United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued February 26, 2007 Decided June 1, 2007
No. 06-3029
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
APPELLEE
v.
SHAWN A. SOUTHERLAND,
APPELLANT
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 03cr00216-01)
Rita B. Bosworth, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J.
Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.
Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor,
U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III and Martin Carpenter,
Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit
Judges.
2
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.
SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Police officers stopped
appellant Shawn Southerland after they observed the front
license plate of his vehicle on the dashboard. He was
subsequently arrested after a computer check indicated that his
license had been suspended. After an inventory search of the
vehicle revealed a loaded handgun, he was charged with illegal
possession of the handgun. He filed a motion to suppress
evidence of the handgun, arguing that both the stop of his
vehicle and his subsequent arrest were unlawful. The district
court denied the motion. Because we conclude that the stop was
proper and probable cause existed for the arrest, we affirm.
I. Background
Early on an April evening in 2003 two Washington, D.C.,
Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) police officers
patrolling in a police vehicle in the Northeast quadrant of the
city observed a green Cadillac approaching them from the
opposite direction. The officers noticed that the front license
plate of the vehicle, issued by the State of Maryland, was placed
on the dashboard. Believing this placement of the plate to be a
violation of Maryland traffic laws, the officers stopped the
vehicle. The driver and sole occupant of the vehicle was the
appellant, Shawn Southerland. After receipt of his driver’s
license, the officers radioed the dispatcher and requested that
Southerland’s license number be run through the Washington
Area Law Enforcement System (“WALES”). The dispatcher
reported that Southerland’s license had been suspended.
Southerland was then arrested for operating a vehicle after
suspension. Following the arrest, an inventory search of the
Cadillac revealed, inter alia, a loaded .45 caliber semi-automatic
handgun. The officers charged Southerland with possessing it
illegally. Southerland filed a motion to suppress the evidence
3
found at the time of his arrest, arguing that both the initial stop
of his vehicle and his subsequent arrest were unlawful. The
district court denied the motion. Southerland then entered a
conditional plea of guilty to the firearms charge and was
sentenced to 57 months in prison.
II. Discussion
A. The Stop
At the hearing on Southerland’s suppression motion the two
officers testified as to the circumstances surrounding the stop of
Southerland’s Cadillac. Both officers said that upon
encountering the Cadillac they observed a license plate on the
dashboard, but no license plate on the front bumper. The first
officer to testify stated that Southerland was stopped for “an
improperly displayed front tag,” and upon further questioning
stated that the display was improper because the tag was not “on
the front bumper” where it “has to be.” When questioned the
second officer also stated that the stop was conducted because
the front plate “was not placed on the front bumper where it was
supposed to be properly placed.” The district court, in rejecting
Southerland’s claim that the stop was unlawful, did not
specifically refer to the officers’ testimony. Rather, the court
noted that under Maryland law license plates must be
“[s]ecurely fastened” and “clearly visible.” United States v.
Southerland, Crim. No. 03-216, slip op. at 2-3 (D.D.C. Apr. 20,
2005) (quoting MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 13-411(c)(2)).
Finding from the “evidence presented” to it that Southerland’s
front license plate was neither “securely fastened” nor “clearly
visible,” the court held that the plate was not displayed in
accordance with Maryland law and therefore the stop was
lawful.
4
Southerland now argues that there is no evidence in the
record to support the district court’s finding that the license plate
was not securely fastened or clearly visible, asserting that the
officers’ only testimony was that the plate was on the dashboard.
He further argues that the police officers’ “subjective” belief
that a violation had occurred because the plate was not attached
to the bumper was not a reasonable basis for the stop. In support
of these arguments Southerland relies chiefly on United States
v. Hill, 131 F.3d 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In that case the police
stopped Hill’s vehicle for not having a Vehicle Identification
Number (“VIN”) on its temporary tags. Events following the
stop led to Hill’s arrest for unlawful possession of a firearm.
Hill filed a motion to suppress evidence of the firearm, arguing
that the stop was unlawful. During the hearing on the motion he
produced the temporary tags which contained a VIN. The
district court stated that it could not say whether or not the tags
had a VIN at the time of the stop, but it accepted as true the
officer’s testimony that he believed that the tag did not have a
VIN, and denied the motion. On appeal, we noted that these
statements by the district court showed that it had “applied a
subjective reasonableness test to the officer’s decision to stop
Hill’s car, rather than the objective reasonableness test that is
required in such situations.” Id. at 1060. The case was
remanded for the district court to make a determination of
whether it was objectively reasonable for the officer to conclude
that the tag did not have a VIN.
