March 24, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 93-1908
LEVON A. GARABEDIAN,
Petitioner,
v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Breyer, Chief Judge,
Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
George A. Pliakas and Peter A. Allen on brief for
petitioner.
Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,
Mark C. Walters, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration
Litigation, Civil Division, and Michele Y. F. Sarko, Attorney,
Office of Immigration, Litigation Civil Division, on brief for
respondent.
Per Curiam. Petitioner Levon Garabedian seeks review of
a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals [BIA]
affirming a denial by an immigration judge [IJ] of
petitioner's application for discretionary relief from an
order of deportation. Petitioner was ordered deported
following a hearing in which he was found to have been
convicted of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine)
and of two crimes of entering a dwelling with intent to
commit larceny, all in violation of the laws of Rhode Island.
Petitioner conceded that he was deportable under section
241(a)(11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [INA], 8
U.S.C. 1251(a)(11), but sought discretionary relief
pursuant to section 212(c) of the same act, 8 U.S.C.
1182(c). A denial of discretionary relief will be upheld
"unless it was made without a rational explanation,
inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on
an impermissible basis." Williams v. INS, 773 F.2d 8, 9 (1st
Cir. 1985). We affirm.
Petitioner's main contention is that the BIA failed
to provide a rational explanation for its denial of
discretionary relief. Instead, the BIA merely stated that
"[u]pon a review of the record, we affirm the [IJ's] decision
and dismiss the appeal." The BIA did note that it found a
"few errors in the Immigration Judge's decision, but they
were not significant and in some instances were to the
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benefit of the [petitioner]." The BIA also found that the IJ
"did not fail to consider any of the evidence submitted by
the [petitioner]."
While the BIA has the discretionary power to
conduct de novo review of a decision of an IJ, it is under no
obligation to do so. Hazzard v. INS, 951 F.2d 435, 439-40 &
n.4 (1st Cir. 1991). In this case, the BIA explicitly stated
that it was affirming the IJ's decision after having reviewed
the record. Since petitioner has presented no evidence
challenging the accuracy of this claim, we must presume that
the BIA confirmed the IJ's findings and adopted his reasons
for denying the request for discretionary relief. See McLeod
v. INS, 802 F.2d 89, 95 n.8 (3d Cir. 1986) (absent evidence
to the contrary, BIA procedure in reviewing decision of the
IJ "entitled to a presumption of regularity"). The decision
of the IJ contains a detailed summary of the evidence,
extensive factual findings, and a reasoned explanation for
his denial of relief. We are satisfied that this decision of
the IJ provides the rational explanation required to uphold
the BIA's denial of discretionary relief. See DeLeon v. INS,
547 F.2d 142, 149 (2d Cir. 1976) (even though BIA did not
discuss claim, its affirmance of decision of the IJ shows
that it adequately considered claim where most of the IJ's
decision was devoted to discussion of claim), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 841 (1977); Ramirez-Gonzalez v. INS, 695 F.2d 1208,
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1213 (9th Cir. 1983) (even though BIA stated no reasons for
its decision, the decision by the IJ which the BIA affirmed
"supplies the reasons required by the regulation").
Petitioner also claims that the BIA erred in
failing to give adequate weight to evidence of his
rehabilitation when it denied him relief. See Gouveia v.
INS, 980 F.2d 814, 816 (1st Cir. 1992) (in deciding whether
to exercise discretion, BIA must balance factors favoring
deportation against factors supporting application, such as
evidence of rehabilitation). The record indicates that the
IJ (and implicitly the BIA) considered the evidence of
rehabilitation but found it, along with the other factors
favoring relief, insufficient to meet petitioner's burden,
see Hazzard, 951 F.2d at 438, of showing that he deserved a
favorable exercise of discretion.1 As this court has stated
repeatedly, as long as the relevant factors have been
considered, it belongs to the BIA and not to this court to
weigh the various factors in arriving at the ultimate
decision of whether to grant discretionary relief. See
Gouveia, 980 F.2d at 819.
Affirmed.
1. The immigration judge did question "whether or not such
advances [were] primarily due to the pending deportation
proceedings." The record contains evidence which would
support this evaluation.
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