UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 93-1238
PAUL WITTY, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
MICHAEL S. DUKAKIS, ETC., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
GERALD S. KRAMER, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges,
and Fuste,* District Judge.
Mary Winstanley O'Connor with whom Gaffin & Krattenmaker,
P.C. was on brief, for appellants.
Margaret Monsell, Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, with whom Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General,
was on brief, for defendants-appellees.
September 2, 1993
*Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.
SELYA, Circuit Judge. After failing to strike while
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
the iron was hot, appellants invited the district court to
overlook their lassitude and award them attorneys' fees under 42
U.S.C. 1988. The district court demurred. We find the court's
declination of appellant's invitation, premised on the lack of a
timely fee petition, to be appropriate. Consequently, we affirm.
I
We need not dwell on the provenance of the underlying
suit. For present purposes, it suffices merely to say that
parents of several mentally and physically handicapped children
brought suit in a Massachusetts state court charging the named
defendants, state officials, with dereliction of duty and seeking
injunctive relief. The original plaintiffs averred in substance
that the state had an obligation to continue the children's
special education past age twenty-two; that the state legislature
appropriated money to accomplish this objective; and that the
executive branch then wrongfully impounded the funds. Plaintiffs
later added a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Appellants,
parents of similarly situated children, moved to intervene as
parties plaintiff, making virtually identical claims. On October
10, 1989, a state judge granted their motion.
On October 18, defendants removed the action to the
federal district court. All plaintiffs, including the
appellants, moved to remand. On January 24, 1990, the district
court, in an order reminiscent of the precedent proposed by
Solomon to resolve conflicting claims of parentage, see 2 Kings
2
3:16-18, remanded the state-law claims but retained jurisdiction
over the section 1983 claim. The parties subsequently reached a
settlement resolving all the state-law claims. By virtue of this
settlement, the plaintiffs, and all persons similarly situated,
including appellants, achieved complete relief.
On January 15, 1991, plaintiffs asked the district
court for attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988.1
Appellants did not file a similar application. On June 21, 1991,
the judge issued a memorandum order awarding plaintiffs
$147,288.17. On August 12, 1991, final judgment entered. The
judgment commemorated the fee award and dismissed the underlying
claims as moot. On the same date, the case was administratively
closed.
On April 23, 1992, appellants stirred from their
apparent slumber and applied for fees. On July 17, the district
court denied the application as untimely under D. Mass. Loc. R.
54.3, which requires a prevailing party to move for attorneys'
fees within thirty days next following the entry of judgment, on
pain of preclusion. Appellants moved for reconsideration. The
court denied that motion on December 7. Appellants then tried a
different route, moving for entry of judgment pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(b). Appellants contended that, because the district
court's earlier entry of judgment did not specifically mention
142 U.S.C. 1988 provides in pertinent part that, in
actions brought under the aegis of 42 U.S.C. 1983, "the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
3
"intervenors," it "adjudicate[d] fewer than all the claims . . .
of fewer than all the parties," and therefore failed to
"terminate the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).2 By virtue of
this maneuver, appellants hoped to restart the clock in regard to
the filing of an application for counsel fees. On December 31,
1992, the district court granted the motion for entry of judgment
stating explicitly, however, that it was doing so "with respect
to the only issue remaining, [appellants'] claim for attorney's
fees." A judgment commemorative of the December 31 order entered
on January 4, 1993. The district court subsequently refused to
amend either the new or the old judgment and, by order dated
February 3, 1993, again denied appellants' request for attorneys'
fees. This appeal ensued.
2Rule 54(b) provides in pertinent part:
When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, . . . or when
multiple parties are involved, the court may
direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims
or parties only upon an express determination
that there is no just reason for delay and
upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment. In the absence of such
determination and direction, any order or
other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than
all the parties shall not terminate the
action as to any of the claims or parties,
and the order or other form of decision is
subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims
and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties.
4
II
Ordinarily, a prevailing plaintiff in a section 1983
case is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees "unless
special circumstances would render such an award unjust."
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 89 n.1 (1989); Newman v.
Piggy Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). Local Rule
54.3 conditions this entitlement by requiring prevailing parties
to file fee applications within thirty days next following the
entry of judgment or else forever hold their peace. The
genealogy of this timeliness requirement is impeccable. See
White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Empl't Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 454
(1981) (suggesting that courts adopt such rules); Baird v.
