UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-7220
LARRY COLEMAN,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
SUP. CHARLES I. POFF, JR.; JOHN DOE, (1); SGT. THOMAS;
CONMED HEALTH SERVICE; JOHN DOE, (2); JANE DOE, (3),
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Glen E. Conrad, Chief
District Judge. (7:12-cv-00156-GEC-RSB)
Submitted: November 13, 2012 Decided: November 27, 2012
Before KING, GREGORY, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Larry Coleman, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Larry Coleman filed an in forma pauperis action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), alleging deliberate indifference to the
conditions of his confinement and to his serious medical needs.
The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a
claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2006). Coleman
appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for
failure to state a claim. Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg’l Jail,
407 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2005). A complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless, “after accepting
all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as
true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those
facts in the plaintiff’s favor, it appears certain that the
plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim
entitling him to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). While pro se pleadings must be construed liberally,
Erickson v. Pardus, 511 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), the complaint must
contain sufficient facts “to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 570 (2007).
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment “protects inmates from inhumane treatment and
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conditions while imprisoned.” Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d
756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). To establish that an inmate has
suffered cruel and unusual punishment based on his conditions of
confinement, he must “produce evidence of a serious or
significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the
challenged conditions,” Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th
Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), and
establish that prison officials acted with “a sufficiently
culpable state of mind,” that is, deliberate indifference to the
inmate’s health and safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
837 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). A prison
official “is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of
harm to a [prisoner] when that [official] knows of and
disregards the risk.” Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372
F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Negligence is inadequate; rather, “the official must
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
To establish an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate
medical care by prison personnel, the inmate must demonstrate
that he suffers from a serious medical need and that prison
officials acted with deliberate indifference to that need. See
Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). To be
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deliberately indifferent, the official must have “actual
knowledge of the risk of harm to the inmate” and also “must have
actually known that their response was inadequate to address
those needs.” Id. at 241-42 (emphasis omitted). Thus,
negligence or medical malpractice is insufficient to establish
deliberate indifference; rather, the treating official must
entirely fail to consider the inmate’s medical complaints or
intentionally delay or deny access to adequate medical care.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Sosebee v. Murphy,
797 F.2d 179, 181 (4th Cir. 1986). Mere disagreement with the
course of treatment provided by treating officials also falls
short of a valid claim. Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319
(4th Cir. 1975).
A plaintiff cannot maintain a claim against a
supervisor under § 1983 unless he alleges
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive
knowledge that his subordinate[s were] engaged in
conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk
of constitutional injury to . . . plaintiff; (2) that
the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so
inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or
tacit authorization of the alleged offensive
practices; and (3) that there was an affirmative
causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the
particular constitutional injury suffered by the
plaintiff.
Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Our review of the record indicates that Coleman failed
to allege sufficient facts to state a cognizable Eighth
Amendment claim. Specifically, while his allegations supported
the conclusion that his bunk assignment posed some risk to
Coleman, he failed to adequately allege that the Defendants had
actual knowledge of a serious medical need or substantial risk
of serious harm to Coleman. Nor did Coleman plausibly allege
actual or constructive knowledge by Defendants Poff and Conmed
Health Service of misconduct by their subordinates, as necessary
to support supervisory liability under § 1983.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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