June 5, 1996
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 96-1240
LUC GAETAN YARGEAU, A/K/A LUKE GAETAN YARGEAU,
Petitioner,
v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Respondent.
ERRATA SHEET
The opinion of this Court issued on May 30, 1996 is
amended as follows:
On the cover sheet, after the line under the date, add
the following line:
Luc Gaetan Yargeau on Petition for Review pro se.
May 30, 1996 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 96-1240
LUC GAETAN YARGEAU, A/K/A LUKE GAETAN YARGEAU,
Petitioner,
v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF FINAL ORDER
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Boudin and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
Luc Gaetan Yargeau on Petition for Review pro se.
Per Curiam. After careful review of the record and
the petition for review, we find no reversible error in the
BIA decision. Accordingly, we affirm, essentially for the
reasons stated in that decision, adding only the following
comments.
1. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, his Maine drug
conviction is an "aggravated felony" in the context of this
deportation proceeding. See 8 U.S.C 1101(a)(43)
("aggravated felony" includes illicit trafficking in
controlled substances as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802,
including drug trafficking crimes as defined in 18 U.S.C.
924(c)); Amaral v. INS, 977 F.2d 33, 35-36 (1st Cir. 1992)
(explaining the definitions of "aggravated" and "felony").
In any event, the point is not properly raised to us, as
petitioner conceded his deportability in the proceedings
before the immigration judge and the BIA.
2. The BIA's description of petitioner's juvenile
record is supported by the evidence presented by petitioner's
witnesses. To the extent that petitioner disputes the BIA's
characterization of his juvenile arrest for theft as one for
"robbery," we find any such inaccuracy on this tangential,
background point to be harmless. See White v. INS, 17 F.3d
475, 479 (1st Cir. 1994) (INS error is harmless unless it
could have affected the decision).
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3. We perceive no merit in petitioner's assertion that
"many other mitigating circumstances" have been "overlooked
or ignored." Our review of the record discloses that
petitioner, then represented by counsel, had a full and fair
opportunity to present his arguments and evidence, and that
the BIA fully considered the arguments and evidence presented
to it. We have no authority to consider matters not brought
to the BIA's attention. See 8 U.S.C. 1105a(c); Alleyne v.
INS, 879 F.2d 1172, 1182 (1st Cir. 1989).
4. Finally, on its merits, the BIA's decision suggests
no grounds for reversal. The BIA considered all the
evidence, made specific findings as to both the positive and
negative factors, and explained how it reached the decision.
The BIA noted that this was a difficult case because of the
factors on both sides, including some outstanding equities in
petitioner's favor. Even in light of the outstanding
equities, the grant or denial of a waiver remains a matter of
BIA discretion, and this court will not "second-guess the
Board on the manner in which it weights different factors
when arriving at its ultimate decision." See Gouveia v. INS,
980 F.2d 814, 819 (1st Cir. 1992).
There being no substantial question for review, we
summarily affirm the decision of the BIA and deny and dismiss
the petition for review. See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27.1.
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