Bellotti, 724 F.2d 1032, 1037 n.6 (1st Cir. 1984) (similar).
In general, rules limiting the time within which fee
claims may be filed are enforceable according to their tenor.
Here, appellants do not question the propriety of such rules. By
like token, appellants have shown insufficient reason why they
should be excused from the operation of Local Rule 54.3.
Nevertheless, appellants weave an imaginative tapestry featuring
manifold reasons why the district court erred in refusing to
entertain their fee petition. Having pulled each asseverational
thread, we find the fabric to be unserviceable.
First, appellants say that, inasmuch as the 1991
judgment made no particular mention of them, it could not have
been a final judgment within the meaning of the Civil Rules and,
therefore, the 30-day time period specified in Local Rule 54.3
5
did not begin to run until January 4, 1993 (when the district
court, at appellants' behest, entered another judgment). But,
appellants proceed from a mistaken assumption.
A judgment is final "when the court enters a decision
resolving the contested matter, leaving nothing to be done except
execution of the judgment." United States v. Metropolitan Dist.
Comm'n, 847 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1988).3 Since appellants had
intervened as parties plaintiff and their substantive claims
matched those of the original plaintiffs, the action was
effectively ended when the court dismissed plaintiffs' federal
claims as moot. See 7C Charles A. Wright et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure 1920, at 488 (1983) (explaining that, as
a general rule, "the intervenor is treated as if he were an
original party and has equal standing with the original
parties"). At that point in the proceedings, then, appellants'
claims had no independent life.
We add a postscript. We think that the 1991 judgment,
by dint of plain language and surrounding context, disposed of
all remaining claims. If, however, any ambiguity existed, we
would be bound to defer to a reasonable interpretation of the
judgment's meaning and effect elucidated by the judicial officer
who authored it. See, e.g., Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 847 F.2d
at 14; Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v.
3It is, of course, well settled that a judgment is
considered "final" if it resolves the merits, despite the fact
that it leaves claims for attorneys' fees to be adjudicated at a
later date. See White, 455 U.S. at 452 & n.14; Crossman v.
Maccoccio, 792 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
6
Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Steam Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059,
1066-67 (1st Cir. 1987); Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 22-23
(1st Cir. 1987); Advance Fin. Corp. v. Isla Rica Sales, Inc., 747
F.2d 21, 26 n.10 (1st Cir. 1984). Here, the district judge, in
denying the fee application as untimely, made it crystal clear
that she believed the 1991 judgment disposed of all remaining
claims, appellants' included, and that she intended the judgment
to have precisely that culminative effect. Because the district
judge's reading is, far and away, the most plausible
interpretation that can be placed on the judgment, appellants'
attempt to argue otherwise can only be viewed as a prime example
of disappointed litigants elevating hope above reason.
Second, appellants asseverate that the 30-day period
specified in Local Rule 54.3 began to run anew when the district
court entered another judgment on January 4, 1993. This argument
is also flawed. To the extent it relies upon the alleged
incompleteness or lack of finality of the earlier judgment, it
fails on the basis of what we have already written. To the
extent that this argument has a somewhat different focus, it
conveniently overlooks that the 1993 judgment entered at
appellants' express request. From the district court's
standpoint, the judgment's only effect was to put a tidy end to
appellants' belated quest for fees.4 A party confronted by a
set period for taking an action cannot allow the time to lapse
4The district court made this abundantly clear both in the
wording of its order and in holding fast to its earlier refusal
to grant fees.
7
and then resurrect his rights merely by asking the court to
reconsider or to confirm what the court has already done. See,
e.g., Fisichelli v. City, Etc. of Methuen, 884 F.2d 17, 18-19
(1st Cir. 1989); Rodriguez-Antuna v. Chase Manhattan Bank Corp.,
871 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Browder v. Director, Ill.
Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978). After all,
"[t]he law ministers to the vigilant not to those who sleep upon
perceptible rights." Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1203 (1st
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 990 (1988).
