FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 07 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT E. COLEMAN, No. 09-57031
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:06-cv-02606-JFW-
PJW
v.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MEMORANDUM *
CORRECTIONS AND
REHABILITATION; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 15, 2011 **
Before: CANBY, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Robert E. Coleman, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and violation of the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Rehabilitation Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for Drs. Smith and
Ofoegbu because Coleman failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether these defendants were deliberately indifferent to his knee problems and
high blood pressure. See id. at 1057-58 (prison officials must know of and
disregard a substantial risk of serious harm for their conduct to constitute
deliberate indifference; negligence and a mere difference of opinion is
insufficient).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for the Internal
Classification Committee defendants because Coleman failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether these defendants were personally involved in
denying a transfer for physical therapy. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934
(9th Cir. 2002) (“In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable
under section 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged
rights deprivation . . . .”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation on Coleman’s Rehabilitation Act
claim because Coleman failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
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whether he had a disability. See Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351,
1354 (9th Cir. 1996) (definition of disability). Moreover, Coleman failed to raise a
triable issue as to whether he was denied benefits on account of his claimed
disability or denied a reasonable accommodation in violation of the Rehabilitation
Act. See O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007)
(elements of a Rehabilitation Act claim); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (addressing
reasonable accommodations).
Coleman’s remaining contentions, including those concerning discovery, are
unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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