codified as D.C. Code s 11-1202 (1981)).
Congress' intent in the Court Reform Act could not be
more clear: Congress unambiguously intended to vest in the
District of Columbia courts exclusive jurisdiction over all
challenges to District of Columbia taxes including those in-
volving federal statutory or constitutional claims in lieu of
(rather than concurrently with) jurisdiction in the federal
courts. Lest there be any doubt about Congress' intent to
place exclusive jurisdiction in the newly established District
of Columbia courts, in the Court Reform Act Congress ex-
pressly repealed its earlier enactment vesting concurrent
jurisdiction over matters relating to District of Columbia
taxes in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.
Prior to the Court Reform Act, the district court for the
District of Columbia was vested with "a two-fold jurisdiction,"
King v. Wall & Beaver Street Corp., 145 F.2d 377, 380 (D.C.
Cir. 1944), as "both a federal district court and the local trial
court of general jurisdiction." Fehlhaber Pile Co. v. Tennes-
see Valley Authority, 155 F.2d 864, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1946); see
also W. Urn Mfg. Co. v. Am. Pipe and Steel Corp., 284 F.2d
279, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1960); D.C. Code ss 11-301, 11-305,
11-306 (1940). In 1952, Congress enacted legislation with a
"savings clause," S. Rep. No. 82-1471, at 3 (1952); H.R. Rep.
No. 82-1977, at 4 (1952), preserving the availability of judicial
remedies in the federal court for those District of Columbia
taxpayers who elected not to pursue an administrative refund
process that was available under District of Columbia law.
See Act of July 10, 1952, ch. 649, 66 Stat. 543, 546 (codified at
D.C. Code s 47-2413(c) (1961)).13 Because the district court
for the District of Columbia at the time was the local trial
court of general jurisdiction, the 1952 statute had the effect of
vesting concurrent jurisdiction in the district court over ac-
tions seeking refunds of District of Columbia taxes, along
with the administrative jurisdiction of the District of Colum-
bia Board of Tax Appeals. See, e.g., Pearson, 250 F.2d at
765. Section 111 of Title I of the Court Reform Act repealed
the 1952 statute. See D.C. Code s 11-1202 (1981) (repealing
D.C. Code s 47-2413(c) (1961)). Consequently, appellants'
reliance on Pearson, 250 F.2d at 765, for the proposition that
the district court had jurisdiction, is misplaced.
Congress also made clear that its grant of exclusive juris-
diction over challenges to tax assessments under District of
Columbia law included claims for refunds. Section 161 of the
Court Reform Act established an administrative procedure
for obtaining refunds of District of Columbia taxes, see Court
Reform Act, Title I, s 161(a)(7) (codified as amended at D.C.
Code s 47-3310 (1981)), and provided an appeal from an
administrative determination with de novo review in the D.C.
Superior Court, see id. s 161(a)(3) (codified as amended at
D.C. Code s 47-3303 (1981)), a right of appeal to the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals, see id. s 161(a)(4) (codified as
amended at D.C. Code s 47-3304 (1981)), and certiorari re-
__________
13 The 1952 Act provided, in relevant part:
The remedies provided to the taxpayer under this chapter shall
not be deemed to take away from the taxpayer any remedy
which he might have under any other provision of law, but no
suit for the recovery of overpayment of any tax shall be
instituted in any court if the taxpayer has elected to file an
appeal with respect to such overpayment with the Board of Tax
Appeals for the District of Columbia under this title.
Act of July 10, 1952, ch. 649, 66 Stat. 543, 546 (codified at D.C. Code
s 47-2413(c) (1961)).
view by the United States Supreme Court. See id.; see also
D.C. Code s 11-102 (1981).
Having established a state-type court system for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, three years later Congress enacted the
District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Re-
organization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (December
24, 1973) (codified at D.C. Code s 1-201 et seq. (1981)) ("Self-
Government Act"). In addition to transferring certain func-
tions previously performed by federal agencies to the District
of Columbia government, Congress delegated some of its
legislative authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of
the United States Constitution to a new District of Columbia
government. Title IV of the Self-Government Act was a
Charter, which set forth the three branches of the District of
Columbia government and is similar, in some measure, to a
state constitution. See Shook v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility and
Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 132 F.3d 775, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Therein Congress delegated to the D.C. Council certain legis-
lative powers, including revenue raising powers, see D.C.
Code ss 1-227, 1-233 (1981), by means of legislation in the
form of either permanent, temporary, or emergency acts, as
appropriate. See id. ss 1-229, 1-233 (1981); see also United
States v. Alston, 580 A.2d 587, 590-91 (D.C. 1990). The
Mayor, in turn, was charged with the responsibility to enforce
the laws, including the levying and collection of taxes. See
D.C. Code ss 47-301, 47-310(6) (1981). Pursuant to their
delegated authority, the D.C. Council enacted the 1994, 1998,
and 1999 Acts, and the emergency and temporary acts, and
the Mayor collected the special taxes for which appellants
seek refunds.
By enactment of the Court Reform Act and the Self-
Government Act, therefore, Congress has expressed its clear
intent to grant exclusive jurisdiction over claims for refunds
of District of Columbia taxes to the District of Columbia
courts and authorized District of Columbia government offi-
cials to enact and collect, as well as refund, taxes. Congress
divested the federal courts of any jurisdiction over such
challenges that they might otherwise have, including jurisdic-
tion over challenges presenting federal statutory or constitu-
tional claims. See Block v. District of Columbia, 492 F.2d
646, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1974); District of Columbia v. Berenter,
466 F.2d 367, 373 n.9, 376 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1972); H.R. Rep.
No. 91-907, at 165 (1970). The lack of life tenure and of the
other attributes of Article III status on the part of the judges
of the District of Columbia's courts does not render the
exclusive jurisdiction of those courts over federal statutory
and constitutional claims constitutionally problematic. See
Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 382-83 (1977). As would be
true of a litigant challenging State taxes, the refund and
appeal procedures in the Court Reform Act do not preclude a
litigant, including appellants, from raising federal statutory
and constitutional claims in the District of Columbia courts,
with ultimate review of federal claims by the United States
Supreme Court available by writ of certiorari. See Court
Reform Act, Title I, s 161(a)(7) (codified as amended at D.C.
Code s 47-3310 (1981)); id. s 161(a)(3) (codified as amended
at D.C. Code s 47-3303 (1981)); id. s 161(a)(4) (codified as
amended at D.C. Code s 47-3304 (1981)); see also D.C. Code
s 11-102 (1981).
Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of appellants' com-
plaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.14
__________
14 In view of our disposition, we do not address appellants'
contention that administrative remedies under District of Columbia
law are inadequate and that pursuit of them would be futile. We
note that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals summarily
affirmed dismissal of a similar complaint brought by appellants for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Jenkins v. Wash.
Convention Ctr. Auth., Nos. 00-CV-29 and 00-CV-239 (D.C. Au-
gust 7, 2000). Further, it appears that on September 27, 1999,
appellants filed administrative claims for refunds. See Washington
Convention Center Authority's Brief at 19; Appellants' Reply Brief
at 7 n.4.