Southerland argues that similarly in his case the district
court never made any determination whether it was objectively
reasonable for the officers to determine that the plate on the
dashboard was improperly displayed. Indeed, he asserts that
under Maryland law a front license plate only needs to be
“attached” and “visible,” and the officers’ belief that the plate
was required to be placed on the bumper was subjective and
therefore not reasonable under Hill. The district court erred, he
5
continues, in substituting its own conclusions, i.e., that the tag
was not “securely attached” nor “clearly visible,” for those of
the officers.
Southerland correctly states that under Hill the question to
be answered is whether it was objectively reasonable for the
officers who observed his vehicle to conclude that a traffic
violation had occurred. The observations made by the officers
leading to the stop are findings of fact for the hearing judge to
determine and we will disturb those findings only if they are
clearly erroneous. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699
(1996). But we review independently whether, acting on those
observations, it was objectively reasonable for the police to stop
Southerland’s vehicle. Id. at 696-97.
An automobile stop must not be unreasonable under the
circumstances. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810
(1996). Whether a stop is reasonable turns on whether the facts
“viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police
officer, amount to reasonable suspicion” that a traffic violation
has occurred. See Ornelas at 696. The police may initiate a
stop even if the traffic violation is a minor one. See
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (there was
“no question about the propriety” of a stop for an expired license
plate). Here, one of the officers testified that Southerland’s
Cadillac was stopped because the license plate observed on the
dashboard was “improperly displayed,” while the other officer
testified that the plate was not “properly placed.” At the same
time both officers testified to their belief that Maryland law
requires that the plate be placed on the bumper. As the
prosecution concedes, Maryland law does not mandate that front
license plates be affixed to the bumper, but the law of that state
does require that vehicles have license plates “on the front” and
that these plates be “[i]n a horizontal position” and “[s]ecurely
fastened” and “clearly visible.” MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 13-
6
411(a), (c). Maryland’s two neighboring jurisdictions, the
District of Columbia and Virginia, have similar requirements.
D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 18, § 422; VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-716. In
light of these requirements we think it objectively reasonable for
the officers to suspect that Southerland’s dashboard plate was in
violation of Maryland law, even assuming they were mistaken
that the law required display of the front plate on the bumper.
Cf. United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(upholding arrest where original ground–expired license–was
invalid but officers had probable cause to arrest for a different
offense–reckless driving). The district court’s determination
that the stop was lawful is therefore affirmed.
B. The Arrest
During the proceedings on his suppression motion
Southerland argued that the officers did not have probable cause
to arrest him for a suspended license. In support of this
argument he introduced testimony from the District of Columbia
Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”), including a so-called
“5 Year Record Request” from 2004, indicating that at the time
of the arrest his license had not been suspended. The
government then introduced its own “5 Year Record Request”
from 2003 indicating that at the time of the arrest Southerland’s
license had in fact been suspended. Also at the hearing both
officers testified that a WALES check on Southerland’s license
indicated that his license had been suspended. The district court,
in determining that the arrest was proper, stated that although
there were conflicting records from the DMV, any errors were
made by the DMV and not by the police. Southerland, slip op.
at 5. Consequently, the court found that “the officer’s reliance
on the WALES report was objectively reasonable and lacked
any indicia of bad faith.” Id.
7
On appeal Southerland argues in effect that the weight of
the evidence presented during the suppression hearing
establishes that the DMV’s records did not show his license was
ever suspended and consequently no probable cause existed for
his arrest. We disagree. Initially we note that the district court,
after reviewing the evidence, stated that there were “conflicting
records from the DMV” resulting in a “genuine dispute” as to
whether or not Southerland’s license was suspended at the time
of the stop. Id. But even if Southerland had definitively
established that his license was not suspended at the time of the
arrest, we would nevertheless conclude that the officers had
probable cause to arrest him.
Probable cause “must be determined objectively from the
facts and circumstances known to the officers at the time of the
arrest.” Bookhardt, 277 F.3d at 565. These facts and
circumstances must be sufficient to warrant a prudent person’s
believing that an offense has been committed. United States v.
