UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 98-40452
Summary Calendar
_____________________
RAYMOND PETER GODAIRE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
E. EDE; T. PORTER, Chief Classification
Officer; WAYNE ULRICH, Unit Health
Administrator; H. CANTU, Doctor,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(1:95-CV-206)
_________________________________________________________________
December 8, 1999
Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Raymond Peter Godaire (TDCJ # 613522), pro se, contests the
summary-judgment dismissal of his civil rights complaint, in which
he alleges that in retaliation for his legal activities, defendants
conspired to deny him medical treatment and medically-required
housing. (Godaire’s motion to “amend” his appeal, and the various
relief requested therein, and for this court to take judicial
notice of various filings in this and other actions, is DENIED.
His motion to file his reply brief out-of-time is GRANTED. The
clerk is directed to file only that reply brief which was tendered
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
to the court on 23 June 1999.)
Godaire contends that the district court impermissibly granted
summary judgment based on credibility determinations. We review a
summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the
district court. E.g., Melton v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of
Am., 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1997). Such judgment is proper if
the summary judgment record presents no genuine issue of material
fact and if, viewing that record in the light most favorable to the
non-movant, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986). A factual dispute will preclude summary judgment if,
based on the evidence, a reasonable juror could return a verdict
for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). In this regard, the court may neither weigh the
evidence nor make credibility determinations. Id. at 255.
The district court determined that defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity because Godaire had failed to establish Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference. To state a claim for the
unconstitutional denial of medical treatment, a convicted prisoner
must allege that care was denied or delayed and that this
constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). A prison
official acts with deliberate indifference “only if he knows that
inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and [he] disregards
that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
2
Summary judgment is proper on the claims that defendants
conspired to withhold prescribed medical treatment. Godaire’s
conclusional conspiracy allegations are not supported by any
evidence. See Copsey v. Swearingen, 36 F.3d 1336, 1347 (5th Cir.
1994).
With respect to withholding such treatment claims against Drs.
Ede and Cantu (unit physicians), the district court concluded that
the summary-judgment evidence showed a pattern of medical care
which refuted the inadequate treatment claims. Although some of
those claims are based on a lack of, or inadequate, treatment,
Godaire alleged, under penalty of perjury, that, in order to punish
him for his legal activities, the defendant doctors deliberately
failed to enter his prescriptions in the computer. By dismissing
the allegations, the district court apparently made a credibility
determination that they were untrue, which is, as noted,
impermissible for summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
On the other hand, such judgment was proper for the claim
against Ulrich (health administrator) for the alleged withholding
of prescribed soft-soled shoes. Godaire does not show that Ulrich
acted with deliberate indifference, because the summary judgment
record does not show that the denial of the shoes created a
“substantial risk of serious harm”. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.
For the housing-classification claim, the district court
concluded that Godaire had not shown deliberate indifference on the
part of Porter (chief of classification), because (1) the summary
judgment evidence did not support Godaire’s claim that he had
3
fallen down stairs in June 1993, as a result of his upper-floor
assignment; and (2) that assignment lasted for only two months and
was perhaps the result of a housing shortage. But, again,
accepting Godaire’s verified pleadings as true, the summary
judgment evidence is conflicting with regard to whether he had
fallen as a result of the assignment. Further, that the assignment
may have lasted only two months does not necessarily negate the
allegation that it was made deliberately and with a retaliatory
motive. Accordingly, summary judgment is not proper for this
claim.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Godaire’s motion for leave to amend his complaint to add additional
defendants, by refusing to rule on Godaire’s discovery motions
prior to granting summary judgment, or by staying discovery pending
ruling on qualified immunity.
And, we do not have jurisdiction to consider Godaire’s claim
that the court erred by denying his numerous requests for temporary
restraining orders. See Matter of Lieb, 915 F.2d 180, 183 (5th
Cir. 1990).
Finally, we reject Godaire’s attempt to present allegations
against unidentified and unserved individuals regarding denial of
access to the courts in connection with the prosecution of his case
in the district court, based on claims of limited access to a law
library and destruction of his legal filings and evidence while he
was housed at a halfway house.
For the foregoing reasons, the portion of the judgment
4
dismissing the claims against Porter and Drs. Ede and Cantu for
deliberate indifference to Godaire’s serious medical needs by
withholding prescribed housing and medical treatment is VACATED.
In all other respects, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED and REMANDED IN PART
5