UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4338
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MATTHEW QUINN MASON, a/k/a Q,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey,
Chief District Judge. (3:08-cr-00030-JPB-DJJ-2)
Submitted: March 24, 2010 Decided: April 16, 2010
Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lary D. Garrett, GARRETT & GARRETT, Moorefield, West Virginia,
for Appellant. Sharon L. Potter, United States Attorney, Erin
K. Reisenweber, Assistant United States Attorney, Martinsburg,
West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, Matthew Quinn Mason was
convicted of conspiracy to retaliate against a witness, in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(a)(1)(A), (f) (West 2000 & Supp.
2009); aiding and abetting in retaliating against a witness, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(A) (2006); and damage to the
property of another in retaliation for testimony, in violation
of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(b)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009). The
district court sentenced Mason to concurrent sentences of
ninety-five months on each count.
Mason asserts two claims on appeal: 1 (1) the district
court erred in denying his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29
motion for a judgment of acquittal, because the evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) the district
court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of prior
interactions between Mason and Darryl Clinkscale, the victim in
this case. For the reasons that follow, we reject Mason’s
arguments and affirm.
1
At the beginning of his brief, Mason indicates that he
also appeals the jury instructions issued by the district court.
However, he does not provide any argument pertaining to this
issue in the body of his brief. See Fed. R. App. P.
28(a)(9)(A). Therefore, we find Mason has waived this issue on
appeal. See Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d
599, 607 (4th Cir. 2009).
2
We review a district court’s decision to deny a Rule
29 motion de novo. United States v. Midgett, 488 F.3d 288, 297
(4th Cir. 2007). Where, as here, the motion is based on a claim
of insufficient evidence, “[t]he verdict of a jury must be
sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most
favorable to the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); see United States v. Kellam, 568
F.3d 125, 140 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 657 (2009).
“[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of
fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 471 (4th Cir. 2007)
(quoting United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir.
1996) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We “can
reverse a conviction on insufficiency grounds only when the
prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Moye, 454
F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
To satisfy its burden of proof in this case, the
Government had to prove that, in retaliation for Clinkscale’s
testimony against Cecil Ray, Jr., 2 Mason: aided and abetted in
2
Clinkscale testified at Ray’s 2007 federal drug
trafficking trial. Ray was convicted and received a life
(Continued)
3
attempting to kill Clinkscale; conspired with at least one other
person to attempt to kill Clinkscale; and damaged Clinkscale’s
property. See 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1), (b)(1), (f). We have
thoroughly reviewed the record and find the evidence supports
Mason’s convictions. Clinkscale testified that, prior to his
involvement in Ray’s trial, he did not know Mason. Clinkscale
further testified to the three (and only three) interactions he
had with Mason prior to the incident underlying this appeal.
These exchanges, which occurred while both men were in custody
immediately prior to Ray’s trial, all centered around
Clinkscale’s testimony against Ray. Further, Mason’s co-
defendant testified that one of the men who shot at Clinkscale
expressed anger at Clinkscale, because Clinkscale had “told on”
Ray.
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that
“the most and perhaps the only[] reasonable inference to be
drawn by the jury . . . is that Clinkscale was being pursued and
shot at because he had testified against Cecil Ray.” Viewed in
the light most favorable to the Government, we find no clear
failure in the Government’s evidence that would support
reversal. See Moye, 454 F.3d at 394 (“[W]here the evidence
sentence, which this court affirmed on appeal. See United
States v. Ray, 317 F. App’x 346 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-5155).
4
supports differing reasonable interpretations, the jury will
decide which interpretation to accept.”).
Mason next asserts that the district court abused its
discretion in admitting Clinkscale’s testimony pertaining to his
three prior exchanges with Mason. 3 This court reviews a district
court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 325 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating
standard of review). An abuse of discretion occurs when “the
district court judge acted arbitrarily or irrationally in
admitting evidence.” Id. at 326 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence
prohibits the admission of evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or
acts” solely to prove a defendant’s bad character, but “[s]uch
evidence . . . may ‘be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.’” Id.
(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)). For such evidence to be
admissible under Rule 404(b), it “must be (1) relevant to an
3
Mason first challenges the timeliness of the Government’s
notice regarding its intent to proffer this evidence. However,
because Mason did not ask for a continuance based on the late
notice, he will not be heard to complain of it now. Relatedly,
Mason asserts that the late disclosure of this evidence violated
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. However, the evidence at
issue simply does not implicate Rule 16. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
16(a)(1)(A)-(G).
5
issue other than character; (2) necessary; and (3) reliable.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the
evidence must be more probative than prejudicial. Id. (citing
Fed. R. Evid. 403).
Assuming, as the district court did, that the
challenged evidence constituted 404(b) material, there was no
abuse of discretion in admitting it. Mason’s basic defense was
that he participated in this crime for no reason. Therefore,
evidence of Mason’s prior interactions with Clinkscale, which
established Mason’s knowledge of Clinkscale’s role as a federal
witness, was admissible because it was relevant and probative of
an issue other than Mason’s character.
For these reasons, we affirm Mason’s convictions and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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