Third, appellants argue that the 1991 judgment had no
dispositive effect because they received no contemporaneous
notice of its entry. This suggestion ignores an abecedarian rule
of civil practice: parties to an ongoing case have an
independent obligation to monitor all developments in the case
and cannot rely on the clerk's office to do their homework for
them. See Vargas v. Gonzalez, 975 F.2d 916, 917 (1st Cir. 1992);
Spiller v. U.S.V. Labs., Inc., 842 F.2d 535, 537 (1st Cir. 1988);
cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d) (providing that "lack of notice of the
entry [of a judgment] by the clerk does not affect the time to
appeal"). Had appellants exercised even a modicum of diligence,
they would have known that proceedings were in progress to assess
attorneys' fees and, thereafter, that the case had been closed.
In sum, appellants' professed lack of awareness cannot be
permitted to frustrate the 30-day time limit limned in Local Rule
54.3.
Next, appellants assert that the district court's
8
denial of fees was inexplicit it did not particularly describe
the "special circumstances" that rendered a fee award "unjust,"
Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 89 n.1 and, therefore, defective. This
assertion blinks reality. The pertinent facts are as follows.
The district court initially rebuffed appellants' fee application
on July 17, 1992. The court's order explained that the fee
request was time barred. Appellants later made two subsequent
motions that, in effect, asked the court to revisit the matter of
fees. The district court denied these motions without comment;
the operative orders were entered on December 7, 1992 and
February 3, 1993, respectively.
Appellants urge us to set aside the last two orders for
lack of findings. We see no need to do so. So long as a
district court's reason for denying fees or monetary sanctions is
(1) well founded, (2) sufficient to the stated end, and (3)
apparent on the face of the record, a reviewing tribunal will not
insist on unnecessary punctilio. See, e.g., Figueroa-Ruiz v.
Alegria, 905 F.2d 545, 549 (1st Cir. 1990) (requiring explanation
only when reason for denial of sanctions is "not obvious or
apparent from the record"); Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.,
901 F.2d 186, 195 (1st Cir. 1990) (similar); see also Brewster v.
Dukakis, F.2d , (1st Cir. 1993) [No. 92-2399, slip op.
at 11-12] (affirming reduction in claimed attorneys' fees despite
absence of explicit findings); Jacobs v. Mancuso, 825 F.2d 559,
564 (1st Cir. 1987) (acknowledging that there are some
circumstances in which judges confronted by fee requests may "be
9
allowed to draw conclusions . . . without full articulation").
The case at bar comes squarely within this principle. It is
perfectly clear that the district court's thinking had not
changed between July 17 and December 7, and that the denial of
fees on the latter date, and thereafter in February of 1993,
stemmed from the court's steadfast, unarguably correct belief
that the time for filing a viable fee application had expired.
Because the record clearly confirms the existence of this
"special circumstance," no more is exigible.
Finally, appellants claim that the district court's
failure to grant their motion for postjudgment relief in a manner
that would have opened a new 30-day window constituted an abuse
of discretion. But the district court's discretion under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b) is "wide," Cotto v. United States, 993 F.2d 274,
277 (1st Cir. 1993); accord Valley Citizens for a Safe Env't v.
Aldridge, 969 F.2d 1315, 1317 (1st Cir. 1992),5 and we discern
no abuse in this instance. Whether the district court, as a
matter of grace, might have had discretion to vacate and reenter
the 1991 judgment or otherwise relieve appellants from the burden
of Local Rule 54.3 is not the issue. Here, the judge did not see
fit to extend discretionary relief and we can hardly fault her
for refusing to extricate appellants from a self-dug hole. See,
5It makes no difference that appellants also invoked Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e). The same expansive discretion inheres under that
rule. See Mackin v. City of Boston, 969 F.2d 1273, 1279 (1st
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1043 (1993); United States
v. Land at 5 Bell Rock Rd., 896 F.2d 605, 611 (1st Cir. 1990);
Appeal of Sun Pipe Line Co., 831 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
10
e.g., Zaklana v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 906 F.2d 645, 649 (11th
Cir. 1990) (affirming trial court's denial of fee petition for
applicant's failure to comply with timeliness requirements of
local rule; stating, inter alia, "[p]ractitioners must adhere to
applicable local rules in order for those local rules to have
effect and federal courts by enforcement will preserve the
integrity of local rules, absent problems of a constitutional
dimension").
III
We need go no further. Local Rule 54.3 provides a
reasonable period of time following the entry of judgment within
which a prevailing party may bring an application for attorneys'
fees. Appellants dawdled well past the deadline; they did not
file their application until eight months after judgment entered.
The district court acted well within its discretion in refusing
to entertain so stale an entreaty.
Affirmed.
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