Wesley, 293 F.3d 541, 545 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
Both officers testified that at the time of the stop the WALES
system reported that Southerland’s license was suspended.
WALES is a database maintained by the Metropolitan Police
Department that contains, inter alia, motor vehicle information
such as drivers’ licenses and vehicle registrations. See United
States v. Hutchinson, 408 F.3d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Information from the DMV database is uploaded to the WALES
system. The district court listed as one of its “factual findings”
the indication from the WALES computer check that
Southerland’s license had been suspended. Southerland, slip op.
at 1-2. In relying on this information and arresting Southerland,
the district court also determined that the officers acted in good
faith. Id. at 5. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803-04
(1971) (probable cause to arrest where “officers in good faith
believed Miller was Hill and arrested him”). We conclude that
regardless of whether Southerland’s license was in fact
8
suspended, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to rely
on the information received from WALES and to believe that
Southerland’s license had been suspended. See United States v.
Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 102 (1st Cir. 2006) (although defendant’s
license not suspended at time of police stop, it was objectively
reasonable for officers to believe, from information on the police
cruiser’s computer, that it was suspended). Accordingly,
probable cause existed for the arrest and we uphold the district
court’s determination that the arrest was proper.
At oral argument Southerland asserted, apparently for the
first time, that probable cause for his arrest was negated by the
so-called “fellow-officer doctrine.” See Whiteley v. Warden,
Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971). Because this
argument was raised for the first time at oral argument, it is
forfeited. See United States v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 1162, 1167-68
(D.C. Cir. 2000). In any event the argument has no merit.
Southerland’s claim appears to be that the DMV is equal to
“law enforcement,” i.e., it is a “fellow officer” of the MPD, and
therefore the error by the DMV in reporting his license to the
MPD as suspended is a law enforcement error. Under Whiteley,
evidence resulting from a search based on the fellow officer’s
erroneous information is subject to evidentiary exclusion per the
exclusionary rule, see 401 U.S. at 568-69. But in United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme Court discussed the
exclusionary rule’s purpose of deterring unlawful police
conduct. While questioning whether the rule does in fact have
a deterrent effect on police misconduct, the Court stated that the
rule “cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter
objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.” 468 U.S. at
918-19. The Supreme Court itself resolved any apparent tension
between Whiteley and Leon in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1
(1995).
9
In Evans, the Court first discussed the facts of the Whiteley
decision in which the arrest, held to be illegal, had been based
on an outstanding warrant coupled with a subsequent radio
bulletin, which taken together were “insufficient to support an
independent judicial assessment of probable cause.” Id. at 12
(citing Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568). On those facts, the Whiteley
Court had concluded that “‘an otherwise illegal arrest cannot be
insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating
officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest.’” Id.
(quoting Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568). That said, the Evans Court
stated that, “Although Whiteley clearly retains relevance in
determining whether police officers have violated the Fourth
Amendment, its precedential value regarding application of the
exclusionary rule is dubious.” Id. (citation omitted). While
Whiteley had “treated identification of a Fourth Amendment
violation as synonymous with application of the exclusionary
rule to evidence secured incident to that violation,” the Evans
Court made clear that “[s]ubsequent case law has rejected this
reflexive application of the exclusionary rule.” Id. (citing
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987); Leon, 468 U.S. 897;
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)). Relying
specifically on Leon, the Evans Court held that “the issue of
exclusion is separate from whether the Fourth Amendment has
been violated, and exclusion is appropriate only if the remedial
objectives of the rule are thought most efficaciously served.” Id.
at 13-14 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, and Calandra, 414 U.S.
at 348).
In the present case, as in Leon and Evans, there is no
deterrent function to be served. We see no reason why officers
should be deterred from relying upon the common tools of the
traffic officer in determining whether there is probable cause to
believe a driver’s license has been suspended. We offer no
opinion as to whether the DMV is “a fellow officer” for
purposes of the application of Whiteley. Our conclusion that it
10
was objectively reasonable for the officers to rely on the
WALES system and arrest Southerland precludes, under Leon
and Evans, application of the exclusionary rule in this case.
III. Conclusion
We conclude that the stop of appellant was proper and
probable cause existed for his arrest. The decision of the district
court is therefore affirmed.
So ordered.